Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch is a blog that tracks multinational aid efforts in Haiti with an eye towards ensuring they are oriented towards the needs of the Haitian people, and that aid is not used to undermine Haitians' right to self-determination.

At the United Nations Security Council meeting last week, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power did not mince words regarding who was to blame for Haiti’s electoral impasse. Power, speaking to the assembled members, stated bluntly [PDF]:

But a group of six senators seems intent on holding elections hostage to partisan concerns, even going so far as to prevent a debate on the electoral law.

Legislators in a democracy have a responsibility to defend their constituents’ rights. But when elected officials take advantage of democracy’s checks and balances to cynically block debates and elections altogether, they stand in the way of addressing citizens’ real needs.

It wasn’t just the U.S. referencing the so called “Group of 6.” The head of MINUSTAH, the U.N. mission in Haiti, also blamed a “group of Senators opposed to the El Rancho Accord.” Today, in a separate action, 15 U.S. members of Congress wrote to the Senate president Simon Desras. As the Miami Herald reports, the lawmakers wrote that:

“We are deeply concerned that the Haitian Senate has been unable to pass the requisite legislation to authorize elections this year….We believe that Haitians deserve better than to have this fundamental democratic right continually delayed.”

But, the Herald continues, “[i]n addition to the senators, several large political parties in Haiti are also opposed to the agreement and were not part of the negotiations [the El Rancho Accord]. In addition to raising constitutional issues, Martelly opponents have also raised questions about the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) tasked with organizing the vote. Many feel that it is currently being controlled by the executive.”

Opposition leader Mirlande Manigat, a conservative who lost to Martelly in a run-off election in 2011 and is a constitutional scholar, responded to the comments from the U.S. and the U.N., saying it was unreasonable to overlook the role that Martelly has played in the delay:

“For three years, he refused to call elections. A large part of this is his fault…It is unfair to accuse the six senators for the crisis.”

As we have noted previously, there are legal and constitutional reasons behind the oppositions’ electoral stance. According to Mario Joseph, managing lawyer for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, “Prompt elections are much needed, but elections will only remedy Haiti’s political crisis if they are run fairly by a constitutionally-mandated electoral council. President Michel Martelly has delayed elections for three years because he does not want to lose the political control he has enjoyed without full parliamentary oversight.”

Given the outrage coming from the U.S. and other foreign powers about the delayed elections and the focus on this group of senators, it could be easy to forget that indeed, as Joseph and Manigat point out, this issue has been developing for years, a fact of which the international community is well aware. For starters, much of the current political stalemate arises from the deeply flawed presidential elections in 2010, through which Martelly was elected only after the arbitrary intervention of the Organization of American States. Since that election, every year, without fail, the Martelly government has pledged to hold elections and then subsequently failed to live up to its promises. By overlooking this background and simply blaming a group of six senators, the international community and the U.S. are once again prioritizing the holding of any election, without regard to the quality of said election.

To illustrate just how long this has been an issue, and the changing viewpoints and criticisms from the international community one need only look back over the last few years of U.N. Security Council meetings.

In September 2011 Martelly had been in office for less than 6 months. With partial legislative elections on the horizon, then head of MINUSTAH Mariano Fernandez Amunategui spoke to the council [PDF]:

“It will also be important to support the electoral process in Haiti, which is preparing for partial legislative and local Government elections in November. In that respect, I stress that electoral reform, including the establishment of a credible permanent electoral council, is indispensable if Haiti hopes gradually to reduce its dependence on international electoral assistance.”

One year later, after those scheduled elections had not taken place, Fernandez once again addressed the Security Council [PDF]:

An exceptional situation in Haitian political life is currently being played out in that the Senate, which is theoretically made up of 30 members, today has only 20 members… That continues to distort political life, with negative consequences for the democratic stabilization process in Haiti In addition, there is at present a serious impasse in the formation of the Permanent Electoral Council.

Fernandez continued:

The formation of an electoral body of nine members in accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution is an unavoidable prerequisite for any elections; its establishment will determine how soon the pending elections can be held to renew a third of the Senate as well as to elect all municipal mayors and councillors. That is why MINUSTAH is currently working in coordination with the international community to promote dialogue and prepare the way for the soonest possible establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council that is legitimate and legal and that enjoys the broadest possible support.

That year (another with no elections held), the terms of some 130 mayors expired. Rather than let them continue until elections were held, they were replaced by appointees of Martelly. Fast forward another year, and MINUSTAH has a new head, Sandra Honoré. In her address to the Security Council, she states [PDF]:

Turning to the political situation, the continued delay in the holding of long-overdue partial senatorial, municipal and local elections is of increasing concern and poses a series of risks to the stabilization process. Yesterday’s long-awaited submission to Parliament by President Martelly of the draft electoral law that is required to launch the electoral process is a most welcome development. However, there have been protracted delays caused, in part, by the eight months that it took the three branches of Government to designate the nine members of the Electoral Council…

But most importantly, last year Honoré explicitly stated what has caused this grouping of senators to come together:

Despite the executive branch’s repeated public statements in favour of holding the elections as soon as possible, those delays have led a number of political and civil society actors to express skepticism concerning the likelihood that elections will be held in 2013.

Delays in the submission of the draft electoral law by the executive to Parliament fuelled speculation among legislators that the executive had intentionally delayed the process to ensure that Parliament would become non-functional. That perception united a grouping of main opposition parties that repeatedly and publicly called on President Martelly to uphold the constitutional requirement of timely elections, or else to resign, thus popularizing the chant calling for “elections or resignation”.

Again, another year passed without elections. For years now, the international community has called for elections which respect the constitution and reflect a broad consensus. Now, however, with the terms of another third of the Senate and the entire lower house set to expire in January, the calls for elections have become deafening. Unfortunately, it appears as though the U.S. and other countries involved in Haiti, after doing little more than make speeches each year calling for elections, are now willing to accept any sort of election, even if it doesn’t follow the constitutional provisions that they themselves have been citing over the last three years. It is true that Haiti needs to hold elections, but after the debacle in 2010 (largely shoved on Haitians by the international community), it would be wrong to discard the objections of a large section of Haitian society and push forward with another deeply flawed election.

At the United Nations Security Council meeting last week, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power did not mince words regarding who was to blame for Haiti’s electoral impasse. Power, speaking to the assembled members, stated bluntly [PDF]:

But a group of six senators seems intent on holding elections hostage to partisan concerns, even going so far as to prevent a debate on the electoral law.

Legislators in a democracy have a responsibility to defend their constituents’ rights. But when elected officials take advantage of democracy’s checks and balances to cynically block debates and elections altogether, they stand in the way of addressing citizens’ real needs.

It wasn’t just the U.S. referencing the so called “Group of 6.” The head of MINUSTAH, the U.N. mission in Haiti, also blamed a “group of Senators opposed to the El Rancho Accord.” Today, in a separate action, 15 U.S. members of Congress wrote to the Senate president Simon Desras. As the Miami Herald reports, the lawmakers wrote that:

“We are deeply concerned that the Haitian Senate has been unable to pass the requisite legislation to authorize elections this year….We believe that Haitians deserve better than to have this fundamental democratic right continually delayed.”

But, the Herald continues, “[i]n addition to the senators, several large political parties in Haiti are also opposed to the agreement and were not part of the negotiations [the El Rancho Accord]. In addition to raising constitutional issues, Martelly opponents have also raised questions about the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) tasked with organizing the vote. Many feel that it is currently being controlled by the executive.”

Opposition leader Mirlande Manigat, a conservative who lost to Martelly in a run-off election in 2011 and is a constitutional scholar, responded to the comments from the U.S. and the U.N., saying it was unreasonable to overlook the role that Martelly has played in the delay:

“For three years, he refused to call elections. A large part of this is his fault…It is unfair to accuse the six senators for the crisis.”

As we have noted previously, there are legal and constitutional reasons behind the oppositions’ electoral stance. According to Mario Joseph, managing lawyer for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, “Prompt elections are much needed, but elections will only remedy Haiti’s political crisis if they are run fairly by a constitutionally-mandated electoral council. President Michel Martelly has delayed elections for three years because he does not want to lose the political control he has enjoyed without full parliamentary oversight.”

Given the outrage coming from the U.S. and other foreign powers about the delayed elections and the focus on this group of senators, it could be easy to forget that indeed, as Joseph and Manigat point out, this issue has been developing for years, a fact of which the international community is well aware. For starters, much of the current political stalemate arises from the deeply flawed presidential elections in 2010, through which Martelly was elected only after the arbitrary intervention of the Organization of American States. Since that election, every year, without fail, the Martelly government has pledged to hold elections and then subsequently failed to live up to its promises. By overlooking this background and simply blaming a group of six senators, the international community and the U.S. are once again prioritizing the holding of any election, without regard to the quality of said election.

To illustrate just how long this has been an issue, and the changing viewpoints and criticisms from the international community one need only look back over the last few years of U.N. Security Council meetings.

In September 2011 Martelly had been in office for less than 6 months. With partial legislative elections on the horizon, then head of MINUSTAH Mariano Fernandez Amunategui spoke to the council [PDF]:

“It will also be important to support the electoral process in Haiti, which is preparing for partial legislative and local Government elections in November. In that respect, I stress that electoral reform, including the establishment of a credible permanent electoral council, is indispensable if Haiti hopes gradually to reduce its dependence on international electoral assistance.”

One year later, after those scheduled elections had not taken place, Fernandez once again addressed the Security Council [PDF]:

An exceptional situation in Haitian political life is currently being played out in that the Senate, which is theoretically made up of 30 members, today has only 20 members… That continues to distort political life, with negative consequences for the democratic stabilization process in Haiti In addition, there is at present a serious impasse in the formation of the Permanent Electoral Council.

Fernandez continued:

The formation of an electoral body of nine members in accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution is an unavoidable prerequisite for any elections; its establishment will determine how soon the pending elections can be held to renew a third of the Senate as well as to elect all municipal mayors and councillors. That is why MINUSTAH is currently working in coordination with the international community to promote dialogue and prepare the way for the soonest possible establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council that is legitimate and legal and that enjoys the broadest possible support.

That year (another with no elections held), the terms of some 130 mayors expired. Rather than let them continue until elections were held, they were replaced by appointees of Martelly. Fast forward another year, and MINUSTAH has a new head, Sandra Honoré. In her address to the Security Council, she states [PDF]:

Turning to the political situation, the continued delay in the holding of long-overdue partial senatorial, municipal and local elections is of increasing concern and poses a series of risks to the stabilization process. Yesterday’s long-awaited submission to Parliament by President Martelly of the draft electoral law that is required to launch the electoral process is a most welcome development. However, there have been protracted delays caused, in part, by the eight months that it took the three branches of Government to designate the nine members of the Electoral Council…

But most importantly, last year Honoré explicitly stated what has caused this grouping of senators to come together:

Despite the executive branch’s repeated public statements in favour of holding the elections as soon as possible, those delays have led a number of political and civil society actors to express skepticism concerning the likelihood that elections will be held in 2013.

Delays in the submission of the draft electoral law by the executive to Parliament fuelled speculation among legislators that the executive had intentionally delayed the process to ensure that Parliament would become non-functional. That perception united a grouping of main opposition parties that repeatedly and publicly called on President Martelly to uphold the constitutional requirement of timely elections, or else to resign, thus popularizing the chant calling for “elections or resignation”.

