Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch is a blog that tracks multinational aid efforts in Haiti with an eye towards ensuring they are oriented towards the needs of the Haitian people, and that aid is not used to undermine Haitians' right to self-determination.

On March 19, Haitian president Jovenel Moïse confirmed the first two cases of the novel coronavirus in Haiti. The number has since increased to eight. In response, the president has declared a state of emergency and ordered schools, factories, and religious entities to close; established a curfew; and closed the country’s borders. The government announced the new policies after previously suspending air travel from most countries.  

The initial reported cases both related to individuals who had traveled internationally. There has, however, only been limited local testing. As of March 25, 58 tests had been administered nationwide, according to the latest epidemiological update. The Ministry of Health has outlined a plan to combat the pandemic in Haiti, estimating a budget of $37.2 million. Already, international and local organizations have been meeting to coordinate the response.

After nearly two years of sustained protests and government inaction, the economic situation in Haiti has already made life exceedingly difficult for the vast majority of the population. The currency has rapidly depreciated, inflation has remained elevated, and the government has been unable to increase revenues domestically or through international assistance. The Haitian government has few fiscal resources to draw upon in responding to the coronavirus pandemic, and Haitian families, many already pushed to the edge, are facing an increasingly perilous future. 

There are multiple complementary aspects of the response to this virus in Haiti. One centers on the health care system and the ability to adequately detect, treat, and contain the virus. The other relates to the government’s ability to establish and enforce policies that encourage physical distancing. In addressing the latter, it is important to consider how the Haitian population interacts, lives, and survives in order to implement effective policies to contain the virus, protect the population, and ensure access to essential goods.

The cases reported have so far been marked as imported, but with the difficulties of enforcing a sustained national quarantine, Haiti is facing the very real risk of COVID-19 spreading locally. While declaring a state of emergency nationwide was a necessary step, it needs to be boosted by provisions for workers and the poor, and allocations for the health care system. The international community must also play a role, with the World Bank, IMF, and other multilateral development organizations immediately freeing up resources for Haiti and other developing nations to respond to the pandemic.  

The Health Care System

Prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Haiti’s health care system faced many challenges. According to a 2019 study by the Research and Education consortium for Acute Care in Haiti (REACH), Haiti only has an estimated 124 ICU beds and 64 ventilators for a population of more than 11 million. Other public health experts have put those figures even lower. This is a serious concern, especially given the relatively high proportion of the population considered to be at an elevated risk.

Already, there have been reports from the State University Hospital (HUEH) of inadequate preparation and supplies of protective equipment, which has led to some health professionals refusing to work. The HUEH was one of the marquee post-quake international reconstruction projects, but, more than ten years later, those plans remain mostly unrealized.

Haiti’s health care system overall is extremely reliant on private actors, including foreign assistance and NGOs. Dr. Youri Louis told the Haitian Times that, as of 2013, 64 percent of Haiti’s health budget derived from international assistance. In many parts of the country, access to health care is only provided by nonstate actors.

In such a fragmented system, coordination will be critical. In this regard, it is positive that national and international organizations are already meeting and discussing coordinated response mechanisms. Health actors in Haiti can draw upon their experiences combatting the cholera epidemic, which spread in Haiti after its introduction by United Nations troops in 2010. While the response to cholera was woefully inadequate, more coordinated and concerted efforts in recent years have led to some positive developments. As Sandra Wisner of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti told the Haitian Times, empowering communities must be a key aspect of any successful response:

This includes access and ensuring services are available to communities ― so having available where people are, tracing, treatment; health facilities resources with the necessary supplies, and ensuring front line workers have the resources and tools they need to provide safe and effective care and treatment for patients.

Since the 2010 earthquake, the Haitian Ministry of Health has been one of the only government institutions that has received direct donor support. Nevertheless, a significant portion of foreign assistance bypasses national health systems. It is vitally important that efforts to respond to the current pandemic also focus on strengthening the government’s health care infrastructure. Though some improvements have been evident over the previous decade, national health spending remains woefully inadequate and has actually decreased in recent years

The government has also appealed to Cuba for assistance in fighting the pandemic. The government announced there were 348 Cuban health professionals in the country to respond, many of whom were already in the country as part of Cuba’s decades-long assistance in providing health care in Haiti.

The Economy

Even before the arrival of the novel coronavirus, the Haitian economy was projected to shrink by 1 percent on a per capita basis in 2019. The government’s directive to close businesses will bring additional economic hardship. Remittances, on which the Haitian economy relies, may also see a reduction as diaspora communities struggle in their own communities with quarantines and business closures. 

Haitians’ reliance on the informal economy will make responding to the crisis even more difficult. Some 60 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day. Though the government has directed businesses to close, the reality is that many rely on the informal economy to survive.

In this regard, despite the government’s announcements, public markets and public transportation continue to operate. Local journalists have raised concerns about the lack of guidelines for drivers and passengers. While the public might be aware of the virus, most people still depend on public transportation and public markets to survive and get around. Unions have taken the lead by recommending a reduction in the number of passengers allowed on taxis and buses, but there has yet to be any clear initiative from the state to enforce the unions’ recommendations and regulate transportation. 

While the government has ordered factories closed, it is unclear what, if any, financial support from the government will go to impacted workers. Antèn Ouvriye, an organization representing factory subcontractors, has criticized the government for not ensuring salaries will continue to be paid during closures. On March 25, de facto prime minister Joseph Jouthe announced that public workers and those working in the textile industry would receive one month of wages; however, it remains unclear exactly when that would take place and how much the government will be able to afford. 

In order to ensure communities are able to take action to protect themselves and are able to stay at home, the government must act to provide the resources necessary to sustain people’s livelihoods, including access to food and water. Some countries have acted to reinforce and increase government spending on essential services and social safety net policies. Some have prioritized subsidizing revenue by ensuring salaries are maintained, while others are providing meals to those who rely on daily activities for their basic needs. Although Haiti’s resources are limited, the government response needs to incorporate economic relief for the population, especially for street vendors, factory workers, and small business owners, many of whom rely on the informal economy to make a living.

The government, however, has thus far relied on monetary policy ― increasing access to credit through the central bank and relaxing repayment schedules. This, however, is likely to have only a limited impact for the vast majority of Haitians. Without greater international assistance, it is unlikely the government will have the fiscal resources available to properly support the population throughout the crisis.

Price gouging has already started, putting a strain on an already fragile population. This is partly due to the fact that the Haitian food supply depends largely on imports, which are likely to decline during the current situation. While the government has announced measures to ensure food distribution, it must make a priority of protecting consumers from price spikes. This also presents an opportunity to invest in and expand the agricultural sector, which could provide stability for farmers and sellers, and increase national production.

International Aid

It is imperative to recognize that the Haitian state’s inability to adequately respond to the crisis is tied to a legacy of foreign domination, occupation, and exploitation, and to decades of foreign aid policies that have eroded the state’s capacity. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear, as with the 2010 earthquake, that the Haitian government will not be able to adequately respond to the current crisis without increased support from the international community. 

The IMF and the World Bank have issued a statement urging “all official bilateral creditors to suspend debt payments from IDA countries that request forbearance.” Though most of Haiti’s debt is concessional (loans provided at very low or even zero interest rates), bilateral and multilateral donors should immediately suspend any debt servicing requirements for the duration of the pandemic. The Inter-American Development Bank has also announced a special lending facility for countries impacted by the coronavirus pandemic. 

The IMF could also provide an unprecedented influx of reserve assets to developing countries, including Haiti, through a Special Drawing Rights allocation. The IMF is reportedly considering this. With its dwindling reserves and reliance on the importation of goods, such a boost would be extremely valuable to Haiti.

