Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Can We Talk About Drug Patents?

The NYT had a short editorial discussing the issues raised by the refusal of insurance companies to pay for many expensive drugs of questionable usefulness. It would have been useful to point out the reason that drug prices are high and that drug companies mislead the public about the degree of their effectiveness. 

If the government did not grant patent monopolies, most of these drugs would sell for less than 10 percent of their patent protected prices and possibly less than one percent. This would make their affordability a non-issue in almost all cases. It would also take away the incentive for drug companies to mislead the public about the effectiveness and safety of their drugs. 

There are alternatives to patent support funding for research, such as the $30 billion in direct funding that the government commits now through the National Institutes of Health. While this funding mostly goes for more basic research, there is nothing except the political power of the pharmaceutical industry that prevents the funding from being used for the development and clinical testing of drugs. If the government were to increase its funding then all drugs developed through this mechanism could be sold as generics and the research findings immediately made public. This way the results would be accessible to doctors, patients, and other researchers.

The NYT had a short editorial discussing the issues raised by the refusal of insurance companies to pay for many expensive drugs of questionable usefulness. It would have been useful to point out the reason that drug prices are high and that drug companies mislead the public about the degree of their effectiveness. 

If the government did not grant patent monopolies, most of these drugs would sell for less than 10 percent of their patent protected prices and possibly less than one percent. This would make their affordability a non-issue in almost all cases. It would also take away the incentive for drug companies to mislead the public about the effectiveness and safety of their drugs. 

There are alternatives to patent support funding for research, such as the $30 billion in direct funding that the government commits now through the National Institutes of Health. While this funding mostly goes for more basic research, there is nothing except the political power of the pharmaceutical industry that prevents the funding from being used for the development and clinical testing of drugs. If the government were to increase its funding then all drugs developed through this mechanism could be sold as generics and the research findings immediately made public. This way the results would be accessible to doctors, patients, and other researchers.

Josh Barro has a thoughtful piece on public pensions and risk in the NYT’s Upshot section. He makes many points with which I agree, most notably raising cautions about pension fund investments in “alternative investments.” These are mostly private equity funds, but can also include venture capital and hedge funds. The problem with these alternative investments is that they come with unknown return distributions (essentially the pension funds have a promise that a smart investor will beat market indexes) and they come with high expenses. The public has good reason to be concerned when their pensions start to go more heavily into these alternatives to make up for funding shortfalls.

The issue where I differ is on how pensions need view the risk in the stock market. Josh notes my comment that pension funds don’t need to be concerned about the short-term fluctuations in the market, only long-period averages. His counter is that many funds became underfunded when the stock market plummeted and therefore had to boost funding in the recession. He also notes that many pensions cut back funding and even raised benefits when the stock bubble in the 1990s led to considerable overfunding.

This points are correct, but they stem largely from bad projections about future returns, and I don’t mean year to year, I mean long period averages. When price to earnings ratios in the market go above long-term averages, it is not possible to get historic rates of return. This means that the return projections used by pension funds in the 1990s should have been adjusted downward since there was no way on earth they would get the 7.0 percent real (10.0 percent nominal) returns that most funds were assuming.

The same story applied at the peak in the pre-recession period. They should have adjusted downward their assumption on long-term returns to a 5.0-5.5 percent real rate (8.0 percent to 8.5 percent nominal). After the market plunged they should have adjusted their return projections upward, which certainly would have been consistent with the sharp bounceback we have actually seen over the last five years. With these adjustments, pension funds would not have suddenly found themselves hugely underfunded even with the plunge in the market that we saw at the start of the recession.

None of this is 20-20 hindsight. I have been arguing this story about long period stock returns for almost twenty years, first in the context of Social Security and more recently in the context of pension funds.

Barro seems troubled by the idea that governments can benefit by investing in the stock market. It is not clear why this should be troubling, after all individuals benefit by investing in the stock market all the time. And the notion of risk arbitrage comes up in all sorts of different contexts.

For example, the claim that we made money on the TARP bailout is entirely a story of arbitrage. In a time where there was an enormous risk premium associated with lending, we made below market loans to favored banks, where the interest rate charged by the government was still above the risk free rate paid by the government. (The claim we make money on the Export-Import Bank is also a story of risk arbitrage.)

