There was a lengthy and pointless debate that began in the early 90s over what sized businesses created the most jobs. The original story was that small businesses created the most jobs. This turned out not to be true on more careful investigation, since small businesses also lost the most jobs. There were various twists and turns in the academic literature before most economists came to the conclusion that businesses of all sizes on net create jobs at roughly the same rate.
While this debate kept many economists employed and no doubt helped to boost wages in the profession, it did little to advance our knowledge of the economy. Unfortunately economists learn little from such experiences.
We now have the sequel to this silliness with the claim that it is new businesses that create jobs. This claim emanates most prominently from the entrepreneurially oriented Kauffman Foundation. It was picked up in an Ezra Klein column yesterday. The argument coming from this direction is that all the job growth in the last three decades came from new businesses. Employment in firms that existed in 1980 has just stayed roughly even.
The reason this claim is silly is that the decision of a corporation to expand and open a new division depends to a large extent on the ease with which new businesses can form. If it is easy for start-ups to form, then existing businesses will be less likely to expand their operations by setting up a new division. If they want to get into a new area, then they will just buy a start-up that looks promising.
The logic here is simple. The vast majority of start-ups will fail. However if there are a large number, then certainly some will succeed. The ones that do can then be purchased by existing companies that want to expand. The new jobs can then be attributed to start-ups and not existing businesses, but this is entirely due to the fact that we make it easy for start-ups to form.
An example of this story is Google’s acquisition of Youtube. The fact that there was a successful start-up that Google could buy made it easier to enter this market. But does anyone think that Google would not have moved itself in a similar direction had Youtube not existed?
The point is that even if we accept that all net new jobs came from start-ups it does not follow that we necessarily want to do more to encourage start-ups nor adopt any policies that have a negative impact on existing businesses to favor start-ups. The reason why the former is not true is that the vast majority of new businesses fail within a decade. It is reasonable to assume that the marginal start-up (the ones we encourage with our new more start-up friendly policies) will be less successful on average than the current group that did not need this extra boost from the government.
This means that we will possibly be encouraging millions more people to take their life’s savings, work ridiculously long hours, usually dragging in other family members, in pursuing a venture that will fail. We will then see the person without a business, without savings and without a job and just a few years left to retirement. That doesn’t sound like good policy, nor is it a good use of the economy’s resources.
On other side, suppose we tilt the playing a field a bit to favor new businesses at the expense of existing businesses. Well, if we accept the Kauffman analysis, imagine that instead of holding their own existing businesses had lost 5 percent of their jobs over the last three decades. That would give us a really big hole. Would the additional tilt to new businesses fill this gap? We don’t know — at least the Kauffman data don’t answer this question.
The long and short is that new businesses are wonderful, but policies that go overboard to push people to start new businesses are likely to ruin many lives and lead their promoters with lots of egg on their face.
There was a lengthy and pointless debate that began in the early 90s over what sized businesses created the most jobs. The original story was that small businesses created the most jobs. This turned out not to be true on more careful investigation, since small businesses also lost the most jobs. There were various twists and turns in the academic literature before most economists came to the conclusion that businesses of all sizes on net create jobs at roughly the same rate.
While this debate kept many economists employed and no doubt helped to boost wages in the profession, it did little to advance our knowledge of the economy. Unfortunately economists learn little from such experiences.
We now have the sequel to this silliness with the claim that it is new businesses that create jobs. This claim emanates most prominently from the entrepreneurially oriented Kauffman Foundation. It was picked up in an Ezra Klein column yesterday. The argument coming from this direction is that all the job growth in the last three decades came from new businesses. Employment in firms that existed in 1980 has just stayed roughly even.
The reason this claim is silly is that the decision of a corporation to expand and open a new division depends to a large extent on the ease with which new businesses can form. If it is easy for start-ups to form, then existing businesses will be less likely to expand their operations by setting up a new division. If they want to get into a new area, then they will just buy a start-up that looks promising.
