When
"Good Parents" Go Bad:
The IMF in Argentina
A Reply to Nancy Birdsall's
"What Went Wrong in Argentina?"
By Mark
Weisbrot and Dean Baker[1]
April 2, 2002
This is a formal reply to a speech
given by Nancy Birdsall,[2]
"What Went Wrong in Argentina?"[3]
As Argentina's economy continues to decline, and the International Monetary Fund
and the Bush Administration seek to put the blame for Argentina's troubles
squarely on Argentine institutions and society, independent policy analysis
becomes increasingly important. This response is offered in the spirit of
dialogue and debate that we feel is necessary to arrive at a more accurate
assessment of the current situation, and the possibilities for Argentina to get
out of its severe economic crisis and depression.
First, regarding Ms. Birdsall's
basic thesis: "'The roots of Argentina's crisis go deep' . . . The
crisis in Argentina is rooted in the longstanding problems of political
chicanery and social injustice, combined with truly bad luck in the last several
years. It is not due to technical economic errors, and will not be resolved by
economic fixes alone."
Most important economic problems
have deep roots based on longstanding problems. The same could be said of our
own Great Depression in the 1930s—which, with the collapse of the banking
system, and a quarter of the labor force unemployed—is not a far-fetched
comparison to Argentina's current depression. It is neither possible nor
necessary to resolve all these "longstanding problems of political
chicanery and social injustice," in order to bring about an economic
recovery. Conversely, the longer this recovery is postponed, and the deeper and
more prolonged the depression, the greater the risk of political disintegration
that would make economic recovery even more difficult.
This cannot be over-emphasized,
given the IMF's current negotiating position with Argentina, which seeks to
impose any number of conditions, not publicly disclosed, before granting loans
to Argentina. Some of these conditions—especially the cutting of 4 percentage
points of GDP from public spending—will seriously worsen the depression.
Others may not, but the insistence on "reforms" that are not related
to economic recovery is dangerous and counter-productive.
The following will take up each of
Ms. Birdsall's points, in order of presentation:
"But in the end,
convertibility was no substitute for fiscal discipline."
The convertibility system was a
tragic "technical economic error" of enormous proportions, and this
should be stated clearly rather than denied. As will be noted below, it was
neither a lack of "fiscal discipline," nor excessive public borrowing,
that caused this system to collapse. It simply was not viable. It is important
to state this explicitly, because the myth of Argentina's "profligacy"
is widely believed, and it is being exploited politically for several purposes:
(1) to cover the IMF's own failure, in which it supported the fixed exchange
rate with tens of billions of dollars of loans, all the way into the abyss; and
(2) to justify large pro-cyclical spending cuts that will worsen the depression.
In this section it is also stated
that "Many of the reforms in the 1990s, including deregulation of ports
and privatization of banking and telecommunications, did make Argentina's
economy more efficient and competitive."
It is not clear that this is true.
As noted in the Financial Times[4],
some of these privatizations, because they created unregulated monopolies,
actually made Argentina one of the most expensive places in the world to do
business. And of course the overvalued peso (fixed to the US dollar, which
became increasingly overvalued after 1993), greatly exacerbated this problem.
In this section it is argued that "while fiscal deficits were never that
high," "Argentina needed to run strong surpluses in good times
to allow for a countercyclical policy in bad times . . . with a high and rising
stock of debt, the creditors, including bondholders and banks at home and
abroad, needed to see there was political and social capacity to generate
surpluses . . ."
Here again the implication is that
there is some feasible fiscal policy that would have saved Argentina from
sliding into the crisis, default, and devaluation that occurred; and that the
government just didn't have the fiscal discipline to impose it. This is not a
believable story.
Table 1 shows the government's
revenues, spending, and surplus or deficit, as well as GDP, for the years
1993-2001. In 1993, the government actually did run a surplus of about 1.2% of
GDP. In February of 1994, when the US Federal Reserve began a series of interest
rate hikes that raised US short-term rates from 3 percent to 6 percent, the
government's borrowing costs started a cycle of increases that never stopped.
The Mexican peso devaluation in December of 1994 was deadly, with the banking
system losing 18 percent of its deposits within weeks, and GDP contracting by
7.6 percent from the last quarter of 1994 to the first quarter of 1996.
