The Washington Post noted Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell’s efforts to block President Obama’s new proposal for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by closing coal plants. It told readers:
“coal is a major source of energy and jobs in McConnell’s state and in several others represented by Democratic senators who are seeking reelection this year.”
According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Situation survey, the coal industry employs 11,600 workers in Kentucky. This is equal to 0.6 percent of total employment (1,862,000). This puts Kentucky in second place to the 4.2 percent share in West Virginia, but in every other state represented by Democratic senators who are seeking reelection this year the share of employment in the coal industry is considerably less than in Kentucky.
Note: The share in West Virginia was corrected. The post originally said 1.6 percent.
The Washington Post noted Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell’s efforts to block President Obama’s new proposal for reducing carbon dioxide emissions by closing coal plants. It told readers:
“coal is a major source of energy and jobs in McConnell’s state and in several others represented by Democratic senators who are seeking reelection this year.”
According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Situation survey, the coal industry employs 11,600 workers in Kentucky. This is equal to 0.6 percent of total employment (1,862,000). This puts Kentucky in second place to the 4.2 percent share in West Virginia, but in every other state represented by Democratic senators who are seeking reelection this year the share of employment in the coal industry is considerably less than in Kentucky.
Note: The share in West Virginia was corrected. The post originally said 1.6 percent.
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Paul Krugman may have misled readers of his blog yesterday with the comment:
“the trade balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon, determined by the excess of savings over investment.”
As an accounting identity the trade deficit is equal to the excess of national investment over national savings. However it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. trade deficit is caused by our failure to save enough, especially in the current context where the economy is well below its potential level of output.
To take a simple example, suppose that we all become virtuous savers and reduce our consumption by an amount equal to 1 percent of GDP (@ $170 billion annually). This would reduce demand in the economy by $170 billion. In more normal times we might tell a story where this fall in demand would lead to a drop in interest rates, which would in turn spur additional investment. Lower interest rates should also lead to a lower valued dollar (fewer people want to hold dollar denominated assets at a lower interest rate). The lower valued dollar would lead to more exports (our goods are now cheaper to foreigners) and fewer imports (foreign goods are now relatively more expensive than domestically produced goods).
In this story, the end result is that we have the same level of output with higher levels of investment and net exports replacing the lost consumption. We have a somewhat higher level of national savings (the increased investment partially offset the rise in savings) and a lower trade deficit.
That would be the standard story of how a savings-investment balance determines the size of the trade deficit. However, no one can tell this story in today’s economy. If everyone started saving more as described above, it would mostly just lead to a fall in output and employment.
The reason is that the adjustment process would not come close to offsetting the loss in demand. With the short-term interest rate already at zero we would see no help there. Long-term rates could fall some, but the reduction in longer term rates would at best have a trivial effect on investment. The dollar may not move at all, both because interest rates will have changed little and also because many countries (yes, China is the biggest) have a policy of targeting the price of their currencies against the dollar. If market forces started to push the value of the dollar down against their currencies they would respond by buying more dollars to keep up the value of the dollar.
In this story, savings will actually rise by considerably less than the initial $170 billion increase in savings because GDP will have fallen. This means that people who had been saving instead find themselves unemployed and spending from past savings (dissaving). The government will also be saving less (running larger deficits), since it is collected less in taxes and paying out more in transfers like unemployment benefits. There would be some reduction in the trade deficit since at lower levels of GDP we buy less of everything, including imports, but for the most part the trade deficit and national savings balance is maintained by lower savings from the reduction in GDP offsetting most of the increased in intended savings.
By contrast, if foreign countries suddenly started buying more of our stuff (say the dollar fell by 20 percent) then we would see an increase in employment and output. This would lead to more savings as formerly unemployed workers get jobs and can now start putting money into the bank. Also government savings increases as increased employment means more taxes and less money paid out in transfers. The net effect is that a lower trade deficit leads to more net national savings.
When considering these accounting identities it is important to keep the stories on causation straight, otherwise you get some really bad policies. Paul Krugman of course knows this and has made the same point many times (here for example), but we must work hard to prevent confusion on the topic.
Note: link fixed, thanks Squeezed Turnip. Also, typo corrected.