The logic here is simple. The vast majority of start-ups will fail. However if there are a large number, then certainly some will succeed. The ones that do can then be purchased by existing companies that want to expand. The new jobs can then be attributed to start-ups and not existing businesses, but this is entirely due to the fact that we make it easy for start-ups to form.
An example of this story is Google’s acquisition of Youtube. The fact that there was a successful start-up that Google could buy made it easier to enter this market. But does anyone think that Google would not have moved itself in a similar direction had Youtube not existed?
The point is that even if we accept that all net new jobs came from start-ups it does not follow that we necessarily want to do more to encourage start-ups nor adopt any policies that have a negative impact on existing businesses to favor start-ups. The reason why the former is not true is that the vast majority of new businesses fail within a decade. It is reasonable to assume that the marginal start-up (the ones we encourage with our new more start-up friendly policies) will be less successful on average than the current group that did not need this extra boost from the government.
This means that we will possibly be encouraging millions more people to take their life’s savings, work ridiculously long hours, usually dragging in other family members, in pursuing a venture that will fail. We will then see the person without a business, without savings and without a job and just a few years left to retirement. That doesn’t sound like good policy, nor is it a good use of the economy’s resources.
On other side, suppose we tilt the playing a field a bit to favor new businesses at the expense of existing businesses. Well, if we accept the Kauffman analysis, imagine that instead of holding their own existing businesses had lost 5 percent of their jobs over the last three decades. That would give us a really big hole. Would the additional tilt to new businesses fill this gap? We don’t know — at least the Kauffman data don’t answer this question.
The long and short is that new businesses are wonderful, but policies that go overboard to push people to start new businesses are likely to ruin many lives and lead their promoters with lots of egg on their face.
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That arguably should have been the headline of a Post segment discussing the release of new polling data from the Pew Research Center, which Kohut heads. The Center’s poll asked people a series of questions about the budget, taxes, and various programs. Most people answered that they viewed the deficit as a major concern. They were also strongly supportive of all major areas of federal spending with the exception of the military. In the case of military spending, there were almost equal numbers of people favoring cuts as increases. In the case of Medicare and Social Security, those favoring increases outnumbered those supporting cuts by more than 3 to 1.
In the case of Social Security, an overwhelming majority of respondents said that they supported raising the cap on taxable wages (currently $110,000). In addition, an overwhelming majority also said that they would rather see the tax rate increased than face a cut in benefits.
The conclusion of the Post piece tells readers:
“But ultimately, despite listing the deficit as a priority, most Americans — about 60 percent in a 2011 poll — would prefer to maintain benefits than take steps to reduce federal spending. As Kohut explains, this puts legislators in a real bind: ‘They are dealing with a public that is demanding solution to a problem which it has declared to be a major priority, but at the same time Americans are resistant, or divided at best, on the sacrifices that would be required to achieve a solution.'”
Contrary to what Kohut asserted, legislators are not in a bind if they want to follow public opinion. They can easily deal with the problems facing Social Security by raising the cap on taxable wages and phasing in an increase in tax rates over many decades in the future. If ordinary workers again share in the economy’s productivity growth, as the Social Security trustees projections assume, these tax increases would be a small fraction of future wage gains.
That arguably should have been the headline of a Post segment discussing the release of new polling data from the Pew Research Center, which Kohut heads. The Center’s poll asked people a series of questions about the budget, taxes, and various programs. Most people answered that they viewed the deficit as a major concern. They were also strongly supportive of all major areas of federal spending with the exception of the military. In the case of military spending, there were almost equal numbers of people favoring cuts as increases. In the case of Medicare and Social Security, those favoring increases outnumbered those supporting cuts by more than 3 to 1.
In the case of Social Security, an overwhelming majority of respondents said that they supported raising the cap on taxable wages (currently $110,000). In addition, an overwhelming majority also said that they would rather see the tax rate increased than face a cut in benefits.