Although there was a recovery from
the second half of 1996 thru the third quarter of 1997, this was not much time
to "run a strong surplus" in order to counter the shocks that began in
August of 1997 with the onset of the Asian financial crisis. By the second half
of 1998, the economy had fallen into recession again and never recovered.
In short, there is no conceivable
story wherein the government could have rapidly piled up huge surpluses, so as
to counteract the enormous shocks from the Mexican, Asian, Russian, and finally,
Brazilian, currency crises, and the spiraling interest costs of its debt—which
rose from 1.23% to 2.90% percent of GDP from 1993 -2000, even as the government
ran primary budget surpluses throughout virtually the entire period.
This latter point must be
emphasized: Argentina's budget deficits throughout the period 1994-2000 were
entirely attributable to interest payments, which increased rapidly due to a
series of external shocks, exacerbated by growing doubts about the viability of
the fixed exchange rate regime. Without devaluation, there is nothing that the
government could have done to get out of this spiral of rising interest rates
and increasing uncertainty.
Furthermore, to the extent that
"mediocre fiscal policy" played any role in this demise, one fateful
decision stands out: the privatization of Argentina's social security system in
1994. Prior to privatization, Argentina had a "pay-as-you-go" system,
in which the taxes collected in any given year are used to pay current benefits;
with the diversion of payroll taxes amounting to about 1.0 percent of GDP into
private accounts, the government lost a significant amount of revenue. In fact,
as shown in Table 2, the deficit created by Social Security privatization is
almost exactly equal to the government budget deficit during these years.[5],[6]
It is worth noting that this privatization was strongly advocated by the World
Bank.[7]
This section describes the severe inequality in tax burdens, with the rich largely avoiding taxes, as is common in much of Latin America. While this is certainly true, it is strongly implied here that if not for this structural problem, some tax increase might have been able to save the government from its slide toward default and devaluation. "In 1995 in Mexico, an increase from 15 to 18 percent of the VAT [value-added tax] was at least possible, and was part of a package that convinced the markets that Mexico could and would recover. "
But Mexico recovered after a currency devaluation of 40 percent, which was followed by a surge in exports supported by the relatively high and prolonged growth of its major trading partner, the US. It is not believable that Argentina could have regained the confidence of financial markets simply by raising tax revenue; the country still had an overvalued currency and growing doubts in the markets about the viability of the convertibility system.
"On the expenditure side, there is also a bad equilibrium. Levels of spending in the provinces were already high (and highly inefficient in generating public services) from the beginning of the 1990s, and grew with increasing levels of patronage in the late 1990s."
The IMF has also been raising this issue of provincial spending, in an effort to
shift more blame for the crisis to Argentina, as it has become more widely known
that the central government did much to contain spending even during the
recession. But provincial borrowing was separate from that of the central
government, and not guaranteed by the latter. So the deficits of the provinces
had little, if anything, to do with the creditworthiness of the central
government, just as fiscal problems of California or New York do not affect the
credit rating of US Treasury bonds. Furthermore, the central government's
revenue sharing with the provinces did not increase with the provinces' deficit
spending; from 1997-2001 as provincial deficits rose sharply, the central
government's revenue sharing remained flat (1997-2000) and then fell by 12
percent in 2001.[8]
Therefore, whatever reforms may be needed in the provinces, their finances
explain very little, if anything, about "What Went Wrong in
Argentina."
There is also a second
practical issue about who is responsible for the provinces' unpayable debt. The
IMF has pressured the government to take responsibility for provincial debt.
Provincial loans carried a risk premium, in the form of a higher interest rate,
due to the fact that they were not the debt of the central government. At the
higher interest rate, investors were willing to take the chance that their loans
would not be repaid. Now that investors have lost this gamble, there is no
reason that the people of Argentina should be held responsible for the loans
made to the provinces.
"Argentina was the spoiled child of the Washington Consensus. The
IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB too (as you heard I was there from 1993-98)
looked fondly on Argentina's success in halting inflation and on the steps it
took to open its economy to foreign investment and deregulate and privatize . .
. the official creditors paid too little attention to public borrowing, worried
too little about the tax evasion of the rich . . .the markets . . . enjoyed the
benefits of the spoiled child's excessive borrowing through much of the decade."
Again, it is vital to point out that Argentina's "excessive
borrowing through much of the decade" was to meet increasing interest
payments, not spending; and to make up for the lost revenues from the
privatization of Social Security.