It is also likely that a prolonged crisis will exacerbate an already fragile food security situation in much of the country. Many children rely on school feeding programs, which are often funded by international organizations. International assistance will be key in ensuring the government is able to reach the most vulnerable in responding to the pandemic, but international actors must be wary of repeating past mistakes. Food assistance should be designed to ensure local procurement of available goods, and to support investment in national production.

The onset of the coronavirus pandemic in Haiti requires immediate and concerted action by local and international actors; but in a country where the failures of international assistance and intervention are so readily apparent, those involved in the response must make every effort to ensure a more sustainable future.

On March 19, Haitian president Jovenel Moïse confirmed the first two cases of the novel coronavirus in Haiti. The number has since increased to eight. In response, the president has declared a state of emergency and ordered schools, factories, and religious entities to close; established a curfew; and closed the country’s borders. The government announced the new policies after previously suspending air travel from most countries.  

The initial reported cases both related to individuals who had traveled internationally. There has, however, only been limited local testing. As of March 25, 58 tests had been administered nationwide, according to the latest epidemiological update. The Ministry of Health has outlined a plan to combat the pandemic in Haiti, estimating a budget of $37.2 million. Already, international and local organizations have been meeting to coordinate the response.

After nearly two years of sustained protests and government inaction, the economic situation in Haiti has already made life exceedingly difficult for the vast majority of the population. The currency has rapidly depreciated, inflation has remained elevated, and the government has been unable to increase revenues domestically or through international assistance. The Haitian government has few fiscal resources to draw upon in responding to the coronavirus pandemic, and Haitian families, many already pushed to the edge, are facing an increasingly perilous future. 

There are multiple complementary aspects of the response to this virus in Haiti. One centers on the health care system and the ability to adequately detect, treat, and contain the virus. The other relates to the government’s ability to establish and enforce policies that encourage physical distancing. In addressing the latter, it is important to consider how the Haitian population interacts, lives, and survives in order to implement effective policies to contain the virus, protect the population, and ensure access to essential goods.

The cases reported have so far been marked as imported, but with the difficulties of enforcing a sustained national quarantine, Haiti is facing the very real risk of COVID-19 spreading locally. While declaring a state of emergency nationwide was a necessary step, it needs to be boosted by provisions for workers and the poor, and allocations for the health care system. The international community must also play a role, with the World Bank, IMF, and other multilateral development organizations immediately freeing up resources for Haiti and other developing nations to respond to the pandemic.  

The Health Care System

Prior to the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Haiti’s health care system faced many challenges. According to a 2019 study by the Research and Education consortium for Acute Care in Haiti (REACH), Haiti only has an estimated 124 ICU beds and 64 ventilators for a population of more than 11 million. Other public health experts have put those figures even lower. This is a serious concern, especially given the relatively high proportion of the population considered to be at an elevated risk.

Already, there have been reports from the State University Hospital (HUEH) of inadequate preparation and supplies of protective equipment, which has led to some health professionals refusing to work. The HUEH was one of the marquee post-quake international reconstruction projects, but, more than ten years later, those plans remain mostly unrealized.

Haiti’s health care system overall is extremely reliant on private actors, including foreign assistance and NGOs. Dr. Youri Louis told the Haitian Times that, as of 2013, 64 percent of Haiti’s health budget derived from international assistance. In many parts of the country, access to health care is only provided by nonstate actors.

In such a fragmented system, coordination will be critical. In this regard, it is positive that national and international organizations are already meeting and discussing coordinated response mechanisms. Health actors in Haiti can draw upon their experiences combatting the cholera epidemic, which spread in Haiti after its introduction by United Nations troops in 2010. While the response to cholera was woefully inadequate, more coordinated and concerted efforts in recent years have led to some positive developments. As Sandra Wisner of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti told the Haitian Times, empowering communities must be a key aspect of any successful response:

This includes access and ensuring services are available to communities ― so having available where people are, tracing, treatment; health facilities resources with the necessary supplies, and ensuring front line workers have the resources and tools they need to provide safe and effective care and treatment for patients.

Since the 2010 earthquake, the Haitian Ministry of Health has been one of the only government institutions that has received direct donor support. Nevertheless, a significant portion of foreign assistance bypasses national health systems. It is vitally important that efforts to respond to the current pandemic also focus on strengthening the government’s health care infrastructure. Though some improvements have been evident over the previous decade, national health spending remains woefully inadequate and has actually decreased in recent years

The government has also appealed to Cuba for assistance in fighting the pandemic. The government announced there were 348 Cuban health professionals in the country to respond, many of whom were already in the country as part of Cuba’s decades-long assistance in providing health care in Haiti.

The Economy

Even before the arrival of the novel coronavirus, the Haitian economy was projected to shrink by 1 percent on a per capita basis in 2019. The government’s directive to close businesses will bring additional economic hardship. Remittances, on which the Haitian economy relies, may also see a reduction as diaspora communities struggle in their own communities with quarantines and business closures. 

Haitians’ reliance on the informal economy will make responding to the crisis even more difficult. Some 60 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day. Though the government has directed businesses to close, the reality is that many rely on the informal economy to survive.

In this regard, despite the government’s announcements, public markets and public transportation continue to operate. Local journalists have raised concerns about the lack of guidelines for drivers and passengers. While the public might be aware of the virus, most people still depend on public transportation and public markets to survive and get around. Unions have taken the lead by recommending a reduction in the number of passengers allowed on taxis and buses, but there has yet to be any clear initiative from the state to enforce the unions’ recommendations and regulate transportation. 

While the government has ordered factories closed, it is unclear what, if any, financial support from the government will go to impacted workers. Antèn Ouvriye, an organization representing factory subcontractors, has criticized the government for not ensuring salaries will continue to be paid during closures. On March 25, de facto prime minister Joseph Jouthe announced that public workers and those working in the textile industry would receive one month of wages; however, it remains unclear exactly when that would take place and how much the government will be able to afford. 

In order to ensure communities are able to take action to protect themselves and are able to stay at home, the government must act to provide the resources necessary to sustain people’s livelihoods, including access to food and water. Some countries have acted to reinforce and increase government spending on essential services and social safety net policies. Some have prioritized subsidizing revenue by ensuring salaries are maintained, while others are providing meals to those who rely on daily activities for their basic needs. Although Haiti’s resources are limited, the government response needs to incorporate economic relief for the population, especially for street vendors, factory workers, and small business owners, many of whom rely on the informal economy to make a living.

The government, however, has thus far relied on monetary policy ― increasing access to credit through the central bank and relaxing repayment schedules. This, however, is likely to have only a limited impact for the vast majority of Haitians. Without greater international assistance, it is unlikely the government will have the fiscal resources available to properly support the population throughout the crisis.

Price gouging has already started, putting a strain on an already fragile population. This is partly due to the fact that the Haitian food supply depends largely on imports, which are likely to decline during the current situation. While the government has announced measures to ensure food distribution, it must make a priority of protecting consumers from price spikes. This also presents an opportunity to invest in and expand the agricultural sector, which could provide stability for farmers and sellers, and increase national production.

International Aid

It is imperative to recognize that the Haitian state’s inability to adequately respond to the crisis is tied to a legacy of foreign domination, occupation, and exploitation, and to decades of foreign aid policies that have eroded the state’s capacity. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear, as with the 2010 earthquake, that the Haitian government will not be able to adequately respond to the current crisis without increased support from the international community. 

The IMF and the World Bank have issued a statement urging “all official bilateral creditors to suspend debt payments from IDA countries that request forbearance.” Though most of Haiti’s debt is concessional (loans provided at very low or even zero interest rates), bilateral and multilateral donors should immediately suspend any debt servicing requirements for the duration of the pandemic. The Inter-American Development Bank has also announced a special lending facility for countries impacted by the coronavirus pandemic. 

The IMF could also provide an unprecedented influx of reserve assets to developing countries, including Haiti, through a Special Drawing Rights allocation. The IMF is reportedly considering this. With its dwindling reserves and reliance on the importation of goods, such a boost would be extremely valuable to Haiti.

