Promoting Good Ideas on Drugs:
Are Patents the Best Way?
The Relative Efficiency of Patent and Public Support for
Bio-Medical Research
October
11, 2002
Executive Summary
A widely publicized analysis of pharmaceutical research (DiMasi, 2002),
found that the cost of developing new drugs is rising far more rapidly than the
rate of inflation. Its findings indicated that research costs had risen at the
rate of more than 10.0 percent annually between 1987 and 2000, with research and
development costs estimated at $802 million per drug in 2000. As research costs
rise, it becomes more important to the economy that research be carried through
in the most efficient possible manner.
Although nearly half of biomedical
research spending in the United States is supported by either the government or
non-profit sector, the bulk of the research involved in actually carrying drugs
through the clinical testing process needed to gain FDA approval is carried on
by the pharmaceutical industry and financed through patent protection. While
patent protection may have once been the most efficient way to support this
research, this does not mean it necessarily will continue to be the most
efficient means to support research as costs continue to increase. It is
possible that alternative methods—for example, direct contracting to develop
drugs or vaccines (as some firms advocated in response to the Anthrax scare) may
prove more efficient, given current and future economic considerations. In such
an alternative system, research findings would be placed in the public domain,
and firms would be able to compete in the same way as generic producers do at
present. This paper examines this possibility.
Basic
economic theory indicates that as research costs rise, they will eventually
reach a point where public/ non-profit funding will be more efficient than
patent supported research. The reason for this is that patents effectively allow
private firms to charge an excise tax—the mark-up allowed by the patent
monopoly—on prescription drugs. The economic distortions associated with such
a tax are proportional to the square of the mark-up. Therefore, if drug
companies have to charge twice as high a mark-up in order to cover their
research costs, then the size of the economic distortions will be multiplied
fourfold. This means that even if patent supported research is somewhat more
efficient than public/ non-profit supported research on a dollar for dollar
basis, at some point the distortions created by the patent mark-up must
eventually offset this greater efficiency.
Economic
theory also predicts that patent protection will lead to wasteful rent seeking
behavior by firms, as they attempt to maximize their patent rents. The paper
notes six important ways in which patent rents in the pharmaceutical industry
lead to wasteful or harmful behavior:
1)
the research and development of copycat drugs—in a world with patent
protection, copycat drugs can reduce prices by providing competition. However,
in the absence of patent protection, most of this research would serve little
purpose, since there would be little benefit from developing second and third
drugs, when a first one has already been shown to be effective. According to a
recent study commissioned by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Researchers of
America (PhRMA), the drug industry association, copycat drugs may account for
more than 70 percent of all research spending.
2)
advertising and sales promotion—patent rents provide firms with a large
incentive to try to persuade doctors and patients to use their drugs. These
sales efforts can even go as far as outright bribes to doctors to prescribe
drugs, as happened recently in Germany. According to PhRMA, the industry employs
nearly twice as many people in sales and marketing as in research and
development.
3)
restricting the dissemination of research findings and/or falsifying research
results—the industry has strong financial incentives to prevent the disclosure
of its research findings until it has filed for all the patents that could prove
profitable. This slows scientific progress. There is also evidence that the
industry has on occasion attempted to keep secret research findings that suggest
its products are ineffective or possibly harmful.
4)
legal costs associated with filing and protecting patents—the industry employs
large numbers of lawyers to secure and enforce its patents. These costs can also
include side payments to generic producers to keep competition out of the
market.
5)
political lobbying for the protection and extension of patent monopolies—the
pharmaceutical industry typically ranks near the top in campaign contributions.
It has also begun financing "grassroots" lobbying efforts by people
afflicted with specific diseases and their friends and relatives.
6)
the production of gray market drugs, which may not meet safety standards—the
existence of large patent mark-ups provides a strong incentive for the
production of unauthorized versions of drugs (sometimes abroad), just as is the
case with illegal drugs like marijuana or cocaine.
Economic theory predicts that the waste associated with each of these
forms of rent-seeking will increase at a rate that is proportionate to the
square of the increase in the patent mark-up.
The paper then produces a set of estimates of the amount of additional
public money (net of current spending and tax credits) that would be needed to
replace the patent supported research currently being conducted by the
pharmaceutical industry. Depending on the portion of current research wasted on
copycat drugs, and the relative efficiency of public/non-profit supported
research and patent supported research, it was estimated that it would have
taken additional expenditures of between 4.0 billion and $27.6 billion in 2000
to replace the $25.8 billion that the industry claims to have spent on research.
The paper then estimates the savings that the government and consumers
would have experienced in 2000, if drugs had not been subject to patent
protection. It estimates that the gross savings would have been between $72.8
and $89.6 billion. The savings net of the additional research spending needed to
replace the industry's spending would have been between $39.2 and $85.0 billion.
Finally, the paper uses forecasts of prescription drug spending from the
Health Care Financing Administration to project the future savings and economic
gains that would result from switching to a system of public/non-profit
supported research. These projections show that most, if not all, of the
additional funding for research could be taken directly from the government's
savings due to lower prescription drug costs for Medicaid, Medicare, and other
government supported purchases. This means that there would be little, if any,
need for new tax revenue to support publicly funded drug research. The gains to
the private sector from lower drug prices would be substantial. By 2024, when
the full impact of the switch to publicly supported research will be felt, the
private sector will be saving between $560 and $670 billion a year due to lower
prescription drug prices, an amount equal to 1.7 to 2.0 percent of GDP.
This decline in drug prices would also be expected to have substantial secondary impacts on the economy. In effect, it leads to a substantial increase in the real wage, which would create a large number of new jobs. It should lead to an increase in annual GDP of approximately 2.6 to 3.0 percent. This would be associated with an increase of between 3.8 and 4.5 million jobs. There are few possible economic policy changes that could potentially have an impact of a comparably magnitude.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that the cost of researching new drugs is rising
rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP.[2]
As these costs grow, it becomes more important that research expenditures are
carried through in the most efficient possible manner. In policy circles it is
generally assumed that the current mix of public and private support is optimal.
Under this system, basic research is primarily supported by governments,
universities, and private foundations and charities. The process of actually
developing drugs and carrying them through the stages of clinical testing needed
for regulatory approval is primarily left to private corporations, which recoup
these costs through patent protection.
In fact, there is little, if any, theoretical or empirical basis for
assuming that the current mix of responsibilities between the public,
non-profit, and corporate sector is optimal. Even if this mix may have maximized
efficiency at some previous point in time, there is no guarantee that it is
still optimal at present, or that it will continue to be in the future, as
research costs increase through time.
This paper examines the theoretical argument for the current system of mixed public and private patent supported research, compared with a system that relies on an expanded role for the public and non-profit sectors in the development of new drugs. It then examines evidence on the size of the distortions created by the current patent system, and estimates the potential gains from eliminating these distortions by expanding public sector support for biomedical research.
The basic argument for funding
research through the patent system stems from the belief that the private sector
can carry through research more efficiently than the public sector. In other
words, the implicit assumption in this view is that it takes more than one
dollar of publicly supported research to produce results of the same value as a
dollar of privately supported research (e.g. Kremer 2000). For example, if all
the research and tests associated with the development of a new drug in the
private sector would cost $100 million, then it might cost $125 million or even
$150 million if the government were to try to carry through the research itself,
or contract out with private firms. Research costs are therefore minimized by
allowing the private sector to carry through the process of research and
development of new drugs, after the basic research phase (which is supported by
the government or non-profit institutions), with their expenses being recouped
through a limited period of monopoly provided by patent protection.
All economists recognize the
static inefficiency associated with patent protection. The government’s
enforcement of a private monopoly allows corporations to sell drugs at prices
that are far above their cost of production. From the standpoint of consumers,
the granting of a patent monopoly produces the same sort of distortions as
imposing a tax on drugs—in other words the distortions could be modeled in the
same way as a tax—with the difference being that the tax is imposed by a
private corporation. If patents are the best way to support research and
development of new drugs, then the distortions attributable to the patent
monopoly must be less than the efficiency gains from having the private sector
rather than the public sector carry through the research. In other words, if the
country saves $50 million by leaving the development of a new drug to the
private sector, then it will only on net benefits from this system if the
distortions resulting from patent protection are less than $50 million. If the
distortions are more than $50 million, the public would be better served by
having the government carry through the development of the drug, even though it
is less efficient than the private sector in doing research.