"Perhaps in a subconscious
overreaction [to its mistakes in the Asian economic crisis] the IMF was not
eager to insist with the Argentines on austerity as the crisis deepened in
2000-2001."
But the IMF noted that Argentina's
austerity measures in fiscal 2000 were equal to 2 percent of GDP (the equivalent
of $200 billion of deficit reduction in the United States).[9]
And this was during a protracted, deep recession. It is wrong to create the
impression that the IMF was too "indulgent"—if anything, its
insistence on austerity worsened the recession, as well as the recession's
impact on poor and working people.
This notion of an overindulgent parent and spoiled child is a popular
misconception and was widely disseminated during the debates in the summer of
2001 as to whether the IMF should continue lending to Argentina. Ignoring for
the moment the colonial rhetoric, a better analogy would be a misguided (or
greedy) uncle, who loans his nephew money on the condition that the nephew
liquidate his modestly profitable business, and invest the proceeds in highly
risky stocks. As these new investments turn sour, the uncle piles on more and
more debt, at ever higher interest rates; the uncle then insists that the nephew
cut back on basic household spending, and sell other assets, in order to meet
the increasing interest payments, and maintain the uncle's
"confidence," while holding onto the deteriorating stocks. When the
whole scheme collapses under a mountain of debt, the uncle washes his hands of
the situation and blames the nephew for his "profligacy."
In this section the "mysteriously strong dollar and weak Euro,"
the Russian crisis in 1998 and the Brazilian devaluation in 1999 are described
as "bad luck," in the absence of which "Argentina might
well have muddled through." (The Fed's interest rate hikes of 1994-5
and the Mexican peso crisis are not mentioned). "The spoiled kid took a
lot of hits in the late 1990s, and hadn't acquired resilience."
It would seem more accurate to describe an exchange rate regime that
cannot withstand these types of shocks to emerging bond markets as a mistake. In
addition, one might question the extent to which Argentina put itself at the
mercy of highly volatile, speculative capital flows—a problem that is separate
from, although greatly worsened by, Argentina's convertibility system. These are
bad policies—not just bad luck.
"It was not market
reforms, not privatization, not foreign banks, and not the opening of its
economy that created Argentina's crisis. It was not even economic or technical
misjudgments, though there were some of these . . . It was, and still is, a
political system that fails to make the politicians accountable to the citizens
. . . The challenge now is not to weaken or undo the economic reforms [that
Argentina] began, but to attack its political problems and the social injustices
those political problems perpetuate. "
The worst of the economic reforms—the convertibility system—has
already been undone. The question of which other reforms will have to be undone
is a longer discussion; but clearly at least some of them did contribute to the
crisis, especially the complete opening up to volatile portfolio investment,
combined with the de-regulation of the banking system; and the privatization of
Argentina's social security system.
Most importantly it should be noted that, in spite of three and a half
years of solid growth at the beginning of the convertibility regime, Argentina
is facing a terrible, policy-induced collapse of its economy. Millions of
manufacturing jobs have been lost, the economy is in its worst depression ever,
and the country's debt—depending on how much is written off and
restructured—could remain a terrible drag on future economic growth, as well
as a major obstacle to addressing the problems of social injustice.
These are the problems that must be faced, as well as re-starting the
banking system, restoring normal credit conditions, and reviving domestic demand
in the economy. As of today, the institutions that advocated and financed the
"reforms" that got Argentina into this mess—most prominently the IMF,
World Bank, and US Treasury Department—have contributed nothing toward these
vital needs. Even worse, they are coercing the government to adopt polices that
will prolong the depression.
At the same time, these institutions seek to absolve themselves from
responsibility for any and all of Argentina's problems, and promote to the
public a story about a "spoiled child," who failed in spite of overly
generous "help" and sound economic advice from its
"parents." A more accurate and balanced view of the situation, past
and present, is surely needed.