It is also likely that a prolonged crisis will exacerbate an already fragile food security situation in much of the country. Many children rely on school feeding programs, which are often funded by international organizations. International assistance will be key in ensuring the government is able to reach the most vulnerable in responding to the pandemic, but international actors must be wary of repeating past mistakes. Food assistance should be designed to ensure local procurement of available goods, and to support investment in national production.

The onset of the coronavirus pandemic in Haiti requires immediate and concerted action by local and international actors; but in a country where the failures of international assistance and intervention are so readily apparent, those involved in the response must make every effort to ensure a more sustainable future.

On February 20, the UN Security Council held a meeting to discuss the situation in Haiti. The Miami Herald’s Jacqueline Charles reports: 

Both U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres’ representative in Haiti, Helen La Lime, and Marie Yolene Gilles, a leading human rights activist in the country, painted a climate of deteriorating human rights and disappearing rule of law. Gilles said Haitians are subject to raging malnutrition, kidnappings for ransom, rapes and gang violence that have forced the courts in Port-au-Prince to be closed since September.

“The two associations of magistrates in the country have deserted the tribunals until safety returns,” she said.

Gilles, who heads the human rights group La Fondasyon Je Klere [FJKL], said while there are 23 known armed gangs in the capital, around a third of Haiti is under gang control.

La Lime, who heads the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), had hoped to arrive at the Security Council meeting bearing news of progress in long-stalled efforts to break the political deadlock in Haiti. However, in nearly two years of protests and political conflict, the Haitian government and international actors have failed to lead meaningful talks. At the Security Council, La Lime once again appealed for all political actors to enter into dialogue. While supporting those efforts, ambassadors from the United States, France, and Germany, among others, called for the timely planning of legislative elections — and the prioritization of elections over constitutional reform, the latter of which President Jovenel Moïse began promoting after parliamentary terms expired in January. 

“The Haitian people must have a voice in selecting its leaders. And further, while constitutional reforms are necessary and welcomed, they must not become a pretext to delay elections,” US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Kraft said.

Incidentally, the UN Security Council met a few days after BINUH and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) released a report on gang violence and human rights abuses in the popular Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Bel Air. This report detailed events that took place last year between November 4 and 6. Bel Air residents had erected barricades and participated in a two-month period of protests known as “Peyi Lock.” According to the UN report, three different gang leaders entered Bel Air in an attempt to get residents to remove barricades in exchange for money. Those efforts failed, and were followed by a series of attacks over a period of three days. 

More than 50 armed men were seen opening fire on civilians and setting fire to private vehicles and at least 30 homes, the UN found. At least three people were killed and six were wounded. Local rights organizations have put the toll even higher

The violence in Bel Air, as Gilles told the Security Council, was not a new development. Local rights organizations, including Gilles’s FJKL, have documented a series of violent attacks, often with the involvement of police officers, in popular neighborhoods throughout the capital. In the case of Bel Air, the UN report mentioned the presence of at least three police officers, signaling that there were political motives behind this attack. 

The UN report also alleged that a former police officer, Jimmy Cherizier, also known as “Barbecue,” led the November Bel Air attacks. Local human rights organizations, as well as the UN itself, have also alleged the involvement of Barbecue in the La Saline massacre in November 2018, in which dozens of civilians were massacred. More than 100 members of the US Congress condemned that attack in early 2019. 

The UN report notes: 

… more than a year after the fact, the lack of progress is particularly worrying and the involvement of Jimmy Cherizier, alias Barbecue, in other similar acts demonstrates the direct impact of impunity on the recurrence of violence and on the population. Of the thirteen recommendations made in the June 2019 report on the La Saline case, none has been fully implemented. 

But while the UN is now calling for an end to impunity and the political protection that perpetuates it, the organization’s own record reveals the shallowness of these pleas. 

In November 2017, UN police officers “secured the perimeter” of a school in the Grand Ravine neighborhood of Port-au-Prince as part of a joint raid with the Haitian police. Inside that school, Haitian police officers, including Jimmy Cherizier, massacred nine civilians. 

That Cherizier has been able to continue to operate, and led the raid on Bel Air even after his involvement in two previous massacres, is a testimony to the privilege of immunity that many politically protected gangs enjoy. These reports show that gangs have unlimited access to a supply chain of both arms and money when it comes to political repression and violence. But the UN’s own actions relating to Cherizier reveal the hypocrisy of their recent calls for accountability, and may point to one of the reasons the institution has failed to play a productive role in the current situation. 

In early 2018, Susan Page, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), applauded progress made in regard to the Petrocaribe investigation and called for accountability for the victims of the Grand Ravine massacre. She was seriously criticized by the Haitian government and the UN quickly acquiesced, replacing Page with Helen La Lime. 

In its report on Bel Air and at the Security Council meeting last week, officials pushed for accountability and a more consistent fight against impunity in Haiti. But the road to empowering local authorities and institutions must start with the culture of impunity within international institutions. UN police were involved in the raid that resulted in Cherizier and other officials massacring nine civilians in 2017, but violent UN raids are not simply a recent phenomenon. After the deployment of thousands of foreign military soldiers to Haiti in 2004, UN troops repeatedly led raids into poor neighborhoods of the capital, often resulting in civilian deaths. Though the Dominican Republic’s representative to the UN pointed to recent violent actions as the “result” of the departure of UN soldiers in 2017, the more appropriate lesson is that a policy of combating violence with violence has been an abject failure. 

The UN’s credibility crisis, however, goes even deeper. It took six years for the UN to accept any responsibility for introducing cholera in 2010, which has since killed at least 10,000 Haitians and sickened hundreds of thousands more. The UN has still failed to properly respond to the epidemic. 

Far from addressing root causes, the billions the UN spent on “peacekeepers” in Haiti has instead consolidated a political and economic system that bears significant responsibility for the on-going violence and instability of the country. 

That the UN is now willing to expressly call for accountability in response to incidents such as Bel Air may be a positive development, but it must also be deepened to reflect a recognition of the responsibility of international organizations. This entails depicting a more complete picture of repeated attacks on popular neighborhoods. The police force in Haiti continues to be politicized with the tacit support of international actors, who have supported it with billions of dollars.  Meanwhile the institution has proven itself more at the service of the sitting government than the population it is meant to protect. 

An honest accounting of the violence in Haiti must also address the political and economic elite who sponsor these violent outbursts with arms, money, and protection — a phenomenon that transcends political affiliation. Nevertheless, the UN investigations into the massacres of La Saline and Bel Air, as well as research by local human rights organizations, make abundantly clear the relationship between the current government and its allies and the ongoing repression in popular neighborhoods throughout the capital. 

To move forward, the international community must first recognize its own role in stoking Haiti’s current political, economic, and social crisis. Until they do, international calls for accountability — and pleas for dialogue — will continue to ring hollow. 

On February 20, the UN Security Council held a meeting to discuss the situation in Haiti. The Miami Herald’s Jacqueline Charles reports: 

Both U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres’ representative in Haiti, Helen La Lime, and Marie Yolene Gilles, a leading human rights activist in the country, painted a climate of deteriorating human rights and disappearing rule of law. Gilles said Haitians are subject to raging malnutrition, kidnappings for ransom, rapes and gang violence that have forced the courts in Port-au-Prince to be closed since September.

“The two associations of magistrates in the country have deserted the tribunals until safety returns,” she said.

Gilles, who heads the human rights group La Fondasyon Je Klere [FJKL], said while there are 23 known armed gangs in the capital, around a third of Haiti is under gang control.

