Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

By Dean Baker and David Rosnick Over the last seven years there has been a steady drumbeat of complaints from people who are upset by the Fed’s zero interest rate policy. We first heard that it was going to lead to hyperinflation. Then we were told that low interest rates would fuel asset bubbles. More recently a rate hike has become a matter of the Fed’s credibility. One of the most persistent complaints is that the zero interest rate policy is unfair to small savers. The argument is that we have all these elderly people who depend on the income from their savings who are being destroyed by getting near zero interest on their CDs and money market accounts. There are two problems with this story. The first one is a logical problem. Interest rates are low because the economy is extremely weak. In the simple textbook story (very simple), the interest rate is supposed to equate the supply and demand for savings. Ever since the recession began we have had an enormous excess supply of savings. This means that the interest rate should be lower than it actually is. However, interest rates don’t fall further because they will not go below zero, or at least not much below zero. People are not willing to pay banks to borrow their money. Given the market outcome pushing interest rates to zero, those who want the 2–3 percent short-term interest rates of pre-recession years effectively want the government to pay them interest rates that are above the market clearing rate. That’s fine as a demand from a self-interested group — I’d like the government to pay me twice what my house is worth — but it’s not one that deserves much credence in policy debates. Most of us probably think it’s more important to use the Fed’s monetary policy to get people employed than to subsidize the interest received by savers. The other problem is that the story of small saver suffering because of low interest rates doesn’t fit the data. There just are not very many people with substantial amount of savings in CDs, money market, saving accounts, or other short-term assets who don’t also have large amounts of money in stocks and bonds. Anyone who has large sums in stocks and bonds has done very well in the last five years, as both markets have soared, so if they aren’t earning much interest on their savings accounts it is difficult to feel too sorry for them.
By Dean Baker and David Rosnick Over the last seven years there has been a steady drumbeat of complaints from people who are upset by the Fed’s zero interest rate policy. We first heard that it was going to lead to hyperinflation. Then we were told that low interest rates would fuel asset bubbles. More recently a rate hike has become a matter of the Fed’s credibility. One of the most persistent complaints is that the zero interest rate policy is unfair to small savers. The argument is that we have all these elderly people who depend on the income from their savings who are being destroyed by getting near zero interest on their CDs and money market accounts. There are two problems with this story. The first one is a logical problem. Interest rates are low because the economy is extremely weak. In the simple textbook story (very simple), the interest rate is supposed to equate the supply and demand for savings. Ever since the recession began we have had an enormous excess supply of savings. This means that the interest rate should be lower than it actually is. However, interest rates don’t fall further because they will not go below zero, or at least not much below zero. People are not willing to pay banks to borrow their money. Given the market outcome pushing interest rates to zero, those who want the 2–3 percent short-term interest rates of pre-recession years effectively want the government to pay them interest rates that are above the market clearing rate. That’s fine as a demand from a self-interested group — I’d like the government to pay me twice what my house is worth — but it’s not one that deserves much credence in policy debates. Most of us probably think it’s more important to use the Fed’s monetary policy to get people employed than to subsidize the interest received by savers. The other problem is that the story of small saver suffering because of low interest rates doesn’t fit the data. There just are not very many people with substantial amount of savings in CDs, money market, saving accounts, or other short-term assets who don’t also have large amounts of money in stocks and bonds. Anyone who has large sums in stocks and bonds has done very well in the last five years, as both markets have soared, so if they aren’t earning much interest on their savings accounts it is difficult to feel too sorry for them.

The context is Nigeria’s economic relationship with China. The NYT complains to readers that China is providing goods at a lower cost than other other countries or the country’s domestic industry.

“Chinese goods are so dominant that consumers have few other choices.”

The article points out that the goods are of varying quality and some, in the case of electronic items, may pose safety problems. Of course, the reason that consumers have few other choices is that the Chinese products sell for much lower prices than the goods produced by competitors.

The piece also complains that China’s firms are willing to accept a lower return on investment in Nigeria:

“The risks [associated with investing in Nigeria] have prompted Western companies to demand very fat profits before putting money into the country — returns on the order of 25 to 40 percent a year. Their Chinese counterparts have been willing to accept 10 percent or less.”

The piece points out that low cost Chinese imports have displaced hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers in Nigeria. While this is likely true, this is an entirely predictable outcome of the removal of trade barriers, a process that the NYT usually celebrates in both its opinion and news pages.