Again, another year passed without elections. For years now, the international community has called for elections which respect the constitution and reflect a broad consensus. Now, however, with the terms of another third of the Senate and the entire lower house set to expire in January, the calls for elections have become deafening. Unfortunately, it appears as though the U.S. and other countries involved in Haiti, after doing little more than make speeches each year calling for elections, are now willing to accept any sort of election, even if it doesn’t follow the constitutional provisions that they themselves have been citing over the last three years. It is true that Haiti needs to hold elections, but after the debacle in 2010 (largely shoved on Haitians by the international community), it would be wrong to discard the objections of a large section of Haitian society and push forward with another deeply flawed election.

Fanmi Lavalas leaders report that the police that have guarded former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s residence since he returned to Haiti in 2011 were removed around 1:00 a.m. this morning. It is unclear who ordered the removal of the state security agents, but Agence Haitienne de Presse is reporting that Haitian National Police deny giving the order, and that a “pro-government source” says the orders came from the National Palace. This news conflicts with reports yesterday that Aristide is being placed under house arrest. While Judge Lamarre Belizaire reportedly issued an order for “agents of the prison administration, known as APENA” to be placed around Aristide’s house in Tabarre (according to the Caribbean Media Corporation) and “agents of the Central Department of the Judicial Police” to guard the perimeter of his residence, witnesses on the ground say it appears that law enforcement agencies have ignored Belizaire’s order. Under Haitian law, house arrest has no legal basis.

Brian Concannon of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, whose sister organization the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux’s Managing Attorney Mario Joseph represents Aristide, sees the withdrawal of security as retaliation against Aristide for exercising his civil rights. Specifically, Aristide’s lawyers’ are seeking the recusal and dismissal of Judge Belizaire, who is already barred from practicing law for 10 years after he leaves his position as judge.

Concannon says that the message is that “If you assert your civil rights, we’re going to expose you and your family to being killed.” He sees it as a clear signal from the Haitian government that “the police will not come to Aristide’s aid if something happens.” The secretive way in which the security was pulled, in the dead of night, is worrying, he notes.

Aristide continues to have many enemies in Haiti. He was twice ousted in violent coups, in 1991 and 2004. Some of the people involved in the coups and in the killing of Fanmi Lavalas members and other Aristide supporters continue to walk free in Haiti. Haiti’s former dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier – who was ousted in a popular uprising by the grassroots movement that later provided the base for Aristide’s party – also lives freely in Haiti despite the various human rights atrocities committed during his rule and the diverting of hundreds of millions of dollars from the government for his family’s personal use.

There have been numerous recent attacks and threats against human rights defenders and political activists. Haïti Liberté reports:

On Wed., Aug. 20 in Cité Soleil, Clifford Charles, a member of the Fanmi Lavalas Political Organization was killed following a demonstration by residents demanding the release of their imprisoned comrade Louima Louis Juste in the National Penitentiary for the past six months for his political opinions.

Human rights defender Daniel Dorsinvil and his wife Girldy Larêche were murdered earlier this year. Well-known Fanmi Lavalas leader and human rights activist Lovinsky Pierre-Antoine remains missing after being forcibly disappeared in 2007, to name a few other examples.

In this context, the danger to Aristide is real, and it is clear that the Martelly government is putting his life and safety at risk.

Aristide continues to be widely popular, as was seen when thousands of people accompanied his caravan from the airport to his residence in 2011. Over the past weeks, crowds of supporters have repeatedly gathered outside Aristide’s residence following rumors and news of his pending arrest. The AP reported on demonstrations in support of Aristide yesterday on the 26th anniversary of the most infamous assassination attempt against him, when death squads killed at least 13 people and injured 80 more at the St. Jean Bosco church where Aristide was saying mass. The AP’s Evens Sanon writes:

Supporters promised major protests would erupt if what they see as a politically motivated arrest is carried out.

“There is only one person who represents the people of Haiti and his name is President Aristide,” 37-year-old Lionel Patrick said in the yard of the church, which was destroyed in the January 2010 earthquake. “If anything happens to him, Haiti is going to be shut down.”

Any attack on Aristide’s residence is likely to result in many additional casualties.

As we have pointed out previously, the supposedly impending charges and arrest of Aristide – and now the new threat to his security – may be intended to distract from the postponement, yet again, of legislative and local elections that were supposed to be held on October 26. With another third of senate seats expiring next year, as well as the entire House of Deputies, the Martelly administration will be unencumbered by the check-and-balance of the legislature on his authority if elections are not held soon. He also could be in a position to replace local mayors with more appointed “municipal agents,” as he’s already done with 130 of them.

This real exercise of anti-democratic behavior by the current administration is getting far less attention than the rehashed allegations of corruption targeting a past president, even though 10 years of investigations in Haiti and a grand jury in the U.S. have failed to produce evidence of actual corruption by Aristide that could support criminal charges.

The security team’s unusual withdrawal is not just dangerous for Aristide, his wife and daughter. It puts the reputation of the Martelly administration, and its chief international supporter, the Obama administration on the line.  If anything does happen to the Aristide residence, fingers will be pointed at President Martelly and the U.S. Embassy. Many of those fingers will come from the hands of irate Lavalas supporters, who will likely take to the streets in numbers that will cause significant disruption in Haiti.  

Fanmi Lavalas leaders report that the police that have guarded former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s residence since he returned to Haiti in 2011 were removed around 1:00 a.m. this morning. It is unclear who ordered the removal of the state security agents, but Agence Haitienne de Presse is reporting that Haitian National Police deny giving the order, and that a “pro-government source” says the orders came from the National Palace. This news conflicts with reports yesterday that Aristide is being placed under house arrest. While Judge Lamarre Belizaire reportedly issued an order for “agents of the prison administration, known as APENA” to be placed around Aristide’s house in Tabarre (according to the Caribbean Media Corporation) and “agents of the Central Department of the Judicial Police” to guard the perimeter of his residence, witnesses on the ground say it appears that law enforcement agencies have ignored Belizaire’s order. Under Haitian law, house arrest has no legal basis.

Brian Concannon of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, whose sister organization the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux’s Managing Attorney Mario Joseph represents Aristide, sees the withdrawal of security as retaliation against Aristide for exercising his civil rights. Specifically, Aristide’s lawyers’ are seeking the recusal and dismissal of Judge Belizaire, who is already barred from practicing law for 10 years after he leaves his position as judge.

Concannon says that the message is that “If you assert your civil rights, we’re going to expose you and your family to being killed.” He sees it as a clear signal from the Haitian government that “the police will not come to Aristide’s aid if something happens.” The secretive way in which the security was pulled, in the dead of night, is worrying, he notes.

Aristide continues to have many enemies in Haiti. He was twice ousted in violent coups, in 1991 and 2004. Some of the people involved in the coups and in the killing of Fanmi Lavalas members and other Aristide supporters continue to walk free in Haiti. Haiti’s former dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier – who was ousted in a popular uprising by the grassroots movement that later provided the base for Aristide’s party – also lives freely in Haiti despite the various human rights atrocities committed during his rule and the diverting of hundreds of millions of dollars from the government for his family’s personal use.

There have been numerous recent attacks and threats against human rights defenders and political activists. Haïti Liberté reports:

On Wed., Aug. 20 in Cité Soleil, Clifford Charles, a member of the Fanmi Lavalas Political Organization was killed following a demonstration by residents demanding the release of their imprisoned comrade Louima Louis Juste in the National Penitentiary for the past six months for his political opinions.

Human rights defender Daniel Dorsinvil and his wife Girldy Larêche were murdered earlier this year. Well-known Fanmi Lavalas leader and human rights activist Lovinsky Pierre-Antoine remains missing after being forcibly disappeared in 2007, to name a few other examples.

In this context, the danger to Aristide is real, and it is clear that the Martelly government is putting his life and safety at risk.

Aristide continues to be widely popular, as was seen when thousands of people accompanied his caravan from the airport to his residence in 2011. Over the past weeks, crowds of supporters have repeatedly gathered outside Aristide’s residence following rumors and news of his pending arrest. The AP reported on demonstrations in support of Aristide yesterday on the 26th anniversary of the most infamous assassination attempt against him, when death squads killed at least 13 people and injured 80 more at the St. Jean Bosco church where Aristide was saying mass. The AP’s Evens Sanon writes:

Supporters promised major protests would erupt if what they see as a politically motivated arrest is carried out.

“There is only one person who represents the people of Haiti and his name is President Aristide,” 37-year-old Lionel Patrick said in the yard of the church, which was destroyed in the January 2010 earthquake. “If anything happens to him, Haiti is going to be shut down.”

Any attack on Aristide’s residence is likely to result in many additional casualties.

As we have pointed out previously, the supposedly impending charges and arrest of Aristide – and now the new threat to his security – may be intended to distract from the postponement, yet again, of legislative and local elections that were supposed to be held on October 26. With another third of senate seats expiring next year, as well as the entire House of Deputies, the Martelly administration will be unencumbered by the check-and-balance of the legislature on his authority if elections are not held soon. He also could be in a position to replace local mayors with more appointed “municipal agents,” as he’s already done with 130 of them.

This real exercise of anti-democratic behavior by the current administration is getting far less attention than the rehashed allegations of corruption targeting a past president, even though 10 years of investigations in Haiti and a grand jury in the U.S. have failed to produce evidence of actual corruption by Aristide that could support criminal charges.

The security team’s unusual withdrawal is not just dangerous for Aristide, his wife and daughter. It puts the reputation of the Martelly administration, and its chief international supporter, the Obama administration on the line.  If anything does happen to the Aristide residence, fingers will be pointed at President Martelly and the U.S. Embassy. Many of those fingers will come from the hands of irate Lavalas supporters, who will likely take to the streets in numbers that will cause significant disruption in Haiti.  

Education remains one of Haiti’s lasting challenges. Illiteracy remains high (more than half of the total population), but since the great majority of schools are private, families usually pay for school expenses such as uniforms, meals, books and fees. This means that many children cannot afford school, while many other families struggle to come up with the money. The AP’s Danica Coto reported this week:

Haiti’s education system has suffered for decades due to poverty, political instability and the devastating 2010 earthquake. An estimated 30 percent of young people are illiterate, and only about half of all children can afford to attend primary school, according to UNICEF, the U.N.’s children’s agency. Fewer than a quarter go to secondary school.

The education ministry recently announced that it has invested some $13 million in books and school supplies for this year — though many students still must pay for all or part of their textbooks — and also launched a school meal system that will help 800,000 children.

Another challenge that Haitian school children face is that much of the teaching has been done in French, the country’s traditional language, but one which is spoken by only a (mostly higher-income) minority. In recent years, reformers have sought to expand Creole education, as the AP has also reported:

In a sign of growing interest in Creole’s educational potential, the U.S. Agency for International Development last fall awarded a $12.9 million contract to the North Carolina nonprofit group, RTI International, to create a basic reading curriculum that includes the language.

Last month, USAID’s Office of Inspector General released an audit of the 2-year, 4-month Research Triangle Institute (RTI) contract, which was also intended “to help the Haitian Ministry of Education develop and test an instructional model to improve the reading skills of children in first through third grades in Haiti’s development corridors,” including by “provid[ing] curricula that meet international standards for best practice and respond to Haiti’s culture and students’ educational needs.”

The audit’s conclusions can, unfortunately, be interpreted as a failing grade for RTI’s performance. It found that:

the project did not achieve all of its expected results—particularly with respect to developing and testing an instructional model for children in the second and third grades—and the project is significantly behind schedule to achieve its overall goals within the planned time frames. For example, RTI did not distribute the first-grade curriculum and materials until late March 2013—2 months past the deadline; second- and third-grade materials also were late[.]