In short, we see instances of the government arbitraging risk all the time. It is not clear what policy we would be advancing if we prohibited it from doing so. We do know that such a prohibition would raise the cost of hiring public employees since they obviously value the guaranteed retirement income from a defined benefit pension.

 

 

Typos corrected — thanks to Robert Salzberg.

Josh Barro has a thoughtful piece on public pensions and risk in the NYT’s Upshot section. He makes many points with which I agree, most notably raising cautions about pension fund investments in “alternative investments.” These are mostly private equity funds, but can also include venture capital and hedge funds. The problem with these alternative investments is that they come with unknown return distributions (essentially the pension funds have a promise that a smart investor will beat market indexes) and they come with high expenses. The public has good reason to be concerned when their pensions start to go more heavily into these alternatives to make up for funding shortfalls.

The issue where I differ is on how pensions need view the risk in the stock market. Josh notes my comment that pension funds don’t need to be concerned about the short-term fluctuations in the market, only long-period averages. His counter is that many funds became underfunded when the stock market plummeted and therefore had to boost funding in the recession. He also notes that many pensions cut back funding and even raised benefits when the stock bubble in the 1990s led to considerable overfunding.

This points are correct, but they stem largely from bad projections about future returns, and I don’t mean year to year, I mean long period averages. When price to earnings ratios in the market go above long-term averages, it is not possible to get historic rates of return. This means that the return projections used by pension funds in the 1990s should have been adjusted downward since there was no way on earth they would get the 7.0 percent real (10.0 percent nominal) returns that most funds were assuming.

The same story applied at the peak in the pre-recession period. They should have adjusted downward their assumption on long-term returns to a 5.0-5.5 percent real rate (8.0 percent to 8.5 percent nominal). After the market plunged they should have adjusted their return projections upward, which certainly would have been consistent with the sharp bounceback we have actually seen over the last five years. With these adjustments, pension funds would not have suddenly found themselves hugely underfunded even with the plunge in the market that we saw at the start of the recession.

None of this is 20-20 hindsight. I have been arguing this story about long period stock returns for almost twenty years, first in the context of Social Security and more recently in the context of pension funds.

Barro seems troubled by the idea that governments can benefit by investing in the stock market. It is not clear why this should be troubling, after all individuals benefit by investing in the stock market all the time. And the notion of risk arbitrage comes up in all sorts of different contexts.

For example, the claim that we made money on the TARP bailout is entirely a story of arbitrage. In a time where there was an enormous risk premium associated with lending, we made below market loans to favored banks, where the interest rate charged by the government was still above the risk free rate paid by the government. (The claim we make money on the Export-Import Bank is also a story of risk arbitrage.)

In short, we see instances of the government arbitraging risk all the time. It is not clear what policy we would be advancing if we prohibited it from doing so. We do know that such a prohibition would raise the cost of hiring public employees since they obviously value the guaranteed retirement income from a defined benefit pension.

 

 

Typos corrected — thanks to Robert Salzberg.

Suppose we proposed giving President Obama the option to put modest tariffs, say 2-3 percent, on imports of various categories of goods and services, if he felt it was important for the economy. Every right-thinking person would denounce this as crude protectionism. The argument for the export-import bank is essentially the same as the argument for selective tariffs.

The big difference is that all sorts of people who would be among the protectionist denouncers are making the case for the Ex-Im Bank. Today’s effort comes from Joe Nocera.

His story begins, “In the real world, markets aren’t perfect.” He then goes on to tell us that the Ex-Im Bank doesn’t just help Boeing sell planes, it also helps thousands of small businesses export their goods.

Let’s get out President Obama’s selective tariffs. Suppose he imposes a 3 percent tariff on planes and aircraft parts. Defenders of the Obama tariffs will point out that this tariff is not only helping Boeing, but hundreds of small businesses that provides parts and services for these planes. See, in the real world, markets aren’t perfect.

We can point out that the government is actually making money off these tariffs, just like it does with the loans provided through the Ex-Im Bank, what’s the problem?

At this point our free traders would jumping up and down yelling that we are paying higher prices for planes because of the tariffs. The government may be making money, but consumers are paying the price.

That’s a good argument, but if our free traders have taken intro economics they would know that by diverting capital to the winners picked by the Ex-Im Bank, we are raising the price of capital for other firms. (Increased demand leads to higher prices.) This means that all the small businesses that are not privileged with subsidies from the Ex-Im Bank are now penalized by paying higher interest rates than would otherwise be the case.