The conclusion of the Post piece tells readers:
“But ultimately, despite listing the deficit as a priority, most Americans — about 60 percent in a 2011 poll — would prefer to maintain benefits than take steps to reduce federal spending. As Kohut explains, this puts legislators in a real bind: ‘They are dealing with a public that is demanding solution to a problem which it has declared to be a major priority, but at the same time Americans are resistant, or divided at best, on the sacrifices that would be required to achieve a solution.'”
Contrary to what Kohut asserted, legislators are not in a bind if they want to follow public opinion. They can easily deal with the problems facing Social Security by raising the cap on taxable wages and phasing in an increase in tax rates over many decades in the future. If ordinary workers again share in the economy’s productivity growth, as the Social Security trustees projections assume, these tax increases would be a small fraction of future wage gains.
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That probably was not his intention, but that is the only conclusion that numerate readers can take away from his column. He tells readers that:
“But many Republicans have now come to the conclusion that the welfare-state model is in its death throes.”
He points to the crises in Greece, Spain, and Italy and then adds:
“In the decades after World War II, the U.S. economy grew by well over 3 percent a year, on average. But, since then, it has failed to keep pace with changing realities. The average growth was a paltry 1.7 percent annually between 2000 and 2009. It averaged 0.6 percent growth between 2009 and 2011. Wages have failed to keep up with productivity. Family net worth is back at the same level it was at 20 years ago.”
There are a number of problems with this story. First Greece, Spain, and Italy have among the least developed welfare states in Europe. If someone wants to make an argument that there is some inherent problem with the welfare state model then we should look for crises in Sweden, Denmark and Germany, all states with far more generous welfare states than these Mediterranean countries. In fact, the welfare states of northern Europe are doing relatively well through the crisis, it is difficult to understand how anyone can look at the pattern of the crisis across Europe and conclude that it implies that the welfare state model has reached its end.
Brooks account of U.S. growth is just bizarre. Did he somehow miss the collapse of the housing bubble? If he excluded the period since the crisis then there is not much of a case for a weakening economy. The economy definitely did better in the three decades immediately following World War II, when the top marginal tax rate was between 70-90 percent than it did in the post-Reagan years, but there was a substantial uptick in productivity growth in the mid-90s. The second half of that decade saw the strongest sustained growth since the early 70s, with workers up and down the income latter sharing in the gains of productivity growth.
The economy did turn down with the collapse of the stock bubble in 2000-2002, but it is hard to see how Republicans tie the collapse of this bubble to the death throes of the welfare state, just as it is difficult to see how the more recent collapse of the housing bubble implies the death throes of the welfare state. In principle the Los Angeles Kings victory in the Stanley Cup could also signal the death throes of the welfare state, but it is not easy to see the connection. The more obvious take away from this story is that a corrupt financial sector can wreck the economy.
In terms of the link between wages and productivity growth, Brooks Republican friends seem to be in an inverted world. If this is the concern, then the welfare states in Europe would seem to be the answer, not the problem. Workers have certainly seen more of the benefits of productivity growth over the last three decades in northern Europe than in the United States. If Brooks has a point here, it is very difficult to see what it is.
He then comments:
“Money that could go to schools and innovation must now go to pensions and health care. This model, which once offered insurance from the disasters inherent in capitalism, has now become a giant machine for redistributing money from the future to the elderly. “
Brooks is presumably referring primarily to health care (assuming that he has an idea of the numbers involved), since that has been the sector showing rapid increases in costs. Of course here also the story is 180 degrees at odds with what Brooks has in his piece. All the welfare states in Europe have much lower per person health care costs than the United States. In fact, the average is less than half as much. If the U.S. paid the same amount per person for health care as Denmark, Germany, or Sweden we would be looking at massive budget surpluses.
The idea that Mitt Romney expects “an efficiency explosion” from relying more on the market in the health care sector defies both common sense and a massive amount of evidence. It is more likely that he expects a big jump in profits for private insurers and other powerful interests in the health care sector.
In short, if Brooks hoped to show why Republicans rationally concluded that the United States should further cut back its welfare state he fell way short of the mark.