In addition, RTI did not implement community literacy strategies fully, and its monitoring of teachers was weak. Implementation delays reduce USAID/Haiti‘s ability to assess and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of various instructional approaches.

More specifically

Despite the contract’s requirements, RTI completed only 13 of the 31 deliverables that were due through March 31, 2014. Eleven were late, and seven have yet to be delivered.

In addition to the late delivery of first-grade curriculum and materials, among the “key deliverables…not implemented as planned”:

Second- and Third-Grade Curriculum and Materials Were Not Developed. As of March 31, 2014, RTI had not developed and distributed second-grade curriculum and materials by the project’s original June 2013 deadline (subsequently amended to March 31, 2014). RTI officials said they would not meet the deadline of developing third-grade materials by June 2014.

Late and Weak Implementation of Community-based Activities for Treatment 2 Schools. During the first year of the project, RTI was to implement community-based activities in 75 of the 200 schools. However, it did not implement many of the activities fully. For example, RTI did not (1) develop report cards for teachers and parents that showed whether students’ reading skills were improving, (2) hold literacy fairs at schools, (3) facilitate parent meetings, and (4) hold weekly reading clubs as required. Other planned activities were dropped, including (1) Big-Brother/Sister Reading Partners, (2) bookmaking workshops, and (3) initiating a radio listening club.

Part of the poor performance was due to a subcontractor. The audit notes that the subcontractor only completed one-third of the mandated visits to schools during the 2012-2013 school year, and “continued to underperform for the 2013-2014 school year.”

Another finding of the audit calls into question whether RTI staff were qualified for the contract in the first place:

Mission officials said RTI’s staff lacked experience in developing the training materials, and some team members had no experience in Haiti or did not speak French or Creole. This resulted, they said, in poor-quality materials that required substantial revisions. RTI officials said the revisions were needed because of a fundamental difference in expectations between USAID/Haiti and RTI.

The audit finds deeper problems, however:

Mission officials said they did not ask for substantial revisions, but they did expect RTI to provide deliverables that met basic standards. They pointed out examples such as (1) a comprehensive training plan that was neither comprehensive nor a plan, (2) a capacity mapping report with no mapping, (3) an annual report with no reporting on performance indicators, and (4) instructional material based on repetition/memorization, lacking cultural appropriateness, and not meeting international standards. USAID/Haiti officials said the expectations were defined clearly in the contract…

USAID/Haiti, RTI, and the subcontractor trade blame for the project’s failures to (literally) deliver:

USAID/Haiti and RTI officials agreed that the subcontractor did not deliver many of the community-based activities and did not provide ongoing mentoring of teachers. But they disagreed on the root cause; RTI officials said they assigned the subcontractor to the project at USAID/Haiti’s insistence, but mission officials said this was not true. The subcontractor simply noted that it had a difficult working relationship with RTI.

The subcontractor is not named in the audit. The lack of accountability in USAID subcontracting is a problem we identified in our report “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti” and is one that the new Assessing Progress in Haiti law will attempt to tackle. But it is clear from the audit that RTI shares blame for the subcontractor’s failures, as the contractor ultimately must be held to account for meeting the terms of the contract.

Among the reasons that the OIG suggested could explain RTI’s poor performance is a lack of incentive when benchmarks are not linked to a pay schedule:

Because RTI is reimbursed by USAID/Haiti only when it has satisfactorily completed a milestone per the payment schedule, not clearly linking requirements, standards, and deliverables to the schedule does not give for RTI the financial incentive to focus its efforts on completing those activities.

Considering RTI’s failures to adequately deliver suitable Creole and French materials that are “cultural appropriate,” this may be another case where contracting with Haitian organizations might well have produced better results.

Education remains one of Haiti’s lasting challenges. Illiteracy remains high (more than half of the total population), but since the great majority of schools are private, families usually pay for school expenses such as uniforms, meals, books and fees. This means that many children cannot afford school, while many other families struggle to come up with the money. The AP’s Danica Coto reported this week:

Haiti’s education system has suffered for decades due to poverty, political instability and the devastating 2010 earthquake. An estimated 30 percent of young people are illiterate, and only about half of all children can afford to attend primary school, according to UNICEF, the U.N.’s children’s agency. Fewer than a quarter go to secondary school.

The education ministry recently announced that it has invested some $13 million in books and school supplies for this year — though many students still must pay for all or part of their textbooks — and also launched a school meal system that will help 800,000 children.

Another challenge that Haitian school children face is that much of the teaching has been done in French, the country’s traditional language, but one which is spoken by only a (mostly higher-income) minority. In recent years, reformers have sought to expand Creole education, as the AP has also reported:

In a sign of growing interest in Creole’s educational potential, the U.S. Agency for International Development last fall awarded a $12.9 million contract to the North Carolina nonprofit group, RTI International, to create a basic reading curriculum that includes the language.

Last month, USAID’s Office of Inspector General released an audit of the 2-year, 4-month Research Triangle Institute (RTI) contract, which was also intended “to help the Haitian Ministry of Education develop and test an instructional model to improve the reading skills of children in first through third grades in Haiti’s development corridors,” including by “provid[ing] curricula that meet international standards for best practice and respond to Haiti’s culture and students’ educational needs.”

The audit’s conclusions can, unfortunately, be interpreted as a failing grade for RTI’s performance. It found that:

the project did not achieve all of its expected results—particularly with respect to developing and testing an instructional model for children in the second and third grades—and the project is significantly behind schedule to achieve its overall goals within the planned time frames. For example, RTI did not distribute the first-grade curriculum and materials until late March 2013—2 months past the deadline; second- and third-grade materials also were late[.]

In addition, RTI did not implement community literacy strategies fully, and its monitoring of teachers was weak. Implementation delays reduce USAID/Haiti‘s ability to assess and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of various instructional approaches.

More specifically

Despite the contract’s requirements, RTI completed only 13 of the 31 deliverables that were due through March 31, 2014. Eleven were late, and seven have yet to be delivered.

In addition to the late delivery of first-grade curriculum and materials, among the “key deliverables…not implemented as planned”:

Second- and Third-Grade Curriculum and Materials Were Not Developed. As of March 31, 2014, RTI had not developed and distributed second-grade curriculum and materials by the project’s original June 2013 deadline (subsequently amended to March 31, 2014). RTI officials said they would not meet the deadline of developing third-grade materials by June 2014.

Late and Weak Implementation of Community-based Activities for Treatment 2 Schools. During the first year of the project, RTI was to implement community-based activities in 75 of the 200 schools. However, it did not implement many of the activities fully. For example, RTI did not (1) develop report cards for teachers and parents that showed whether students’ reading skills were improving, (2) hold literacy fairs at schools, (3) facilitate parent meetings, and (4) hold weekly reading clubs as required. Other planned activities were dropped, including (1) Big-Brother/Sister Reading Partners, (2) bookmaking workshops, and (3) initiating a radio listening club.

Part of the poor performance was due to a subcontractor. The audit notes that the subcontractor only completed one-third of the mandated visits to schools during the 2012-2013 school year, and “continued to underperform for the 2013-2014 school year.”

Another finding of the audit calls into question whether RTI staff were qualified for the contract in the first place:

Mission officials said RTI’s staff lacked experience in developing the training materials, and some team members had no experience in Haiti or did not speak French or Creole. This resulted, they said, in poor-quality materials that required substantial revisions. RTI officials said the revisions were needed because of a fundamental difference in expectations between USAID/Haiti and RTI.

The audit finds deeper problems, however:

Mission officials said they did not ask for substantial revisions, but they did expect RTI to provide deliverables that met basic standards. They pointed out examples such as (1) a comprehensive training plan that was neither comprehensive nor a plan, (2) a capacity mapping report with no mapping, (3) an annual report with no reporting on performance indicators, and (4) instructional material based on repetition/memorization, lacking cultural appropriateness, and not meeting international standards. USAID/Haiti officials said the expectations were defined clearly in the contract…

USAID/Haiti, RTI, and the subcontractor trade blame for the project’s failures to (literally) deliver:

USAID/Haiti and RTI officials agreed that the subcontractor did not deliver many of the community-based activities and did not provide ongoing mentoring of teachers. But they disagreed on the root cause; RTI officials said they assigned the subcontractor to the project at USAID/Haiti’s insistence, but mission officials said this was not true. The subcontractor simply noted that it had a difficult working relationship with RTI.

The subcontractor is not named in the audit. The lack of accountability in USAID subcontracting is a problem we identified in our report “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti” and is one that the new Assessing Progress in Haiti law will attempt to tackle. But it is clear from the audit that RTI shares blame for the subcontractor’s failures, as the contractor ultimately must be held to account for meeting the terms of the contract.

Among the reasons that the OIG suggested could explain RTI’s poor performance is a lack of incentive when benchmarks are not linked to a pay schedule:

Because RTI is reimbursed by USAID/Haiti only when it has satisfactorily completed a milestone per the payment schedule, not clearly linking requirements, standards, and deliverables to the schedule does not give for RTI the financial incentive to focus its efforts on completing those activities.

Considering RTI’s failures to adequately deliver suitable Creole and French materials that are “cultural appropriate,” this may be another case where contracting with Haitian organizations might well have produced better results.

A judge in Haiti has reportedly issued an arrest warrant for former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, saying that Aristide failed to appear for questioning following a summons issued earlier in the week. While some outlets reported that Aristide is facing “charges relating to acts of corruption, money laundering, misappropriation of public funds, criminal conspiracy,” as the Miami Herald noted on Tuesday, Aristide’s attorneys said that their client had not been summoned:

Haitian media, quoting unnamed sources, said that Aristide and at least 30 others have been barred from leaving the country by Judge Lamarre Belizaire and that arrest warrants have been issued for some supporters.

Belizaire could not be reached for confirmation, but a government source said Aristide was served to appear in court.

Mario Joseph, Aristide’s Haiti lawyer, denied that the former president was served. And both he and Aristide’s U.S. lawyer Ira Kurzban said no formal notice of a travel ban had been imposed. The ramblings, they said, are politically motivated.

“It is solely motivated by the upcoming potential elections in Haiti and, like all other allegations against President Aristide, has no basis in fact or reality,?” Kurzban said.

Joseph said the reports are aimed at distracting the public from [suspected kidnapper Clifford] Brandt’s “organized” release from jail.

“President Aristide has not received any mandate,” Joseph said. “After Brandt’s planned freedom from prison, they are looking for anything that makes noise and distracts people from the real issues.”

The AP reports that Joseph went to the court session on Wednesday in an attempt to learn more about the summons, but Belizaire did not appear; Joseph’s colleagues with the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti relayed the same account of events in a conference call today with reporters.

It is not the first time that “news” of charges against Aristide have appeared in the press; as we have previously noted, such phantom charges and grave allegations of corruption have long been central to a politicized effort to publicly demonize the former president. Yet after over a decade of supposedly imminent charges relating to alleged misconduct during Aristide’s second (2001-2004) term, Aristide has in fact never been charged. The threat of charges was a consistent part of the narrative during Aristide’s forced exile following the bloody 2004 coup d’etat against his democratically-elected (and popular) administration. Investigators with the post-coup government of Gerard Latortue, the FBI and hired guns have spent years attempting to link to Aristide to wrong-doing, but apparently have very little to show for it.