La Lime, who heads the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), had hoped to arrive at the Security Council meeting bearing news of progress in long-stalled efforts to break the political deadlock in Haiti. However, in nearly two years of protests and political conflict, the Haitian government and international actors have failed to lead meaningful talks. At the Security Council, La Lime once again appealed for all political actors to enter into dialogue. While supporting those efforts, ambassadors from the United States, France, and Germany, among others, called for the timely planning of legislative elections — and the prioritization of elections over constitutional reform, the latter of which President Jovenel Moïse began promoting after parliamentary terms expired in January. 

“The Haitian people must have a voice in selecting its leaders. And further, while constitutional reforms are necessary and welcomed, they must not become a pretext to delay elections,” US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Kraft said.

Incidentally, the UN Security Council met a few days after BINUH and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) released a report on gang violence and human rights abuses in the popular Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Bel Air. This report detailed events that took place last year between November 4 and 6. Bel Air residents had erected barricades and participated in a two-month period of protests known as “Peyi Lock.” According to the UN report, three different gang leaders entered Bel Air in an attempt to get residents to remove barricades in exchange for money. Those efforts failed, and were followed by a series of attacks over a period of three days. 

More than 50 armed men were seen opening fire on civilians and setting fire to private vehicles and at least 30 homes, the UN found. At least three people were killed and six were wounded. Local rights organizations have put the toll even higher

The violence in Bel Air, as Gilles told the Security Council, was not a new development. Local rights organizations, including Gilles’s FJKL, have documented a series of violent attacks, often with the involvement of police officers, in popular neighborhoods throughout the capital. In the case of Bel Air, the UN report mentioned the presence of at least three police officers, signaling that there were political motives behind this attack. 

The UN report also alleged that a former police officer, Jimmy Cherizier, also known as “Barbecue,” led the November Bel Air attacks. Local human rights organizations, as well as the UN itself, have also alleged the involvement of Barbecue in the La Saline massacre in November 2018, in which dozens of civilians were massacred. More than 100 members of the US Congress condemned that attack in early 2019. 

The UN report notes: 

… more than a year after the fact, the lack of progress is particularly worrying and the involvement of Jimmy Cherizier, alias Barbecue, in other similar acts demonstrates the direct impact of impunity on the recurrence of violence and on the population. Of the thirteen recommendations made in the June 2019 report on the La Saline case, none has been fully implemented. 

But while the UN is now calling for an end to impunity and the political protection that perpetuates it, the organization’s own record reveals the shallowness of these pleas. 

In November 2017, UN police officers “secured the perimeter” of a school in the Grand Ravine neighborhood of Port-au-Prince as part of a joint raid with the Haitian police. Inside that school, Haitian police officers, including Jimmy Cherizier, massacred nine civilians. 

That Cherizier has been able to continue to operate, and led the raid on Bel Air even after his involvement in two previous massacres, is a testimony to the privilege of immunity that many politically protected gangs enjoy. These reports show that gangs have unlimited access to a supply chain of both arms and money when it comes to political repression and violence. But the UN’s own actions relating to Cherizier reveal the hypocrisy of their recent calls for accountability, and may point to one of the reasons the institution has failed to play a productive role in the current situation. 

In early 2018, Susan Page, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), applauded progress made in regard to the Petrocaribe investigation and called for accountability for the victims of the Grand Ravine massacre. She was seriously criticized by the Haitian government and the UN quickly acquiesced, replacing Page with Helen La Lime. 

In its report on Bel Air and at the Security Council meeting last week, officials pushed for accountability and a more consistent fight against impunity in Haiti. But the road to empowering local authorities and institutions must start with the culture of impunity within international institutions. UN police were involved in the raid that resulted in Cherizier and other officials massacring nine civilians in 2017, but violent UN raids are not simply a recent phenomenon. After the deployment of thousands of foreign military soldiers to Haiti in 2004, UN troops repeatedly led raids into poor neighborhoods of the capital, often resulting in civilian deaths. Though the Dominican Republic’s representative to the UN pointed to recent violent actions as the “result” of the departure of UN soldiers in 2017, the more appropriate lesson is that a policy of combating violence with violence has been an abject failure. 

The UN’s credibility crisis, however, goes even deeper. It took six years for the UN to accept any responsibility for introducing cholera in 2010, which has since killed at least 10,000 Haitians and sickened hundreds of thousands more. The UN has still failed to properly respond to the epidemic. 

Far from addressing root causes, the billions the UN spent on “peacekeepers” in Haiti has instead consolidated a political and economic system that bears significant responsibility for the on-going violence and instability of the country. 

That the UN is now willing to expressly call for accountability in response to incidents such as Bel Air may be a positive development, but it must also be deepened to reflect a recognition of the responsibility of international organizations. This entails depicting a more complete picture of repeated attacks on popular neighborhoods. The police force in Haiti continues to be politicized with the tacit support of international actors, who have supported it with billions of dollars.  Meanwhile the institution has proven itself more at the service of the sitting government than the population it is meant to protect. 

An honest accounting of the violence in Haiti must also address the political and economic elite who sponsor these violent outbursts with arms, money, and protection — a phenomenon that transcends political affiliation. Nevertheless, the UN investigations into the massacres of La Saline and Bel Air, as well as research by local human rights organizations, make abundantly clear the relationship between the current government and its allies and the ongoing repression in popular neighborhoods throughout the capital. 

To move forward, the international community must first recognize its own role in stoking Haiti’s current political, economic, and social crisis. Until they do, international calls for accountability — and pleas for dialogue — will continue to ring hollow. 

Magnitude of earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010: 7.0 Years since an earthquake of that magnitude struck Haiti: 168 Number of aftershocks, over 4.5 magnitude, in the week after the initial tremor: 51
Magnitude of earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010: 7.0 Years since an earthquake of that magnitude struck Haiti: 168 Number of aftershocks, over 4.5 magnitude, in the week after the initial tremor: 51
In August 2015, President Michel Martelly inaugurated the Delmas viaduct, a four-lane overpass designed to ease the capital’s grid-locked streets. “This viaduct proves once again that together we can achieve great and beautiful things,” Martelly told the
In August 2015, President Michel Martelly inaugurated the Delmas viaduct, a four-lane overpass designed to ease the capital’s grid-locked streets. “This viaduct proves once again that together we can achieve great and beautiful things,” Martelly told the

On February 17, Haitian police arrested seven Blackwater-like security contractors a few blocks from the country’s Central Bank. Driving in unmarked vehicles and transporting semi-automatic rifles, drones, and other tactical equipment, the contractors claimed to be on a government mission. Four days later the US “rescued” them. None are expected to face charges.

Over the course of just a few days, the case took on political significance much greater than the detention and release of the contractors. The chain of events initiated by the detention revealed the weakness of the nation’s justice system and the precariousness of the current Haitian administration; it exposed the close ties between criminal networks and the ruling party; and casts doubt on the idea that this was a simple security operation gone wrong.

Launch the investigation below.

Nan kreyòl

Our Boss Will Call Your Boss
An investigation into American security contractors arrested in Haiti and their “rescue” by the US government

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On February 17, Haitian police arrested seven Blackwater-like security contractors a few blocks from the country’s Central Bank. Driving in unmarked vehicles and transporting semi-automatic rifles, drones, and other tactical equipment, the contractors claimed to be on a government mission. Four days later the US “rescued” them. None are expected to face charges.

Over the course of just a few days, the case took on political significance much greater than the detention and release of the contractors. The chain of events initiated by the detention revealed the weakness of the nation’s justice system and the precariousness of the current Haitian administration; it exposed the close ties between criminal networks and the ruling party; and casts doubt on the idea that this was a simple security operation gone wrong.

Launch the investigation below.