The standard argument is that the gains from consumers in the form of lower prices easily exceed the losses to the workers who lose their jobs. There may be an issue of redirecting some of these gains to help the unemployed workers, but the country as a whole still gains. It is striking that the NYT seems reluctant to accept economic orthodoxy on trade when it comes to China’s role in Nigeria and the rest of Africa.

The context is Nigeria’s economic relationship with China. The NYT complains to readers that China is providing goods at a lower cost than other other countries or the country’s domestic industry.

“Chinese goods are so dominant that consumers have few other choices.”

The article points out that the goods are of varying quality and some, in the case of electronic items, may pose safety problems. Of course, the reason that consumers have few other choices is that the Chinese products sell for much lower prices than the goods produced by competitors.

The piece also complains that China’s firms are willing to accept a lower return on investment in Nigeria:

“The risks [associated with investing in Nigeria] have prompted Western companies to demand very fat profits before putting money into the country — returns on the order of 25 to 40 percent a year. Their Chinese counterparts have been willing to accept 10 percent or less.”

The piece points out that low cost Chinese imports have displaced hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers in Nigeria. While this is likely true, this is an entirely predictable outcome of the removal of trade barriers, a process that the NYT usually celebrates in both its opinion and news pages.

The standard argument is that the gains from consumers in the form of lower prices easily exceed the losses to the workers who lose their jobs. There may be an issue of redirecting some of these gains to help the unemployed workers, but the country as a whole still gains. It is striking that the NYT seems reluctant to accept economic orthodoxy on trade when it comes to China’s role in Nigeria and the rest of Africa.

A NYT article on cuts to government subsidies for solar and wind energy were put in place by a conservative government, “determined to tighten spending and balance the budget in a program to grow the economy.” The piece does not indicate how budget cuts in the current economic situation are supposed to “grow the economy.”

As the article points out, Denmark’s economy is suffering from a lack of demand.

“Shortly after taking over in June, the new government was forced to cut its forecast for economic growth to 1.5 percent this year and 1.9 percent in 2016, citing a slow recovery in domestic demand.”

Cutting spending on clean technologies means less demand, not more. This would mean that the government’s plans to reduce its subsidies are in direct conflict with its stated desire to increase growth.

While it is certainly the case that in some contexts lower government spending can lead to lower interest rates, which will spur consumption and investment (the Danish Kroner is tied to the euro, so interest rates have no effect on the exchange rate), this is hardly a plausible story in the case of Denmark. The interest rate on its 10-year government bonds is currently 0.91 percent. By comparison, the rate in the United States is 2.27 percent. In this context, it is unlikely that cuts to government spending can have much of a further effect in lower interest rates, nor that any further reduction in rates would have a noticeable effect on spending.

 

A NYT article on cuts to government subsidies for solar and wind energy were put in place by a conservative government, “determined to tighten spending and balance the budget in a program to grow the economy.” The piece does not indicate how budget cuts in the current economic situation are supposed to “grow the economy.”

As the article points out, Denmark’s economy is suffering from a lack of demand.

“Shortly after taking over in June, the new government was forced to cut its forecast for economic growth to 1.5 percent this year and 1.9 percent in 2016, citing a slow recovery in domestic demand.”

Cutting spending on clean technologies means less demand, not more. This would mean that the government’s plans to reduce its subsidies are in direct conflict with its stated desire to increase growth.

While it is certainly the case that in some contexts lower government spending can lead to lower interest rates, which will spur consumption and investment (the Danish Kroner is tied to the euro, so interest rates have no effect on the exchange rate), this is hardly a plausible story in the case of Denmark. The interest rate on its 10-year government bonds is currently 0.91 percent. By comparison, the rate in the United States is 2.27 percent. In this context, it is unlikely that cuts to government spending can have much of a further effect in lower interest rates, nor that any further reduction in rates would have a noticeable effect on spending.

 

The state of economics is pretty dismal these days, which is demonstrated constantly in the reporting on major issues. The NYT gave us a beautiful example this morning in a piece on a pledge by China’s government of $60 billion in aid to Africa.

The third paragraph told readers:

“Against longstanding accusations that China benefits from a lopsided relationship with Africa, contentions that have recently gained traction as China’s trade deficits with many African nations have widened, Mr. Xi said that ‘China has the strong political commitment to supporting Africa in achieving development and prosperity.'”

Okay folks, get those scorecards ready. In standard textbook theory, poor countries are supposed to run trade deficits with rich countries. The story goes that capital is plentiful in rich countries while it’s scare in poor countries. Rich countries should therefore lend capital to poor countries where it will get a better return.