It is important to recognize that
this logic implies that current patent system might be desirable for some levels
of spending on drug research, but may not be desirable for higher levels of
spending. The reason is simple—the distortions associated with the monopoly
provided by patent protection are proportionate to the square of the revenue
raised as a result of the patent. This means that if a drug manufacturer has to
double the amount of money it raises from each patent, in order to recoup higher
research costs, then the distortions attributable to the higher price would be
multiplied by a factor of four.[3]
Assuming that the relative efficiency of privately and publicly supported
research does not change, if research costs continually rise, then at some point
the distortions that result from patent protection will more than offset the
gain from the greater efficiency of privately supported research.
A simple example can make this
point more clear. Suppose that it costs drug companies an average of $100
million to research a new drug, while it would cost the government 50 percent
more, or $150 million. The drug company then recoups its $100 million investment
through the monopoly price that it can charge as a result of patent protection.
Suppose that this higher price—as compared to the competitive price that would
be charged in the absence of patent protection— leads to a deadweight loss to
consumers of $20 billion. (This is the pure inefficiency attributable to the
higher price, it is the cost borne by consumers in addition to the $100 million
profit earned by the drug company.) In this case, the public on net gains from
the patent system, since the $20 million deadweight loss attributable to paying
the patent protected price, is much less than the $50 million gain from having
the private sector conduct research rather than the public sector.[4]
However, the advantages of patent
supported research are less evident as the amount of research expenditures that
are being recouped increases. This is shown in table 1. In each case, it is
assumed that government research is only two-thirds as efficient on a dollar for
dollar basis as private sector research. In this highly stylized scenario,
private sector research is, on net, more efficient than public sector research
as long as the spending per drug is relatively low. However, as the spending per
drug increases, the deadweight losses associated with the patent protected price
come to be relatively more important.
Table 1
The Relative Efficiency of Private and Public Sector Research
Private Sector
Public Sector
Deadweight loss
Net Gain
Research Cost
Research Cost
from patent
from patent
$100 million
$150 million
$20 million
$30 million
$200 million
$300 million
$80 million
$20 million
$400 million
$600 million
$320 million
$-120 million
$800 million
$1200 million
$1280 million
$-880 million
In the case where the private sector research costs are
$400 million, the deadweight losses from patent protection exceed the gains from
the greater efficiency of patent supported research. In the last case shown in
the table, where research costs are $800 million per drug, the deadweight losses
exceed the benefit from private sector research by $880 million.
The numbers in the table illustrate an important point. The monopoly pricing that is allowed by patent monopolies creates economic distortions. The size of these distortions grows at a rate that is more than proportionate to the size of patent rents. In the case of drug research, this means that there is inevitably some level of research costs, above which it is more efficient to support research through the public sector, rather than relying on patent rents to support private sector search. It is possible that research costs have long ago reached this level, or it may be the case that drug research costs are still far below the level where public sector research would be more efficient, but it is an inescapable conclusion that there is some level of research expenditures where public sector research would be more efficient than private sector research.
Patents and Rent Seeking Behavior
There is a second part of this story which must be taken into account in
evaluating the relative merits of publicly and privately supported research. The
above discussion only referred to the deadweight losses to consumers that result
from the fact that the patent protected price is above the competitive market
price. In other words, this would be the loss to the economy if patents did not
induce any economically wasteful behavior by the drug industry. Economic theory
predicts that this will not be the case—patent rents provide incentives for
firms to engage in many activities that are wasteful from the standpoint of the
economy as a whole. The size of this waste will also increase in proportion to
the square of the size of the patent rent—again indicating that the waste from
rent seeking behavior must eventually exceed any efficiency gains from relying
on patent protection rather than public support for drug research.
There are several wasteful (or even harmful) practices which are a
predictable result of the economic incentives provided by patent rents. These
include:
1) researching copycat drugs,
) advertising and sales promotion,
3) restricting the free flow of research (or, in extreme cases, falsifying
research results),
4) legal costs associated with filing for and protecting patents,
5) political lobbying (or bribes) for the protection and extension of patent
monopolies,
6) the production of unauthorized versions of drugs, which do not meet safety
standards.
Each of these practices lead to an additional waste of
resources as drug companies carry through expenditures which are designed to
increase the amount of patent rents that they are able to receive. In the
absence of patent rents, they would not have the incentive to engage in the same
sort of behavior. For example, if there were no patents on drugs, there would be
no point in carrying through research that was intended to produce a copycat
drug, which does not show any promise of being significantly more effective than
existing drugs. However, when patent protection allows for large rents for
certain drugs, there is very strong incentive for firms to try to capture of a
portion of these rents with a comparable drug, even if it is not medically
superior to the existing drug.[5]
Taking each of these wasteful
activities in turn—the research of copycat drugs is a straightforward form of
waste that results from patent rents. Firms have an incentive to develop drugs
which will allow them to encroach on their competitors' rents, even when they
have little or no reason to expect that their research will lead to a better
drug. In the absence of patent rents there would be no incentive for this
research. However, patent rents provide almost as much incentive to engage in
copycat research as there is for research aimed at developing breakthrough
drugs. According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the vast majority of
drugs fall in this copycat category. Only 24 percent of drugs are classified as
representing significant advances over existing drugs (U.S. FDA 1999).
In many cases the industry may not
have intended to develop a copycat drug. Since the research and development
process often takes many years, a drug company may have initiated its research
at a time when developing a drug would have been a qualitative breakthrough, but
a competitor may beat them to the market. At that point the company would have
the choice of abandoning its research, and recovering none of its expenses, or
continuing it with the hope of capturing some of the patent rents. While this
rationale may place copycat research in a better light, it is nonetheless a
source of waste that is created by the patent system.[6]
The sales promotion efforts attributable to patent rents take a variety
of forms, including advertising campaigns targeting consumers, direct contact
with physicians by salespeople, and elaborate seminars to educate doctors about
particular drugs—some of which take place at resorts or involve payments for
showing up (e.g. "Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors To Prescribe Is Big
Business," by Abigail Zuger, New York
Times, January 11, 1999, page A1). In one recent case, it appears that
outright bribes were used to persuade doctors to prescribe a company's drugs
(e.g. "German Doctors Accused of Taking Bribes," by Geoff Dyer and
High Williamson, London Financial Times, 3-12-02).Another way in which the industry
has sought to promote sales to increase its patent rents has been through paying
private charities, such as the American Cancer Society, for the use of their
name in connection with their drugs (e.g. " Sales
Pitches Tied To Charities Draw States’ Scrutiny," by Reed Abelson, New
York Times, May 3, 1999, page
A1). The expenses involved in these sorts of activities are clearly quite
large. research.[7]
[8]
According to the industry's own data, in 2000 it employed almost twice as many
people in sales promotion as in research, 87,810 in sales compared to 48,527 in
research.[9]
The third source of waste
resulting from rent seeking behavior perhaps provides the greatest basis for
concern. Drug firms have a strong incentive to keep their research findings
secret until they have had an opportunity to exploit all possible patents based
on their research. This means that the findings of drug industry sponsored
research will provide less benefit than if the same findings were produced in
research supported by the public or non-profit sector. In the latter case, the
results would be available to other scientists in a far more timely manner,
since there would be no incentive to keep findings secret. In fact, scientists
working in the public or non-profit sectors would have the opposite incentive,
since their reputations would be enhanced by having their findings disseminated
as widely as possible.
However, delaying the publication
of research findings is a far less serious issue than either withholding
findings that reflect negatively on a firm's drug, or even worse, falsifying
research. Patent rents provide large incentives for the industry to engage in
such behavior. While the government can use punitive measures to attempt to
limit the extent to which research findings are concealed or altered, when the
incentives are large, the profit motive is likely to prevail over government
action.
In recent years there have been numerous accounts of efforts by the drug
manufacturers to conceal research findings (e.g. "Missing Data On Celebrex,"
by Susan Okie, Washington Post, August
5, 2001, Page A11; "How a Drug Firm Paid For University Study, Then
Undermined It" by Ralph T. King Jr., Wall
Street Journal, 4-25-96; A1; Blumenthal et al,
1996). Studies have also found evidence that research conducted by the
industry is biased towards finding that their drugs are safe and effective.[10]
Even without any deliberate falsification on the part of drug companies,
researchers may take it upon themselves to produce findings that are
advantageous to the industry, due to the large incentives for such findings
(e.g. "A Doctor's Drug Studies Turn Into
Fraud," by Kurt Eichenwald and Gina Kolata, New York Times, May 17, 1999, page A1).