Nan kreyòl

Our Boss Will Call Your Boss
An investigation into American security contractors arrested in Haiti and their “rescue” by the US government

Enter

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Years since a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti: 9 Estimated number of aftershocks that measured 4.5 or greater: 59 Number of people who died in the earthquake, according to Haitian government: 316,000 Number of people displaced: 1,300,000 Number of people who remained in internally displaced persons camps, as of September 2017: 37,867 Estimated population of Canaan, a barren hillside north of the capital, pre-earthquake: 0 Estimated population of Canaan now: 300,000 Minimum number of new homes necessary to meet demand: 500,000 Estimated damage and economic losses from earthquake, in percent of Haiti’s GDP: 120 percent Total amount of aid disbursed by donors, since 2010: $7,538,885,632 Amount of aid given to the government in the form of budget support: $280,844,071 Total amount of approved World Bank projects in Haiti since the earthquake: $1.167 billion Total aid awarded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID): $2.3 billion Of that amount, percent of which was given to organizations or companies located inside the Beltway (Maryland, DC, Virginia): 55.5 percent Percent of which was awarded directly to Haitian organizations or companies: 2.3 percent Total amount of contracts awarded to the DC-based company Chemonics International: $298.55 million Total amount of contracts awarded directly to all Haitian firms: $52.95 million Amount allocated by USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank to support the Caracol Industrial Park, the flagship post-quake project: $350 million Number of miles from the earthquake epicenter to Caracol: 190 Date on which the industrial park was inaugurated: October 22, 2012 Number of jobs the State Department promised the new industrial park would create: 65,000 Total number of jobs at the industrial park, as of 2017: 10,214 Percent by which garment sector employment has increased countrywide since 2010: 93 percent Minimum number of residents displaced by the construction of the Caracol Industrial Park: 400 Date on which those 400 residents reached an agreement with the IDB and Haitian government on corrective measures, including access to new land: December 19, 2018 Daily minimum wage in the garment sector: 420 gourdes (less than $6) Daily minimum wage requested by unions: 1000 gourdes Percent of garment factories noncompliant with social security and other benefit payments in 2018: 75 percent Total remittances sent to Haiti in 2018, according to the World Bank: $2.5 billion Haiti’s rank among countries with the highest remittances as a share of GDP: 5 Minimum number of Haitians who emigrated to Chile in 2017: 105,000 Number of Haitians living in the United States with Temporary Protected Status (TPS): 59,000 Date on which then-candidate Trump proclaimed that he would be Haiti’s “greatest champion”: September 16, 2016 Date on which the US announced it was ending TPS for Haitians: November 20, 2017 Date on which it was reported that President Trump referred to Haiti as a “shithole” country: January 11, 2018 Date on which a trial in New York commenced contesting the US decision to end TPS: January 7, 2019 Ratio of per capita public health funding in Haiti compared to Cuba: 1:60 Percent by which child mortality decreased, between 1990 and 2015: 50 percent Factor by which Haiti’s child mortality rate remains greater than the Latin America and Caribbean average: 5 Percent of health facilities that charge user fees: 93 percent Percent of the national budget that went to health in 2004: 16.6 In 2016: 4.4 Percent of national budget that went to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies last year: 5.8 percent
Years since a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti: 9 Estimated number of aftershocks that measured 4.5 or greater: 59 Number of people who died in the earthquake, according to Haitian government: 316,000 Number of people displaced: 1,300,000 Number of people who remained in internally displaced persons camps, as of September 2017: 37,867 Estimated population of Canaan, a barren hillside north of the capital, pre-earthquake: 0 Estimated population of Canaan now: 300,000 Minimum number of new homes necessary to meet demand: 500,000 Estimated damage and economic losses from earthquake, in percent of Haiti’s GDP: 120 percent Total amount of aid disbursed by donors, since 2010: $7,538,885,632 Amount of aid given to the government in the form of budget support: $280,844,071 Total amount of approved World Bank projects in Haiti since the earthquake: $1.167 billion Total aid awarded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID): $2.3 billion Of that amount, percent of which was given to organizations or companies located inside the Beltway (Maryland, DC, Virginia): 55.5 percent Percent of which was awarded directly to Haitian organizations or companies: 2.3 percent Total amount of contracts awarded to the DC-based company Chemonics International: $298.55 million Total amount of contracts awarded directly to all Haitian firms: $52.95 million Amount allocated by USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank to support the Caracol Industrial Park, the flagship post-quake project: $350 million Number of miles from the earthquake epicenter to Caracol: 190 Date on which the industrial park was inaugurated: October 22, 2012 Number of jobs the State Department promised the new industrial park would create: 65,000 Total number of jobs at the industrial park, as of 2017: 10,214 Percent by which garment sector employment has increased countrywide since 2010: 93 percent Minimum number of residents displaced by the construction of the Caracol Industrial Park: 400 Date on which those 400 residents reached an agreement with the IDB and Haitian government on corrective measures, including access to new land: December 19, 2018 Daily minimum wage in the garment sector: 420 gourdes (less than $6) Daily minimum wage requested by unions: 1000 gourdes Percent of garment factories noncompliant with social security and other benefit payments in 2018: 75 percent Total remittances sent to Haiti in 2018, according to the World Bank: $2.5 billion Haiti’s rank among countries with the highest remittances as a share of GDP: 5 Minimum number of Haitians who emigrated to Chile in 2017: 105,000 Number of Haitians living in the United States with Temporary Protected Status (TPS): 59,000 Date on which then-candidate Trump proclaimed that he would be Haiti’s “greatest champion”: September 16, 2016 Date on which the US announced it was ending TPS for Haitians: November 20, 2017 Date on which it was reported that President Trump referred to Haiti as a “shithole” country: January 11, 2018 Date on which a trial in New York commenced contesting the US decision to end TPS: January 7, 2019 Ratio of per capita public health funding in Haiti compared to Cuba: 1:60 Percent by which child mortality decreased, between 1990 and 2015: 50 percent Factor by which Haiti’s child mortality rate remains greater than the Latin America and Caribbean average: 5 Percent of health facilities that charge user fees: 93 percent Percent of the national budget that went to health in 2004: 16.6 In 2016: 4.4 Percent of national budget that went to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies last year: 5.8 percent
More than two months have passed since an innocuous tweet went viral and a social media campaign targeting government corruption in Haiti began. Using the hashtags #PetrocaribeChallenge and #KotKobPetwoKaribea (“where is the Petrocaribe money?”), the camp
More than two months have passed since an innocuous tweet went viral and a social media campaign targeting government corruption in Haiti began. Using the hashtags #PetrocaribeChallenge and #KotKobPetwoKaribea (“where is the Petrocaribe money?”), the camp
It was 2:15 on Friday afternoon, July 6th, when I got the first WhatsApp message. The Haitian government was going to announce that fuel prices would increase the following day by up to 50 percent. It was also somewhere around the 13th minute of the World Cup quarterfinal match between Belgium and Brazil, the national team adopted by most Haitian soccer fans. Eyes across the country were glued to the TV when the official announcement came late in the game’s second half. Minutes later, Brazil had lost the match. And soon after, thousands of Haitians were in the streets, though not because of the game’s disappointing result. Roadblocks and burning tires went up in smoke throughout the capital, and soon demonstrations had broken out across the country. By Saturday morning the situation had worsened. International airlines canceled flights in and out of Haiti. Parking lots at many private businesses were turned into car cemeteries. Digicel, the leading cell provider in Haiti, said its fiber optic cables were destroyed, blocking international phone calls, internet usage and other services. Helicopters could be seen evacuating individuals from their rooftops. At least three people were killed. Less than 24 hours after the initial announcement, the government was forced to cancel the price increases. But the aftershocks of that initial decision have continued to reverberate. The heads of both chambers of parliament (erstwhile allies of the president) as well as the most powerful private business organization have since called for Prime Minister Jack Guy Lafontant, a doctor and political novice, to resign. The Jovenel Moise administration is now facing its most significant test yet. But how the government found itself backed into this corner is about far more than fuel prices, and reveals as much about the failures of the international community as it does those of Haiti. The price increase was not a surprise. In late 2017, faced with an increasing budget deficit, and a lack of donor funds, the government sought the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Before the government could sign a financing deal with the IMF however, it first had to complete a 6-month reform program. If that program was successful, the government could then sign a long-term deal with the IMF, and budget support from other donors would begin to flow again. On June 20, the IMF issued a statement welcoming “the government's intention to eliminate fuel price subsidies,” a key step in completing the program. The IMF also noted that it “agreed on the importance of implementing key social measures to mitigate the impact of the subsidy reform on the most vulnerable segments of the population.” According to World Bank research, 90 percent of the benefits from the subsidy go toward the wealthiest segments of the population. But, in a country with 60 percent youth unemployment, a majority of citizens living on less than $2.40 a day, and stubborn double-digit inflation, any increase in the cost of living can be catastrophic. And to make matters worse, kerosene, the fuel that the poor most rely on, was to see the greatest increase.