In fact, we could actually treat interest rate subsidies and tariffs as interchangeable forms of protection. We can tell the plane and aircraft industry that it will have the option of either a 3 percent tariff on imports or a 3 percentage point reduction (this may not be the exact number) on the interest rate it pays on borrowing by getting loans through our protectionist bank. Is everybody happy now?

(In fairness, in the current economic environment of zero short-term interest rates and considerable unemployment, the impact of subsidized loans on borrowing costs for others would be essentially zero. However it is also easy to show that protectionist measures would increase output and employment in the current economy.)

Anyhow, it is possible to make an argument for the Ex-Im Bank, but it is an argument that people who like to boast about being free-traders should be embarrassed to make. See you at the Neanderthal dance.

 

Suppose we proposed giving President Obama the option to put modest tariffs, say 2-3 percent, on imports of various categories of goods and services, if he felt it was important for the economy. Every right-thinking person would denounce this as crude protectionism. The argument for the export-import bank is essentially the same as the argument for selective tariffs.

The big difference is that all sorts of people who would be among the protectionist denouncers are making the case for the Ex-Im Bank. Today’s effort comes from Joe Nocera.

His story begins, “In the real world, markets aren’t perfect.” He then goes on to tell us that the Ex-Im Bank doesn’t just help Boeing sell planes, it also helps thousands of small businesses export their goods.

Let’s get out President Obama’s selective tariffs. Suppose he imposes a 3 percent tariff on planes and aircraft parts. Defenders of the Obama tariffs will point out that this tariff is not only helping Boeing, but hundreds of small businesses that provides parts and services for these planes. See, in the real world, markets aren’t perfect.

We can point out that the government is actually making money off these tariffs, just like it does with the loans provided through the Ex-Im Bank, what’s the problem?

At this point our free traders would jumping up and down yelling that we are paying higher prices for planes because of the tariffs. The government may be making money, but consumers are paying the price.

That’s a good argument, but if our free traders have taken intro economics they would know that by diverting capital to the winners picked by the Ex-Im Bank, we are raising the price of capital for other firms. (Increased demand leads to higher prices.) This means that all the small businesses that are not privileged with subsidies from the Ex-Im Bank are now penalized by paying higher interest rates than would otherwise be the case.

In fact, we could actually treat interest rate subsidies and tariffs as interchangeable forms of protection. We can tell the plane and aircraft industry that it will have the option of either a 3 percent tariff on imports or a 3 percentage point reduction (this may not be the exact number) on the interest rate it pays on borrowing by getting loans through our protectionist bank. Is everybody happy now?

(In fairness, in the current economic environment of zero short-term interest rates and considerable unemployment, the impact of subsidized loans on borrowing costs for others would be essentially zero. However it is also easy to show that protectionist measures would increase output and employment in the current economy.)

Anyhow, it is possible to make an argument for the Ex-Im Bank, but it is an argument that people who like to boast about being free-traders should be embarrassed to make. See you at the Neanderthal dance.

 

Every economist knows that when you put a 20 percent tariff on imported clothes it leads to inefficiency and corruption. For some reason they don’t seem to know that when you give out patent monopolies that can raise prices by 2000 percent or more above the free market price that it leads to big-time inefficiency and corruption.

Reality is working hard to teach economists. Today the Washington Post had an article reporting on how many hospitals appear to be profiting from a program that allows them to buy drugs at a discount from the patent protected price. The program is ostensibly designed to provide drugs to low-income people.

This sort of program would of course be unnecessary if drugs were sold in a free market. There would be no reason to establish complicated discount systems if drugs were selling for $5-$10 per prescription, as is generally the case for generic drugs. This would require an alternative mechanism for financing drug research, but folks who have heard of the National Institutes of Health know that alternative mechanisms exist. (Yes, NIH mostly does basic research, but that it a policy choice not a fact of nature.)

Every economist knows that when you put a 20 percent tariff on imported clothes it leads to inefficiency and corruption. For some reason they don’t seem to know that when you give out patent monopolies that can raise prices by 2000 percent or more above the free market price that it leads to big-time inefficiency and corruption.