At the least, these concealed or
distorted findings can lead patients to waste money on drugs that may provide
little benefit, or little additional benefit over non-patented drugs. For
example, in one case, a pharmaceutical manufacturer suppressed a study for six
years, which showed that its thyroid medication was no more effective than a
generic competitor. As a result, patients spent an additional $800 million over
this period on the brand drug (see "Drug
Firm, Relenting, Allows Unflattering Study to Appear," by Lawrence K.
Altman, New York Times, April 16,
1997; page A1). In more serious cases, concealing evidence may cause
patients to take drugs that are actually harmful to them. For example, there
have been cases where firms have pressured the FDA to approve drugs of
questionable safety (e.g. see "For ALS Patients, a Drug With a Clouded
Future," by Robert O'Harrow Jr., Washington
Post, July 10, 2000, page A1).[11]
The fourth source of waste
associated with patent rents is the legal fees and associated costs that
companies incur to register and protect their patents. These can end up being
quite large since the issues involved are often quite complex and there is so
much money at stake. For example, one estimate put the value of a three year
extension of Schering-Plough's patent on Claritin at between $1.6-$3.2 billion
(Public Citizen, 2001). Through abusing the patent process, firms may be able to
extend the length of their patent protection. Patent law in the United States is
very favorable to firms attempting to extend their patents providing ample
opportunities to defray generic competition with questionable claims. As a
result, drug manufacturers spend significant sums on lawyers to design and carry
through effective legal strategies. The rents provided by patent monopolies can
also provide a basis for payoffs by patent holders to keep generic competitors
out of the market even after a patent has expired. There have been some
instances where evidence of such payoffs have come to light (e.g. see "How
Companies Stall Generics And Keep Themselves Healthy," by Sheryl Gay
Stolberg and Jeff Gerth, New York Times,
July 23, 2000, Section 1 page 1).
Patent rents also create a
powerful incentive to interfere in the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
approval process. This can take the form of both paying lobbyists to apply
political pressure to affect the outcome of the process, or paying experts to
advocate on behalf of a firm's drugs. A recent study found that 54 percent of
the experts who were asked to advise the FDA on its drug approval process had
financial interests in the drugs that they were evaluating ("FDA Advisers
Tied to Industry," by Dennis Cauchon, USA
Today, 9-24-00; A1).
The fifth source of waste is the
campaign contributions and lobbying expenses that the industry incurs in order
to win political support for strengthening and extending the reach of patent
protection. The pharmaceutical industry consistently ranks near the top of the
list of campaign contributors, giving more than $26 million to political
candidates in the 2000 election cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, 2002).
Efforts to gain political influence can go through indirect channels. For
example, pharmaceutical firms have helped to support the creation of grass roots
organizations around specific diseases, which lobby for measures that will
increase the demand for their drugs (e.g. "Grass Roots Seeded by Drugmaker,"
by Robert O'Harrow Jr., Washington Post,
September 12, 2000, Page A1). In the absence of patent protection, it is
unlikely that the drug industry would be as concerned about politics, since
there would be so much less at stake.
The sixth source of waste—the production and sale of unauthorized
versions of drugs—is a problem that arises largely because of the nature of
pharmaceuticals. Ordinarily, unauthorized versions of products (e.g. compact
discs or videocassettes) provide gains to consumers, albeit at the expense of
lost profits to manufacturers. In these cases, the existence of unauthorized
copies can actually reduce the static losses created by copyright protection or
some other interference with the market. However, since drugs must meet
stringent production standards to ensure that they are safe and effective, the
growth of a black market can be extremely detrimental to the public's health. If
there is no way of ensuring the quality of the drugs sold in the black market,
then many patients may end up buying drugs that are ineffective or even harmful.
As the size of patent rents increase, it is almost inevitable that the black
market for drugs will grow as well. If the profit margins grow sufficiently
large, there is no reason to believe that the government will be any more
effective in restraining a black market in prescription drugs than it has been
in restraining the black market in cocaine, heroine, and other illegal drugs
(e.g. see "In Tijuana, a New Kind of Drug Peril," by Tim Weiner, New
York Times, August 14, 2001, page A9 and "
Online Sales Spur Illegal Importing Of Medicine To U.S." by Robert Pear, New
York Times, January 10, 2000 page A1 ).
It is not generally possible to determine precisely the amount of waste
attributable to rent-seeking activity, both because the industry does not
disclose how much money it spends in each area, and because most of these
activities will have some useful aspects to them. For example, the advertising
and sales promotion efforts help to convey information to doctors and patients.
But the existence of patent rents implies that firms will engage in more than an
optimal amount of sales promotion, so that resources will be wasted in these
efforts. From a social standpoint there is no greater benefit in disseminating
information about a drug subject to patent protection than a generic drug, but
patent rents ensure that physicians and the general public will learn more about
the benefits of patent protected drugs. Unfortunately, there has been very
little economic research into the amount of waste attributable to rent seeking
behavior in the pharmaceutical industry, so any discussion of the resulting
costs must be largely speculative.
It is important to recognize that the economic impact of the additional
costs associated with rent-seeking behavior are amplified by the fact that they
generally increase the mark-up that firms charge on their patent protected
drugs. This increases the size of the deadweight loss attributable to the
patent. In other words, the mark-up that firms charge over their cost of
production must not only recoup their research costs, plus a normal profit, it
also must recoup the advertising and sales promotion costs, as well as legal and
lobbying expenses associated with protecting and extending the patent. As noted
in the first section, the economic distortions attributable to patent protection
are proportionate to the square of the mark-up, so the fact that these
additional expenses raise the mark-ups that firms charge, can lead to a large
increase in the inefficiency associated with patent protection.
It is possible to work from data that Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the industry trade group, publishes each year
on research spending to get a rough assessment of the relative costs of patent
supported and publicly supported research. In carrying through this assessment,
it is important to recognize that using PhRMA's estimate of research spending as
the basis of the calculation is likely to lead to an upward bias in the amount
of research spending carried through by the industry, since PhRMA's data relies
entirely on self-reporting by the industry.
In 2000, the brand name
prescription drug manufacturers spent $25.8 billion on research (PhRMA, 2002).[12]
Not all of this research depended on patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
According to the industry, approximately 8.3 percent of research spending was
used for quality control and improving the production process.[13]
This spending would be needed whether or not drugs were subject to patent
protection. In other words, a generic competitor would have to make the same
expenditures in order to ensure that its drugs met established safety standards.
This means that only $23.7 billion of the industry's research spending was
dependent on patent protection for drugs.
However, some portion of this
research money was used to research copycat drugs, which would serve little
purpose in the absence of patent protection. As noted earlier, the FDA's
classification system implies that 76 percent of the drugs approved fall into
this copycat category, providing no significant therapeutic advantage over
existing drugs. While it might be expected that copycat drugs are less costly to
research than breakthrough drugs, the industry recently commissioned a study
which found that the research required to produce copycat drugs can be as
expensive as the research involved in developing a breakthrough drug (Ernst and
Young, 2001). This assumption would imply that 76 percent of the industry's
research dollars are devoted toward researching copycat drugs, meaning that the
vast majority of research dollars are largely wasted on rent seeking activity
encouraged by the patent system. However, it is likely that the PhRMA study
exaggerates the cost of researching copycat drugs. Also, copycat drugs are not
completely worthless, since they provide alternative treatments that prove
medically superior for some patients. However, in most cases, the research that
developed the drugs that the FDA views as copycats cannot be considered to be as
valuable as the research to develop break through drugs.
For purposes of this analysis it
is only necessary to produce a range for the amount of research spending that is
channeled in wasteful directions as a result of firms seeking patent rents at
the expense of their competitors. As one extreme, it can be assumed that copycat
drugs cost as much to research as breakthrough drugs, and that there is little
social benefit to these drugs, therefore virtually all (e.g. 90 percent) of the
money spent in this research can be viewed as waste.[14]
This is the "high waste" scenario shown in table 2. The "low
waste" scenario assumes that copycat drugs cost only half as much to
research as breakthrough drugs, and that the research is on average half as
beneficial as the research intended to produce a breakthrough drug.
Table 2
Pharmaceutical Industry Research Spending in 2000
A B C D
Total Research
Percent
Copycat
Usefulness
Wasted
Research
Spending
of Copycat
Spending
Research
(A*B)*(1-C)
High Waste
$25.8 billion
76%
10%
$17.6 billion
Low Waste $25.8
billion
38%
50%
$4.9 billion
While the estimates in table 2 are speculative, they
probably encompass the plausible range, both for the percent of research
spending devoted to producing copycat drugs, and the relative usefulness of this
research. This implies that the amount of wasteful copycat research induced by
patent protection was between $4.9 billion and $17.6 billion in 2000.
