WILL
NEW TRADE GAINS MAKE US RICH?
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTIVE GAINS FROM NEW TRADE AGREEMENTS
by Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot
October 3, 2001
Executive Summary
This paper examines the likely effects of future trade agreements on
economic growth and the living standards of most Americans. Standard models show
that trade liberalization should lead to some gains in income, although these
gains are considerably smaller than is often claimed by political figures.
Economists also generally accept that trade liberalization has been one of the
factors increasing inequality, redistributing wage income from workers without
college degrees to workers with college and advanced degrees, in addition to
shifting income from wages generally to profits.
For the vast majority of workers—the three quarters of the labor
force who lack college degrees—the negative distributional effects of trade
over the last two decades almost certainly outweighed the positive growth
effects, causing them a net loss of real income. This is true even under the
assumption that trade was a relatively minor factor in the upward redistribution
of income over the last two decades, and accepting the more optimistic
assessments of the impact of trade on growth.
* Using a low estimate of the impact of trade on wage inequality from
Princeton economics professor Paul Krugman, three-fourths of the labor force
has seen a net reduction in hourly wages, attributable to expanded trade between
1.6 percent and 2.4 percent.
* Using a higher estimate of the impact of trade on wage inequality by
William Cline of the Institute for International Economics, the net reduction in
hourly wages for these workers is between 9.4 percent and 10.1 percent.
* If Cline's estimate is adjusted to take account of indirect ways in which trade may lower wages—such as weakening unions' bargaining power—trade may have reduced the hourly wages of three-fourths of the labor force by between 12.2 percent and 12.6 percent.
Introduction
In order to press their case for new trade agreements, some government
officials have occasionally made questionable assertions. For example, Trade
Representative Robert B. Zoelleck recently claimed that “between 1990 and
2000, exports of goods and services have accounted for one-fifth of U.S.
economic growth.”[1]
While this is literally true, it ignores the fact that imports have actually
grown far more rapidly than exports, as the trade deficit soared from $71.4
billion in 1990 to $399.1 billion in 2000. Since imports are subtracted from
GDP, in this simple accounting framework trade has been a serious drag on growth
over the last decade.[2]
The previous administration also
made claims about the gains from trade that were not always accurate. For
example, in 1994, the President's Council of Economic Advisors reported that the
Uruguay Round of GATT would lead to an increase in annual GDP of $100 to $200
billion by 2004 or 0.9 to 1.7 percent of projected GDP.[3]
Five years later, this figure had been revised down considerably. In a paper
published in 1999, the Council of Economic Advisors estimated the gains from the
Uruguay Round at between 0.4-0.6 percent of GDP, less than half the gains that
it had projected five years earlier.[4]
It is not just political figures
who have been cavalier in touting the benefits of trade liberalization. In a
recent paper, Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel suggested that the gains from a
major round of trade liberalization would be approximately 1 percent of world
GDP (Frankel 2000, p. 34). At another point, the same paper cites studies
indicating that Europe alone could increase its GDP by 7 percent if it carried
through with liberalization of trade in agriculture and elsewhere (Frankel 2000,
p. 10). Since Europe's economy is approximately one quarter of the world's
economy, the gains estimated for Europe alone would be equal to approximately
1.75 percent of world GDP, an amount that is 75 percent larger than this study
estimated as the gains accruing to the whole world. These two numbers are
inconsistent; if the figure for Europe is plausible, then the estimate of
worldwide gains is far too low. Alternatively, if the estimate of worldwide
gains is plausible, then the gains estimated for Europe are hugely exaggerated.
Economic theory predicts that trade liberalization will lead to economic
gains. The basic argument is relatively simple: consumers will have the
opportunity to buy cheaper goods if tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers are
eliminated. The elimination of trade protection can hurt producers in the
industries affected—for example the textile industry will lose jobs if trade
barriers are eliminated—but it can generally be shown, given the important
assumption of full employment, that the gains to consumers will exceed the
losses to producers. Because of this result, economists generally view the
removal of trade barriers as desirable.