The flip side of this flow of capital (it is an accounting identity) is that poor countries run trade deficits with rich countries. These trade deficits allow the poor countries to build up their infrastructure and capital stock while still have enough goods and services to meet the needs of their populations. If relatively better off countries like China are willing to give money, rather than lend it, the developing country trade deficits should be even larger.

This means that folks who believe the textbook trade theory should see the widening of the trade deficits that African nations are running with China as evidence that they are gaining from the relationship, not as evidence that the relationship is lopsided.

The state of economics is pretty dismal these days, which is demonstrated constantly in the reporting on major issues. The NYT gave us a beautiful example this morning in a piece on a pledge by China’s government of $60 billion in aid to Africa.

The third paragraph told readers:

“Against longstanding accusations that China benefits from a lopsided relationship with Africa, contentions that have recently gained traction as China’s trade deficits with many African nations have widened, Mr. Xi said that ‘China has the strong political commitment to supporting Africa in achieving development and prosperity.'”

Okay folks, get those scorecards ready. In standard textbook theory, poor countries are supposed to run trade deficits with rich countries. The story goes that capital is plentiful in rich countries while it’s scare in poor countries. Rich countries should therefore lend capital to poor countries where it will get a better return.

The flip side of this flow of capital (it is an accounting identity) is that poor countries run trade deficits with rich countries. These trade deficits allow the poor countries to build up their infrastructure and capital stock while still have enough goods and services to meet the needs of their populations. If relatively better off countries like China are willing to give money, rather than lend it, the developing country trade deficits should be even larger.

This means that folks who believe the textbook trade theory should see the widening of the trade deficits that African nations are running with China as evidence that they are gaining from the relationship, not as evidence that the relationship is lopsided.

The Post has an interesting piece discussing Janet Yellen’s tenure as Fed chair as she prepares to possibly raise interest rates for the first time since the onset of the recession. The piece discusses Yellen’s Republican critics in Congress who want to rein in the power of the Fed to conduct monetary policy. These critics complain that the Fed has been too loose with the money supply and that this will result in runaway inflation.

It would have been worth noting that these critics have been repeatedly proven wrong. They have been complaining about loose monetary policy for over five years yet the inflation rate has consistently been well below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. This information would have been useful to readers trying to evaluate the seriousness of their complaints.

The Post has an interesting piece discussing Janet Yellen’s tenure as Fed chair as she prepares to possibly raise interest rates for the first time since the onset of the recession. The piece discusses Yellen’s Republican critics in Congress who want to rein in the power of the Fed to conduct monetary policy. These critics complain that the Fed has been too loose with the money supply and that this will result in runaway inflation.

It would have been worth noting that these critics have been repeatedly proven wrong. They have been complaining about loose monetary policy for over five years yet the inflation rate has consistently been well below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. This information would have been useful to readers trying to evaluate the seriousness of their complaints.

Neil Irwin had a piece in the Upshot section of the NYT raising the possibility that the Fed could have negative interest rates on reserves, rather than its current near zero rate, as a way to provide an additional boost to the economy. The argument is that it is very inconvenient to carry cash, so deposits would not flee banks even if the interest rate were a small negative number.

The problem is that this analysis does not consider the realities of the banked population. Banks have millions (tens of millions?) of customers with relatively low balances. These customers are marginally profitable to the banks. (Often the banks profit on fees from these people, like overdraft charges.)

If banks had to pay interest on reserves then these accounts would be even less desirable for banks, since they now would have to pay interest on the reserves that the small account holders had brought to their bank. For this reason, they may opt to raise their fees for opening and maintaining a bank account. The result would be that more people would be getting by without bank accounts.

Any serious discussion of negative interest rates has to deal with this problem.

Neil Irwin had a piece in the Upshot section of the NYT raising the possibility that the Fed could have negative interest rates on reserves, rather than its current near zero rate, as a way to provide an additional boost to the economy. The argument is that it is very inconvenient to carry cash, so deposits would not flee banks even if the interest rate were a small negative number.

The problem is that this analysis does not consider the realities of the banked population. Banks have millions (tens of millions?) of customers with relatively low balances. These customers are marginally profitable to the banks. (Often the banks profit on fees from these people, like overdraft charges.)