The next adjustment to the industry's spending is for the amount that is
directly reimbursed in tax credits that the industry receives from the
government. When firms increase their research expenditures above their prior
level, the additional spending is eligible for a 20 percent research expenditure
tax credit. In addition, some categories of spending, such as research into
drugs intended to treat rare diseases (orphan drugs) are eligible for even
larger credits. In total the industry received more than $500 million in
research related tax credits in 1998. Adjusting for the industry’s reported
growth in research spending, it should have received approximately $600 million
in research related tax credits in 2000.[15]
These tax credits must be deducted to determine how much effective research was
supported by the industry.
Table 3 shows the amount of research spending claimed by the industry and
the adjustments that must be made to determine the net effective research
supported by patent protection. It is worth noting that the number used for
total research spending includes the research carried through in other nations
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. This means that the question being
posed is how much money it would take to replace all
of the research spending of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, not just its
domestic spending. The subsequent discussion implicitly assumes that none of
this spending would come from foreign sources. Since some funding for drug
research would almost certainly come from foreign sources in any conceivable
scenario, the calculations below over-estimate the amount of additional funding
that would be needed to replace the industry's research in the absence of patent
protection.
Net Effective Patent Supported Drug Research in 2000
High Waste
Low Waste
Reported Research Spending
$25.8 billion
$25.8 billion
minus
production and quality control
$2.1 billion
$2.1 billion
wasteful copycat spending
$17.6 billion
$4.9 billion
tax credits
$0.6 billion
$0.6 billion
Net Effective Patent
Supported Research $5.5
billion
$18.2 billion
The “low waste” scenario
implies that the net effective research supported through patent protection was
approximately $18.2 billion in 2000. The “high waste” scenario implies that
patent spending supported the equivalent of just $5.5 billion in useful
research. These numbers can be viewed as the amount of additional
public/non-profit spending that would be needed to replace patent supported
research, if this research were exactly as efficient as private sector research
(after excluding the portion of private sector research devoted to the
unproductive pursuit of copycat drugs). In other words, it would take between
$5.5 billion and $18.2 billion dollars from these sources to fully replace the
research that is currently supported by patents.
As a practical matter, as noted earlier, it is possible that public/
non-profit supported research will not be as efficient as patent supported
research. It is plausible that market incentives will cause research spending,
net of that wasted in copycat efforts, to be more efficient when supported by
patents than in the public or non-profit sector. But even this cannot be taken
as necessarily true. It is possible to envision flexible and efficient research
arrangements in the public and/or non-profit sectors which could be at least as
efficient as private sector research.
For example, an expanded public sector research system could contract out
the process of drug development with private sector firms (with any resulting
patents being placed in the public domain).[16]
Such contracts could be subject to competitive bids, so that the funds would be
directed to the low cost researcher. It could also establish a system of prizes
whereby especially important breakthroughs would receive large monetary awards.
In principle, it should be possible to establish a system where those actually
engaged in the research process have as much incentive as under the current
system.
In addition, a publicly supported system would also benefit from the more
rapid dissemination of research findings. Under such a system, there would be no
reason to keep research findings secret, and in fact any contracts could
explicitly require that research findings be made available in a timely manner.
There would also not be the same sort of incentive to falsify research findings
as exists presently.[17]
For these reasons, it is reasonable to believe that money spent on research
supported by the public or non-profit sectors could actually be more productive
than the money spent in patent supported research.
For this exercise it is only necessary to construct a plausible range of
estimates of the ratio of the efficiency of public/non-profit sector research to
patent supported research. For the "efficient" public/non-profit
scenario, it will be assumed that public/non-profit sector is 25 percent more
efficient than the private sector, therefore it will only take 80 cents to
produce results that are equivalent to one dollar spent on patent supported
research. The "equal" efficiency scenario assumes that a dollar spent
in either sector produces the same output. The "inefficient" scenario
assumes that it takes $1.25 of public/non-profit sector research to produce as
much output as $1.00 of patent supported research. The "very
inefficient" scenario assumes that it takes $1.50 of public/non-profit
sector research to produce as much output as $1.00 of patent supported research.
Table 4 shows the amount of public/non-profit sector research that would be needed in each of these scenarios, assuming alternatively the "high waste" or "low waste" scenarios shown in table 3. The difference between the total spending estimates and the net new spending is attributable to tax credits that the pharmaceutical industry currently receives to cover a portion
Table 4
Public/
Non-Profit Sector Equivalent of Patent Supported Drug Research in 2000
Efficient
Equal
Inefficient
Very Inefficient
Total Spending
(billions)
High Waste
$4.6
$6.1
$7.6
$9.2
Low Waste
$14.1
$18.8
$23.5
$28.2
Net New Spending
High Waste
$4.0
$5.5
$7.0
$8.6
Low Waste
$13.5
$18.2
$22.9
$27.6
of its research. In the absence of patent supported research, this money could
be used to directly fund additional research.
The table shows that in the extreme case, where a large portion of patent
supported research is assumed to be wasted developing copycat drugs of little
benefit, and public/non-profit research is assumed to be very efficient, it
would take just $4.0 billion in additional spending to fully replace the useful
research that is currently being supported by patent protection. This rises to
$8.6 billion, if it is assumed that public/non-profit supported research is very
inefficient. In the case where relatively little patent supported research is
assumed to be wasted in the development of copycat drugs, but public sector
non-profit research is assumed to be relatively efficient, it would take $13.5
billion in additional revenue to replace the useful research currently supported
by patent protection. This rises to $27.6 billion in the case where this
research is assumed to be very inefficient.
The next issue is how much money would be saved on drug purchases, if
patent protection were eliminated. There has been considerable research
documenting a wide variation both in the price of brand drugs in different
nations, and between the price of brand drugs and generics. In principle, in the
absence of patent protection, drug prices in the United States would fall to the
level of high quality generic competitors. In some cases this price decline
would be quite dramatic. For example, generic versions of many of the drugs used
to treat AIDS often sell for less than 10 percent of the price of the brand
drugs in the United States.[18]
Another way of assessing this issue is examining the price of drugs in
the period after they have lost patent protection. A series of studies found
large price declines in drugs after their period of patent protection was
removed (Berndt et al, 1996; Griliches and Cockburn, 1994). On average these
drugs cost approximately 30-40 percent as much after the patent was removed as
they did during the period of patent protection. The actual price decline in a
world with no patent protection is almost certain to be somewhat greater. One of
the factors which raises costs even after a patent has expired is the legal cost
associated with protecting firms from patent disputes. As was noted earlier,
patent rents give firms a large incentive to try to protect and extend their
patents, even when they may lack a legal basis. Generic producers must incur
costs to contest these legal disputes. As a result, the existence of the patent
system increases the cost of drugs even in the period after patent protection
has expired.
The Australian Productivity Commission recently completed an extensive
study of drug prices across nations.[19]
It consistently found that prices in the United States were by far the highest
in the industrialized world. A calculation that used its lower end estimates of
drug prices in the United States, put them at 262 percent of Australian drug
prices (page XXIII). Even drugs purchased at the discount prices in the federal
supply schedule (used for Medicaid and other government purchases) were
estimated to cost 84 percent more than in Australia. The high-end estimates put
U.S. drug prices at 350 percent of Australian drug prices, with the high-end
estimate for the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) being 250 percent of Australian
drug prices. These comparisons set ranges for the same drug in both nations,
they do not directly compare generics to brand drugs, which is the appropriate
measure for this exercise.
The Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association recently did a comparison of
the prices of brand and generic drugs for the 25 top selling drugs in Canada
that are subject to generic competition.[20]
This study found that the generic drug prices were on average 61.3 percent as
high as the brand drugs. This finding can be used to provide a rough estimate of
the impact on U.S. drug prices of eliminating patent protection, since the
Australian Productivity Commission also estimated Canadian drug prices. While
Canadian prices were on average considerably higher than Australian prices, they
were still well below the prices charged in the United States. The Canadian
prices were approximately 20 percent less than the low estimate of FSS prices
and 43 percent less than the low estimate of private sector prices.
Combining the difference between generic and brand prices calculated by the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association with the Australian Productivity Commission's estimate of the difference between average drug prices in the United States and Canada, provides a basis for estimating the relationship between Canadian generic drug prices and brand drugs in the United States, as shown in table 5.