Belizaire, however, may be acting illegally himself. A judicial candidate must have 8 years experience in a related field and there also must be a 3 year period between being a prosecutor and becoming a judge in the same jurisdiction. It appears Belizaire fails to pass either requirement. Belizaire has been disbarred for 10 years, beginning as soon as he leaves his current position with the courts, as the Haitian Sentinel reports:

Lamarre Belizaire, the judge who signed arrest warrants and ordinances restricting flight for political prisoners and opponents of the administration, now has sent a summons to Radio Kiskeya for broadcasting the information that he was suspended for 10 years by the Bar of Port-au-Prince. This court action is being regarded as an attack on the liberty of expression.

Indeed the Bar of Port-au-Prince did take the action and suspended Lamarre Belizaire for 10 years, beginning at the time he leaves his position as judge, barring him from practicing law in Haiti’s first city. This information was confirmed by the Secretary of the Bar of Port-au-Prince and Secretary General of the Federations of Bar Associations of Haiti, Stanley Gaston.

Belizaire has been criticized for overseeing other arrests that appear politically-motivated, such as the illegal arrest of attorney Andre Michel the night of October 22 last year (the Haitian constitution prohibits arrests after 6:00 p.m.). Michel had been pursuing a corruption case against President Martelly’s family when the arrest happened. Belizaire’s role in the Michel case led to his disbarment.

In related news that seems to have flown under the radar, the Provisional Electoral Commission (CEP) informed President Martelly this week that the legislative elections cannot happen by October 26, as Martelly had promised. While this is yet another development from which Martelly’s government may wish to distract attention, it also may be related in that Fanmi Lavalas, as Haiti’s most popular political party, remains a serious obstacle for Martelly and the U.S. government, which has continually opposed and undermined Fanmi Lavalas since it first emerged as a powerful political force. Fanmi Lavalas has been arbitrarily excluded from the last several elections, and whether that exclusion will continue into the new election cycle has loomed as a big question. The absence of the party’s head – former president Aristide – from Haiti served as a pretext for banning Fanmi Lavalas from the ballot during previous elections. With that pretext now removed, new maneuvers will be needed if the party is to be prevented from heavily influencing the elections, if not electing a slate of candidates itself (it is unclear how many candidates the party might run, or if it will even participate in the elections at all).

U.S. State Department cables made available by WikiLeaks show that criminal charges were previously suggested (by the now former head of MINUSTAH Edmond Mulet) as a way of discouraging popular support for Aristide. “The display of popular support for Aristide is very worrisome to the U.S., so indicting Titid [Aristide] before a potential comeback makes perfect sense,” Robert Fatton, a Haiti expert at the University of Virginia, told the Miami Herald the last time news of charging Aristide emerged in the media, a few years ago.

In the context of election preparations – and challenges from senators to the government’s manipulation of the CEP –the specter of criminal charges against Aristide is particularly worrisome. The government has also gone after human rights defenders and journalists. Hopefully the media and the international human rights community will be more vigilant now than they were during the post-2004 coup government, which jailed numerous Fanmi Lavalas leaders and officials of the constitutional government on bogus charges.

Correction: A previous version of this article stated that lawyers must practice for 10 years before becoming a judge, making Belizaire unqualigied for the position. That requirement is only for appellate judges.

A judge in Haiti has reportedly issued an arrest warrant for former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, saying that Aristide failed to appear for questioning following a summons issued earlier in the week. While some outlets reported that Aristide is facing “charges relating to acts of corruption, money laundering, misappropriation of public funds, criminal conspiracy,” as the Miami Herald noted on Tuesday, Aristide’s attorneys said that their client had not been summoned:

Haitian media, quoting unnamed sources, said that Aristide and at least 30 others have been barred from leaving the country by Judge Lamarre Belizaire and that arrest warrants have been issued for some supporters.

Belizaire could not be reached for confirmation, but a government source said Aristide was served to appear in court.

Mario Joseph, Aristide’s Haiti lawyer, denied that the former president was served. And both he and Aristide’s U.S. lawyer Ira Kurzban said no formal notice of a travel ban had been imposed. The ramblings, they said, are politically motivated.

“It is solely motivated by the upcoming potential elections in Haiti and, like all other allegations against President Aristide, has no basis in fact or reality,?” Kurzban said.

Joseph said the reports are aimed at distracting the public from [suspected kidnapper Clifford] Brandt’s “organized” release from jail.

“President Aristide has not received any mandate,” Joseph said. “After Brandt’s planned freedom from prison, they are looking for anything that makes noise and distracts people from the real issues.”

The AP reports that Joseph went to the court session on Wednesday in an attempt to learn more about the summons, but Belizaire did not appear; Joseph’s colleagues with the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti relayed the same account of events in a conference call today with reporters.

It is not the first time that “news” of charges against Aristide have appeared in the press; as we have previously noted, such phantom charges and grave allegations of corruption have long been central to a politicized effort to publicly demonize the former president. Yet after over a decade of supposedly imminent charges relating to alleged misconduct during Aristide’s second (2001-2004) term, Aristide has in fact never been charged. The threat of charges was a consistent part of the narrative during Aristide’s forced exile following the bloody 2004 coup d’etat against his democratically-elected (and popular) administration. Investigators with the post-coup government of Gerard Latortue, the FBI and hired guns have spent years attempting to link to Aristide to wrong-doing, but apparently have very little to show for it.

Belizaire, however, may be acting illegally himself. A judicial candidate must have 8 years experience in a related field and there also must be a 3 year period between being a prosecutor and becoming a judge in the same jurisdiction. It appears Belizaire fails to pass either requirement. Belizaire has been disbarred for 10 years, beginning as soon as he leaves his current position with the courts, as the Haitian Sentinel reports:

Lamarre Belizaire, the judge who signed arrest warrants and ordinances restricting flight for political prisoners and opponents of the administration, now has sent a summons to Radio Kiskeya for broadcasting the information that he was suspended for 10 years by the Bar of Port-au-Prince. This court action is being regarded as an attack on the liberty of expression.

Indeed the Bar of Port-au-Prince did take the action and suspended Lamarre Belizaire for 10 years, beginning at the time he leaves his position as judge, barring him from practicing law in Haiti’s first city. This information was confirmed by the Secretary of the Bar of Port-au-Prince and Secretary General of the Federations of Bar Associations of Haiti, Stanley Gaston.

Belizaire has been criticized for overseeing other arrests that appear politically-motivated, such as the illegal arrest of attorney Andre Michel the night of October 22 last year (the Haitian constitution prohibits arrests after 6:00 p.m.). Michel had been pursuing a corruption case against President Martelly’s family when the arrest happened. Belizaire’s role in the Michel case led to his disbarment.

In related news that seems to have flown under the radar, the Provisional Electoral Commission (CEP) informed President Martelly this week that the legislative elections cannot happen by October 26, as Martelly had promised. While this is yet another development from which Martelly’s government may wish to distract attention, it also may be related in that Fanmi Lavalas, as Haiti’s most popular political party, remains a serious obstacle for Martelly and the U.S. government, which has continually opposed and undermined Fanmi Lavalas since it first emerged as a powerful political force. Fanmi Lavalas has been arbitrarily excluded from the last several elections, and whether that exclusion will continue into the new election cycle has loomed as a big question. The absence of the party’s head – former president Aristide – from Haiti served as a pretext for banning Fanmi Lavalas from the ballot during previous elections. With that pretext now removed, new maneuvers will be needed if the party is to be prevented from heavily influencing the elections, if not electing a slate of candidates itself (it is unclear how many candidates the party might run, or if it will even participate in the elections at all).

U.S. State Department cables made available by WikiLeaks show that criminal charges were previously suggested (by the now former head of MINUSTAH Edmond Mulet) as a way of discouraging popular support for Aristide. “The display of popular support for Aristide is very worrisome to the U.S., so indicting Titid [Aristide] before a potential comeback makes perfect sense,” Robert Fatton, a Haiti expert at the University of Virginia, told the Miami Herald the last time news of charging Aristide emerged in the media, a few years ago.

In the context of election preparations – and challenges from senators to the government’s manipulation of the CEP –the specter of criminal charges against Aristide is particularly worrisome. The government has also gone after human rights defenders and journalists. Hopefully the media and the international human rights community will be more vigilant now than they were during the post-2004 coup government, which jailed numerous Fanmi Lavalas leaders and officials of the constitutional government on bogus charges.

Correction: A previous version of this article stated that lawyers must practice for 10 years before becoming a judge, making Belizaire unqualigied for the position. That requirement is only for appellate judges.

More than four-and-a-half years after the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. Congress passed legislation on Friday demanding greater accountability and transparency in U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts. “[W]e need to provide more accountability of our efforts to rebuild Haiti as we work to produce sustainable local capacity and strengthen democratic institutions,” said Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA), in a press release praising the bill’s passage.

In April 2013, CEPR published “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti.” The report concluded that “the lack of real transparency around U.S. assistance to Haiti makes it much more difficult to identify problems and take corrective measures.” Among the recommendations made in the report, many have been included in the recent legislation, such as: reporting sub-award contract data, prioritizing local procurement and the involvement of local civil society, releasing data at the project level and including benchmarks and goals, and increasing the amount of information published in Haitian Creole.

The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, as the bill is known, will require the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report every 6 months detailing the U.S. government strategy in Haiti, including program goals and outcomes. Crucially, the bill also requires reporting on “amounts committed, obligated, and expended on programs and activities to implement the Strategy, by sector and by implementing partner at the prime and subprime levels,” making it far easier to track where the money goes and who is the ultimate recipient.

It has been U.S. policy to increase local procurement worldwide as part of an ambitious reform program called USAID Forward. However, the new bill will ensure that the U.S. carries this out in its Haiti policy, something that has taken on extra importance as recent data released by USAID shows the level of local procurement actually decreased in 2013 from 2012.

Local procurement data recently posted (XLS) on the USAID Forward website reveals that just over $4 million, or 2 percent of all USAID spending went to local companies or organizations in Haiti. This is down from $11.3 million (5.4 percent) in 2012. Overall expenditures for Haiti decreased from $209.5 to $198 million, according to the database. Worldwide, the level of local procurement actually increased, from 14.3 to 17.9 percent, showing just how far behind U.S. policy in Haiti is.

The aid accountability bill states that “it is the policy of the United States” to prioritize “the local procurement of goods and services in Haiti,” and repeatedly calls on the U.S. government to outline a strategy that “builds the long term capacity of the Government of Haiti and civil society in Haiti.” While these are core principles that leading donors worldwide have agreed to adopt in line with evolving aid accountability awareness, the U.S. has been slow to implement these changes, especially in Haiti.

Commenting on the bill’s passage, CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot stated, “it is a step in the right direction if U.S. taxpayer dollars are to be used in a way that will benefit the people of Haiti instead of merely lining contractors’ pockets.” He added that, “66.2 percent of USAID contracts has gone to Beltway-based firms, while just 1.5 percent has gone to Haitian companies…There is something terribly wrong with this picture.”

What the Data Shows

The data released by USAID, showing the levels of local procurement, while a step in the right direction, falls far short of what is being required in the Haiti aid bill, and has severe limitations. Unlike in the USASpending.gov database, which reports all contracts and grants awarded by USAID, the Forward Database contains no identifying contract numbers, meaning reconciling the two databases is virtually impossible. Further, the USAID Forward database doesn’t specify whether the expenditures are via prime awards or sub-awards, an important distinction. Finally, the information is provided only well after the fact, while the USASpending.gov data is updated regularly. For these reasons, to present a more complete picture of USAID procurement in Haiti, an analysis of the USASpending.gov database is required.