Paul Krugman may have misled readers of his blog yesterday with the comment:
“the trade balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon, determined by the excess of savings over investment.”
As an accounting identity the trade deficit is equal to the excess of national investment over national savings. However it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. trade deficit is caused by our failure to save enough, especially in the current context where the economy is well below its potential level of output.
To take a simple example, suppose that we all become virtuous savers and reduce our consumption by an amount equal to 1 percent of GDP (@ $170 billion annually). This would reduce demand in the economy by $170 billion. In more normal times we might tell a story where this fall in demand would lead to a drop in interest rates, which would in turn spur additional investment. Lower interest rates should also lead to a lower valued dollar (fewer people want to hold dollar denominated assets at a lower interest rate). The lower valued dollar would lead to more exports (our goods are now cheaper to foreigners) and fewer imports (foreign goods are now relatively more expensive than domestically produced goods).
In this story, the end result is that we have the same level of output with higher levels of investment and net exports replacing the lost consumption. We have a somewhat higher level of national savings (the increased investment partially offset the rise in savings) and a lower trade deficit.
That would be the standard story of how a savings-investment balance determines the size of the trade deficit. However, no one can tell this story in today’s economy. If everyone started saving more as described above, it would mostly just lead to a fall in output and employment.
The reason is that the adjustment process would not come close to offsetting the loss in demand. With the short-term interest rate already at zero we would see no help there. Long-term rates could fall some, but the reduction in longer term rates would at best have a trivial effect on investment. The dollar may not move at all, both because interest rates will have changed little and also because many countries (yes, China is the biggest) have a policy of targeting the price of their currencies against the dollar. If market forces started to push the value of the dollar down against their currencies they would respond by buying more dollars to keep up the value of the dollar.
In this story, savings will actually rise by considerably less than the initial $170 billion increase in savings because GDP will have fallen. This means that people who had been saving instead find themselves unemployed and spending from past savings (dissaving). The government will also be saving less (running larger deficits), since it is collected less in taxes and paying out more in transfers like unemployment benefits. There would be some reduction in the trade deficit since at lower levels of GDP we buy less of everything, including imports, but for the most part the trade deficit and national savings balance is maintained by lower savings from the reduction in GDP offsetting most of the increased in intended savings.
By contrast, if foreign countries suddenly started buying more of our stuff (say the dollar fell by 20 percent) then we would see an increase in employment and output. This would lead to more savings as formerly unemployed workers get jobs and can now start putting money into the bank. Also government savings increases as increased employment means more taxes and less money paid out in transfers. The net effect is that a lower trade deficit leads to more net national savings.
When considering these accounting identities it is important to keep the stories on causation straight, otherwise you get some really bad policies. Paul Krugman of course knows this and has made the same point many times (here for example), but we must work hard to prevent confusion on the topic.
Note: link fixed, thanks Squeezed Turnip. Also, typo corrected.
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The NYT ran a piece profiling former IBM executive and Bank of America adviser Hans-Olaf Henkel, who is now head of a German anti-euro party. While it discusses much of his background in business and politics, it neglected to mention his efforts to blame the U.S. housing bubble and financial crisis on anti-discrimination laws. Specifically, he attributed the crisis to the 1977 Community Re-investment Act (CRA), which prohibited banks from discriminating based on the racial compensation of a neighborhood and required them to invest in the areas from which they were drawing deposits.
As Henkel described the problem:
“Mr. Galbraith [University of Texas economist James Galbraith] should familiarize himself Jimmy Carter’s “Housing and Community Development Act” where in Section VIII Banks were prohibited the practice of “red lining” which until then enabled them to distinguish ‘better living quarters’ and ‘slums.'”
This tidbit would seem to provide an important insight into Mr. Henkel’s background that deserves to be noted in a profile.
As a practical matter, Henkel’s claim about the CRA is absurd on its face. Much of the sub-prime lending of the bubble years was done by financial institutions that were not covered by the CRA to areas that would not be covered. Huge subprime lenders like Ameriquest, Countrywide, and New Century mostly raised their money on Wall Street, not from bank deposits and therefore were not subject to CRA regulation. Furthermore much of the lending was to newly built exurbs that would not be covered by the CRA, which was intended to protect inner city neighborhoods.