Table
5
Drug Price Comparisons
Average Drug Prices
as a Percent of Australian Drug Prices
Canada—150 percent
United States—262 percent (low estimate)
United States (FSS)—184 percent (low estimate)
United States—350 percent (high estimate)
United States (FSS)—250 percent (high estimate)
U.S. Drug Prices as
a Percent of Canadian Drug Prices
Low Estimate—175 percent
Low Estimate (FSS)—123 percent
High Estimate—233 percent
High Estimate (FSS)—167 percent
U.S. Brand Drug
Prices as a Percent of Canadian Generic Drug Prices
Low Estimate—285 percent
Low Estimate (FSS)—201 percent
High Estimate—380 percent
High Estimate (FSS)—272 percent
(Source:
Australian Productivity Commission, 2001; Canadian Drug Manufacturers
Association; and author's calculations).
Using the low estimate of U.S. drug prices, Canadian generics sell for
approximately 35 percent as much as brand drugs in the United States on average.
Using the low estimate for drug prices on the FSS, Canadian generics sell for
just less than 50 percent as much as the federal government's payments for brand
drugs. These figures will be used as a high price estimate for the cost of
prescription drugs in the United States in the absence of patent protection. In
other words, the assumption is that in the absence of patent protection, drug
prices in the United States would fall to the same price as Canadians currently
pay for equivalent generic drugs.
It is important to recognize that this estimate is almost certainly a
large understatement of the drop in U.S. drug prices in a post-patent world. The
brand/generic comparisons calculated by the Canadian Drug Manufacturers are
based on drugs for which generic competition exists. The price of the brand
version of these drugs will generally be much lower in the period after the
patent had expired than in the period in which the brand drug had a monopoly. In
other words, the price reduction moving from a brand drug that is still subject
to patent protection to a generic drug, will be far larger than the difference
between the price of the brand and generic drug in the period after patent
protection has expired. For this reason, this high price estimate—that
prescription drugs in a patent free world would cost 35 percent as much as they
currently do in the private sector and 50 percent as much under the FSS—is
almost certainly a significant overstatement of drug prices in the absence of
patent protection.
The low price scenario is derived loosely from the Australian
Competitiveness Commission's high estimates of U.S. drug prices. It assumes that
drug prices in the absence of patent protection would average 20 percent of
their patent protected level, while drugs purchased under the FSS would sell for
33 percent of their current price.
Table 6 shows the static savings in a world where patent protection for
drugs were eliminated instantly. For simplicity, it is assumed that all drugs
are currently sold at the private sector prices. (The dynamic scenarios in the
next section assess the impact of producing drugs without patent protection,
given the actual distribution of spending between the private sector and state
and federal governments.) The first row in table 6 presents the gross savings
from the elimination of patent protection for prescription drugs, since it does
not take into account the additional tax revenue that would be needed to pay for
expanded public/non-profit sector research. The second row shows net savings
assuming that the amount of research spending that would need to be replaced is
relatively large—the “low waste, very inefficient” scenario which appears
in the last row and column of table 4. The fourth row shows net savings in a
scenario in which the amount of additional research required would be very low,
the “high waste, very efficient” scenario shown in the third row and first
column of table 4. The third row shows the net saving in an intermediate case,
which averages these two.
Table 6
Savings From Competition in the Prescription Drug Market
2000 spending patent
free patent
free Saving
Saving
spending
spending (high
cost) (low
cost)
(high cost)
(low cost)
(billions)
Gross
$112
$39.2
$22.4
$72.8
$89.6
Net (high research)
$112
$39.2
$22.4
$45.2
$62.0
Net (mid research)
$112
$39.2
$22.4
$56.7
$73.5
Net (low research)
$112
$39.2
$22.4
$68.2
$85.0
All the combinations in the table show large savings from switching from
the current system of patent supported research to a system that relies on
public/non-profit sector research. The lowest figure projection of net savings
is $45.2 billion a year, which assumes relatively high prescription drug prices
in the absence of patent protection coupled with assumptions that imply that it
will require a large amount of new spending to replace the research that is
currently being supported through patent protection. The highest projection of
net savings, which combines optimistic assumptions on both of these issues, is
$85.0 billion, approximately one percent of GDP. The middle set of assumption
shows savings ranging from $56.7 to $73.5 billion a year.
These estimates of the economic impact of eliminating drug patents are
incomplete, since they do not include the welfare gains that result from having
lower drug prices. In effect, the numbers in table 6 are estimates of the
reduction in payments from drug consumers to drug producers. However, a measure
of the full economic gain would also have to add in the additional benefits that
consumers would enjoy as a result of being able to buy drugs at lower prices, in
other words, the additional consumer surplus that results from this drop in
prices. To calculate the consumer surplus, it would be necessary to know the
elasticity of drug consumption with respect to changes in prices.
For purposes of this exercise, it
is only necessary to construct a plausible range of elasticities. Drug
consumption is generally assumed to be relatively inelastic, since most people
will try to purchase the drugs they view as necessary, if they are able to
afford them. For purposes of this calculation it is assumed in the low
elasticity scenario that the elasticity is 0.15, which means that a 10 percent
drop in drug prices would lead to a 1.5 percent increase in drug purchases. The
high elasticity scenario assumes an elasticity of 0.3, which implies that a 10
percent fall in drug prices would lead on average to a 3.0 percent increase in
drug purchases.[21] To complete the picture,
it is also necessary to subtract the additional deadweight loss that would be
associated with higher taxes needed to fund more public sector/non-profit
research. Most estimates put the deadweight loss associated with the income tax
at between 15-20 percent of the revenue raised.[22]
For simplicity, the calculations in the table all assume the higher 20 percent
deadweight loss.
Table 7
Net Efficiency Gain From Competition in the Prescription Drug Market
Low Elasticity
High Elasticity
Based on 2000
spending
patent free patent free
patent free
patent free
spending
spending spending
spending
(high cost)
(low cost)
(high cost) (low cost)
(billions)
Gross
$5.0
$8.6
$10.4
$18.4
Net (high research)
$-0.6
$3.1
$4.9
$12.9
Net (mid research)
$1.8
$5.4
$7.2
$15.2
Net (low research)
$4.1
$7.7
$9.5
$17.5
The numbers in the table are all
positive (except in the case combining all the negative assumptions), which
indicates that the efficiency gains associated with lower drugs prices (apart
from the gains that result from the elimination of rent seeking activities), are
larger than the deadweight losses that would result from higher taxes to support
addition public sector/non-profit research, in the scenarios described above. By
definition these net efficiency gains become greater, as the elasticity of
demand for drugs increases. Also, the gains increase if the percentage reduction
in price due to the elimination of patent protection is larger—an outcome that
would be expected if the mark-up over costs for prescription drugs increases
rapidly as firms attempt to recoup higher research costs. In any case, these
figures—coupled with the numbers in table 6—suggest that switching from
patent supported drug research to research supported by the public/non-profit
sector will produce large gains for the economy.
The previous discussion presented
an outline of how the prescription drug market would be different if the country
had in place a system of public sector/ non-profit supported research in 2000.
However, as a practical matter, if such a policy were to be adopted, it would be
necessary to phase it in through time. In addition, the drug market is expanding
quickly, as drug expenditures are growing far more rapidly than the economy as a
whole. It is also important to take into account the fact that large portion of
national spending on drugs is done by the federal and state governments through
Medicare, Medicaid and other programs. The savings to these programs from lower
drug prices would free up tax revenue which could be used to finance additional
spending on research and development for new drugs. The savings in the private
sector on drug expenditures translates into a higher real wage, which increases
the incentive to work. Determining the distribution of the gains from lower drug
prices will provide a better basis for assessing the benefits to the economy
from switching to a system of public sector/non-profit supported drug research.