However, the fact that removing trade barriers can lead to increased output does not imply that it is necessarily a desirable policy. Reducing military spending leads to large economic gains in standard models, yet few people would consider eliminating the Defense Department a desirable policy. In the case of trade liberalization, the standard models imply that trade liberalization leads to a redistribution of income. Specifically, most of the forms of trade liberalization currently being considered would redistribute income from workers to corporations, and from lower wage workers to higher wage workers. It is entirely possible that for most workers, the lost wages due to the upward redistribution caused by trade liberalization outweigh the overall gains to the economy. This is especially true if trade liberalization results in long-term unemployment for workers in the affected industries; but even under the assumption of full employment, it is very possible for trade liberalization to cause a net loss of income for the majority of the labor force.
If policy makers and the public at large are to have a reasonable basis for assessing the merits of future trade agreements, then it is essential that they have plausible estimates of the potential gains from liberalization, which can be balanced against the potential costs to the groups that are harmed. This paper is an effort to place a range on the size of these gains and losses. The next section examines a recent study by the International Trade Commission (a United States government agency that examines the impact of trade policy), which sought to quantify the economic gains from eliminating all identifiable trade barriers. The second section examines some of the distributional issues raised by this study and in other research. The third section examines the relative size of the gains from trade liberalization, with the losses to less educated workers that result from worsening income distribution.
How Large are the Gains?
In the midst of much heated rhetoric, there have been some serious
efforts to model the impact of trade liberalization. For example, a recent study
by the International Trade Commission (ITC) estimated the gains to the United
States from eliminating the remaining tariffs and quotas on imported goods.[5]
This study used standard economic methods to carefully quantify the impact of
eliminating these barriers. It also explicitly laid out the assumptions used in
the model: most importantly, that there is no transitional unemployment
resulting from the loss of protection.
The study’s findings are informative. It found that the net welfare
gains to the economy from eliminating all tariff and quotas, using 1996 prices
and output, would be $14.9 billion annually (ITC, p 15). This would be
equivalent to approximately $19 billion annually, if the gains were scaled up to
the current size of the economy. While these gains are not trivial, they are
less than 0.2 percent of GDP.
It is important to note some of
the factors that caused the ITC estimate of gains to be even this large. The ITC
estimated $3.6 billion of the gains from trade liberalization, or nearly 25
percent of the total, were attributable to the elimination of the rents
associated with import quotas (p 14).[6]
In standard trade models, import quotas lead to large costs to the importing
nations, and large benefits to the producers in exporting nations. This is
because they raise the price of imports to consumers—as tariffs do—but
unlike tariffs, quotas allow foreign producers to pocket the price increase in
the form of higher profit margins.
For example, suppose the United
States places a quota on the number of foreign produced cars that can be sold in
the United States. Since the supply of foreign cars is restricted, this move
will raise the price, for example, from $20,000 to $22,000 per car. The foreign
car producers can now make an additional $2,000 on every car they sell in the
United States. They can keep this money as extra profit. By contrast, suppose
the United States imposed a tariff of 10 percent on imported cars. While the
tariff also raises the price of imported cars by 10 percent to $22,000, in this
case the additional $2,000 goes to the United States government in the form of
tariff revenue. Tariffs do not provide extra profits to foreign producers in the
same way as do quotas.
In standard trade models, such as
the one used by the ITC, exporting nations will typically benefit when other
nations apply quotas to their exports. While the quotas restrict the volume of
exports, they allow exporters to charge a premium on each unit they are allowed
to sell. In these models, the extraordinary profits that result from quota
restrictions typically will far more than offset any profit reduction from
selling fewer units.[7]
The structure of standard trade
models implies that, in trade negotiations, nations should attempt to have
import quotas placed on the goods they export, in order to increase the quota
rents that their exporters earn.[8]
In reality, nations usually push to have the barriers to their exports removed.