If banks had to pay interest on reserves then these accounts would be even less desirable for banks, since they now would have to pay interest on the reserves that the small account holders had brought to their bank. For this reason, they may opt to raise their fees for opening and maintaining a bank account. The result would be that more people would be getting by without bank accounts.

Any serious discussion of negative interest rates has to deal with this problem.

It has become a common practice for reporters to refer to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s proposal to spend $275 billion on infrastructure. Is this a lot of money? My guess is that almost no one reading the number has a clue. Certainly Secretary Clinton wants people to think it is a major commitment.

While there is no obvious yes or no answer, it would help first of all if reporters started by giving a time frame. Spending $275 billion over one year is a much larger commitment than $275 billion over 10 years. The proposal would spend this money out over five years, making the annual amount $55 billion a year.

By comparison, the new highway bill calls for spending just over $60 billion annually on infrastructure over the next five years, so Clinton’s proposal would nearly double current spending. As a share of the total budget it is still not a huge deal. With government spending projected to average around $4.7 trillion over the first five years of a Clinton administration, the proposal would amount to a bit less than 1.2 percent of projected spending. Measured as a share of projected GDP, it would be roughly 0.2 percent. And, it would come to roughly $170 a year per person in spending. 

There are other ways to measure this sum, including looking at past levels of spending or relative to estimates of the need for new infrastructure. Reporters have much room to pick and choose on this one, but telling us that Clinton wants to spend $275 billion on infrastructure really is not providing information.

It has become a common practice for reporters to refer to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s proposal to spend $275 billion on infrastructure. Is this a lot of money? My guess is that almost no one reading the number has a clue. Certainly Secretary Clinton wants people to think it is a major commitment.

While there is no obvious yes or no answer, it would help first of all if reporters started by giving a time frame. Spending $275 billion over one year is a much larger commitment than $275 billion over 10 years. The proposal would spend this money out over five years, making the annual amount $55 billion a year.

By comparison, the new highway bill calls for spending just over $60 billion annually on infrastructure over the next five years, so Clinton’s proposal would nearly double current spending. As a share of the total budget it is still not a huge deal. With government spending projected to average around $4.7 trillion over the first five years of a Clinton administration, the proposal would amount to a bit less than 1.2 percent of projected spending. Measured as a share of projected GDP, it would be roughly 0.2 percent. And, it would come to roughly $170 a year per person in spending. 

There are other ways to measure this sum, including looking at past levels of spending or relative to estimates of the need for new infrastructure. Reporters have much room to pick and choose on this one, but telling us that Clinton wants to spend $275 billion on infrastructure really is not providing information.

The Washington Post has long expressed outrage over the fact that unionized auto workers can get $28 an hour. Therefore it is hardly surprising to see editorial page writer Charles Lane with a column complaining that “the United Auto Workers sell out nonunion auto workers.”

The piece starts out by acknowledging that the AFL-CIO opposes tax provisions and trade agreements (wrongly called free trade agreements — apparently Lane has not heard about the increases in patent and copyright protection in these pacts) that encourage outsourcing. He could have also noted that it has argued for measures against currency management and promoted labor rights elsewhere, also measures that work against outsourcing. And, it would be appropriate to note in this context its support for measures that help the workforce as a whole, like Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and the Affordable Care Act.

But in spite of this seeming support for the workforce as a whole, Lane decides he going to prove to his readers that the United Auto Workers supports outsourcing. His smoking gun is the argument that if the union had agreed to lower pay for its workers at the Big Three, then they might shift fewer jobs to Mexico.

Lane’s water pistol here is shooting blanks. As he himself notes in the piece, even the non-union car manufacturers are shifting jobs to Mexico. They have cheaper wages there, companies will therefore try to do this. Essentially, Lane is arguing that unions sellout non-union workers by pushing for higher wages for their workers because if unionized workers got low pay in the United States, there would be less incentive to look overseas for cheap labor. That may be compelling logic at the Washington Post, but probably not anywhere else in the world.

It is worth noting that the Washington Post has never once run either an opinion piece or news article on the protectionist measures that allow U.S. doctors to earn on average twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries. This costs the country nearly $100 billion a year in higher health care costs, or just under $800 a household.

It is probably also worth noting that manufacturing compensation is on average more than 30 percent higher in Germany and several other European countries than in the United States. And unions in general are associated with lower levels of inequality, according to the International Monetary Fund.

But hey, Charles Lane and the Washington Post are outraged that auto workers can earn $28 an hour.