Reality is working hard to teach economists. Today the Washington Post had an article reporting on how many hospitals appear to be profiting from a program that allows them to buy drugs at a discount from the patent protected price. The program is ostensibly designed to provide drugs to low-income people.

This sort of program would of course be unnecessary if drugs were sold in a free market. There would be no reason to establish complicated discount systems if drugs were selling for $5-$10 per prescription, as is generally the case for generic drugs. This would require an alternative mechanism for financing drug research, but folks who have heard of the National Institutes of Health know that alternative mechanisms exist. (Yes, NIH mostly does basic research, but that it a policy choice not a fact of nature.)

The Washington Post had a piece discussing a proposal to increase access to child care. The piece told readers the proposal would cost $20 billion a year. It then added this could:

“be financed through a 0.2 percentage-point increase in payroll taxes, which advocates say equals $72.04 a year for the average female worker.”

While the $20 billion figure likely would mean little to most Post readers since few have much sense of how large this is relative to the budget or their tax bill, most readers likely have a clear idea of what a 0.2 percentage point increase in the payroll tax means. This simple addition to the article conveyed essential information to readers that would have been missed if the article had only reported the $20 billion figure.

Now why can’t news stories do this all the time?

 

Addendum: I see from comments that the calculation here almost certainly refers to the earnings of the median female worker and not the average. Thanks for catching this.

The Washington Post had a piece discussing a proposal to increase access to child care. The piece told readers the proposal would cost $20 billion a year. It then added this could:

“be financed through a 0.2 percentage-point increase in payroll taxes, which advocates say equals $72.04 a year for the average female worker.”

While the $20 billion figure likely would mean little to most Post readers since few have much sense of how large this is relative to the budget or their tax bill, most readers likely have a clear idea of what a 0.2 percentage point increase in the payroll tax means. This simple addition to the article conveyed essential information to readers that would have been missed if the article had only reported the $20 billion figure.

Now why can’t news stories do this all the time?

 

Addendum: I see from comments that the calculation here almost certainly refers to the earnings of the median female worker and not the average. Thanks for catching this.

When economies have lots of excess capacity and idle workers, as is the case following a recession, they tend to grow very rapidly. When they are near their potential level of output growth tends to be slower.

This is why the United States economy was able to grow at a 5.6 percent rate in 1978 or a 7.3 percent rate in 1984. In both cases the economy was operating far below its potential so it had lots of room to grow simply to get back to potential. Once it reaches potential, an economy can only grow at the rate of labor force growth plus the rate of productivity growth.

If the Wall Street Journal understood this simple fact it might not have tried to imply that Japan faces some economic disaster because it is projected to have a lower rate of growth in 2015 than the other major western economies. Japan’s economy is much closer to its potential than most of the other economies on the list.

Japan’s unemployment rate is under 4.0 percent. And the percentage of prime age people (ages 25-54) who are employed is now 81.9 percent, 1.3 percentage points above the pre-recession level. By comparison in the United States employment among prime age workers is still down by 2.5 percentage points from pre-recession levels at 76.4 percent. Given this difference in where these economies are in relation to their potential output it would be very surprising if the U.S. economy were not growing more rapidly.

The piece also implies that a low growth rate is a major problem. Economists usually look at per capita GDP, that is why they generally think that Denmark is wealthier than Indonesia. Japan’s population is shrinking at the rate of roughly 0.1 percent annually. By contrast, the U.S. population is growing at a rate of 0.8 percent annually. This means that, on a per capita basis, the 1.0 percent growth projected for Japan is equivalent to 1.9 percent growth in the United States. That is roughly the long-run potential growth rate that many analysts now project for the United States.

When economies have lots of excess capacity and idle workers, as is the case following a recession, they tend to grow very rapidly. When they are near their potential level of output growth tends to be slower.

This is why the United States economy was able to grow at a 5.6 percent rate in 1978 or a 7.3 percent rate in 1984. In both cases the economy was operating far below its potential so it had lots of room to grow simply to get back to potential. Once it reaches potential, an economy can only grow at the rate of labor force growth plus the rate of productivity growth.

If the Wall Street Journal understood this simple fact it might not have tried to imply that Japan faces some economic disaster because it is projected to have a lower rate of growth in 2015 than the other major western economies. Japan’s economy is much closer to its potential than most of the other economies on the list.