It was 2:15 on Friday afternoon, July 6th, when I got the first WhatsApp message. The Haitian government was going to announce that fuel prices would increase the following day by up to 50 percent. It was also somewhere around the 13th minute of the World Cup quarterfinal match between Belgium and Brazil, the national team adopted by most Haitian soccer fans. Eyes across the country were glued to the TV when the official announcement came late in the game’s second half. Minutes later, Brazil had lost the match. And soon after, thousands of Haitians were in the streets, though not because of the game’s disappointing result. Roadblocks and burning tires went up in smoke throughout the capital, and soon demonstrations had broken out across the country. By Saturday morning the situation had worsened. International airlines canceled flights in and out of Haiti. Parking lots at many private businesses were turned into car cemeteries. Digicel, the leading cell provider in Haiti, said its fiber optic cables were destroyed, blocking international phone calls, internet usage and other services. Helicopters could be seen evacuating individuals from their rooftops. At least three people were killed. Less than 24 hours after the initial announcement, the government was forced to cancel the price increases. But the aftershocks of that initial decision have continued to reverberate. The heads of both chambers of parliament (erstwhile allies of the president) as well as the most powerful private business organization have since called for Prime Minister Jack Guy Lafontant, a doctor and political novice, to resign. The Jovenel Moise administration is now facing its most significant test yet. But how the government found itself backed into this corner is about far more than fuel prices, and reveals as much about the failures of the international community as it does those of Haiti. The price increase was not a surprise. In late 2017, faced with an increasing budget deficit, and a lack of donor funds, the government sought the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Before the government could sign a financing deal with the IMF however, it first had to complete a 6-month reform program. If that program was successful, the government could then sign a long-term deal with the IMF, and budget support from other donors would begin to flow again. On June 20, the IMF issued a statement welcoming “the government's intention to eliminate fuel price subsidies,” a key step in completing the program. The IMF also noted that it “agreed on the importance of implementing key social measures to mitigate the impact of the subsidy reform on the most vulnerable segments of the population.” According to World Bank research, 90 percent of the benefits from the subsidy go toward the wealthiest segments of the population. But, in a country with 60 percent youth unemployment, a majority of citizens living on less than $2.40 a day, and stubborn double-digit inflation, any increase in the cost of living can be catastrophic. And to make matters worse, kerosene, the fuel that the poor most rely on, was to see the greatest increase.
On March 13, President Jovenel Moise appointed six individuals to the high command of the recently reinstated Haitian armed forces (FAdH). All of the appointees, now in their sixties, were majors or colonels in the former FAdH, disbanded in 1995 after a long history of involvement in coups, violent repression, and drug trafficking. At least three of the officers appear to have held senior positions within the early-‘90s military coup regime. One of them is a convicted intellectual author of a civilian massacre, and another was a member of a committee that sought to cover it up. Ministry of Defense press release from March 13, 2018 announcing the FAdH’s new senior leadership. The makeup of the new leadership has raised concerns among human rights organizations over the trajectory of the new force and its commitment to the rule of law. “The appointment confirms once again that the Haitian Armed Forces, remobilized by the [ruling Tét Kale party] is a militia whose hidden mission is to have the Haitian people relive the darkest hours of bloodthirsty Duvalierism,” wrote the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) in a press release, referencing the illegal arrests, forced disappearances, assassinations, and other abuses that characterized the Duvalier dictatorship. Haitian Defense Minister Herve Denis responded that the new high-command is “clean,” and that all were vetted for involvement in human rights abuses or drug trafficking. In 1990, an outspoken liberation theologian priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected in the first democratic election in the country’s history. But within months, a group of Haitian military officers – backed by many of the country’s wealthiest families – overthrew the new government, imposing a military dictatorship that would last three years. It was later revealed that the CIA had supported certain military elements involved in the coup, and that leaders of a paramilitary group that waged a campaign of terror against Aristide supporters and other activists were on the CIA payroll. The group, FRAPH, helped to prop up the coup regime of Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, while also at times appearing to undermine and sabotage the official actions of Clinton administration to restore democratic government to Haiti. Thousands of Haitians were murdered under the coup regime and hundreds of thousands fled the country. Colonel Jean-Robert Gabriel, the new FAdH’s assistant chief of staff, was the secretary of the general staff, and later a public spokesperson, for the Cédras regime. Following the 1991 military coup, the US and the international community implemented sanctions against the regime, eventually instituting an embargo. After Bill Clinton became president in January 1993, and increasingly in 1994, the Congressional Black Caucus played a leading role in pushing for a more aggressive role against the dictatorship, and solidarity groups in the US and elsewhere also influenced policy. In June of 1993, the Clinton administration announced individual targeted sanctions against those determined to be a part of the “de facto regime in Haiti.” The initial sanction list, published in July of 1993, named 83 individuals, including 29 military officers. Included in this initial list was Jean-Robert Gabriel. Screenshot of the Federal Register from July 1993, listing Jean-Robert Gabriel as one of 29 military officers sanctioned for their participation in the coup regime. In 1993, the UN mediated indirect negotiations between Cédras and Aristide (who had taken up residence in Washington, DC to lobby for his restoration to office). Known as the Governors Island negotiations for the location where they took place, the eventual accord did little to immediately overturn the bloody coup. According to official documents, Gabriel, as well as the newly appointed chief of the general staff, Sadrac Saintil, were members of the delegation, indicating their senior positions within the Cédras regime.   List of members of Armed Forces delegation to Governors Island. The US temporarily suspended some of the sanctions during the negotiations, but when it became clear that Cédras and his regime would not back down, the sanctions were expanded. In October 1993, the administration revoked US visas and froze the US assets of 41 officials who were determined to be thwarting a return to democratic rule and contributing to the violence in Haiti. Among the 41 individuals was Derby Guerrier, recently named as an assistant chief of staff in the reinstated armed forces ? and then a lieutenant colonel. Guerrier held a US passport, and a New Jersey address was listed next to his name. According to press reports at the time, Guerrier was the head of the military’s anti-drug unit. Though there is little public information about Guerrier, drug trafficking took off under the military regime. A 1997 federal indictment in Miami alleged that Joseph-Michel François, a former military officer who helped topple Aristide in 1991 and later become the police chief under Cédras, “placed the political and military structure of the Republic of Haiti under his control” in order to facilitate drug shipments from Colombia. François, by that time, was living in exile in Honduras and managed to avoid accountability. Back in 1994, with the situation in Haiti continuing to deteriorate, and more and more Haitians fleeing the country, the US expanded its sanctions policy. Some 550 military officers were added to the sanctions list, including all of those recently appointed to the FAdH’s new high command. In April that year, around the same time the new sanctions were levied, Haitian military and paramilitary forces descended on the neighborhood of Raboteau, where many opposition supporters were apparently seeking refuge. At least eight, and likely far more, were assassinated. The next month a military-led commission of inquiry was tasked with investigating the allegations that a massacre had taken place in Raboteau. Cédras named Lieutenant Colonel Sadrac Saintil as one of four members, according to official documents made public as part of the Raboteau trial. Unsurprisingly, the commission found no evidence of a massacre and the FADH high command accepted the commission’s recommendation that nobody be punished. Communique signed by Raoul Cédras, appointing Sadrac Saintil to a commission of inquiry looking into the Raboteau massacre. But in 2000, in a landmark human rights trial supported by the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (the same organization now denouncing the new armed forces’ leadership), a Haitian court convicted 53 former officers and paramilitaries of involvement in the Raboteau massacre. Among the military officers convicted was Jean-Robert Gabriel. Though he was not implicated in direct involvement, he was charged under the theory of “command responsibility” due to his position within the top echelons of the Cédras regime. “It’s the same type of case made against the Nazis and (Slobodan) Milosevic,” Brian Concannon, an American attorney who helped form the BAI in the early ‘90s and who worked the Raboteau case, told the St. Petersburg Times in 2002. Concannon is now the executive director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, a partner organization to the BAI. The Haitian government has pushed back on Gabriel’s involvement in Raboteau. “What I can tell you in all honesty,” the defense minister told the press, “the candidates were subjected to vetting, including Colonel Gabriel. There is nothing negative against him in the vetting with regard to human rights.”