The subprime loans were made for the old-fashioned reason, they were hugely profitable. Bankers don’t need government bureaucrats to tell them to make money.
The NYT ran a piece profiling former IBM executive and Bank of America adviser Hans-Olaf Henkel, who is now head of a German anti-euro party. While it discusses much of his background in business and politics, it neglected to mention his efforts to blame the U.S. housing bubble and financial crisis on anti-discrimination laws. Specifically, he attributed the crisis to the 1977 Community Re-investment Act (CRA), which prohibited banks from discriminating based on the racial compensation of a neighborhood and required them to invest in the areas from which they were drawing deposits.
As Henkel described the problem:
“Mr. Galbraith [University of Texas economist James Galbraith] should familiarize himself Jimmy Carter’s “Housing and Community Development Act” where in Section VIII Banks were prohibited the practice of “red lining” which until then enabled them to distinguish ‘better living quarters’ and ‘slums.'”
This tidbit would seem to provide an important insight into Mr. Henkel’s background that deserves to be noted in a profile.
As a practical matter, Henkel’s claim about the CRA is absurd on its face. Much of the sub-prime lending of the bubble years was done by financial institutions that were not covered by the CRA to areas that would not be covered. Huge subprime lenders like Ameriquest, Countrywide, and New Century mostly raised their money on Wall Street, not from bank deposits and therefore were not subject to CRA regulation. Furthermore much of the lending was to newly built exurbs that would not be covered by the CRA, which was intended to protect inner city neighborhoods.
The subprime loans were made for the old-fashioned reason, they were hugely profitable. Bankers don’t need government bureaucrats to tell them to make money.
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That appears to be the central claim of Kevin Warsh and Stanley Druckenmiller in a Wall Street Journal column criticizing the Fed’s asset buying program. The central claim appears to be that because asset prices have been rising, companies have been discouraged from undertaking productive investment. While Warsh and Druckenmiller are certainly right that the asset buying program has had limited benefits for the real economy, it doesn’t follow that the economy would be stronger without it.
First, they misrepresent the wealth situation when they tell readers:
“The aggregate wealth of U.S. households, including stocks and real-estate holdings, just hit a new high of $81.8 trillion. That’s more than $26 trillion in wealth added since 2009.”
The sharp rise in wealth since 2009 was due to a sharp plunge in the financial crisis. The notion of a “record” is misleading since the economy is growing we expect wealth to continually hit records. The ratio of wealth to GDP was 4.78 in the first quarter of 2014. By comparison, it was 4.86 for 2006. The Fed’s policies have simply brought the ratio of wealth to GDP back to pre-recession levels.
More importantly, Warsh and Druckenmiller seem to turn causality on its head when they say:
“Meanwhile, corporate chieftains rationally choose financial engineering—debt-financed share buybacks, for example—over capital investment in property, plants and equipment.”
Low interest rates encourage corporations to invest in stock rather than bonds. If interest rates were higher, then presumably they would do the opposite. Low interest rates (and high stock prices) make it easier to borrow to finance capital investment in property, plants and equipment. It is hard to imagine why they think firms would be investing more, if it cost them more money to make these investments.
That appears to be the central claim of Kevin Warsh and Stanley Druckenmiller in a Wall Street Journal column criticizing the Fed’s asset buying program. The central claim appears to be that because asset prices have been rising, companies have been discouraged from undertaking productive investment. While Warsh and Druckenmiller are certainly right that the asset buying program has had limited benefits for the real economy, it doesn’t follow that the economy would be stronger without it.
First, they misrepresent the wealth situation when they tell readers:
“The aggregate wealth of U.S. households, including stocks and real-estate holdings, just hit a new high of $81.8 trillion. That’s more than $26 trillion in wealth added since 2009.”
The sharp rise in wealth since 2009 was due to a sharp plunge in the financial crisis. The notion of a “record” is misleading since the economy is growing we expect wealth to continually hit records. The ratio of wealth to GDP was 4.78 in the first quarter of 2014. By comparison, it was 4.86 for 2006. The Fed’s policies have simply brought the ratio of wealth to GDP back to pre-recession levels.