The Washington Post has long expressed outrage over the fact that unionized auto workers can get $28 an hour. Therefore it is hardly surprising to see editorial page writer Charles Lane with a column complaining that “the United Auto Workers sell out nonunion auto workers.”

The piece starts out by acknowledging that the AFL-CIO opposes tax provisions and trade agreements (wrongly called free trade agreements — apparently Lane has not heard about the increases in patent and copyright protection in these pacts) that encourage outsourcing. He could have also noted that it has argued for measures against currency management and promoted labor rights elsewhere, also measures that work against outsourcing. And, it would be appropriate to note in this context its support for measures that help the workforce as a whole, like Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and the Affordable Care Act.

But in spite of this seeming support for the workforce as a whole, Lane decides he going to prove to his readers that the United Auto Workers supports outsourcing. His smoking gun is the argument that if the union had agreed to lower pay for its workers at the Big Three, then they might shift fewer jobs to Mexico.

Lane’s water pistol here is shooting blanks. As he himself notes in the piece, even the non-union car manufacturers are shifting jobs to Mexico. They have cheaper wages there, companies will therefore try to do this. Essentially, Lane is arguing that unions sellout non-union workers by pushing for higher wages for their workers because if unionized workers got low pay in the United States, there would be less incentive to look overseas for cheap labor. That may be compelling logic at the Washington Post, but probably not anywhere else in the world.

It is worth noting that the Washington Post has never once run either an opinion piece or news article on the protectionist measures that allow U.S. doctors to earn on average twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries. This costs the country nearly $100 billion a year in higher health care costs, or just under $800 a household.

It is probably also worth noting that manufacturing compensation is on average more than 30 percent higher in Germany and several other European countries than in the United States. And unions in general are associated with lower levels of inequality, according to the International Monetary Fund.

But hey, Charles Lane and the Washington Post are outraged that auto workers can earn $28 an hour.

Matt Yglesias is trying to convince people that we should not be mad at Alan Greenspan, the Bush administration economic policy team, and the economics profession for missing the housing bubble that sank the economy. He says that "financial bubbles are much harder to spot than people realize" and argues that the subsequent history shows that I actually was wrong in identifying a housing bubble in 2002. There are two important points that need to be made here. First, my claim has always been that identifying asset bubbles that move the economy is in fact easy. This both narrows the scope for observation and also gives us more evidence against which to check the assessment. In terms of narrowing the scope, I would not hazard a guess as to whether there is a bubble in the market for platinum or barley. You would need to do lots of homework about these specific industries and also the prospects for related sectors that could provide platinum or barley substitutes, as well as the industries that use these commodities as inputs. In looking at the housing market in 2002, it was possible to see that sale prices had diverged sharply from rents. While sale prices had already risen by more 30 percent compared with their long-term trend, rents had gone nowhere. Also, the vacancy rate in the housing market was at record highs. This strongly suggested that house prices were not being driven by the fundamentals. (Weak income growth also seemed inconsistent with surging house prices.) If families suddenly wanted to commit so much more of their income to housing, why wasn't it affecting rents and why were so many valuable units sitting empty? And, the housing market was clearly driving the economy. Housing construction was reaching a record share of GDP. This was not something that would be expected when most of the baby boom cohort was looking to downsize as kids moved out of their homes. Also, the housing wealth created by the bubble was leading to a consumption boom, driving savings rates even lower than they had been at the peak of the stock bubble. I'll confess that I did not expect the bubble to continue as long as it did. I learned from my experience with the stock bubble that the timing of the bursting is pretty much unknowable, but it never occurred to me that Greenspan and other financial regulators would allow the proliferation of junk mortgages to the level they reached in 2004–2006, the peak bubble years. Contrary to the "who could have known?" alibis told by the folks setting policy, the abusive mortgages being pushed at the time were hardly a secret. The financial press were full of accounts of NINJA loans, where "NINJA" stands for no-income, no job, and no assets. Anyone who cared to know, realized that millions of mortgages were being issued that could only be supported if house prices continued to rise.  Anyhow, it was inexcusable for the folks at the Fed, at the Council of Economic Advisers, and other policy posts to have been blindsided by the bubble and the damage that would be caused by its collapse. If dishwashers had failed so miserably at their jobs, they would all be unemployed today. Fortunately for economists, they don't have the same level of accountability.
Matt Yglesias is trying to convince people that we should not be mad at Alan Greenspan, the Bush administration economic policy team, and the economics profession for missing the housing bubble that sank the economy. He says that "financial bubbles are much harder to spot than people realize" and argues that the subsequent history shows that I actually was wrong in identifying a housing bubble in 2002. There are two important points that need to be made here. First, my claim has always been that identifying asset bubbles that move the economy is in fact easy. This both narrows the scope for observation and also gives us more evidence against which to check the assessment. In terms of narrowing the scope, I would not hazard a guess as to whether there is a bubble in the market for platinum or barley. You would need to do lots of homework about these specific industries and also the prospects for related sectors that could provide platinum or barley substitutes, as well as the industries that use these commodities as inputs. In looking at the housing market in 2002, it was possible to see that sale prices had diverged sharply from rents. While sale prices had already risen by more 30 percent compared with their long-term trend, rents had gone nowhere. Also, the vacancy rate in the housing market was at record highs. This strongly suggested that house prices were not being driven by the fundamentals. (Weak income growth also seemed inconsistent with surging house prices.) If families suddenly wanted to commit so much more of their income to housing, why wasn't it affecting rents and why were so many valuable units sitting empty? And, the housing market was clearly driving the economy. Housing construction was reaching a record share of GDP. This was not something that would be expected when most of the baby boom cohort was looking to downsize as kids moved out of their homes. Also, the housing wealth created by the bubble was leading to a consumption boom, driving savings rates even lower than they had been at the peak of the stock bubble. I'll confess that I did not expect the bubble to continue as long as it did. I learned from my experience with the stock bubble that the timing of the bursting is pretty much unknowable, but it never occurred to me that Greenspan and other financial regulators would allow the proliferation of junk mortgages to the level they reached in 2004–2006, the peak bubble years. Contrary to the "who could have known?" alibis told by the folks setting policy, the abusive mortgages being pushed at the time were hardly a secret. The financial press were full of accounts of NINJA loans, where "NINJA" stands for no-income, no job, and no assets. Anyone who cared to know, realized that millions of mortgages were being issued that could only be supported if house prices continued to rise.  Anyhow, it was inexcusable for the folks at the Fed, at the Council of Economic Advisers, and other policy posts to have been blindsided by the bubble and the damage that would be caused by its collapse. If dishwashers had failed so miserably at their jobs, they would all be unemployed today. Fortunately for economists, they don't have the same level of accountability.