In the context of this model, this means that the benefits from eliminating
quota rents in the United States—which account for nearly one quarter of the
total gains estimated from trade liberalization— may be offset by the
elimination of quota rents earned by U.S. exporters in other nations. Since
import barriers—including quota-type barriers—are generally higher in other
countries than in the United States, it is entirely possible, that in a full
model of multi-lateral trade liberalization, the loss of quota rents earned by
U.S. exporters will more than offset the welfare gains to the United States by
eliminating quota barriers here.[9]
Even if the loss of quota rents earned elsewhere were assumed to be just equal
to the welfare gains of eliminating quota rents in the United States, it would
reduce the estimate of the gains from trade liberalization by approximately $4.6
billion to $14.4 billion annually.[10]
There is a second important reason for believing that the ITC estimate
overstates the gains from trade liberalization—given the assumptions of the
model. This reason stems from its treatment of lost tax revenue. The elimination
of all tariffs would result in a loss of tax revenue of approximately $20
billion a year. The ITC model assumed that this tax revenue is offset by a
“lump-sum” tax of the same size. Lump-sum taxes are a purely hypothetical
construction. In effect, lump-sum taxes imply that the government just pulls the
revenue away from the economy—without affecting economic activity.
In reality, the government must
impose specific taxes—income taxes, payroll taxes, sales taxes etc.—in order
to obtain revenue. All taxes actually in use result in some economic
distortions. Most economists put the range of the distortions at between 10-20
percent of the revenue raised by the tax. This means that the tax increases
needed to make up for the lost tariff revenue would reduce the ITC's estimate of
welfare gains by between $2-4 billion. This
would leave a net gain from trade liberalization of between $15 and $17 billion
annually. If the loss of quota rents from U.S. exports offsets the gains from
eliminating quota rents in the United States, then the ITC's estimate of the
gains from trade liberalization would be further reduced to between $10.4
billion to $12.4 billion annually. This
places the gains from trade liberalization at between 0.10 and 0.12 percent of
GDP.
As noted earlier, an explicit
assumption of standard trade models, like the ITC model, is that there is no
transitional unemployment (ITC 1999, p7). Implicitly, this model assumes that
workers who leave the industries that are losing jobs due to increased imports
are immediately re-employed in the sectors where their skills can be best
utilized.[11] In reality, many of these
workers will be unemployed for at least some period of time, before they find
another job.[12]
Such spells of unemployment can significantly reduce the economic gains from
trade liberalization, especially in the first years after barriers are reduced.
The ITC estimated that the job
losses due to increased imports would be equivalent to 130,000 full-time
positions. This job loss is equal to approximately 0.11 percent of the economy's
total employment. If a significant percentage of these job losers take a long
time to find new employment, or leave the labor force altogether without finding
new jobs, then much of the gains from trade liberalization will disappear. (For
example, since the percentage of the workforce facing displacement is
approximately equal to the percentage of GDP for projected gains from trade, it
follows that if one-third of these workers remained unemployed, the gains from
trade would be reduced by approximately one-third.) This will be especially
likely if there is a multiplier effect due to job losses—for example, store
closings in a town where an apparel factory was the major employer. On the other
side, the impact of job losses will be mitigated to the extent that positions
are eliminated through attrition.
There is one final point worth noting about the effect of unemployment on
the economic gains estimated in the ITC model. Insofar as there are government
transfer payments associated with unemployment caused by trade liberalization,
such as unemployment benefits, food stamps, or other means-tested benefits, they
come with an economic cost. Tax revenue must be raised to cover the cost of such
benefits, and the economic distortions caused by higher taxes must be subtracted
from the estimated gains from trade. This cost can be especially large if the
upward redistribution of income caused by trade liberalization leads to large
increases in payments for programs such as Medicaid or the earned income tax
credit. The cost of these programs may rise not only because of workers being
displaced by imports, but also as a result of an upward redistribution of income
due to trade. This issue will be considered more directly in the next section.
Trade and Income Distribution
A point on which nearly all economists agree is that trade has been one
of the factors that has increased income inequality in the last two decades.