More importantly, Warsh and Druckenmiller seem to turn causality on its head when they say:
“Meanwhile, corporate chieftains rationally choose financial engineering—debt-financed share buybacks, for example—over capital investment in property, plants and equipment.”
Low interest rates encourage corporations to invest in stock rather than bonds. If interest rates were higher, then presumably they would do the opposite. Low interest rates (and high stock prices) make it easier to borrow to finance capital investment in property, plants and equipment. It is hard to imagine why they think firms would be investing more, if it cost them more money to make these investments.
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Neil Irwin is trying to implicate the rest of us in his desire to subsidize Boeing and other big corporations through the Export-Import Bank. The Ex-Im Bank provides below market loans to select projects in order to help make sales in both directions. Irwin tells readers the debate over the bank provides:
“A fascinating case study in how modern economies really work, and the ways big business and big government are inevitably intertwined in ways that believers in free markets may not like — but may not be able to avoid. In short, we’re all crony capitalists, whether we like it or not.”
Irwin argues that all foreign governments have similar sorts of subsidies for their businesses and that we would be operating at a serious disadvantage if we didn’t subsidize our business deals.
There are two points worth noting on Irwin’s argument. First, it goes directly against free trade 101. Remember how we call autoworkers and steelworkers Neanderthal protectionists if they support tariffs or quotas to keep their jobs? The argument that is the basis for dismissing these workers’ efforts at protecting their livelihoods is the same argument that would be used against the Ex-Im Bank. (Other countries provide subsidies to their auto and steel industry also. In the standard trade models it doesn’t matter.)
When Irwin tells us that we have to be crony capitalists “whether we like it or not,” why don’t we also have to be crony protectors of workers’ livelihoods? It seems that there is a very fundamental inconsistency here. When it comes to business interests we are prepared to throw the economics textbook theory in the garbage, but when the question is worker’s jobs, that textbook is the bible.
The other point worth noting in reference to Irwin’s argument is the logic of the textbook story itself. The logic is that if we lose jobs in the steel or auto industry we will get jobs in other sectors that will offset these losses. This is not an absurd argument, although the new jobs are not likely to help the auto or steel workers. In the case of business as a whole, the argument would be that if we don’t subsidize loans to favored businesses through the Ex-Im Bank, then we would sell less overseas. This would lead to a fall in the value of the dollar which would make our unsubsidized exports more competitive internationally and make our domestically produced goods cheaper relative to imports. In principle this market determination of winners and losers is more efficient than the government’s designation through the Export-Import Bank.
People can come to different conclusions about the value of the Ex-Im Bank, but it is inconsistent to claim to be a free trader and to support the Bank. Anyone who supports the Bank is clearly willing to have the government subsidize certain businesses. If they claim support for free trade is the reason they don’t care about losing auto or steel jobs to foreign competition, they are not being honest.
Neil Irwin is trying to implicate the rest of us in his desire to subsidize Boeing and other big corporations through the Export-Import Bank. The Ex-Im Bank provides below market loans to select projects in order to help make sales in both directions. Irwin tells readers the debate over the bank provides:
“A fascinating case study in how modern economies really work, and the ways big business and big government are inevitably intertwined in ways that believers in free markets may not like — but may not be able to avoid. In short, we’re all crony capitalists, whether we like it or not.”
Irwin argues that all foreign governments have similar sorts of subsidies for their businesses and that we would be operating at a serious disadvantage if we didn’t subsidize our business deals.
There are two points worth noting on Irwin’s argument. First, it goes directly against free trade 101. Remember how we call autoworkers and steelworkers Neanderthal protectionists if they support tariffs or quotas to keep their jobs? The argument that is the basis for dismissing these workers’ efforts at protecting their livelihoods is the same argument that would be used against the Ex-Im Bank. (Other countries provide subsidies to their auto and steel industry also. In the standard trade models it doesn’t matter.)
When Irwin tells us that we have to be crony capitalists “whether we like it or not,” why don’t we also have to be crony protectors of workers’ livelihoods? It seems that there is a very fundamental inconsistency here. When it comes to business interests we are prepared to throw the economics textbook theory in the garbage, but when the question is worker’s jobs, that textbook is the bible.