Growth and Global Warming

Eduardo Porter discusses whether a no growth economy is feasible as a solution to addressing global warming. While he is largely right about the practicality of no-growth economy, there are a couple of points worth adding.

As a practical matter, it is just simple arithmetic that a larger world population will require fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per person. For this reason, a shrinking world population, or least more slowly growing one, would make it easier to hit emissions targets.

The second point is that historically people having taken the dividend of productivity gains in a mix of more lesiure and higher income. Given the strong correlation between income and GHG it would be desirable to structure policy to give people more incentive to take the benefits of productivity growth in leisure.

There has been a huge difference in this area between Europe and the United States over the 35 years. Europeans can almost all count on 4–6 weeks a year of paid vacation, paid family leave and sick days, and often shorter workweeks. As a result, the average work year in Europe has 20 percent fewer hours than in the United States. These countries have much lower levels of GHG per person than the United States. Policies that push the United States in this direction and push Europe further in the direction of more leisure should help to reduce GHG emissions.

As a definitional matter, better software, education, and health care would all be forms of economic growth. It is difficult to see why anyone would be opposed to such gains.

Eduardo Porter discusses whether a no growth economy is feasible as a solution to addressing global warming. While he is largely right about the practicality of no-growth economy, there are a couple of points worth adding.

As a practical matter, it is just simple arithmetic that a larger world population will require fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per person. For this reason, a shrinking world population, or least more slowly growing one, would make it easier to hit emissions targets.

The second point is that historically people having taken the dividend of productivity gains in a mix of more lesiure and higher income. Given the strong correlation between income and GHG it would be desirable to structure policy to give people more incentive to take the benefits of productivity growth in leisure.

There has been a huge difference in this area between Europe and the United States over the 35 years. Europeans can almost all count on 4–6 weeks a year of paid vacation, paid family leave and sick days, and often shorter workweeks. As a result, the average work year in Europe has 20 percent fewer hours than in the United States. These countries have much lower levels of GHG per person than the United States. Policies that push the United States in this direction and push Europe further in the direction of more leisure should help to reduce GHG emissions.

As a definitional matter, better software, education, and health care would all be forms of economic growth. It is difficult to see why anyone would be opposed to such gains.

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