As of July 14, 2014 USAID has awarded $1.38 billion for Haiti-related work according to the USASpending.gov database, including both contracts and grants. As can be seen in Figure 1, overall, just 0.9 percent has gone directly to Haiti organizations, while 56.6 percent has gone to firms located inside the Beltway (Washington D.C., Virginia and Maryland).

Figure 1. Percent of USAID Funds Awarded, by Location of Recipient
USAID location 2

There is some evidence to show that local procurement has been increasing in 2014. Though the USASpending.gov data confirms the drastic decrease in local procurement in 2013, thus far in 2014 just over 2 percent has gone to local companies, as can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Percent of USAID Awards Given to Haitian Companies, Annual
USAID location by year 2

In response to inquiries from CEPR, the USAID Haiti Task Team responded that, “the amount of new obligations directly to local organizations will vary from year to year and do not necessarily reflect the level of USAID involvement in building local capacity,” adding that, “any attempt to split up our funding into discrete shorter time periods such as fiscal years is bound to encounter fluctuations.”

In 2014 and beyond, “USAID/Haiti anticipates higher percentages,” of local procurement. To help move in this direction, USAID issued an Annual Program Statement (APS) in March 2014 that programs $5.5 million “to provide direct funding to local Haitian organizations,” in a number of sectors. Further, and in line both with USAID Forward and the recently-passed legislation, USAID “is currently identifying opportunities” for Haitian organizations to provide development capacity building to civil society groups and local companies in order “to expand the number of Haitian organizations able to receive direct funding from USAID or other donors,” according to the Haiti Task Team.

Still, a deeper look at who the recipients are shows a more limited reach of USAID’s local procurement. Since the earthquake in January 2010, of the $1.38 billion awarded by USAID, just $12.36 million has gone to Haitian organizations. And of that, 57 percent went to just one company, Cemex Haiti, which is a subsidiary of a Mexican company that is one of the largest cement manufacturers in the world. A further 8.6 percent went to the local branch of Transparency International. Though both organizations physically operate in Haiti and employ Haitians, it highlights the advantage for local firms of having international connections, without which they are often left behind.

While more funds certainly go to Haitian companies through subcontracts, there is little available information available on this. Despite previous legislation requiring the reporting of subcontracts to the USASpending.gov database, in practice very little is ever reported. Only $44.1 million is reported in subawards for work in Haiti, of which 20 percent went to Haitian companies, as can be seen in Table 1. Even at this level, over 44 percent of the funds went to companies inside the Beltway. The newly-passed legislation, in requiring the reporting of data at both the prime and sub levels, will allow for a much more thorough analysis of USAID spending in the future.

Table 1. Subaward Obligations, by Location of Recipient
USAID Table Subaward

The U.S. Congress has sent a clear message to the State Department and administration that the U.S.’s Haiti policy has not lived up to its pledge and that is has fallen short in key areas of transparency and accountability. The next step will be holding those actors accountable with this new piece of legislation.

More than four-and-a-half years after the devastating earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. Congress passed legislation on Friday demanding greater accountability and transparency in U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts. “[W]e need to provide more accountability of our efforts to rebuild Haiti as we work to produce sustainable local capacity and strengthen democratic institutions,” said Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA), in a press release praising the bill’s passage.

In April 2013, CEPR published “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti.” The report concluded that “the lack of real transparency around U.S. assistance to Haiti makes it much more difficult to identify problems and take corrective measures.” Among the recommendations made in the report, many have been included in the recent legislation, such as: reporting sub-award contract data, prioritizing local procurement and the involvement of local civil society, releasing data at the project level and including benchmarks and goals, and increasing the amount of information published in Haitian Creole.

The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, as the bill is known, will require the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report every 6 months detailing the U.S. government strategy in Haiti, including program goals and outcomes. Crucially, the bill also requires reporting on “amounts committed, obligated, and expended on programs and activities to implement the Strategy, by sector and by implementing partner at the prime and subprime levels,” making it far easier to track where the money goes and who is the ultimate recipient.

It has been U.S. policy to increase local procurement worldwide as part of an ambitious reform program called USAID Forward. However, the new bill will ensure that the U.S. carries this out in its Haiti policy, something that has taken on extra importance as recent data released by USAID shows the level of local procurement actually decreased in 2013 from 2012.

Local procurement data recently posted (XLS) on the USAID Forward website reveals that just over $4 million, or 2 percent of all USAID spending went to local companies or organizations in Haiti. This is down from $11.3 million (5.4 percent) in 2012. Overall expenditures for Haiti decreased from $209.5 to $198 million, according to the database. Worldwide, the level of local procurement actually increased, from 14.3 to 17.9 percent, showing just how far behind U.S. policy in Haiti is.

The aid accountability bill states that “it is the policy of the United States” to prioritize “the local procurement of goods and services in Haiti,” and repeatedly calls on the U.S. government to outline a strategy that “builds the long term capacity of the Government of Haiti and civil society in Haiti.” While these are core principles that leading donors worldwide have agreed to adopt in line with evolving aid accountability awareness, the U.S. has been slow to implement these changes, especially in Haiti.

Commenting on the bill’s passage, CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot stated, “it is a step in the right direction if U.S. taxpayer dollars are to be used in a way that will benefit the people of Haiti instead of merely lining contractors’ pockets.” He added that, “66.2 percent of USAID contracts has gone to Beltway-based firms, while just 1.5 percent has gone to Haitian companies…There is something terribly wrong with this picture.”

What the Data Shows

The data released by USAID, showing the levels of local procurement, while a step in the right direction, falls far short of what is being required in the Haiti aid bill, and has severe limitations. Unlike in the USASpending.gov database, which reports all contracts and grants awarded by USAID, the Forward Database contains no identifying contract numbers, meaning reconciling the two databases is virtually impossible. Further, the USAID Forward database doesn’t specify whether the expenditures are via prime awards or sub-awards, an important distinction. Finally, the information is provided only well after the fact, while the USASpending.gov data is updated regularly. For these reasons, to present a more complete picture of USAID procurement in Haiti, an analysis of the USASpending.gov database is required.

As of July 14, 2014 USAID has awarded $1.38 billion for Haiti-related work according to the USASpending.gov database, including both contracts and grants. As can be seen in Figure 1, overall, just 0.9 percent has gone directly to Haiti organizations, while 56.6 percent has gone to firms located inside the Beltway (Washington D.C., Virginia and Maryland).

Figure 1. Percent of USAID Funds Awarded, by Location of Recipient
USAID location 2

There is some evidence to show that local procurement has been increasing in 2014. Though the USASpending.gov data confirms the drastic decrease in local procurement in 2013, thus far in 2014 just over 2 percent has gone to local companies, as can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Percent of USAID Awards Given to Haitian Companies, Annual
USAID location by year 2

In response to inquiries from CEPR, the USAID Haiti Task Team responded that, “the amount of new obligations directly to local organizations will vary from year to year and do not necessarily reflect the level of USAID involvement in building local capacity,” adding that, “any attempt to split up our funding into discrete shorter time periods such as fiscal years is bound to encounter fluctuations.”

In 2014 and beyond, “USAID/Haiti anticipates higher percentages,” of local procurement. To help move in this direction, USAID issued an Annual Program Statement (APS) in March 2014 that programs $5.5 million “to provide direct funding to local Haitian organizations,” in a number of sectors. Further, and in line both with USAID Forward and the recently-passed legislation, USAID “is currently identifying opportunities” for Haitian organizations to provide development capacity building to civil society groups and local companies in order “to expand the number of Haitian organizations able to receive direct funding from USAID or other donors,” according to the Haiti Task Team.

Still, a deeper look at who the recipients are shows a more limited reach of USAID’s local procurement. Since the earthquake in January 2010, of the $1.38 billion awarded by USAID, just $12.36 million has gone to Haitian organizations. And of that, 57 percent went to just one company, Cemex Haiti, which is a subsidiary of a Mexican company that is one of the largest cement manufacturers in the world. A further 8.6 percent went to the local branch of Transparency International. Though both organizations physically operate in Haiti and employ Haitians, it highlights the advantage for local firms of having international connections, without which they are often left behind.

While more funds certainly go to Haitian companies through subcontracts, there is little available information available on this. Despite previous legislation requiring the reporting of subcontracts to the USASpending.gov database, in practice very little is ever reported. Only $44.1 million is reported in subawards for work in Haiti, of which 20 percent went to Haitian companies, as can be seen in Table 1. Even at this level, over 44 percent of the funds went to companies inside the Beltway. The newly-passed legislation, in requiring the reporting of data at both the prime and sub levels, will allow for a much more thorough analysis of USAID spending in the future.

Table 1. Subaward Obligations, by Location of Recipient
USAID Table Subaward

The U.S. Congress has sent a clear message to the State Department and administration that the U.S.’s Haiti policy has not lived up to its pledge and that is has fallen short in key areas of transparency and accountability. The next step will be holding those actors accountable with this new piece of legislation.

The U.S. Congress has passed the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, which will address some of the significant problems with the lack of transparency and accountability in U.S. contracting for aid and relief work in Haiti. After passing by unanimous consent in the House today, the bill will next head to President Obama to be signed into law. The Senate passed the bill earlier this month, and the House had passed an earlier version in December. In today’s vote the House passed the Senate’s modified version of the bill, which includes a new policy section.

As we noted in a press release today:

The bill requires that Congress receive annual progress reports “on the status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti, including efforts to prevent the spread of cholera and treat persons infected with the disease.” The bill mandates that agencies detail how the Haitian government and target constituencies, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and farmers, are involved in the coordination of the aid process and how they are being impacted.

Importantly, the bill will also require more reporting regarding sub-grants. CEPR’s 2013 report, “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti” by Jake Johnston and Alexander Main detailed how funds designated for Haiti end up going to sub-contractors who are often not identified, and who are not held accountable for what they do with the money. The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act will require the State Department to provide data on U.S. Haiti assistance funds disbursed at both the prime and subprime levels in line with one of the CEPR report’s main recommendations. 

Much of the U.S. government aid earmarked for Haiti following the quake has gone to foreign contractors, providing little benefit to Haitian businesses, organizations or workers. The Haitian government has also largely been bypassed as aid funds have gone to foreign contractors, international agencies and the many groups that populate what is known as the “republic of NGOs.” Of the $6.43 billion disbursed by bilateral and multilateral donors to Haiti from 2010-2012, just 9 percent went through the Haitian government.

Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), who introduced the legislation in the House, said in a press statement today that:

“Following the devastating January 2010 earthquake, the U.S. was quick to act in support of the Haitian people. However, our policies need greater strategic direction and oversight,” said Congresswoman Lee. “Nearly five years later, we need to provide more accountability of our efforts to rebuild Haiti as we work to produce sustainable local capacity and strengthen democratic institutions.”

Her statement also thanked Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), who introduced the Senate bill.

American Jewish World Service, which has itself made millions of dollars-worth of grants in Haiti, also applauded the bill:

“In the wake of the devastating earthquake in Haiti, our government laudably committed a significant amount of aid to help Haiti rebuild, but a lack of transparency made it difficult to understand how U.S. government funds were being used and if recovery efforts were making progress and were being measured,” said Ruth Messinger, president of AJWS.