That probably was not his intention, but that is the only conclusion that numerate readers can take away from his column. He tells readers that:
“But many Republicans have now come to the conclusion that the welfare-state model is in its death throes.”
He points to the crises in Greece, Spain, and Italy and then adds:
“In the decades after World War II, the U.S. economy grew by well over 3 percent a year, on average. But, since then, it has failed to keep pace with changing realities. The average growth was a paltry 1.7 percent annually between 2000 and 2009. It averaged 0.6 percent growth between 2009 and 2011. Wages have failed to keep up with productivity. Family net worth is back at the same level it was at 20 years ago.”
There are a number of problems with this story. First Greece, Spain, and Italy have among the least developed welfare states in Europe. If someone wants to make an argument that there is some inherent problem with the welfare state model then we should look for crises in Sweden, Denmark and Germany, all states with far more generous welfare states than these Mediterranean countries. In fact, the welfare states of northern Europe are doing relatively well through the crisis, it is difficult to understand how anyone can look at the pattern of the crisis across Europe and conclude that it implies that the welfare state model has reached its end.
Brooks account of U.S. growth is just bizarre. Did he somehow miss the collapse of the housing bubble? If he excluded the period since the crisis then there is not much of a case for a weakening economy. The economy definitely did better in the three decades immediately following World War II, when the top marginal tax rate was between 70-90 percent than it did in the post-Reagan years, but there was a substantial uptick in productivity growth in the mid-90s. The second half of that decade saw the strongest sustained growth since the early 70s, with workers up and down the income latter sharing in the gains of productivity growth.
The economy did turn down with the collapse of the stock bubble in 2000-2002, but it is hard to see how Republicans tie the collapse of this bubble to the death throes of the welfare state, just as it is difficult to see how the more recent collapse of the housing bubble implies the death throes of the welfare state. In principle the Los Angeles Kings victory in the Stanley Cup could also signal the death throes of the welfare state, but it is not easy to see the connection. The more obvious take away from this story is that a corrupt financial sector can wreck the economy.
In terms of the link between wages and productivity growth, Brooks Republican friends seem to be in an inverted world. If this is the concern, then the welfare states in Europe would seem to be the answer, not the problem. Workers have certainly seen more of the benefits of productivity growth over the last three decades in northern Europe than in the United States. If Brooks has a point here, it is very difficult to see what it is.
He then comments:
“Money that could go to schools and innovation must now go to pensions and health care. This model, which once offered insurance from the disasters inherent in capitalism, has now become a giant machine for redistributing money from the future to the elderly. “
Brooks is presumably referring primarily to health care (assuming that he has an idea of the numbers involved), since that has been the sector showing rapid increases in costs. Of course here also the story is 180 degrees at odds with what Brooks has in his piece. All the welfare states in Europe have much lower per person health care costs than the United States. In fact, the average is less than half as much. If the U.S. paid the same amount per person for health care as Denmark, Germany, or Sweden we would be looking at massive budget surpluses.
The idea that Mitt Romney expects “an efficiency explosion” from relying more on the market in the health care sector defies both common sense and a massive amount of evidence. It is more likely that he expects a big jump in profits for private insurers and other powerful interests in the health care sector.
In short, if Brooks hoped to show why Republicans rationally concluded that the United States should further cut back its welfare state he fell way short of the mark.
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Those of you who thought that Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, was only good at blowing billions of dollars in risky bets, will be surprised to discover that he is also an expert on the impact of the government debt on the economy. That at least is what Dana Milbank would have us believe.
Milbank commented that President Obama is:
“hoping to limp to a second term without addressing the looming debt crisis — which, as JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon told Congress this week, has contributed to today’s economic malaise.”
Hey, if Jamie Dimon says it, it’s got to be true.
This diatribe stood out even by Washington Post standards. The headline, “skip the falsehoods, Mr. President, and give us a plan,” essentially calls President Obama a liar because he won’t cut Social Security and Medicare as Milbanks wants.