This is both a prediction of trade theory, and an empirical finding in a large
body of research. The prediction of trade theory—that in an industrialized
country like the United States, trade should increase corporate profits and the
income of highly educated workers at the expense of less educated workers—has
been accepted by economists for more than fifty years.[13]
A large body of empirical work supports this theoretical prediction (e.g.
Krugman 1995; Cline 1997; Schmitt and Mishel 1996). The only real issue for most
economists is the exact size of the effect of trade on inequality.
The findings of the ITC report are
consistent with other work on trade and inequality. The report found that
eliminating the trade barriers it examined would benefit corporations more than
workers. For example, it estimated that eliminating the barriers to textile and
apparel imports, which accounts for almost 70 percent of the total welfare gains
in this study, would increase capital income by 0.14 percent, while increasing
labor income by just 0.06 percent (ITC, p36 fn). It did not estimate the impact
of trade liberalization on wage inequality because it did not distinguish
between different types of labor. But if top quintile of workers—who account
for close to half of all wage income—experienced the same rate of income gain
as corporations, then it would mean that the bulk of wage earners were losers
from trade liberalization in textiles and apparel.[14]
This is exactly the sort of situation that could result from trade
liberalization more generally.
It is important to recognize that
the ITC study, like other research on this topic, does not attempt to measure
indirect effects that trade liberalization could have income distribution. Most
obviously this indirect effect can take the form of threats, where employers
threaten to move their operations abroad unless workers make wage concessions.
Bronfenbrenner (2000) found that in more than half of all unionization drives,
employers threatened to close down all or part of their operations. The rate was
much higher (68 percent) in mobile industries such as manufacturing,
communications, and wholesale/distribution. Of the campaigns in which such
threats were used, 18 percent of employers directly threatened to move to
another country if the union were to win representation.
There is no easy way to measure
the extent to which such threats might have lowered the wages of manufacturing
workers, or less skilled workers more generally,[15]
but one piece of evidence of the effectiveness of such threats is the decline in
the unionization rate among manufacturing workers. The unionization rate in the
manufacturing sector fell by 46.8 percent from 1983 to 2000, the sharpest rate
of decline in any industry. (The first year for which consistent data exists is
1983.) This decline took place even though the manufacturing sector experienced
virtually no job growth over this period.[16]
By comparison, unionization rates in the construction industry fell by 33.5
percent over the same period, even though it started at an almost identical
level.
Of course trade has not been the only factor depressing unionization rates. Greater hostility to unions from employers, and a less union-friendly National Labor Relations Board have also hurt unionization efforts. But it is striking that the unionization rate has fallen so much more in manufacturing than elsewhere. Even the transportation and communications industries, which were deregulated during this period, have not seen as large a decline in their unionization rates as manufacturing. Given the survey evidence found by Bronfenbrenner, and the trends in industry unionization rates over the last two decades, it is reasonable to believe that trade has weakened workers' bargaining power in manufacturing, leading to downward pressure on wages in ways that would not be picked up in standard economic models.
Taking the Final Score--Gains and Losses from Trade
As noted above, given the
assumptions in standard trade models—most importantly that displaced workers
are quickly re-employed—trade liberalization can increase aggregate output.
However, the standard model also predicts that trade will increase income
inequality—shifting income from wages to profits, and from low-wage workers to
high-wage workers. This means that even if trade leads to gains for the economy
as a whole, the upward redistribution of income that it causes can mean that
most people lose from expanded trade. Whether most people are winners or losers
will depend on the relative size of these two effects.
Many of the claims made for the
gains from trade liberalization have little foundation. Even among those who
have tried to seriously examine the issue, there is a wide range of estimates of
the size of the impact of liberalization. At the low end, models along the lines
used by the ITC indicate that gains from past trade liberalization may have
increased annual GDP on the order of 0.1-0.2 percent over the last two decades.
At the high end, some estimates—generally far less careful or plausible—have
placed the gains as high as 1.0 percent of annual GDP.