The U.S. Congress has passed the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act, which will address some of the significant problems with the lack of transparency and accountability in U.S. contracting for aid and relief work in Haiti. After passing by unanimous consent in the House today, the bill will next head to President Obama to be signed into law. The Senate passed the bill earlier this month, and the House had passed an earlier version in December. In today’s vote the House passed the Senate’s modified version of the bill, which includes a new policy section.

As we noted in a press release today:

The bill requires that Congress receive annual progress reports “on the status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti, including efforts to prevent the spread of cholera and treat persons infected with the disease.” The bill mandates that agencies detail how the Haitian government and target constituencies, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and farmers, are involved in the coordination of the aid process and how they are being impacted.

Importantly, the bill will also require more reporting regarding sub-grants. CEPR’s 2013 report, “Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti” by Jake Johnston and Alexander Main detailed how funds designated for Haiti end up going to sub-contractors who are often not identified, and who are not held accountable for what they do with the money. The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act will require the State Department to provide data on U.S. Haiti assistance funds disbursed at both the prime and subprime levels in line with one of the CEPR report’s main recommendations. 

Much of the U.S. government aid earmarked for Haiti following the quake has gone to foreign contractors, providing little benefit to Haitian businesses, organizations or workers. The Haitian government has also largely been bypassed as aid funds have gone to foreign contractors, international agencies and the many groups that populate what is known as the “republic of NGOs.” Of the $6.43 billion disbursed by bilateral and multilateral donors to Haiti from 2010-2012, just 9 percent went through the Haitian government.

Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), who introduced the legislation in the House, said in a press statement today that:

“Following the devastating January 2010 earthquake, the U.S. was quick to act in support of the Haitian people. However, our policies need greater strategic direction and oversight,” said Congresswoman Lee. “Nearly five years later, we need to provide more accountability of our efforts to rebuild Haiti as we work to produce sustainable local capacity and strengthen democratic institutions.”

Her statement also thanked Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), who introduced the Senate bill.

American Jewish World Service, which has itself made millions of dollars-worth of grants in Haiti, also applauded the bill:

“In the wake of the devastating earthquake in Haiti, our government laudably committed a significant amount of aid to help Haiti rebuild, but a lack of transparency made it difficult to understand how U.S. government funds were being used and if recovery efforts were making progress and were being measured,” said Ruth Messinger, president of AJWS.

Last week, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon travelled to Haiti to raise awareness of the ongoing cholera epidemic that scientific studies have continually shown the U.N. troops in Haiti to be responsible for introducing. In an interview before his trip, Ban told Jacqueline Charles of the Miami Herald that the U.N. and international community had a “moral responsibility” to help Haiti eradicate the disease, already the world’s worst cholera epidemic having killed over 8,500 and sickened more than 700,000. Also last week, the U.N. quietly posted a document online (PDF) which provides information on its follow up to the Independent Panel of Expert’s recommendations, made in May 2011. The U.N. convened the panel in the aftermath of cholera’s introduction to study how it was introduced, how it can be stopped and efforts to prevent future epidemics.

In Haiti, during remarks at a church service in Las Palmas, the Secretary General told those present that, “I know that the epidemic has caused much anger and fear. I know that the disease continues to affect an unacceptable number of people.” Ban later ensured the Haitian people that, “You can count on me and the United Nations to do our part.”

But the visit by the Secretary General also put the spotlight on the U.N.’s own efforts to evade responsibility for cholera’s introduction, the subject of multiple lawsuits. “It is an insult to all Haitians for the Secretary-General to come to Haiti for a photo-op when he refuses to take responsibility for the thousands of Haitians killed and the hundreds of thousands sickened by the UN cholera epidemic,” said Mario Joseph, Managing Attorney of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) and one of the leading lawyers working to hold the U.N. accountable for cholera’s introduction to Haiti.

In December 2012, Ban pledged to “use every opportunity” to raise funds for an ambitious $2.2 billion ten-year cholera eradication plan. Yet over a year-and-a-half later, the plan remains woefully underfunded. According to the U.N. Office of the Secretary General’s Coordinator for Cholera Response in Haiti, at the current rate of disbursement, it “would take more than 40 years to fund the water, sanitation and hygiene” sectors of the elimination plan. Even the $485 million needed for the critical first two years of the plan, now nearing its end, is only 40 percent funded.

As part of the Secretary General’s trip, Ban launched a “Total Sanitation Campaign.” While it was presented as another new effort, according to the Office of the Secretary General’s Coordinator for Cholera Response in Haiti, it “is part of the sanitation component of the overall elimination plan.” Further, the U.N. itself has committed just 1 percent of the funds needed for the eradication plan. Meanwhile, since the earthquake, the U.N. troops that introduced cholera have cost the international community well over the $2.2 billion needed to fully fund the plan.

The Independent Panel’s Recommendations

In October 2010, the U.N. appointed an independent panel of scientific experts to study the introduction of cholera to Haiti. The panel concluded that it occurred as “a result of human activity,” and likely began in a river near a U.N. troop base, but that the “outbreak was caused by the confluence of circumstances” and that no single party should be blamed. Two years later, after additional scientific research was published, the authors followed up with a report that determined the U.N. was the “most likely” source.

As part of the Independent Panel’s original report, the author’s offered seven recommendations for the U.N.: using prophylactic antibiotics or screening U.N. personnel deployed from cholera endemic regions, use of antibiotics or the cholera vaccine when deploying personnel to locations with concurrent epidemics, improving on-site treatment of fecal waste at U.N. installations, taking the lead in improving case management, prioritizing programs to provide piped drinking water and sanitation, investigating the potential of cholera vaccines and increasing the use of advanced microbial techniques to improve surveillance and detection of cholera.

Upon the report’s release in May 2011, Ban announced that he would convene another task force to review the report and “ensure prompt and appropriate follow-up.” The Task Force was made up of senior U.N. officials from various agencies, including personnel from the UN Haiti team. However there has been little information as to what has been implemented in the intervening three-years, at least until a nine-page fact sheet was posted online last week by the U.N.

The U.N. has adopted some of the recommendations, but did not accept others. The U.N. has supported vaccination campaigns as well as increased use of advanced microbial techniques, as per the panel’s recommendations. The U.N. has also changed policies on the treatment of waste water at their bases around the world, noting that “All [U.N.] missions have provided action plans to ensure that all their wastewater facilities meet the minimum required standards set by the Organization’s Environmental Policy,” and that actions include “improvements to and better monitoring of existing facilities, installation of independent wastewater treatment plants, and inspection and closer supervision of contractors involved in wastewater disposal.”

The U.N. cites its work supporting the national elimination plan in response to the recommendations that it invest in water and sanitation infrastructure. But as described above, the lack of financial resources and the U.N.’s own role in the disease’s introduction have prevented a more robust response on this front.

A Second, Secretive Panel of Experts

“Overall, it does seem like progress is being made,” says Dr. Rishi Rattan, Chair of the Advocacy Committee for Physicians for Haiti. In a report he authored last year, Dr. Rattan evaluated the U.N.’s response to the independent panel’s recommendations, concluding that of the seven recommendations “the UN has not implemented three and only partially implemented two others.” The recently released fact sheet provides a glimpse into the rationale behind the lack of implementation and the role of a secretive second task force that was convened after the panel of experts presented its report.

While the formation of the Task Force was announced publicly at the time, little has been revealed about its actions. Though the Task Force was meant to implement the independent panel’s recommendations, in reality it had little contact with the panel members. In their follow up report (PDF) last year, the original panel members wrote that:

The Task Force did submit one request for additional information from the Independent Panel, which was answered. To date, no further contact has been initiated, and no results from the Task Force released.

Despite this, the U.N. decided against following recommendations one and two, which concerned the use of antibiotics, screening and vaccinations of U.N. personnel deployed from cholera endemic regions or into areas with cholera outbreaks. The U.N. cited the work of the Task Force, determining that there is a lack of scientific evidence to support the panel’s recommendations. While the Task Force’s original stated goal was to ensure “appropriate follow up,” the fact sheet provides an alternative explanation, describing the Task Force as being formed to “review the recommendations,” of the Independent Panel.

According to Dr. Rattan, while the U.N. may be “technically correct,” he added that there “is a lack of evidence to support either position.” For Dr. Rattan the bigger issue is the lack of transparency around this Task Force and how it has reached their decisions. Given that the U.N. itself selected the panel members because of their unique expertise on cholera-related issues, any decision in the opposite direction should be well documented.

“When a topic is controversial, complete transparency is ideal and when disagreements arise, each party goes back to the lab, conducts more tests, and presents all data. This is not what is happening here,” says Dr. Rattan. Even if the most likely outcome would be to agree with the U.N. interpretation, “the fact they are not doing it leaves a very bad taste in the mouth,” he adds.

While the fact that the U.N. has, after three years, publicly released a status update is welcome, says Beatrice Lindstrom of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “it doesn’t provide nearly enough information to explain why their internal experts’ views should trump the findings of the panel of independent experts they appointed in 2011.”

A request for further information on the makeup of the U.N. Task Force, and any documentation of its work was not answered by the U.N. cholera team. Members of the Independent Panel, contacted by e-mail, declined to comment.

Last week, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon travelled to Haiti to raise awareness of the ongoing cholera epidemic that scientific studies have continually shown the U.N. troops in Haiti to be responsible for introducing. In an interview before his trip, Ban told Jacqueline Charles of the Miami Herald that the U.N. and international community had a “moral responsibility” to help Haiti eradicate the disease, already the world’s worst cholera epidemic having killed over 8,500 and sickened more than 700,000. Also last week, the U.N. quietly posted a document online (PDF) which provides information on its follow up to the Independent Panel of Expert’s recommendations, made in May 2011. The U.N. convened the panel in the aftermath of cholera’s introduction to study how it was introduced, how it can be stopped and efforts to prevent future epidemics.

In Haiti, during remarks at a church service in Las Palmas, the Secretary General told those present that, “I know that the epidemic has caused much anger and fear. I know that the disease continues to affect an unacceptable number of people.” Ban later ensured the Haitian people that, “You can count on me and the United Nations to do our part.”

But the visit by the Secretary General also put the spotlight on the U.N.’s own efforts to evade responsibility for cholera’s introduction, the subject of multiple lawsuits. “It is an insult to all Haitians for the Secretary-General to come to Haiti for a photo-op when he refuses to take responsibility for the thousands of Haitians killed and the hundreds of thousands sickened by the UN cholera epidemic,” said Mario Joseph, Managing Attorney of the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) and one of the leading lawyers working to hold the U.N. accountable for cholera’s introduction to Haiti.

In December 2012, Ban pledged to “use every opportunity” to raise funds for an ambitious $2.2 billion ten-year cholera eradication plan. Yet over a year-and-a-half later, the plan remains woefully underfunded. According to the U.N. Office of the Secretary General’s Coordinator for Cholera Response in Haiti, at the current rate of disbursement, it “would take more than 40 years to fund the water, sanitation and hygiene” sectors of the elimination plan. Even the $485 million needed for the critical first two years of the plan, now nearing its end, is only 40 percent funded.

As part of the Secretary General’s trip, Ban launched a “Total Sanitation Campaign.” While it was presented as another new effort, according to the Office of the Secretary General’s Coordinator for Cholera Response in Haiti, it “is part of the sanitation component of the overall elimination plan.” Further, the U.N. itself has committed just 1 percent of the funds needed for the eradication plan. Meanwhile, since the earthquake, the U.N. troops that introduced cholera have cost the international community well over the $2.2 billion needed to fully fund the plan.