Table 8 shows projections for
total spending on prescription drugs through the year 2024, as well as the
distribution of the costs among the major payers. (The construction of the table
is explained in the appendix.) The projections show that spending on
prescription drugs will rise rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a share of
GDP. At present, spending on prescription drugs is equal to approximately 1.3
percent of GDP. By the end of this period, spending on prescription drugs is
projected to be equal to 3.3 percent of GDP. This indicates that the potential
gains from switching to a system of public sector/non-profit supported research
will increase significantly through time. The table also shows projections for
patent supported research over this period. It is assumed that the share of
sales devoted to research spending is 20 percent throughout the period, the peak
level hit in 1994.[23]
Total |
Share of GDP |
Federal |
State |
Private |
R&D Spending |
|
2001 |
$135.7 |
1.3% |
$16.6 |
$12.8 |
$106.3 |
$27.1 |
155.0 |
1.4% |
19.1 |
14.8 |
121.1 |
31.0 |
|
2003 |
175.8 |
1.5% |
21.7 |
17.0 |
137.1 |
35.2 |
2004 |
197.1 |
1.6% |
24.5 |
19.4 |
153.2 |
39.4 |
2004 |
219.9 |
1.7% |
27.7 |
21.9 |
170.3 |
44.0 |
2006 |
245.3 |
1.8% |
31.1 |
24.7 |
189.5 |
49.1 |
2007 |
272.4 |
1.9% |
34.7 |
27.7 |
210.0 |
54.5 |
2008 |
301.5 |
2.0% |
38.5 |
30.8 |
232.2 |
60.3 |
2009 |
332.6 |
2.1% |
42.3 |
34.1 |
256.2 |
66.5 |
2010 |
366.0 |
2.2% |
46.5 |
37.6 |
281.9 |
73.2 |
2011 |
398.9 |
2.3% |
50.7 |
41.0 |
307.3 |
79.8 |
2012 |
434.8 |
2.4% |
55.2 |
44.7 |
334.9 |
87.0 |
2013 |
474.0 |
2.4% |
60.2 |
48.7 |
365.1 |
94.8 |
2014 |
516.6 |
2.5% |
65.6 |
53.1 |
397.9 |
103.3 |
2015 |
563.1 |
2.6% |
71.5 |
57.9 |
433.7 |
112.6 |
2016 |
608.2 |
2.7% |
77.3 |
62.5 |
468.4 |
121.6 |
2017 |
656.8 |
2.8% |
83.5 |
67.5 |
505.9 |
131.4 |
2018 |
709.4 |
2.9% |
90.1 |
72.9 |
546.4 |
141.9 |
2019 |
766.1 |
3.0% |
97.3 |
78.7 |
590.1 |
153.2 |
2020 |
827.4 |
3.1% |
105.1 |
85.0 |
637.3 |
165.5 |
2021 |
885.4 |
3.1% |
112.5 |
91.0 |
681.9 |
177.1 |
2022 |
947.3 |
3.2% |
120.4 |
97.3 |
729.6 |
189.5 |
2023 |
1013.6 |
3.2% |
128.8 |
104.1 |
780.7 |
202.7 |
2024 |
1084.6 |
3.3% |
137.8 |
111.4 |
835.4 |
216.9 |
Table 9 shows estimates of the additional government expenditures that would be needed to offset the loss of patent supported research. The first column in table 9 shows the additional spending that would be needed in the efficient public sector/high waste patent supported research scenario shown in table 4. The third column in the table shows the additional spending that would be needed in very inefficient public sector/low waste patent supported research scenario in table 4. The second column presents a middle scenario, which is the average of columns one and three.
Table
9
Additional Public/Non-Profit
Expenditures on Drug Research
(Billions of Current Dollars)
|
Low |
Mid |
High |
2001 |
$4.8 |
$4.8 |
$16.9 |
2002 |
5.5 |
5.5 |
19.3 |
2003 |
6.3 |
6.3 |
21.9 |
2004 |
7.0 |
7.0 |
24.6 |
2005 |
7.8 |
7.8 |
27.4 |
2006 |
8.7 |
8.7 |
30.6 |
2007 |
9.7 |
9.7 |
34.0 |
2008 |
10.7 |
10.7 |
37.6 |
2009 |
11.8 |
11.8 |
41.5 |
2010 |
13.0 |
13.0 |
45.7 |
2011 |
14.2 |
14.2 |
49.8 |
2012 |
15.5 |
15.5 |
54.3 |
2013 |
16.9 |
16.9 |
59.1 |
2014 |
18.4 |
18.4 |
64.5 |
2015 |
20.0 |
20.0 |
70.3 |
2016 |
21.7 |
21.7 |
75.9 |
2017 |
23.4 |
23.4 |
82.0 |
2018 |
25.3 |
25.3 |
88.5 |
2019 |
27.3 |
27.3 |
95.6 |
2020 |
29.5 |
29.5 |
103.2 |
2021 |
31.5 |
31.5 |
110.5 |
2022 |
33.7 |
33.7 |
118.2 |
2023 |
36.1 |
36.1 |
126.5 |
2024 |
38.6 |
38.6 |
135.3 |
Source:
PhRMA 2002 and Authors’ Calculations.
See Appendix.
It would obviously not be possible
to instantaneously replace the current system of patent supported research. To
construct a set of projections of the gains from public sector/non-profit
supported research, it was assumed that this system would be phased in over a
three-year period from 2003-2005. In principle, the level of research spending
in 2006 and later years should be large enough to produce research that is
comparable in value to the patent supported research that would otherwise be
carried through by the pharmaceutical industry.
Table 10a and 10b show the saving
that would accrue to each sector under this phase in schedule. The projections
in 10a are based on the high cost scenario described in table 6, while table 10b
shows projections based on the low cost scenario in table 6. At first the change
to public/non-profit supported research would have almost no impact, since there
would be a period of time before any drugs developed by this system could work
their way through the FDA approval process. However, by the third year, the
projection assumes that there is noticeable difference in drug prices between
the baseline and the alternative scenario, as some new drugs appear on the
market, without being subject to patent protection. This impact is assumed to
increase substantially over the next several years, so that by the tenth year 70
percent of the ultimate price reductions have been realized.[24]
Table 10a
|
Federal |
State |
Private |
Private Savings as a Percent of GDP |
2001 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
0.0% |
2002 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2003 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2004 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2005 |
1.2 |
1.0 |
10.0 |
0.1% |
2006 |
2.7 |
2.2 |
22.2 |
0.2% |
2007 |
4.6 |
3.6 |
36.9 |
0.3% |
2008 |
6.7 |
5.4 |
54.5 |
0.4% |
2009 |
9.3 |
7.5 |
75.1 |
0.5% |
2010 |
12.2 |
9.9 |
99.2 |
0.6% |
2011 |
15.5 |
12.6 |
126.1 |
0.7% |
2012 |
19.3 |
15.6 |
157.1 |
0.8% |
2013 |
22.0 |
17.8 |
178.6 |
0.9% |
2014 |
24.9 |
20.2 |
202.6 |
1.0% |
2015 |
28.3 |
22.9 |
229.6 |
1.1% |
2016 |
31.7 |
25.6 |
257.4 |
1.1% |
2017 |
35.5 |
28.7 |
288.1 |
1.2% |
2018 |
39.7 |
32.1 |
322.1 |
1.3% |
2019 |
44.3 |
35.8 |
359.8 |
1.4% |
2020 |
49.4 |
40.4 |
401.4 |
1.5% |
2021 |
54.6 |
44.1 |
443.2 |
1.6% |
2022 |
60.2 |
48.7 |
488.9 |
1.6% |
2023 |
64.4 |
52.1 |
523.1 |
1.7% |
2024 |
68.9 |
55.7 |
559.7 |
1.7% |
Source: Health Care Financing Administration and Authors’ Calculations. See Appendix.
Federal |
State |
Private |
Private Savings as a Percent of GDP |
|
2001 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2002 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2003 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2004 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2005 |
1.6 |
1.3 |
11.9 |
0.1 |
2006 |
3.6 |
2.9 |
26.5 |
0.2 |
2007 |
6.1 |
4.8 |
44.1 |
0.3 |
2008 |
9.0 |
7.2 |
65.0 |
0.4 |
2009 |
12.3 |
9.9 |
89.7 |
0.6 |
2010 |
16.3 |
13.2 |
118.4 |
0.7 |
2011 |
20.7 |
16.7 |
150.6 |
0.9 |
2012 |
25.8 |
20.8 |
187.6 |
1.0 |
2013 |
29.3 |
23.7 |
213.2 |
1.1 |
2014 |
33.3 |
26.9 |
241.9 |
1.2 |
2015 |
37.7 |
30.5 |
274.1 |
1.3 |
2016 |
42.2 |
34.2 |
307.3 |
1.4 |
2017 |
47.3 |
38.2 |
344.0 |
1.5 |
2018 |
52.9 |
42.8 |
384.7 |
1.6 |
2019 |
59.1 |
47.8 |
429.6 |
1.7 |
2020 |
65.9 |
53.3 |
479.3 |
1.8 |
2021 |
72.7 |
58.8 |
529.2 |
1.9 |
2022 |
80.2 |
64.9 |
583.7 |
2.0 |
2023 |
85.9 |
69.4 |
624.6 |
2.0 |
2024 |
91.9 |
74.3 |
668.3 |
2.0 |
Since the patent length is twenty
years, and some drugs will continue to be patented even after the alternative
system is set in place, most of the drugs that would be subject to patent
protection in the baseline scenario would still be under patent in this
alternative scenario. However, the assumption that 70 percent of the ultimate
price reduction would be realized is based on the assumption that competitive
drugs will exist in the public domain for many drugs that are still subject to
patent protection. In these cases, the price of the patent protected drug will
have to fall to a level comparable to the generic drug. The rate of price
decline relative to the baseline is assumed to slow, so that by the twentieth
year drug prices have fallen to the levels described in the high cost and low
cost scenarios in table 6. In reality, there may continue to be some patent
protected drugs for long after this point, since firms could still get patents
even with the alternative system of support in place, but presumably these drugs
would account for only a very small share of drug spending.