By comparison, at the low end
economists such as Krugman (1995) have attributed approximately 10 percent of
the increase in wage inequality to trade. It is important to note that Krugman,
like other economists who have done research in this area, makes no effort to
calculate any indirect effects of trade liberalization on wages, such as the
impact that a threat to move jobs abroad can have on wage negotiations or
unionization effort. For this reason, this estimate would almost certainly
underestimate the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality. At the high
end, Cline (1997) attributed 39 percent of the increase in wage inequality over
the period from 1973-1993 to trade liberalization (7 percentage points out of a
net increase in inequality of 18 percent).[17]
This study also made no effort to incorporate any indirect effects of trade on
wage inequality. If Cline's estimate of the direct effects is accurate, then it
is plausible that the indirect effects could easily mean that trade is
responsible for 50 percent, or more, of the increase in wage inequality in the
last two decades. For purposes of this discussion, Krugman's 10 percent estimate
will be taken as a lower bound of the impact on wage inequality, while the 50
percent figure, as an upward adjustment of Cline's estimate, will be taken as an
upper bound.
The income shifts that need to be
explained are the shift from labor in general to capital, and from non-college
educated workers to college-educated workers. The first shift led to a 2.6
percent drop in labor compensation, as the capital share of corporate income
increased from 17.7 percent in 1979 to 19.8 percent in 1999, the profit peak of
the last business cycle.[18]
Over the last two decades, the ratio of wages for college educated workers to
the wages of workers without college degrees rose from 1.36 in 1979 to 1.67 in
1997 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001, table 2.42). As a result of this
shift, wages for workers without college degrees fell by 4.2 percent from 1979
to 1999, a time in which average hourly compensation rose by 17.9 percent.[19]
This means that wages for workers without college degrees would have been on
average 23.1 percent higher in 1999, if there had been no increase in wage
inequality. If there also had been no shift from labor income to capital income,
this would have raised their wages by an additional 2.6 percent. This means that
wages for workers with less than college degrees would have been 26.3 percent
higher in 1999 if there had been no unfavorable shifts in income distribution
over the prior two decades.[20]
The net benefit from trade for the
three quarters of the labor force who lack college degrees depends on the extent
to which trade liberalization is responsible for growing inequality compared
with the extent to which trade has expanded the total amount of income, by
increasing growth. The numbers here suggest that there is little doubt that most
workers have been losers from trade liberalization over the last two decades.
The high-end estimates of the gains from trade liberalization imply that it has
increased GDP by 1.0 percent over the last two decades. By contrast, even a
low-end estimate of the impact of trade on inequality (10 percent of the total
effect) would place the losses at 2.6 percent of wages for workers without
college degrees. This means that the net loss due to trade liberalization for
workers without college degrees has been 1.6 percent of their wages, as shown in
table 1.
Of course less favorable
assumptions (for proponents of trade liberalization) imply larger losses. If
trade is directly or indirectly responsible for half of the increase in wage
inequality over the last two decades, then it implies that it has cost workers
without college degrees an amount equal to 13.1 percent of their current wages.
The net loss would still be equal to 12.1 percent of their wages, even assuming
a large effect of trade on growth. For a worker earning $25,000 a year, this
loss would be slightly over $3,000 per year.
Table 1—Net Effect
of Trade Liberalization on Wages of Workers Without College Degrees
Effect of
Trade on Inequality |
Low Gains from
Trade: 0.2 Percent |
High Gains
from Trade: 1.0 Percent |
Low—10% (Krugman 1995) |
-2.4 % |
-1.6% |
Middle—39% (Cline 1997) |
-10.1% |
-9.4% |
High—50% (Cline, adjusted—see text) |
-12.9% |
-12.2% |
Given the size of
the upward redistribution of income that has actually taken place over the last
two decades, if trade is responsible for even a portion of this
redistribution—even a portion so small as virtually all economists would
acknowledge—the bulk of the work force must have experienced a net loss of
income from the trade liberalization that has taken place over this period. The
potential gains from liberalized trade are far too small to offset the losses
due to greater inequality.