The Independent Panel’s Recommendations

In October 2010, the U.N. appointed an independent panel of scientific experts to study the introduction of cholera to Haiti. The panel concluded that it occurred as “a result of human activity,” and likely began in a river near a U.N. troop base, but that the “outbreak was caused by the confluence of circumstances” and that no single party should be blamed. Two years later, after additional scientific research was published, the authors followed up with a report that determined the U.N. was the “most likely” source.

As part of the Independent Panel’s original report, the author’s offered seven recommendations for the U.N.: using prophylactic antibiotics or screening U.N. personnel deployed from cholera endemic regions, use of antibiotics or the cholera vaccine when deploying personnel to locations with concurrent epidemics, improving on-site treatment of fecal waste at U.N. installations, taking the lead in improving case management, prioritizing programs to provide piped drinking water and sanitation, investigating the potential of cholera vaccines and increasing the use of advanced microbial techniques to improve surveillance and detection of cholera.

Upon the report’s release in May 2011, Ban announced that he would convene another task force to review the report and “ensure prompt and appropriate follow-up.” The Task Force was made up of senior U.N. officials from various agencies, including personnel from the UN Haiti team. However there has been little information as to what has been implemented in the intervening three-years, at least until a nine-page fact sheet was posted online last week by the U.N.

The U.N. has adopted some of the recommendations, but did not accept others. The U.N. has supported vaccination campaigns as well as increased use of advanced microbial techniques, as per the panel’s recommendations. The U.N. has also changed policies on the treatment of waste water at their bases around the world, noting that “All [U.N.] missions have provided action plans to ensure that all their wastewater facilities meet the minimum required standards set by the Organization’s Environmental Policy,” and that actions include “improvements to and better monitoring of existing facilities, installation of independent wastewater treatment plants, and inspection and closer supervision of contractors involved in wastewater disposal.”

The U.N. cites its work supporting the national elimination plan in response to the recommendations that it invest in water and sanitation infrastructure. But as described above, the lack of financial resources and the U.N.’s own role in the disease’s introduction have prevented a more robust response on this front.

A Second, Secretive Panel of Experts

“Overall, it does seem like progress is being made,” says Dr. Rishi Rattan, Chair of the Advocacy Committee for Physicians for Haiti. In a report he authored last year, Dr. Rattan evaluated the U.N.’s response to the independent panel’s recommendations, concluding that of the seven recommendations “the UN has not implemented three and only partially implemented two others.” The recently released fact sheet provides a glimpse into the rationale behind the lack of implementation and the role of a secretive second task force that was convened after the panel of experts presented its report.

While the formation of the Task Force was announced publicly at the time, little has been revealed about its actions. Though the Task Force was meant to implement the independent panel’s recommendations, in reality it had little contact with the panel members. In their follow up report (PDF) last year, the original panel members wrote that:

The Task Force did submit one request for additional information from the Independent Panel, which was answered. To date, no further contact has been initiated, and no results from the Task Force released.

Despite this, the U.N. decided against following recommendations one and two, which concerned the use of antibiotics, screening and vaccinations of U.N. personnel deployed from cholera endemic regions or into areas with cholera outbreaks. The U.N. cited the work of the Task Force, determining that there is a lack of scientific evidence to support the panel’s recommendations. While the Task Force’s original stated goal was to ensure “appropriate follow up,” the fact sheet provides an alternative explanation, describing the Task Force as being formed to “review the recommendations,” of the Independent Panel.

According to Dr. Rattan, while the U.N. may be “technically correct,” he added that there “is a lack of evidence to support either position.” For Dr. Rattan the bigger issue is the lack of transparency around this Task Force and how it has reached their decisions. Given that the U.N. itself selected the panel members because of their unique expertise on cholera-related issues, any decision in the opposite direction should be well documented.

“When a topic is controversial, complete transparency is ideal and when disagreements arise, each party goes back to the lab, conducts more tests, and presents all data. This is not what is happening here,” says Dr. Rattan. Even if the most likely outcome would be to agree with the U.N. interpretation, “the fact they are not doing it leaves a very bad taste in the mouth,” he adds.

While the fact that the U.N. has, after three years, publicly released a status update is welcome, says Beatrice Lindstrom of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “it doesn’t provide nearly enough information to explain why their internal experts’ views should trump the findings of the panel of independent experts they appointed in 2011.”

A request for further information on the makeup of the U.N. Task Force, and any documentation of its work was not answered by the U.N. cholera team. Members of the Independent Panel, contacted by e-mail, declined to comment.

While Haitian President Michel Martelly has unilaterally scheduled long-delayed elections for October 26, 2014, the composition of the electoral council continues to cause controversy in Haiti. The current problems stem from the deeply flawed electoral process in 2010 that saw Martelly emerge victorious after the intervention of the international community. There have yet to be elections since then, with one-third of the 30 member Senate having their terms expire in 2011 while some 130 local mayors have been replaced by Martelly appointments. Another one-third of the Senate and the entire lower house will see their terms expire in January 2015 if elections are not held. In a “frequently asked questions” document released last week, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) provides a legal analysis of the reasons behind the delays and why the current electoral council is unconstitutional. In an accompanying press release, IJDH notes:

According to Mario Joseph, managing lawyer for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, “Prompt elections are much needed, but elections will only remedy Haiti’s political crisis if they are run fairly by a constitutionally-mandated electoral council. President Michel Martelly has delayed elections for three years because he does not want to lose the political control he has enjoyed without full parliamentary oversight.”

Joseph explains that “The current Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) put into place by President Martelly per the El Rancho Accord is unconstitutional.” The El Rancho Accord, which rules the government’s plan for elections, has not been approved by Parliament and the procedure for selecting a CEP conflicts with the Haitian Constitution. The CEP only has seven of the required nine members due to these legitimacy concerns. Parliamentarians and political opposition call the El Rancho Accord a political coup d’état.

Despite the problems associated with the “El Rancho Accord,” the international community has been supportive of the process. After praising the accord in March, the U.N. issued a statement in early May, co-signed with the “Friends of Haiti” grouping of countries, warning “that certain important decisions to advance toward the holding of the elections have yet to be made.” Days later Martelly announced the formation of the electoral council, unilaterally. In early June, the date of October 26 was announced by the government, even though the electoral body is tasked with scheduling elections. Last week, after meeting with Martelly, the Secretary General of the OAS committed “to back the holding of free and fair elections, in a process planned for October.” The OAS also said they would send an electoral observation mission.


The international community is also providing the lion’s share of the funds for the election. IJDH, for its part, has called on the U.S. and other members of the international community to “support rule of law and democracy by conditioning election funding on a lawful and independent electoral council that can run fair and inclusive elections.” Haiti’s last several elections have been criticized for not being inclusive, as several political parties – including the most popular, Fanmi Lavalas – have been arbitrarily kept off the ballot under various pretexts.              

The U.S. has pledged $10 million toward the elections, but a review of contract spending shows that a significant portion of this has already been allocated and spent in coordination with a previous electoral body that no longer exists. In April of 2013, USAID awarded $2.3 million to the International Federation of Electoral Systems (IFES) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for “electoral process support.” In April 2014, the award was raised to $3.4 million. An IFES press release from October 2013, well before elections had been scheduled, notes that the organization had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Transitional College of the Permanent Electoral Council (CTCEP) to provide technical assistance. The CTCEP has since been replaced by the electoral body that emerged from the controversial “El Rancho Accord.” Repeated requests for comment to clarify IFES’s support have yet to be answered.

Additionally, a USAID factsheet reports that $6.5 million will go toward “pre-election planning and capacity building for the” CTCEP. Those funds are part of a multi-donor project run by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Previously called “Support to Electoral Process in Haiti: 2012-2013”, the only recent update to the project’s webpage has been to change to dates to “2013-2014.” Overall, the UNDP project will have a budget of $32 million and had already spent over a $1 million as of October 2013. It remains unclear if the donors – the U.S., Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the EU – have already deposited their contributions with the UNDP.

While Haitian President Michel Martelly has unilaterally scheduled long-delayed elections for October 26, 2014, the composition of the electoral council continues to cause controversy in Haiti. The current problems stem from the deeply flawed electoral process in 2010 that saw Martelly emerge victorious after the intervention of the international community. There have yet to be elections since then, with one-third of the 30 member Senate having their terms expire in 2011 while some 130 local mayors have been replaced by Martelly appointments. Another one-third of the Senate and the entire lower house will see their terms expire in January 2015 if elections are not held. In a “frequently asked questions” document released last week, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) provides a legal analysis of the reasons behind the delays and why the current electoral council is unconstitutional. In an accompanying press release, IJDH notes:

According to Mario Joseph, managing lawyer for the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, “Prompt elections are much needed, but elections will only remedy Haiti’s political crisis if they are run fairly by a constitutionally-mandated electoral council. President Michel Martelly has delayed elections for three years because he does not want to lose the political control he has enjoyed without full parliamentary oversight.”

Joseph explains that “The current Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) put into place by President Martelly per the El Rancho Accord is unconstitutional.” The El Rancho Accord, which rules the government’s plan for elections, has not been approved by Parliament and the procedure for selecting a CEP conflicts with the Haitian Constitution. The CEP only has seven of the required nine members due to these legitimacy concerns. Parliamentarians and political opposition call the El Rancho Accord a political coup d’état.

Despite the problems associated with the “El Rancho Accord,” the international community has been supportive of the process. After praising the accord in March, the U.N. issued a statement in early May, co-signed with the “Friends of Haiti” grouping of countries, warning “that certain important decisions to advance toward the holding of the elections have yet to be made.” Days later Martelly announced the formation of the electoral council, unilaterally. In early June, the date of October 26 was announced by the government, even though the electoral body is tasked with scheduling elections. Last week, after meeting with Martelly, the Secretary General of the OAS committed “to back the holding of free and fair elections, in a process planned for October.” The OAS also said they would send an electoral observation mission.


The international community is also providing the lion’s share of the funds for the election. IJDH, for its part, has called on the U.S. and other members of the international community to “support rule of law and democracy by conditioning election funding on a lawful and independent electoral council that can run fair and inclusive elections.” Haiti’s last several elections have been criticized for not being inclusive, as several political parties – including the most popular, Fanmi Lavalas – have been arbitrarily kept off the ballot under various pretexts.              

The U.S. has pledged $10 million toward the elections, but a review of contract spending shows that a significant portion of this has already been allocated and spent in coordination with a previous electoral body that no longer exists. In April of 2013, USAID awarded $2.3 million to the International Federation of Electoral Systems (IFES) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for “electoral process support.” In April 2014, the award was raised to $3.4 million. An IFES press release from October 2013, well before elections had been scheduled, notes that the organization had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Transitional College of the Permanent Electoral Council (CTCEP) to provide technical assistance. The CTCEP has since been replaced by the electoral body that emerged from the controversial “El Rancho Accord.” Repeated requests for comment to clarify IFES’s support have yet to be answered.

Additionally, a USAID factsheet reports that $6.5 million will go toward “pre-election planning and capacity building for the” CTCEP. Those funds are part of a multi-donor project run by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Previously called “Support to Electoral Process in Haiti: 2012-2013”, the only recent update to the project’s webpage has been to change to dates to “2013-2014.” Overall, the UNDP project will have a budget of $32 million and had already spent over a $1 million as of October 2013. It remains unclear if the donors – the U.S., Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the EU – have already deposited their contributions with the UNDP.