Table One |
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Argentina,
National Government Spending and Revenues (1993-2001) |
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In
millions of current pesos |
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YEAR |
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1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
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Total Revenue |
50,726.5 |
51,078.2 |
50,293.6 |
47,668.9 |
55,376.7 |
56,726.1 |
58,455.4 |
56,570.5 |
51,318.6 |
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Total Spending |
47,996.0 |
51,364.3 |
51,666.9 |
52,933.3 |
59,653.3 |
60,799.6 |
63,223.8 |
63,362.1 |
59,428.9 |
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- Total Spending as % of GDP |
20.29% |
19.95% |
20.07% |
19.45% |
20.37% |
20.34% |
22.30% |
22.29% |
22.12% |
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- Interest Payments |
2,914.0 |
3,150.3 |
4,083.5 |
4,607.9 |
5,745.0 |
6,660.3 |
8,223.6 |
9,656.0 |
9,630.1 |
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- Interest Payments as % of GDP |
1.23% |
1.22% |
1.58% |
1.69% |
1.96% |
2.23% |
2.90% |
3.40% |
3.58% |
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Deficit
or Surplus (Rev-Spend) |
2,730.5 |
-285.9 |
-1,373.3 |
-5,264.4 |
-4,276.6 |
-4,073.5 |
-4,768.4 |
-6,791.6 |
-8,110.3 |
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Primary Spending (exclud. interest) |
45,082.0 |
48,214.0 |
47,583.4 |
48,325.4 |
53,908.3 |
54,139.3 |
55,000.2 |
53,706.1 |
49,798.8 |
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Primary Surplus or Deficit |
5,644.5 |
2,864.2 |
2,710.2 |
-656.5 |
1,468.4 |
2,586.8 |
3,455.2 |
2,864.4 |
1,519.8 |
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Primary Spending as % of GDP |
19.06% |
18.73% |
18.44% |
17.76% |
18.41% |
18.11% |
19.40% |
18.90% |
18.54% |
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Source:
Secretaría de Hacienda. Ministerio de Economía, Argentina |
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GDP
at Current Prices |
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In
millions of current pesos |
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YEAR |
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1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999
(*) |
2000
(*) |
2001
(*) |
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GDP
Market Prices |
236,505.0 |
257,440.0 |
258,031.9 |
272,149.8 |
292,858.9 |
298,948.4 |
283,523.0 |
284,203.7 |
268,638.2 |
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(*)
Estimates |
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Source:
Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales, Argentina |
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Table
Two
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Argentina,
Government Deficit due to Social Security Privatization
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In percent of GDP |
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YEAR |
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1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
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Deficit Incurred by Privatization |
-0.51 |
-1.10 |
-1.20 |
-1.30 |
-1.59 |
-1.86 |
-2.59 |
-3.16 |
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Budget Deficit or Surplus |
-0.11 |
-0.53 |
-1.93 |
-1.46 |
-1.36 |
-1.68 |
-2.39 |
-3.02 |
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Deficit or Surplus Without Social Security Privatization |
0.40 |
0.57 |
-0.73 |
-0.16 |
0.23 |
0.18 |
0.20 |
0.14 |
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[1] Mark Weisbrot and Dean Baker are Co-Directors of the Center of Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net). The authors would like to thank Debayani Kar for research and editorial assistance; and Alan B. Cibils for helpful comments.
[2] Nancy Birdsall is President of the Center for Global Development.
[3] See full text at http://www.cgdev.org/other/birdsall_CSIS_jan29.pdf.
[4] “Argentina to negotiate new contracts with foreign utilities,” Thomas Catan and Michael Scaturro, Financial Times, February 15, 2002. See also “Wrong numbers dog Telecom Argentina,” Thomas Catan, Financial Times, March 19, 2002.
[5] From Baker and Weisbrot, “The Role of Social Security Privatization in Argentina’s Economic Crisis,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2002)
[6] The calculations in Table 2 assume that the tax revenue lost to Social Security privatization was equal to 1.0 percent of GDP based on the estimate in IMF, “Argentina: Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/38, 1998. The additional deficit due to privatization is measured as a share of GDP that is attributable to the combination of lost tax revenue and additional interest costs. Since the privatization began in the middle of 1994, the lost revenue for the year is assumed to be 0.5 percent of GDP. It is assumed that the government must pay interest on half of the lost revenue for the year, since the losses are spread out over the full year.
[7] See World Bank, “National Pension Administration Technical Assistance Project Technical Annex,” Report No. T-7021-AR, 1996; and Robert Holzmann, “The World Bank Approach to Pension Reform,” International Social Security Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1, 2000.
[8] Source: Secretaría de Hacienda. Ministerio de Economía, Argentina
[9] "Article IV Consultation and First Review," December 2000, p.17