Table 11 shows the projected public sector saving in both the high cost and low cost scenarios from tables 10a and 10b alongside the projections for additional public sector research spending from table 9. The public sector savings combine the projections for savings for both the federal and state government. The projections indicate that some additional public spending will be needed to support research in the middle and high research cost scenarios, since the savings on lower drug prices will be fairly limited. However, the additional spending will always be limited, never exceeding 0.3 percent of GDP, even in the high drug cost high research cost scenario. After 10 years, the savings in the high drug cost scenario would be sufficient to fully cover the cost of the additional research spending in the middle price scenario. The savings in the low drug cost scenario would be enough to cover two-third of the additional research spending needed in the high research cost scenario. By 2024, the savings in the high drug cost scenario would be more than enough to cover the additional spending that would be needed in the middle research cost scenario, and sufficient to cover two-thirds of the additional spending needed in the high research cost scenario. The savings in the low drug cost scenario would be sufficient to cover more than 80 percent of the additional research spending in the high research cost scenario.
Table 11
Public Sector Savings on Drug Expenditures
and Additional Public-Non-Profit Sector Spending
(Billions of Current Dollars)
Drug
Costs
Research Costs
|
Low |
High |
Low |
Mid |
High |
2001 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
$0.0 |
2002 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2003 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
2.1 |
4.7 |
7.2 |
2004 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
4.7 |
10.5 |
16.4 |
2005 |
2.9 |
2.2 |
7.8 |
17.6 |
27.4 |
2006 |
6.5 |
4.9 |
8.7 |
19.7 |
30.6 |
2007 |
10.9 |
8.2 |
9.7 |
21.8 |
34.0 |
2008 |
16.2 |
12.1 |
10.7 |
24.2 |
37.6 |
2009 |
22.3 |
16.7 |
11.8 |
26.7 |
41.5 |
2010 |
29.4 |
22.1 |
13.0 |
29.3 |
45.7 |
2011 |
37.4 |
28.1 |
14.2 |
32.0 |
49.8 |
2012 |
46.6 |
35.0 |
15.5 |
34.9 |
54.3 |
2013 |
53.0 |
39.8 |
16.9 |
38.0 |
59.1 |
2014 |
60.2 |
45.1 |
18.4 |
41.4 |
64.5 |
2015 |
68.2 |
51.1 |
20.0 |
45.2 |
70.3 |
2016 |
76.4 |
57.3 |
21.7 |
48.8 |
75.9 |
2017 |
85.5 |
64.1 |
23.4 |
52.7 |
82.0 |
2018 |
95.6 |
71.7 |
25.3 |
56.9 |
88.5 |
2019 |
106.8 |
80.1 |
27.3 |
61.4 |
95.6 |
2020 |
119.2 |
89.4 |
29.5 |
66.4 |
103.2 |
2021 |
131.6 |
98.7 |
31.5 |
71.0 |
110.5 |
2022 |
145.1 |
108.8 |
33.7 |
76.0 |
118.2 |
2023 |
155.3 |
116.5 |
36.1 |
81.3 |
126.5 |
2024 |
166.2 |
124.6 |
38.6 |
87.0 |
135.3 |
While there is some degree of
uncertainty about the exact balance between the public
sector saving on lower drug costs and the amount of additional research
spending that will be needed to replace patent supported research, the
projections in table 11 suggest that imbalance is not likely to be very large in
either direction. It is likely that some net increase in spending on drugs would
be needed in the early years after a commitment to increased public support was
put in place, since most of the savings would not yet be realized. However, by
the end of the period, the savings from lower drug prices should be sufficient
to cover the additional research spending needed to replace patent supported
research. This means that there would be little if any reason for higher taxes
for this purposes, and any tax increase would almost certainly be temporary.
If the additional public sector
research costs can be paid for out of savings from lower public sector
expenditures on drugs, then the lower prescription drug costs for the private
sector can be viewed as a pure gain. Table 12 shows the projected gains measured
in current dollars and as shares of GDP in both the high drug cost and low drug
cost scenarios. As can be seen, these gains are quite substantial. The savings
exceed 1.0 percent of GDP in the 10th year in the low drug cost scenario, and in
the 13th year in the high drug cost scenario. The savings continue to increase
until they reach 1.7 percent of GDP in the high drug cost scenario (the
equivalent of nearly $200 billion in 2002), and 2.0 percent of GDP in the low
drug cost scenario (the equivalent of $220 billion in 2002).
Private Savings from Public/Non-Profit Sector Research
(Billions of Current Dollars)
High
Cost
Low
Cost
|
Private Savings as a Percent of GDP |
Savings |
Private Savings as a Percent of GDP |
|
2001 |
$0.0 |
0.0% |
$0.0 |
0.0% |
2002 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2003 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2004 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2005 |
10.0 |
0.1% |
11.9 |
0.1% |
2006 |
22.2 |
0.2% |
26.5 |
0.2% |
2007 |
36.9 |
0.3% |
44.1 |
0.3% |
2008 |
54.5 |
0.4% |
65.0 |
0.4% |
2009 |
75.1 |
0.5% |
89.7 |
0.6% |
2010 |
99.2 |
0.6% |
118.4 |
0.7% |
2011 |
126.1 |
0.7% |
150.6 |
0.9% |
2012 |
157.1 |
0.8% |
187.6 |
1.0% |
2013 |
178.6 |
0.9% |
213.2 |
1.1% |
2014 |
202.6 |
1.0% |
241.9 |
1.2% |
2015 |
229.6 |
1.1% |
274.1 |
1.3% |
2016 |
257.4 |
1.1% |
307.3 |
1.4% |
2017 |
288.1 |
1.2% |
344.0 |
1.5% |
2018 |
322.1 |
1.3% |
384.7 |
1.6% |
2019 |
359.8 |
1.4% |
429.6 |
1.7% |
2020 |
401.4 |
1.5% |
479.3 |
1.8% |
2021 |
443.2 |
1.6% |
529.2 |
1.9% |
2022 |
488.9 |
1.6% |
583.7 |
2.0% |
2023 |
523.1 |
1.7% |
624.6 |
2.0% |
2024 |
559.7 |
1.7% |
668.3 |
2.0% |
Savings of this
size would have a significant economic impact. Table 13 uses extrapolations from
a WEFA forecasting model to derive estimates of the magnitude of the impact of
these savings on the economy (WEFA 1990). This model projected that a reduction
in oil prices equal to 0.16 percent of GDP would increase GDP by 0.24 percent,
while an increase in oil prices equal to 0.25 percent of GDP would lower GDP by
0.48 percent.[25] Table 13 uses the lower
scenario of these projections, assuming that the economic impact of savings on
prescription drugs is equal to 1.5 times the savings on drugs, measured as a
share of GDP. In the low drug cost scenario the gains exceed 1.0 percent of GDP
by the eighth year, and 2.0 percent of GDP by the 14th year, and eventually
reach 3.0 percent of GDP. The gains in the high cost drug scenario are somewhat
smaller but still quite impressive, eventually reaching 2.6 percent of GDP. The
table also shows the job impact of these gains, using the assumption that the
increase in jobs is proportionate to the increase in GDP. In the high drug cost
scenario, the increase in jobs resulting from the switch to publicly supported
drug research eventually exceeds 3.8 million. In the low drug cost scenario the
job gains exceed 4.5 million by 2024.