On March 13, President Jovenel Moise appointed six individuals to the high command of the recently reinstated Haitian armed forces (FAdH). All of the appointees, now in their sixties, were majors or colonels in the former FAdH, disbanded in 1995 after a long history of involvement in coups, violent repression, and drug trafficking. At least three of the officers appear to have held senior positions within the early-‘90s military coup regime. One of them is a convicted intellectual author of a civilian massacre, and another was a member of a committee that sought to cover it up. Ministry of Defense press release from March 13, 2018 announcing the FAdH’s new senior leadership. The makeup of the new leadership has raised concerns among human rights organizations over the trajectory of the new force and its commitment to the rule of law. “The appointment confirms once again that the Haitian Armed Forces, remobilized by the [ruling Tét Kale party] is a militia whose hidden mission is to have the Haitian people relive the darkest hours of bloodthirsty Duvalierism,” wrote the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) in a press release, referencing the illegal arrests, forced disappearances, assassinations, and other abuses that characterized the Duvalier dictatorship. Haitian Defense Minister Herve Denis responded that the new high-command is “clean,” and that all were vetted for involvement in human rights abuses or drug trafficking. In 1990, an outspoken liberation theologian priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected in the first democratic election in the country’s history. But within months, a group of Haitian military officers – backed by many of the country’s wealthiest families – overthrew the new government, imposing a military dictatorship that would last three years. It was later revealed that the CIA had supported certain military elements involved in the coup, and that leaders of a paramilitary group that waged a campaign of terror against Aristide supporters and other activists were on the CIA payroll. The group, FRAPH, helped to prop up the coup regime of Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, while also at times appearing to undermine and sabotage the official actions of Clinton administration to restore democratic government to Haiti. Thousands of Haitians were murdered under the coup regime and hundreds of thousands fled the country. Colonel Jean-Robert Gabriel, the new FAdH’s assistant chief of staff, was the secretary of the general staff, and later a public spokesperson, for the Cédras regime. Following the 1991 military coup, the US and the international community implemented sanctions against the regime, eventually instituting an embargo. After Bill Clinton became president in January 1993, and increasingly in 1994, the Congressional Black Caucus played a leading role in pushing for a more aggressive role against the dictatorship, and solidarity groups in the US and elsewhere also influenced policy. In June of 1993, the Clinton administration announced individual targeted sanctions against those determined to be a part of the “de facto regime in Haiti.” The initial sanction list, published in July of 1993, named 83 individuals, including 29 military officers. Included in this initial list was Jean-Robert Gabriel. Screenshot of the Federal Register from July 1993, listing Jean-Robert Gabriel as one of 29 military officers sanctioned for their participation in the coup regime. In 1993, the UN mediated indirect negotiations between Cédras and Aristide (who had taken up residence in Washington, DC to lobby for his restoration to office). Known as the Governors Island negotiations for the location where they took place, the eventual accord did little to immediately overturn the bloody coup. According to official documents, Gabriel, as well as the newly appointed chief of the general staff, Sadrac Saintil, were members of the delegation, indicating their senior positions within the Cédras regime.   List of members of Armed Forces delegation to Governors Island. The US temporarily suspended some of the sanctions during the negotiations, but when it became clear that Cédras and his regime would not back down, the sanctions were expanded. In October 1993, the administration revoked US visas and froze the US assets of 41 officials who were determined to be thwarting a return to democratic rule and contributing to the violence in Haiti. Among the 41 individuals was Derby Guerrier, recently named as an assistant chief of staff in the reinstated armed forces ? and then a lieutenant colonel. Guerrier held a US passport, and a New Jersey address was listed next to his name. According to press reports at the time, Guerrier was the head of the military’s anti-drug unit. Though there is little public information about Guerrier, drug trafficking took off under the military regime. A 1997 federal indictment in Miami alleged that Joseph-Michel François, a former military officer who helped topple Aristide in 1991 and later become the police chief under Cédras, “placed the political and military structure of the Republic of Haiti under his control” in order to facilitate drug shipments from Colombia. François, by that time, was living in exile in Honduras and managed to avoid accountability. Back in 1994, with the situation in Haiti continuing to deteriorate, and more and more Haitians fleeing the country, the US expanded its sanctions policy. Some 550 military officers were added to the sanctions list, including all of those recently appointed to the FAdH’s new high command. In April that year, around the same time the new sanctions were levied, Haitian military and paramilitary forces descended on the neighborhood of Raboteau, where many opposition supporters were apparently seeking refuge. At least eight, and likely far more, were assassinated. The next month a military-led commission of inquiry was tasked with investigating the allegations that a massacre had taken place in Raboteau. Cédras named Lieutenant Colonel Sadrac Saintil as one of four members, according to official documents made public as part of the Raboteau trial. Unsurprisingly, the commission found no evidence of a massacre and the FADH high command accepted the commission’s recommendation that nobody be punished. Communique signed by Raoul Cédras, appointing Sadrac Saintil to a commission of inquiry looking into the Raboteau massacre. But in 2000, in a landmark human rights trial supported by the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (the same organization now denouncing the new armed forces’ leadership), a Haitian court convicted 53 former officers and paramilitaries of involvement in the Raboteau massacre. Among the military officers convicted was Jean-Robert Gabriel. Though he was not implicated in direct involvement, he was charged under the theory of “command responsibility” due to his position within the top echelons of the Cédras regime. “It’s the same type of case made against the Nazis and (Slobodan) Milosevic,” Brian Concannon, an American attorney who helped form the BAI in the early ‘90s and who worked the Raboteau case, told the St. Petersburg Times in 2002. Concannon is now the executive director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, a partner organization to the BAI. The Haitian government has pushed back on Gabriel’s involvement in Raboteau. “What I can tell you in all honesty,” the defense minister told the press, “the candidates were subjected to vetting, including Colonel Gabriel. There is nothing negative against him in the vetting with regard to human rights.”