Conclusion--No Reason to Rush Trade Deals
This paper has
briefly evaluated the likely benefits from further trade liberalization by
examining the estimates from the International Trade Commission's study of the
issue. The ITC study estimated that expanded trade would produce gains in the
range of 0.1-0.2 percent of GDP. The ITC study, like other theoretical and
empirical work in the area, indicates that trade liberalization will lead to an
upward redistribution of income, as profits increase by a much higher percentage
than do wages. While the ITC study did not examine this issue, there is a large
body of research that indicates that trade liberalization will also lead to an
upward redistribution of income among workers, from those without college
degrees to workers with college and advanced degrees.
Over the last two decades, there
has been a well-documented shift in wages, as the three quarters of the labor
force without college degrees has seen declining real wages, even as the average
wage has continued to grow at a modest pace. There also has been a
redistribution from wage income to capital income over this same period. The
effect of these two shifts has been to reduce the average hourly wage for
workers without college degrees by more than 26 percent. If even a small
fraction of this decline is attributable to trade liberalization, for most
workers the loss due to increasing wage inequality and the redistribution from
wages to profits will vastly outweigh the modest increments to growth resulting
from trade. At the high end, these losses could exceed $3,000 annually for a
worker earning $25,000 per year.
It is important to realize that
there are no obvious losses to delaying trade liberalization. In other words,
standard models would not predict any smaller gains from liberalizing trade in
five years than at present. The fact that other nations may move ahead with
trade liberalization in the meantime should not affect the potential gains to
the United States, if it decides to liberalize at some future point. This is
worth noting, since there continues to be a great deal of uncertainty around
many issues related to trade. The range of estimates of the potential gains from
trade is quite wide. Also, the full extent of the impact of trade liberalization
on inequality is still not well understood.
In addition, the impact of other
aspects of recent trade agreements is barely understood at all. Most noteworthy
in this respect is TRIPS, and other efforts to apply U.S.-type patent and
copyright laws to developing nations.[21]
There has been virtually no research undertaken that tries to quantify the
economic losses that developing nations will incur as a result of granting
patent and copyright monopolies to producers of pharmaceuticals and other
products. Since these forms of protection raise the price of products to people
in developing nations by several hundred percent above the competitive market
price, there is reason to believe that such costs would be substantial. At the
very least, there should be some effort to quantify these costs before pursuing
trade agreements that impose such costs on developing nations.
References
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Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing.”
Paper submitted to the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission.
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Cline, W. 1997. Trade
and Income Distribution. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics.
Council of Economic Advisors, 1999. "America's
Interest in the World Trade Organization: An Economic Assessment."
Washington D.C.: The President's Council of Economic Advisors.
Economic Report of the President, 1994. Washington, D.C.:
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Frankel, J. 2000. "Assessing the Efficiency Gains from
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Schmitt, J. and L. Mishel, 1996. "Did International
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United States Trade Representative, 2001. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request from Patrick Woodall, Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.
[1] United States Trade Representative, 2001, p 9.
[2] Mr. Zoelleck’s logic relating exports and growth would also imply that the US economy grows if General Motors exports car engines to Mexico so that they can be assembled in a car and imported back into the United States. Much of U.S. export growth in the last ten years was of intermediate goods that were eventually imported back into the United States.
[3] Economic Report of the President, 1994, p 234.
[4] Council of Economic Advisors, 1999, p 22.
[5] ITC, 1999.
[6] In an earlier study Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott attributed almost 70 percent of the welfare gains from trade liberalization to the elimination of quota rents (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994, p. 9).
[7] In effect, quotas can be seen as raising the profits of exporters in the same way as a cartel, such as OPEC, can raise profits by restricting supply.
[8] In principle, these quota rents could be divided between higher profits for exporters and higher wages for the workers in the industry, so that the gains would be broadly shared.
[9] The fact that quota barriers are so important in the textile and apparel sector raises questions about the extent to which the trade liberalization in these sectors will assist developing countries. While the volume of imports would increase if these barriers were eliminated, the economic benefits from increased sales would be largely offset by the reduction in profits per unit.