The other point worth noting in reference to Irwin’s argument is the logic of the textbook story itself. The logic is that if we lose jobs in the steel or auto industry we will get jobs in other sectors that will offset these losses. This is not an absurd argument, although the new jobs are not likely to help the auto or steel workers. In the case of business as a whole, the argument would be that if we don’t subsidize loans to favored businesses through the Ex-Im Bank, then we would sell less overseas. This would lead to a fall in the value of the dollar which would make our unsubsidized exports more competitive internationally and make our domestically produced goods cheaper relative to imports. In principle this market determination of winners and losers is more efficient than the government’s designation through the Export-Import Bank.
People can come to different conclusions about the value of the Ex-Im Bank, but it is inconsistent to claim to be a free trader and to support the Bank. Anyone who supports the Bank is clearly willing to have the government subsidize certain businesses. If they claim support for free trade is the reason they don’t care about losing auto or steel jobs to foreign competition, they are not being honest.
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Thomas Edsall had an interesting piece in the NYT that discussed the shift of aid to the poor from people who are very poor, unmarried, and non-working to the near poor, married, and working. At one point the piece refers to a comment from economist Robert Moffitt that spending on poverty programs increased by 74 percent from 1975 to 2007, after adjusting for inflation. This may have led readers to believe there was an increasing commitment to combat poverty over this period. In fact, since GDP increased by 176 percent over the same years, there was a substantial decline in poverty spending measured as a share of GDP over this period.
Thomas Edsall had an interesting piece in the NYT that discussed the shift of aid to the poor from people who are very poor, unmarried, and non-working to the near poor, married, and working. At one point the piece refers to a comment from economist Robert Moffitt that spending on poverty programs increased by 74 percent from 1975 to 2007, after adjusting for inflation. This may have led readers to believe there was an increasing commitment to combat poverty over this period. In fact, since GDP increased by 176 percent over the same years, there was a substantial decline in poverty spending measured as a share of GDP over this period.
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In the NYT’s Upshot section Neil Irwin correctly notes that real wages have been nearly stagnant in the recovery, however he makes too much of the inflation numbers from the last couple of months. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that inflation rose 0.3 percent in April and 0.4 percent in May. These increases were enough to wipe out modest real wage gains reported in prior months so that the average hourly wage has now fallen slightly over the last year, adjusted for inflation.
While this is bad news, it is wrong to make too much of the drops reported for April and May, as opposed to the modest growth reported in prior months. The higher inflation reported for April and May were largely attributable to unusually large price increases for food and energy. These prices are highly erratic and are likely to be reversed in the months ahead. (Food prices rose at close to a 6.0 percent annual rate over the last two months, compared to a 2.5 percent rate over the last year. Energy prices rose at more than a 7.0 percent rate compared to a 3.3 percent rate over the prior 12 months.)
If these price rises are reversed in the months ahead, which is likely, then we will be back on the path of very weak real wage growth. It will still be the case that workers are seeing very little of the benefit from the recovery, but the number will not be zero.
In the NYT’s Upshot section Neil Irwin correctly notes that real wages have been nearly stagnant in the recovery, however he makes too much of the inflation numbers from the last couple of months. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that inflation rose 0.3 percent in April and 0.4 percent in May. These increases were enough to wipe out modest real wage gains reported in prior months so that the average hourly wage has now fallen slightly over the last year, adjusted for inflation.
While this is bad news, it is wrong to make too much of the drops reported for April and May, as opposed to the modest growth reported in prior months. The higher inflation reported for April and May were largely attributable to unusually large price increases for food and energy. These prices are highly erratic and are likely to be reversed in the months ahead. (Food prices rose at close to a 6.0 percent annual rate over the last two months, compared to a 2.5 percent rate over the last year. Energy prices rose at more than a 7.0 percent rate compared to a 3.3 percent rate over the prior 12 months.)
If these price rises are reversed in the months ahead, which is likely, then we will be back on the path of very weak real wage growth. It will still be the case that workers are seeing very little of the benefit from the recovery, but the number will not be zero.