Those of you who thought that Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, was only good at blowing billions of dollars in risky bets, will be surprised to discover that he is also an expert on the impact of the government debt on the economy. That at least is what Dana Milbank would have us believe.
Milbank commented that President Obama is:
“hoping to limp to a second term without addressing the looming debt crisis — which, as JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon told Congress this week, has contributed to today’s economic malaise.”
Hey, if Jamie Dimon says it, it’s got to be true.
This diatribe stood out even by Washington Post standards. The headline, “skip the falsehoods, Mr. President, and give us a plan,” essentially calls President Obama a liar because he won’t cut Social Security and Medicare as Milbanks wants.
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In Washington the definition of an expert is someone who can be wrong all the time and still be an expert. The folks at the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard are clearly experts.
The Joint Center gained notoriety in the last decade for completely missing the bubble, dismissing those of us who tried to warn that homebuyers in the years 2002-2007 were taking serious risks. Here are a couple of choice comments [thanks to Ben Zipperer].
“So that leads us to the conclusion that while double digit price appreciation is a thing of the past, that it can’t be sustained, that what we’re looking for at least in the next few years is a much flattened price appreciation over time. Over the long run however, we tend to be relatively bullish in terms of prices because we still have a growing population. And in many markets there continues to be constraints on supply. So a rough, rocky patch, lots of rain and clouds and maybe thunderstorms, but we don’t think the sky will fall on the housing sector.” – Nicholas Retsinas, July 18, 2006.
“2007 doesn’t look very good form the housing market’s point of view. I do think we may be near the bottom. The good news for example is inventories have started to stabilize, but at a high number. So I think we’re near the bottom but I think we’re going to be at the bottom for a while and if history is any guide, then it looks like this housing market downturn will probably last well into 2007, and it won’t be toward the last quarter, maybe 2008 before we see signs of it turning around.” – Nicholas Retsinas, December 26, 2006.
Given that the Harvard Center completely missed the largest decline in the U.S. housing market ever, they would naturally be the people you would contact to discuss the bottom of the housing market. In this case the Harvard boys happen to be right, sort of like a stopped clock will be right twice a day.
In Washington the definition of an expert is someone who can be wrong all the time and still be an expert. The folks at the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard are clearly experts.
The Joint Center gained notoriety in the last decade for completely missing the bubble, dismissing those of us who tried to warn that homebuyers in the years 2002-2007 were taking serious risks. Here are a couple of choice comments [thanks to Ben Zipperer].
“So that leads us to the conclusion that while double digit price appreciation is a thing of the past, that it can’t be sustained, that what we’re looking for at least in the next few years is a much flattened price appreciation over time. Over the long run however, we tend to be relatively bullish in terms of prices because we still have a growing population. And in many markets there continues to be constraints on supply. So a rough, rocky patch, lots of rain and clouds and maybe thunderstorms, but we don’t think the sky will fall on the housing sector.” – Nicholas Retsinas, July 18, 2006.
“2007 doesn’t look very good form the housing market’s point of view. I do think we may be near the bottom. The good news for example is inventories have started to stabilize, but at a high number. So I think we’re near the bottom but I think we’re going to be at the bottom for a while and if history is any guide, then it looks like this housing market downturn will probably last well into 2007, and it won’t be toward the last quarter, maybe 2008 before we see signs of it turning around.” – Nicholas Retsinas, December 26, 2006.
Given that the Harvard Center completely missed the largest decline in the U.S. housing market ever, they would naturally be the people you would contact to discuss the bottom of the housing market. In this case the Harvard boys happen to be right, sort of like a stopped clock will be right twice a day.
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In discussing presumptive Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney’s statements on the economy, the Post told readers:
“Romney’s theory is that keeping tax rates low would spur investment in new businesses, thereby increasing economic growth and perhaps tax revenue itself. He believes that rolling back regulations would reduce the cost of doing business and make the United States more competitive.”
It is not clear that Romney has a “theory” about the economy, nor does the Post know what he really believes. Romney has said that he wants to have lower tax rates on the wealthy and corporations. This will put more money in the pockets of the wealthy, the Post does not know if he actually believes this will help the economy.