Japan’s unemployment rate is under 4.0 percent. And the percentage of prime age people (ages 25-54) who are employed is now 81.9 percent, 1.3 percentage points above the pre-recession level. By comparison in the United States employment among prime age workers is still down by 2.5 percentage points from pre-recession levels at 76.4 percent. Given this difference in where these economies are in relation to their potential output it would be very surprising if the U.S. economy were not growing more rapidly.

The piece also implies that a low growth rate is a major problem. Economists usually look at per capita GDP, that is why they generally think that Denmark is wealthier than Indonesia. Japan’s population is shrinking at the rate of roughly 0.1 percent annually. By contrast, the U.S. population is growing at a rate of 0.8 percent annually. This means that, on a per capita basis, the 1.0 percent growth projected for Japan is equivalent to 1.9 percent growth in the United States. That is roughly the long-run potential growth rate that many analysts now project for the United States.

We all know how hard it is for Wall Streeters to get by in a market economy, but can’t we try a little bit of tough love to see if we can’t wean them away from the public trough. The newest absurdity is the insurance policies that many large companies take out on their employees in order to game the tax system.

Many of us might have been led to believe that these “dead peasant” policies had been eliminated with a 2006 change in the tax law. But no, the NYT tells us that they are still there. Remarkably, the paper doesn’t understand the issues involved at all. It tells readers:

“But critics say it is immoral for companies to profit from the death of employees, while employees themselves do not directly benefit.”

Well some critics might be concerned about the morality of this practice, but the more obvious complaint is its economic absurdity. The article goes on:

“Companies and banks say earnings from the insurance policies are used to cover long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations.”

Okay, that’s it — everything we need to know is right there. Insurance companies don’t give away money. Why are there “earnings” from these insurances policies that are available to “cover long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations.” The answer is that these policies are tax subsidized.

The question then is why are taxpayers subsidizing such absurd insurance policies? If we want to subsidize “long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations,” there is a very simple way to do it, subsidize long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations. That way we would not waste money supporting the intermediaries who undoubtedly collect high fees and make high salaries and bonuses in the process.

Yes, but that would meet cutting out the insurance industry and we know the boys and girls in the industry can’t be expected to make their way in a market economy without a big helping hand from the government. At least they aren’t getting food stamps.

We all know how hard it is for Wall Streeters to get by in a market economy, but can’t we try a little bit of tough love to see if we can’t wean them away from the public trough. The newest absurdity is the insurance policies that many large companies take out on their employees in order to game the tax system.

Many of us might have been led to believe that these “dead peasant” policies had been eliminated with a 2006 change in the tax law. But no, the NYT tells us that they are still there. Remarkably, the paper doesn’t understand the issues involved at all. It tells readers:

“But critics say it is immoral for companies to profit from the death of employees, while employees themselves do not directly benefit.”

Well some critics might be concerned about the morality of this practice, but the more obvious complaint is its economic absurdity. The article goes on:

“Companies and banks say earnings from the insurance policies are used to cover long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations.”

Okay, that’s it — everything we need to know is right there. Insurance companies don’t give away money. Why are there “earnings” from these insurances policies that are available to “cover long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations.” The answer is that these policies are tax subsidized.

The question then is why are taxpayers subsidizing such absurd insurance policies? If we want to subsidize “long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations,” there is a very simple way to do it, subsidize long-term health care, deferred compensation and pension obligations. That way we would not waste money supporting the intermediaries who undoubtedly collect high fees and make high salaries and bonuses in the process.

Yes, but that would meet cutting out the insurance industry and we know the boys and girls in the industry can’t be expected to make their way in a market economy without a big helping hand from the government. At least they aren’t getting food stamps.

That’s basically the punch line in a column telling us Thomas Piketty is wrong to worry about rising inequality. After a long digression on motivations for saving among the very rich, Mankiw tells readers:

“When a family saves for future generations, it provides resources to finance capital investments, like the start-up of new businesses and the expansion of old ones. Greater capital, in turn, affects the earnings of both existing capital and workers.

“Because capital is subject to diminishing returns, an increase in its supply causes each unit of capital to earn less. And because increased capital raises labor productivity, workers enjoy higher wages. In other words, by saving rather than spending, those who leave an estate to their heirs induce an unintended redistribution of income from other owners of capital toward workers.”

To summarize, the story is that by saving rather than spending their money, rich people will make more capital available to firms to invest, thereby raising productivity and wages.