When Donald Trump allegedly referred to Haiti as a “shithole” country earlier this year, the US Ambassador was called in to explain the comments, but the Haitian government stopped short of any type of retaliation. But since last week, the government has been up in arms after a UN mission with a mandate to support the Haitian justice system went so far as to welcome a judicial inquiry into corruption allegations. The government has recalled its ambassador to the UN in response. The Background In November, a Senate commission released a 650-page report on Petrocaribe-related corruption. The report implicated top officials from previous administrations in inflating government contracts, funneling money to ghost companies, no-bid contracts for projects that were never finished, and a host of other financial crimes. Even current president Jovenel Moïse was named, allegedly overbilling the government on a $100,000 contract to install solar lamps back in 2013 when he was a relatively unknown businessman. Moïse has rejected the allegations as politically motivated, as have others implicated. And rather than follow up on their colleague’s report, the Senate has worked to bury it. On February 8, four civil society organizations released a statement condemning the efforts to obstruct further investigation into the allegations contained in the Petrocaribe dossier. The organizations noted that the Senate had blocked a vote on the report for four months and then, in a “clandestine” session conducted once the opposition had left the building, passed a resolution condemning the report as politically motivated and sending the dossier to the Superior Court of Accounts ? a governmental body that had already signed off on the contracts in question at the time they were awarded. The civil society organizations wrote that these actions “expose the cowardice” of the Senate, and their desire to bury the report. Anticipating the Senate’s lack of action, a private citizen, Johnson Colin ? backed by lawyer and government critic André Michel ? filed multiple cases at the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance on January 29 and February 20. (The original filing is available here.) The UN Statement On February 25, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) issued a press release welcoming “the assignment of investigating judges to pursue the Petrocaribe court cases filed by private citizens.” The mission noted that Haiti is ranked near the bottom of Transparency International’s corruption report. “I welcome the initiative and the active role of Haitian citizens and civil society who are engaged in the fight against corruption and impunity. Their actions demonstrate that the population is standing up for accountability and justice,” said the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of MINUJUSTH, Susan D. Page. The UN also expressed its regret that no investigating judge had been assigned to two cases of alleged human rights violations on the part of the Haitian police; one in Lilavois on October 12, 2017 and one, the alleged summary execution of civilians, in Grand Ravine on November 13, 2017. (The Grand Ravine operation was planned in coordination with the UN mission). The mandate of MINUJUSTH, which took over for the previous UN mission, MINUSTAH, this past October is to “help the Government of Haiti strengthen rule-of-law institutions, further develop and support the Haitian National Police and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis.”  Of course, as many observers have pointed out (including here on this blog), the UN has its own terrible track record in terms of avoiding accountability for its actions. The UN’s introduction of cholera has killed more than 10,000 and sickened a million while the UN continues to dodge legal accountability or properly fund eradication efforts. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse involving UN personnel have been identified ? however in the overwhelming majority of those cases, the perpetrators were simply moved out of Haiti and avoided prosecution. How can the UN have the moral authority to call for justice in Haiti when the UN itself has yet to face justice for its crimes there? Yet the UN statement was not so much surprising for its content, but for going against the Haitian government. Throughout its controversial history, the UN has rarely even hinted at criticism of the Haitian government. Then again, in this case the UN simply welcomed a judicial investigation. Given its mandate to support anticorruption efforts and strengthen the judicial system, and its creation under Chapter 7 of the UN charter, the mission was within its rights to make those comments, argued university professor James Boyard. The UN did not express an opinion on the content of the Petrocaribe dossier, and given the current state of Haiti’s judicial system, the likelihood of the current case leading to any meaningful accountability is slim. The statement posed little threat to those implicated in the dossier (who, if they believe they are innocent, should be welcoming an investigation into the allegations rather than letting the dossier be used by politicians for political reasons). The Government’s Reaction The first response to the UN statement came from Haitian foreign minister Antonio Rodrigue. Reuters reported that Rodrigue “said in a statement on Tuesday that Page had exceeded her authority and that her comments reflect an ‘attitude harmful to the political and institutional stability acquired during the past few years.’” The Haitian government, rather than address the allegations in the Petrocaribe dossier, has doubled down on this response. “The country is fighting to defend its image,” President Moïse said. “People have to speak well of the country,” he added. (The Haitian government recently hired an international PR firm to help with “media relations services.”)
When Donald Trump allegedly referred to Haiti as a “shithole” country earlier this year, the US Ambassador was called in to explain the comments, but the Haitian government stopped short of any type of retaliation. But since last week, the government has been up in arms after a UN mission with a mandate to support the Haitian justice system went so far as to welcome a judicial inquiry into corruption allegations. The government has recalled its ambassador to the UN in response. The Background In November, a Senate commission released a 650-page report on Petrocaribe-related corruption. The report implicated top officials from previous administrations in inflating government contracts, funneling money to ghost companies, no-bid contracts for projects that were never finished, and a host of other financial crimes. Even current president Jovenel Moïse was named, allegedly overbilling the government on a $100,000 contract to install solar lamps back in 2013 when he was a relatively unknown businessman. Moïse has rejected the allegations as politically motivated, as have others implicated. And rather than follow up on their colleague’s report, the Senate has worked to bury it. On February 8, four civil society organizations released a statement condemning the efforts to obstruct further investigation into the allegations contained in the Petrocaribe dossier. The organizations noted that the Senate had blocked a vote on the report for four months and then, in a “clandestine” session conducted once the opposition had left the building, passed a resolution condemning the report as politically motivated and sending the dossier to the Superior Court of Accounts ? a governmental body that had already signed off on the contracts in question at the time they were awarded. The civil society organizations wrote that these actions “expose the cowardice” of the Senate, and their desire to bury the report. Anticipating the Senate’s lack of action, a private citizen, Johnson Colin ? backed by lawyer and government critic André Michel ? filed multiple cases at the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance on January 29 and February 20. (The original filing is available here.) The UN Statement On February 25, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) issued a press release welcoming “the assignment of investigating judges to pursue the Petrocaribe court cases filed by private citizens.” The mission noted that Haiti is ranked near the bottom of Transparency International’s corruption report. “I welcome the initiative and the active role of Haitian citizens and civil society who are engaged in the fight against corruption and impunity. Their actions demonstrate that the population is standing up for accountability and justice,” said the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of MINUJUSTH, Susan D. Page. The UN also expressed its regret that no investigating judge had been assigned to two cases of alleged human rights violations on the part of the Haitian police; one in Lilavois on October 12, 2017 and one, the alleged summary execution of civilians, in Grand Ravine on November 13, 2017. (The Grand Ravine operation was planned in coordination with the UN mission). The mandate of MINUJUSTH, which took over for the previous UN mission, MINUSTAH, this past October is to “help the Government of Haiti strengthen rule-of-law institutions, further develop and support the Haitian National Police and engage in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis.”  Of course, as many observers have pointed out (including here on this blog), the UN has its own terrible track record in terms of avoiding accountability for its actions. The UN’s introduction of cholera has killed more than 10,000 and sickened a million while the UN continues to dodge legal accountability or properly fund eradication efforts. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse involving UN personnel have been identified ? however in the overwhelming majority of those cases, the perpetrators were simply moved out of Haiti and avoided prosecution. How can the UN have the moral authority to call for justice in Haiti when the UN itself has yet to face justice for its crimes there? Yet the UN statement was not so much surprising for its content, but for going against the Haitian government. Throughout its controversial history, the UN has rarely even hinted at criticism of the Haitian government. Then again, in this case the UN simply welcomed a judicial investigation. Given its mandate to support anticorruption efforts and strengthen the judicial system, and its creation under Chapter 7 of the UN charter, the mission was within its rights to make those comments, argued university professor James Boyard. The UN did not express an opinion on the content of the Petrocaribe dossier, and given the current state of Haiti’s judicial system, the likelihood of the current case leading to any meaningful accountability is slim. The statement posed little threat to those implicated in the dossier (who, if they believe they are innocent, should be welcoming an investigation into the allegations rather than letting the dossier be used by politicians for political reasons). The Government’s Reaction The first response to the UN statement came from Haitian foreign minister Antonio Rodrigue. Reuters reported that Rodrigue “said in a statement on Tuesday that Page had exceeded her authority and that her comments reflect an ‘attitude harmful to the political and institutional stability acquired during the past few years.’” The Haitian government, rather than address the allegations in the Petrocaribe dossier, has doubled down on this response. “The country is fighting to defend its image,” President Moïse said. “People have to speak well of the country,” he added. (The Haitian government recently hired an international PR firm to help with “media relations services.”)

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