The quote that follows this assertion indicate that Romney does not believe what he is saying, since is obviously not true.
“The president’s team indicated that if we passed their stimulus of $787 billion, borrowed, that they’d hold unemployment below 8 percent. We’ve gone 40 straight months with unemployment above 8 percent.
…. If you look at his record over the last 31 / 2 years, you will conclude, as I have, that it is the most anti-investment, anti-business, anti-jobs series of policies in modern American history.”
The comment about 8 percent unemployment refers to a memo printed in early January of 2009 that badly underestimated the severity of the downturn. The memo estimated that the stimulus requested by President Obama would create between 3-4 million jobs. In order to get the necessary Republican support in the Senate, President Obama agreed to a less effective stimulus, which the Congressional Budget Office has estimated created betwen 2-3 million jobs.
The main mistake in this memo was in its projections for the economy, not its assessment of the effectiveness of the stimulus. Presumably Mr. Romney knows this.
The second claim, that President Obama has pursued the most anti-investment, anti-business, anti-jobs policies in modern American history is absurd on its face. Profits are at their highest share of GDP is almost 50 years.
Since Romney must know that these assertions are not true, they cannot reflect what he actually believes. In such cases, rather than trying to penetrate Mr. Romney’s thoughts for readers the Post would be better advised to just report what he says.
In discussing presumptive Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney’s statements on the economy, the Post told readers:
“Romney’s theory is that keeping tax rates low would spur investment in new businesses, thereby increasing economic growth and perhaps tax revenue itself. He believes that rolling back regulations would reduce the cost of doing business and make the United States more competitive.”
It is not clear that Romney has a “theory” about the economy, nor does the Post know what he really believes. Romney has said that he wants to have lower tax rates on the wealthy and corporations. This will put more money in the pockets of the wealthy, the Post does not know if he actually believes this will help the economy.
The quote that follows this assertion indicate that Romney does not believe what he is saying, since is obviously not true.
“The president’s team indicated that if we passed their stimulus of $787 billion, borrowed, that they’d hold unemployment below 8 percent. We’ve gone 40 straight months with unemployment above 8 percent.
…. If you look at his record over the last 31 / 2 years, you will conclude, as I have, that it is the most anti-investment, anti-business, anti-jobs series of policies in modern American history.”
The comment about 8 percent unemployment refers to a memo printed in early January of 2009 that badly underestimated the severity of the downturn. The memo estimated that the stimulus requested by President Obama would create between 3-4 million jobs. In order to get the necessary Republican support in the Senate, President Obama agreed to a less effective stimulus, which the Congressional Budget Office has estimated created betwen 2-3 million jobs.
The main mistake in this memo was in its projections for the economy, not its assessment of the effectiveness of the stimulus. Presumably Mr. Romney knows this.
The second claim, that President Obama has pursued the most anti-investment, anti-business, anti-jobs policies in modern American history is absurd on its face. Profits are at their highest share of GDP is almost 50 years.
Since Romney must know that these assertions are not true, they cannot reflect what he actually believes. In such cases, rather than trying to penetrate Mr. Romney’s thoughts for readers the Post would be better advised to just report what he says.
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Hans-Werner Sinn, the president of the Ifo Institute and the director of the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, compellingly argued that the euro cannot survive in an oped in the NYT this morning. That probably was not his intention. But as one of the respected economic voices in Germany, he showed how completely oblivious that country’s economic policy makers are to the steps that would actually be needed to address the euro crisis.
Mr. Sinn lays out how much money Germany has committed to the bailout of Greece, telling readers that Germans have taken on an enormous burden already to keep Greece afloat. He effectively is asking readers how much more can Germany be expected to give?
Of course that is not the relevant question. Germany will have to allow the European Central Bank to guarantee the debts of the debt-burdened countries. This will allow them to pay much lower interest rates on their debt, which will make the burdens sustainable.