There are two important problems with this story. First, we are operating well below the economy’s potential level of output and are likely to remain below potential for many years into the future according to most projections. This is the story of “secular stagnation” that even folks like Larry Summers have embraced in recent years.

In a context of secular stagnation, more saving is harmful. If people save rather than consume there will be less demand in the economy and less employment. If we think that secular stagnation is likely to be a persistent problem, then the fact the rich save more of their money than everyone is bad news for the economy. It will slow growth and make us all poorer.

The other point is that moderate income and middle income people did actually use to save a larger share of their income. Back in the days when wages were keeping pace with productivity growth, savings rates were considerably higher than they have been in the last two decades when the wealthy got most of the benefits of growth. It tends to be the case that people save a larger share of their income when their income is rising rapidly. This means that we don’t need rich people to not spend. Moderate and middle income people will also save a substantial portion of their income during prosperous times.

 

That’s basically the punch line in a column telling us Thomas Piketty is wrong to worry about rising inequality. After a long digression on motivations for saving among the very rich, Mankiw tells readers:

“When a family saves for future generations, it provides resources to finance capital investments, like the start-up of new businesses and the expansion of old ones. Greater capital, in turn, affects the earnings of both existing capital and workers.

“Because capital is subject to diminishing returns, an increase in its supply causes each unit of capital to earn less. And because increased capital raises labor productivity, workers enjoy higher wages. In other words, by saving rather than spending, those who leave an estate to their heirs induce an unintended redistribution of income from other owners of capital toward workers.”

To summarize, the story is that by saving rather than spending their money, rich people will make more capital available to firms to invest, thereby raising productivity and wages.

There are two important problems with this story. First, we are operating well below the economy’s potential level of output and are likely to remain below potential for many years into the future according to most projections. This is the story of “secular stagnation” that even folks like Larry Summers have embraced in recent years.

In a context of secular stagnation, more saving is harmful. If people save rather than consume there will be less demand in the economy and less employment. If we think that secular stagnation is likely to be a persistent problem, then the fact the rich save more of their money than everyone is bad news for the economy. It will slow growth and make us all poorer.

The other point is that moderate income and middle income people did actually use to save a larger share of their income. Back in the days when wages were keeping pace with productivity growth, savings rates were considerably higher than they have been in the last two decades when the wealthy got most of the benefits of growth. It tends to be the case that people save a larger share of their income when their income is rising rapidly. This means that we don’t need rich people to not spend. Moderate and middle income people will also save a substantial portion of their income during prosperous times.

 

Adam Davidson has an interesting piece in the NYT Magazine noting the rapid growth in the percentage of young adults who continue to live in their parents’ home well into their 20s. The main explanation for this shift is the deteriorating labor market prospects for young people. While the piece does note this fact and has some discussion of the causes, it would be worth going into the latter in a bit more detail.

The country has pursued a set of policies over the last three decades that have the effect of redistributing income upwards. The most important of these at the moment is the high unemployment policy being pursued by Congress. Congress decided that it wanted to rapidly reduce the budget deficit after the 2009 stimulus. This has slowed growth and prevented millions of workers from getting jobs. It has also meant that many workers with jobs are working fewer hours than they would like.

Perhaps most importantly, high unemployment substantially weakens the bargaining power of workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution (these are disproportionately younger workers), so that they end up with lower wages. (See my book with Jared Bernstein, Getting Back to Full Employment.) In short, the decision by Congress to run lower budget deficits has forced millions of young people to move back with their parents.

There are many other policy decisions that have also hurt the wages and job prospects of young people. The decision of the Clinton Administration to have a highly valued dollar back in the late 1990s led to a large trade deficit which is another major cause of high unemployment. The protection of doctors and other highly paid professionals from international competition raises the costs of health care and other services, thereby reducing the real wages of most workers.

And of course the massive government support of the financial sector, in the form of too big to fail services, bailouts, and tax subsidies (other industries are taxed more so that the financial industry can be taxed less), has come at the expense of the rest of the economy which might otherwise be better situated to employ young workers.

Anyhow, the tales in this piece are striking, as many young people continue to need substantial support from their parents at ages where they would have been on their own in prior decades. It is important to recognize the policies that led to this outcome.