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Reuters wants its readers to believe that “analysis-wary Argentines” are disgusted with their government’s economic policies as “jobs [are] becoming harder to find.” While there is little doubt that Argentina is experiencing difficult economic times, it certainly is doing much better than countries that have followed an austerity path, like Greece, Spain, and Portugal, all of which are experiencing double-digit unemployment rates.
In fact, Argentina’s 7.6 percent unemployment rate is less than half of its own double-digit rates in the mid-1990s. Back then we were told that Carlos Menem was re-elected based on the success of his economic reforms.
Reuters wants its readers to believe that “analysis-wary Argentines” are disgusted with their government’s economic policies as “jobs [are] becoming harder to find.” While there is little doubt that Argentina is experiencing difficult economic times, it certainly is doing much better than countries that have followed an austerity path, like Greece, Spain, and Portugal, all of which are experiencing double-digit unemployment rates.
In fact, Argentina’s 7.6 percent unemployment rate is less than half of its own double-digit rates in the mid-1990s. Back then we were told that Carlos Menem was re-elected based on the success of his economic reforms.
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Robert Samuelson agreed to be a punching bag again this morning. His column expressed his concern that the stock market and bond market are going in opposite directions. While the stock market has been rising, which in his view is supposed to mean a stronger economy, interest rates in the bond market have been falling which is supposed to mean a weaker economy.
There are two major flaws in Samuelson’s conundrum story. The first is that the stock market is a horrible indicator of the future. Remember when the market plunged back in 2006 giving us advance warning of the economic disaster that would follow from the collapse of the housing bubble? Oh right, the market rose through 2007 and hit a new nominal high in late October of that year, just over a month before the beginning of the recession.
And of course there was the crash in 1987 that foretold of the ensuing recession that didn’t happen, or at least not for another two and a half years (after the market had fully recovered). Given the weak relationship between the market’s performance and the future state of the economy, it is difficult to believe that anyone would look to the former as predictor of the latter.
The other point is that even in theory the stock market is not supposed to be a predictor of the economy. The stock market is supposed to represent the present value of future profits. In recent years the profit share of output has been extraordinarily high. A likely reason for the surge in profit shares is the weakness of the labor market. If the economy were to get stronger the unemployment rate would fall to more normal levels. This would increase workers’ bargaining power and likely lead to a drop in profit shares. This means that if traders in stock anticipated stronger growth, it could be associated with a drop in stock prices since the decline in profit shares would more than offset the higher profits associated with higher GDP.
In short there is no reason, either based on past evidence or in economic theory, that higher stock prices should be taken as implying stronger economic growth. This is another great non-conundrum to keep economic policy types in Washington employed.
Robert Samuelson agreed to be a punching bag again this morning. His column expressed his concern that the stock market and bond market are going in opposite directions. While the stock market has been rising, which in his view is supposed to mean a stronger economy, interest rates in the bond market have been falling which is supposed to mean a weaker economy.
There are two major flaws in Samuelson’s conundrum story. The first is that the stock market is a horrible indicator of the future. Remember when the market plunged back in 2006 giving us advance warning of the economic disaster that would follow from the collapse of the housing bubble? Oh right, the market rose through 2007 and hit a new nominal high in late October of that year, just over a month before the beginning of the recession.
And of course there was the crash in 1987 that foretold of the ensuing recession that didn’t happen, or at least not for another two and a half years (after the market had fully recovered). Given the weak relationship between the market’s performance and the future state of the economy, it is difficult to believe that anyone would look to the former as predictor of the latter.
The other point is that even in theory the stock market is not supposed to be a predictor of the economy. The stock market is supposed to represent the present value of future profits. In recent years the profit share of output has been extraordinarily high. A likely reason for the surge in profit shares is the weakness of the labor market. If the economy were to get stronger the unemployment rate would fall to more normal levels. This would increase workers’ bargaining power and likely lead to a drop in profit shares. This means that if traders in stock anticipated stronger growth, it could be associated with a drop in stock prices since the decline in profit shares would more than offset the higher profits associated with higher GDP.
In short there is no reason, either based on past evidence or in economic theory, that higher stock prices should be taken as implying stronger economic growth. This is another great non-conundrum to keep economic policy types in Washington employed.
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