The other step that Germany must take is to allow a higher inflation rate, propelled by more rapid wage growth, in order to allow peripheral countries to regain competitiveness. If there is not a change in relative prices between Germany and the peripheral countries then it will be impossible for them to reduce their trade imbalance, which is the central cause of their problem.
The appropriate analogy here is with putting water into a leaky bucket. Mr. Sinn is telling us how much water Germany has put into the leaky bucket of Greece. However it refuses to go along with measures that would patch the holes in the bucket. In fact, it doesn’t appear as though patching the holes is even on the agenda.
If Sinn’s views reflect the attitudes of German policymakers then the euro is doomed. Putting more water in the leaky bucket will not do the trick.
Hans-Werner Sinn, the president of the Ifo Institute and the director of the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, compellingly argued that the euro cannot survive in an oped in the NYT this morning. That probably was not his intention. But as one of the respected economic voices in Germany, he showed how completely oblivious that country’s economic policy makers are to the steps that would actually be needed to address the euro crisis.
Mr. Sinn lays out how much money Germany has committed to the bailout of Greece, telling readers that Germans have taken on an enormous burden already to keep Greece afloat. He effectively is asking readers how much more can Germany be expected to give?
Of course that is not the relevant question. Germany will have to allow the European Central Bank to guarantee the debts of the debt-burdened countries. This will allow them to pay much lower interest rates on their debt, which will make the burdens sustainable.
The other step that Germany must take is to allow a higher inflation rate, propelled by more rapid wage growth, in order to allow peripheral countries to regain competitiveness. If there is not a change in relative prices between Germany and the peripheral countries then it will be impossible for them to reduce their trade imbalance, which is the central cause of their problem.
The appropriate analogy here is with putting water into a leaky bucket. Mr. Sinn is telling us how much water Germany has put into the leaky bucket of Greece. However it refuses to go along with measures that would patch the holes in the bucket. In fact, it doesn’t appear as though patching the holes is even on the agenda.
If Sinn’s views reflect the attitudes of German policymakers then the euro is doomed. Putting more water in the leaky bucket will not do the trick.
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Harold Meyerson has a good column on the impact of the decline in unionization on the middle class. However he makes a mistake in saying the the labor share of income has only declined in the United States and crisis countries in the euro zone. Actually, if we go back to 1980, the labor share of income has declined pretty much everywhere in Europe, although there are differences across countries. In many countries the decline in labor shares has been larger than in the United States. (Meyerson’s comparison of 2001 and 2011 is misleading because 2001 was a cyclical peak for labor share in the U.S.)
Meyerson also blames the reduction in wages for ordinary workers on globalization. This is somewhat misleading. We could have designed trade policies that focused on opening up the most highly paid professions (e.g. doctors, lawyers, economists) to more international competition. This would have driven down wages in these professions and led to higher living standards for ordinary workers since the services they provide would cost less.
Instead policymakers have adopted policies that were designed to put manufacturing workers in direct competition with low-paid workers in the developing world. These policies would lower their wages, making doctors, lawyers, and economists richer in addition to owners of capital.
Harold Meyerson has a good column on the impact of the decline in unionization on the middle class. However he makes a mistake in saying the the labor share of income has only declined in the United States and crisis countries in the euro zone. Actually, if we go back to 1980, the labor share of income has declined pretty much everywhere in Europe, although there are differences across countries. In many countries the decline in labor shares has been larger than in the United States. (Meyerson’s comparison of 2001 and 2011 is misleading because 2001 was a cyclical peak for labor share in the U.S.)
Meyerson also blames the reduction in wages for ordinary workers on globalization. This is somewhat misleading. We could have designed trade policies that focused on opening up the most highly paid professions (e.g. doctors, lawyers, economists) to more international competition. This would have driven down wages in these professions and led to higher living standards for ordinary workers since the services they provide would cost less.
Instead policymakers have adopted policies that were designed to put manufacturing workers in direct competition with low-paid workers in the developing world. These policies would lower their wages, making doctors, lawyers, and economists richer in addition to owners of capital.
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