Speaking in early May at the “Who ‘Owns’ Haiti?” symposium at George Washington’s Elliot School of International Affairs, Colin Granderson, the head of the CARICOM-OAS Electoral Mission in Haiti in 2010-2011 confirmed previous accounts that the international community tried to force then-president Réné Préval from power on election day.

That the international community had “offered” President Préval a plane out of the country during Haiti’s chaotic first-round election in November 2010 was first revealed by Ricardo Seitenfus, the former OAS Special Representative to Haiti. Seitenfus subsequently lost his position with the OAS, but Préval himself soon confirmed the story, telling author Amy Wilentz:

“At around noon, they called me,” he said in an interview at the palace recently. “‘It’s no longer an election,’ they told me. ‘It’s a political problem. Do you want a plane to leave?’ I don’t know how they were going to explain my departure, but I got rid of that problem for them by refusing to go. I want to serve out my mandate and give the presidency over to an elected president.”

Despite accounts of the story from three different high-level sources who were there, the story has gained little international traction in the media.

In filmmaker Raoul Peck’s documentary “Fatal Assistance,” Préval revealed that it was the head of the U.N. mission in Haiti at the time, Edmond Mulet, who made the threat. (Seitenfus recently offered his recollection of discussions with Mulet and other high-level officials that day in an exclusive interview with CEPR and freelance Georgianne Nienaber.) For his part, Mulet categorically denied the event, telling Catherine Porter of the Toronto Star:

“I never said that, he never answered that,” Mulet told the Star when asked about Préval’s allegation. “I was worried if he didn’t stop the fraud and rioting, a revolution would force him to leave. I didn’t have the capability, the power or the interest of putting him on a plane.”

The election, plagued by record-low turnout, problems with voter registration and massive irregularities, was in doubt on election day when, around noon, 12 of 18 presidential candidates held a press conference calling for the election to be cancelled. Speaking at last month’s symposium, Granderson discussed what happened next (just past the 11 minute mark in this video):

The international community intervened, working with representatives of the private sector, and managed to get two of the candidates to reverse themselves, to renege on their commitment, and this rescued the electoral process.

But what I think was most unsettling, was that following this attempt to have these elections cancelled, was the intervention of certain members of the international community basically calling on President Préval to step down.

This wouldn’t be the end of the international community’s intervention in the electoral process. After first-round results were announced showing Mirlande Manigat and Préval’s successor Jude Célestin moving on to the second round, a team from the OAS was brought in to analyze the results. Despite having no statistical evidence, and instead of cancelling the elections, the OAS team overturned the first round results, replacing Célestin in the second round with Michel Martelly. Seitenfus has described in detail how this intervention was carried out, in his recent interview with CEPR and in his forthcoming book, International Crossroads and Failures in Haiti.

Speaking in early May at the “Who ‘Owns’ Haiti?” symposium at George Washington’s Elliot School of International Affairs, Colin Granderson, the head of the CARICOM-OAS Electoral Mission in Haiti in 2010-2011 confirmed previous accounts that the international community tried to force then-president Réné Préval from power on election day.

That the international community had “offered” President Préval a plane out of the country during Haiti’s chaotic first-round election in November 2010 was first revealed by Ricardo Seitenfus, the former OAS Special Representative to Haiti. Seitenfus subsequently lost his position with the OAS, but Préval himself soon confirmed the story, telling author Amy Wilentz:

“At around noon, they called me,” he said in an interview at the palace recently. “‘It’s no longer an election,’ they told me. ‘It’s a political problem. Do you want a plane to leave?’ I don’t know how they were going to explain my departure, but I got rid of that problem for them by refusing to go. I want to serve out my mandate and give the presidency over to an elected president.”

Despite accounts of the story from three different high-level sources who were there, the story has gained little international traction in the media.

In filmmaker Raoul Peck’s documentary “Fatal Assistance,” Préval revealed that it was the head of the U.N. mission in Haiti at the time, Edmond Mulet, who made the threat. (Seitenfus recently offered his recollection of discussions with Mulet and other high-level officials that day in an exclusive interview with CEPR and freelance Georgianne Nienaber.) For his part, Mulet categorically denied the event, telling Catherine Porter of the Toronto Star:

“I never said that, he never answered that,” Mulet told the Star when asked about Préval’s allegation. “I was worried if he didn’t stop the fraud and rioting, a revolution would force him to leave. I didn’t have the capability, the power or the interest of putting him on a plane.”

The election, plagued by record-low turnout, problems with voter registration and massive irregularities, was in doubt on election day when, around noon, 12 of 18 presidential candidates held a press conference calling for the election to be cancelled. Speaking at last month’s symposium, Granderson discussed what happened next (just past the 11 minute mark in this video):

The international community intervened, working with representatives of the private sector, and managed to get two of the candidates to reverse themselves, to renege on their commitment, and this rescued the electoral process.

But what I think was most unsettling, was that following this attempt to have these elections cancelled, was the intervention of certain members of the international community basically calling on President Préval to step down.

This wouldn’t be the end of the international community’s intervention in the electoral process. After first-round results were announced showing Mirlande Manigat and Préval’s successor Jude Célestin moving on to the second round, a team from the OAS was brought in to analyze the results. Despite having no statistical evidence, and instead of cancelling the elections, the OAS team overturned the first round results, replacing Célestin in the second round with Michel Martelly. Seitenfus has described in detail how this intervention was carried out, in his recent interview with CEPR and in his forthcoming book, International Crossroads and Failures in Haiti.

Last month Jacqueline Charles of the Miami Herald reported that the U.S. government had changed its plan for the development of a new port in support of the Caracol industrial park in Haiti’s north. The Herald report began:

After months of unsuccessfully trying to get private investors to cough up millions of dollars for the construction of a new, multimillion dollar port in northeastern Haiti, the U.S. government is scratching its plans and will instead revamp the existing port in the city of Cap-Haitien.

“The private sector was markedly unenthusiastic about investing in a new port,” said a U.S. government official familiar with the decision, but not authorized to speak publicly.

The new Fort Liberté port would have cost between $185 million and $257 million, and the U.S. government had committed to investing $70 million. A new port was viewed as being critical to the success of the nearby $300 million Caracol Industrial Park because the park’s five companies mostly ship out of ports in the neighboring Dominican Republic, a loss of valuable dollars to the Haitian treasury.

But while the Herald report points to a lack of private sector enthusiasm for the project as a key reason for its failure, an analysis of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports and contractor documents reveals that this project has been plagued by a lack of in-house expertise and planning from the beginning.

It began in September 2011 when USAID awarded a contract to MWH Americas to conduct a feasibility study for port infrastructure in northern Haiti. MWH had previously been found by the New Orleans inspector general to have overcharged the city on reconstruction contracts related to hurricane Katrina. As HRRW reported in February 2013, “Within two weeks of receiving the $2.8 million contract, MWH Americas turned around and gave out $1.45 million in subcontracts to four different firms, all headquartered in Washington DC or Virginia.” The contract was extended multiple times, with the overall cost increasing to over $4.25 million. Still, the GAO later found that further studies “still need to be performed,” because the USAID “did not require the contractor to obtain all the information necessary to help select a port site,” according to the GAO.

USAID was overly reliant on the work of MWH and its cadre of beltway-based subcontractors because, as the GAO pointed out in 2011:

USAID’s program in Haiti has not previously involved port construction activities. With no staff who have port construction expertise or experience, USAID will rely on (1) a private firm to conduct a feasibility study and make recommendations regarding, among other things, port design, economic feasibility, and financial viability; and (2) a public private partnership to construct a new port.

A subsequent GAO report, from June 2013 reported that USAID had “not constructed a port anywhere in the world since the 1970s.” Further, the 2013 report found that a ports engineer and advisor position had been vacant for over two years. Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s post-earthquake reconstruction plan earmarked over $70 million to help construct a new port in northern Haiti. The investment was seen as a “critical to the success” to the Caracol industrial park – the flagship reconstruction project of the international community in Haiti.

The GAO also found that while USAID initially had planned on construction of the new port beginning within 2.5 years, after consulting with the Army Corp of Engineers, the agency “learned that port construction may take up to 10 years.” In addition to the time frame being grossly underestimated, the expected costs skyrocketed from the initial plan.

While USAID initially believed the money it had allocated to the ports sector would be a significant portion of the costs of any new port construction, it later found that the amount allocated would be a “significantly smaller portion,” of the overall cost. The GAO estimated that the financing gap for a new port was in the range of $117-$189 million, jeopardizing the chances of finding a private sector actor willing to invest.

Last month Jacqueline Charles of the Miami Herald reported that the U.S. government had changed its plan for the development of a new port in support of the Caracol industrial park in Haiti’s north. The Herald report began:

After months of unsuccessfully trying to get private investors to cough up millions of dollars for the construction of a new, multimillion dollar port in northeastern Haiti, the U.S. government is scratching its plans and will instead revamp the existing port in the city of Cap-Haitien.

“The private sector was markedly unenthusiastic about investing in a new port,” said a U.S. government official familiar with the decision, but not authorized to speak publicly.

The new Fort Liberté port would have cost between $185 million and $257 million, and the U.S. government had committed to investing $70 million. A new port was viewed as being critical to the success of the nearby $300 million Caracol Industrial Park because the park’s five companies mostly ship out of ports in the neighboring Dominican Republic, a loss of valuable dollars to the Haitian treasury.

But while the Herald report points to a lack of private sector enthusiasm for the project as a key reason for its failure, an analysis of Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports and contractor documents reveals that this project has been plagued by a lack of in-house expertise and planning from the beginning.

It began in September 2011 when USAID awarded a contract to MWH Americas to conduct a feasibility study for port infrastructure in northern Haiti. MWH had previously been found by the New Orleans inspector general to have overcharged the city on reconstruction contracts related to hurricane Katrina. As HRRW reported in February 2013, “Within two weeks of receiving the $2.8 million contract, MWH Americas turned around and gave out $1.45 million in subcontracts to four different firms, all headquartered in Washington DC or Virginia.” The contract was extended multiple times, with the overall cost increasing to over $4.25 million. Still, the GAO later found that further studies “still need to be performed,” because the USAID “did not require the contractor to obtain all the information necessary to help select a port site,” according to the GAO.

USAID was overly reliant on the work of MWH and its cadre of beltway-based subcontractors because, as the GAO pointed out in 2011:

USAID’s program in Haiti has not previously involved port construction activities. With no staff who have port construction expertise or experience, USAID will rely on (1) a private firm to conduct a feasibility study and make recommendations regarding, among other things, port design, economic feasibility, and financial viability; and (2) a public private partnership to construct a new port.

A subsequent GAO report, from June 2013 reported that USAID had “not constructed a port anywhere in the world since the 1970s.” Further, the 2013 report found that a ports engineer and advisor position had been vacant for over two years. Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s post-earthquake reconstruction plan earmarked over $70 million to help construct a new port in northern Haiti. The investment was seen as a “critical to the success” to the Caracol industrial park – the flagship reconstruction project of the international community in Haiti.

The GAO also found that while USAID initially had planned on construction of the new port beginning within 2.5 years, after consulting with the Army Corp of Engineers, the agency “learned that port construction may take up to 10 years.” In addition to the time frame being grossly underestimated, the expected costs skyrocketed from the initial plan.

While USAID initially believed the money it had allocated to the ports sector would be a significant portion of the costs of any new port construction, it later found that the amount allocated would be a “significantly smaller portion,” of the overall cost. The GAO estimated that the financing gap for a new port was in the range of $117-$189 million, jeopardizing the chances of finding a private sector actor willing to invest.

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