[10] In standard trade models the vast majority of benefits from trade liberalization accrue to the nations that undertake liberalization, since they gain the consumer surplus that results from the opportunity to buy goods at lower prices. The only gain to exporting nations in these models are a result of having the opportunity to sell more goods at the world market price, which is assumed not to change as a result of trade liberalization. (The ITC model assumes that the prices paid to importers do not increase as a result of the removal of tariff barriers in the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to make the symmetric assumption that the price of U.S. exports does not increase as a result of other countries' removal of tariff barriers.)
[11] Alternatively, the ITC model can be seen as showing the gains from trade after a transition period in which all the displaced workers have either left the labor force due to retirement and/or found employment in other sectors.
[12] The Bureau of Labor Statistics' most recent worker displacement survey found that over one-third of the workers in the occupations of machine operators, assemblers and inspectors who had lost their jobs during the prior three years were still unemployed as of February 2000. Since this was a period in which the unemployment rate was at a 30-year low, this record of re-employment should be considered significantly better than the norm.
[13] This implication of standard trade models can be found in Stolper and Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages. Review of Economic Studies, 1941.
[14] If the top quintile of wage earners saw their income rise by 0.14 percent, the same as the rise for capital, this would given them an increase in wage earnings equal to approximately 0.07 percent of total wage income. Since the ITC report estimated that total wage income would rise by just 0.06 percent, this means that income for the bottom 80 percent of wage earners would have to fall.
[15] Union organizing campaigns where threats were used had a lower win rate (38 percent) than non-threat campaigns (51 percent). For more mobile industries with threats, the success rate was 32 percent, versus 60 percent for less mobile industries such as health care or passenger transportation. (Bronfenbrenner 2000)
[16] Job growth can be expected to have a negative impact on unionization rates in a period in which unions have difficulty getting new members, since more rapid job growth requires that unions organize more workers just to keep the unionization rate constant.
[17] Cline calculates both a gross change in wage inequality and a net change. The gross change in wage inequality combines all the influences, including trade that increased inequality over the 20-year period. The net increase in inequality is the result of both the equalizing influences (an increase in the stock of skilled relative to unskilled labor) and the unequalizing influences, and is therefore much smaller. (See Cline, 1997, p.263-269). For purposes of this discussion it is appropriate to divide the inequality attributable to trade (7 percentage points) by the net increase in inequality (18 percentage points), since the latter corresponds to the actual increase in inequality that the nation has experienced. In other words, Cline's estimates indicate that 39 percent of the actually observed increased inequality (7 out of 18 percentage points) would not have occurred in the absence of trade liberalization.
[18] This data can be found in table 1.16 of the National Income and Products Accounts.
[19] The fall in the wage for high school educated workers uses the data from Mishel et al (2001) table 2.18, with the CPI-U-RS as the deflator. The data on average hourly compensation can be found in the Economic Report of the President, 2001, table B-49.
[20] If the average hourly wage for workers without college degrees is set at an index level of 100 in 1979, it had fallen to 95.8 by 1999. By contrast, the overall average hourly wage has risen 17.9 percent over this period, which would place its index level at 117.9. This means that the wages of workers without college degrees would be 23.1 percent higher at present, if they had kept pace with the average wage (117.9/95.8 = 123.1). The average hourly wage, in turn, would have been 2.6 percent higher if there had been no shift from wages to profits over this period. This means that the average hourly wage for workers without college degrees would be 26.3 percent higher today, if there had been neither a shift in wage income from non-college educated to college educated workers, nor from wages to profits (123.1 x 1.026 = 1.263).
[21] It is worth noting that conditions of new trade agreements, like the Uruguay Round of the GATT, could increase the costs of goods in the United States as well. For example, the TRIPS provisions in this round required that the minimum patent length for prescription drugs be 20 years from the date of the patent application. Previously, patents had been granted for a period of 17 years from the date of the drugs approval. This extension could cost consumers billions of dollars annually due to higher prices for prescription drugs.