Adam Davidson has an interesting piece in the NYT Magazine noting the rapid growth in the percentage of young adults who continue to live in their parents’ home well into their 20s. The main explanation for this shift is the deteriorating labor market prospects for young people. While the piece does note this fact and has some discussion of the causes, it would be worth going into the latter in a bit more detail.

The country has pursued a set of policies over the last three decades that have the effect of redistributing income upwards. The most important of these at the moment is the high unemployment policy being pursued by Congress. Congress decided that it wanted to rapidly reduce the budget deficit after the 2009 stimulus. This has slowed growth and prevented millions of workers from getting jobs. It has also meant that many workers with jobs are working fewer hours than they would like.

Perhaps most importantly, high unemployment substantially weakens the bargaining power of workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution (these are disproportionately younger workers), so that they end up with lower wages. (See my book with Jared Bernstein, Getting Back to Full Employment.) In short, the decision by Congress to run lower budget deficits has forced millions of young people to move back with their parents.

There are many other policy decisions that have also hurt the wages and job prospects of young people. The decision of the Clinton Administration to have a highly valued dollar back in the late 1990s led to a large trade deficit which is another major cause of high unemployment. The protection of doctors and other highly paid professionals from international competition raises the costs of health care and other services, thereby reducing the real wages of most workers.

And of course the massive government support of the financial sector, in the form of too big to fail services, bailouts, and tax subsidies (other industries are taxed more so that the financial industry can be taxed less), has come at the expense of the rest of the economy which might otherwise be better situated to employ young workers.

Anyhow, the tales in this piece are striking, as many young people continue to need substantial support from their parents at ages where they would have been on their own in prior decades. It is important to recognize the policies that led to this outcome.

Steve Rattner has a column in the NYT in which he correctly argues that robots should not provide any reason for concern about future labor market prospects. As Rattner correctly points out, robots are just another form of productivity growth. As a general rule, productivity growth allows for rising living standards and more leisure. Rattner is also right to point out that productivity growth has actually been unusually slow in recent years, the opposite of the concern about robots destroying jobs.

Where Rattner goes wrong is in arguing that the gainers and losers in terms of labor market prospects have been determined by technology and globalization, as opposed to policies that have been designed to make some groups winners and some groups losers. This is very clear from examining the list of winning occupations on his chart. The highest, with median pay of $187,200 in 2012, is physicians. (Most other sources put the median pay of doctors at well over $200,000.) Our doctors are paid close to twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries. This is primarily because we have a government policy of protecting them from both foreign and domestic competition.

Similarly people in finance can get enormous pay because the government grants large banks too-big-to-fail insurance, meaning it bails them out when their incompetence puts them into bankruptcy. (The I.M.F. recently estimated the size of this subsidy at $50 billion a year.) The government also subsidizes the industry by taxing other sectors more so that the financial sector can largely escape taxation.

Anyhow, Rattner is right that we need not fear productivity growth but he is wrong to claim that the winners and losers have been determined by the natural course of economic development as opposed to deliberate government policy.

 

Steve Rattner has a column in the NYT in which he correctly argues that robots should not provide any reason for concern about future labor market prospects. As Rattner correctly points out, robots are just another form of productivity growth. As a general rule, productivity growth allows for rising living standards and more leisure. Rattner is also right to point out that productivity growth has actually been unusually slow in recent years, the opposite of the concern about robots destroying jobs.

Where Rattner goes wrong is in arguing that the gainers and losers in terms of labor market prospects have been determined by technology and globalization, as opposed to policies that have been designed to make some groups winners and some groups losers. This is very clear from examining the list of winning occupations on his chart. The highest, with median pay of $187,200 in 2012, is physicians. (Most other sources put the median pay of doctors at well over $200,000.) Our doctors are paid close to twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries. This is primarily because we have a government policy of protecting them from both foreign and domestic competition.

Similarly people in finance can get enormous pay because the government grants large banks too-big-to-fail insurance, meaning it bails them out when their incompetence puts them into bankruptcy. (The I.M.F. recently estimated the size of this subsidy at $50 billion a year.) The government also subsidizes the industry by taxing other sectors more so that the financial sector can largely escape taxation.

Anyhow, Rattner is right that we need not fear productivity growth but he is wrong to claim that the winners and losers have been determined by the natural course of economic development as opposed to deliberate government policy.

 

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