Economic Impact of Replacing Patent Supported Drug Research
With Public/Non-Profit Sector Research
High
Cost
Low Cost
(Millions)
(Millions)
Additional Jobs |
Change in GDP |
Additional Jobs |
Change in GDP |
|
2001 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2002 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2003 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2004 |
0.0 |
0.0% |
0.0 |
0.0% |
2005 |
0.2 |
0.2% |
0.2 |
0.2% |
2006 |
0.4 |
0.3% |
0.4 |
0.3% |
2007 |
0.7 |
0.5% |
0.6 |
0.5% |
2008 |
0.9 |
0.6% |
0.9 |
0.6% |
2009 |
1.1 |
0.8% |
1.3 |
0.9% |
2010 |
1.3 |
0.9% |
1.5 |
1.1% |
2011 |
1.5 |
1.1% |
2.0 |
1.4% |
2012 |
1.7 |
1.2% |
2.2 |
1.5% |
2013 |
2.0 |
1.4% |
2.4 |
1.7% |
2014 |
2.2 |
1.5% |
2.6 |
1.8% |
2015 |
2.5 |
1.7% |
2.9 |
2.0% |
2016 |
2.5 |
1.7% |
3.1 |
2.1% |
2017 |
2.6 |
1.8% |
3.3 |
2.3% |
2018 |
2.9 |
2.0% |
3.6 |
2.4% |
2019 |
3.2 |
2.1% |
3.8 |
2.6% |
2020 |
3.3 |
2.3% |
4.0 |
2.7% |
2021 |
3.6 |
2.4% |
4.3 |
2.9% |
2022 |
3.5 |
2.4% |
4.5 |
3.0% |
2023 |
3.9 |
2.6% |
4.5 |
3.0% |
2024 |
3.8 |
2.6% |
4.5 |
3.0% |
It is important to recognize that
the choice between patent-supported research and direct funding through the
public/non-profit sectors is not a choice between the market and the government,
but rather a choice between two different forms of government intervention.
Virtually everyone would agree that in the absence of government intervention,
there would be a less than optimal amount of research. But, the question being
posed is not whether the government should intervene, but rather what is the
most efficient form of intervention to address this market failure.
The preceding analysis suggests
that patents are a very inefficient form of government intervention, adding tens
of billions of dollars to the nation's annual bill for prescription drugs.
Furthermore, the pursuit of patent rents leads to further political intervention
in the market, which takes a variety of different forms. For example, firms
attempt to steer federal research spending at National Institutes of Health into
areas that are most likely to lead to breakthroughs from which
they can subsequently profit. Second, firms have often attempted to use
their political influence to shape patent laws in ways that extend their
monopoly. Finally, the decision by the pharmaceutical manufacturers to pursue
the development of a particular drug will depend to a large extent on their
perception as to whether it will be covered under government programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid, and whether it will be possible to exert sufficient
political pressure to force private insurers to pay for it. This is likely to be
an increasing important problem as drug prices rise in future years.
For these reasons, patents almost
certainly involve far more extensive government involvement in the
pharmaceutical market than a system of directly supported research, where the
production and sale of drugs was entirely left to the market. In this situation,
Congress would have to make decisions about the overall appropriations for
research spending, as it does now, but the allocation of funds to specific lines
of research would be done by health care professionals,
independent of political influence, in much the same way as the National
Institutes of Health currently parcel out their research funds. In fact, the
elimination of patent rents is likely to remove the most obvious source of
political interference in the process that presently exists.
Direct funding from the budget is
also not the only alternative to patent supported research. At present,
approximately 4 percent of research is supported through universities, private
foundations, and charities.[26]
This funding would presumably continue and grow if patents ceased to be a major
source of support. This would be especially true if the government increased
incentives for individuals to contribute to such organizations—for example
through more generous tax deductions or credits for this purpose. It is also
worth noting that the shift in funding sources would have relatively little
impact on where research is actually conducted. Most of the research funded by
the pharmaceutical industry actually takes place at universities or other
independent research facilities. Only 9.13 percent of the research funded by the
industry is conducted in their own facilities.[27]
There are clearly many innovative
methods of alternative funding that could be developed, but the basic point
should be clear. These alternatives are likely to reduce, rather than increase,
political involvement in research priorities.
It is also important to note the
international dimensions of this issue. Enforcing patent protection on
pharmaceuticals has been a source of considerable friction between the United
States and its trading partners in recent years, especially in the case of
patent protection for essential medicines in developing nations. In many cases,
requiring that drugs be sold at patent protected prices will be a virtual death
sentence to millions of poor people, since this will make the drugs
unaffordable.
If the research findings were
simply placed in the public domain, it could provide enormous benefits to people
in developing nations, in a way that is essentially costless for the United
States.[28] (This situation is a step
better than simply removing any patent restrictions in developing nations. Since
research findings would be fully accessible, much of the reverse engineering
that is currently used to copy patented drugs would be unnecessary.) In
principle, it would be desirable to have the burden of paying for drug research
shared in some manner internationally, so that wealthy nations could not simply
free-ride on the research expenditures of others. While there would inevitably
be problems in designing an international agreement on this issue, there is no
reason to believe that the problems are more difficult than those involved in
harmonizing patent rules across international boundaries.
Conclusion
Economic theory indicates that
drug patents will lead to increasing economic waste as drug research costs rise,
and patent rents increase correspondingly. While this should make alternative
methods of support for drug development relatively more efficient through time,
there has been very little public discussion of alternatives to patent supported
research. This paper has produced a range of estimates that provide a basis for
comparing the relative efficiency of patent supported and public/non-profit
sector supported research.
It shows that, under plausible
assumptions, the savings to government programs from having access to drugs not
subject to patent protection, should be large enough to fully fund the
additional research needed to replace patent supported research. This means that
the gains to the private sector from lower drug prices would not be offset by
any additional taxes. These savings would be quite substantial even with
pessimistic assumptions about the impact of the removal of patent protection.
When an alternative system of research was fully phased in the savings to the
private sector would be between 1.6 and 2.0 percent of GDP. The economic impact
of savings of this magnitude would be dramatic, eventually leading to increases
of between 2.6-3.0 percent of GDP. This additional output would imply between
3.8 and 4.5 million additional jobs. There are very few policies that could
potentially have a comparable impact.
Appendix
The projections in table 8 are
derived from the Health Care Financing Administration's National Health Care
Expenditures Tables (2000-2010), table 11 (http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/NHE-Proj/proj2000/tables/t11.htm).
The rate of growth of prescription drug spending is assumed to slow gradually in
the years after the end of the projections in 2010. While nominal cost growth
averages 11.7 percent in the projection period, it is assumed to slow to 9.0
percent annually in the years 2010-2015, to 8.0 percent in the years from 2015
to 2020, and to 7.0 percent in the years after 2020. If the growth in spending
does not slow as much as assumed in these projections, then the gains from
switching to a system of public/non-profit sector supported research would be
even larger.
Table 9 projects the additional
spending (net of tax credits) which would be needed to offset the loss of patent
supported research. The "low" scenario is based on "high waste,
efficient research" scenario in table 4, which implied that the amount of
net new spending would be equal to 17.8 percent of the research spending
currently conducted by the pharmaceutical industry. The "high"
scenario in table 9 is based on the "low waste, very inefficient
research" scenario in table 4, which implies that the amount of public
spending needed to replace patent supported research, would be 107 percent of
the research expenditures of the pharmaceutical industry.
Table 10a calculates the savings
to the private sector and federal and state governments under the assumption
that non-patented drugs would cost 50 percent as much as the public sector
currently pays, and 35 percent as much as the private sector pays. Table 10b
assumes the respective costs as 35 percent for the public sector, and 20 percent
for the private sector. The actual savings are assumed to be phased in according
to the schedule described in the text. There are no savings in the first 2
years, in years 3 through 10, the amount of savings increases each year by 8.75
percent of the eventual savings (i.e. in year 3, 8.75 percent of the eventual
price reduction is realized, in year 4, 17.5 percent of the eventual price
reduction is realized, etc.). In years 11 through 20, the amount of savings
increases by 3.0 percentage points annually of the eventual price reduction.
Table11 combines the projections
of savings to the public sector in tables 10a and 10b with the projections of
necessary additional research expenditures in table 9. The "high" cost
scenario is from table 10a, while the low cost scenario is from 10b. The
research expenditures are assumed to be phased up to the necessary levels over
three years beginning in 2003. In 2005, it is assumed that the additional public
sector research expenditures will be sufficient to fully replace patent
supported research.
Table 12 shows the savings to the
private sector from tables 10a and 10b in the high drug cost and low cost drug
cost scenarios, respectively. These savings are expressed in current dollars and
as a share of GDP. The GDP projections are taken from the 2001 Medicare Trustees
Report, in order to be consistent with the drug expenditure projections.
Table 13 shows the estimated
impact of these drug savings on GDP and jobs based on estimates of the
sensitivity of GDP to savings on oil expenditures that appeared in the WEFA
econometric model (WEFA 1990). This calculation is based on the difference in
GDP projected for 2010 in their high oil and mid oil price scenarios. It is
assumed that the increase in employment is proportional to the increase in GDP.
The base employment growth projections are taken from the 2001 Social Security
trustees report.
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[1] Dean Baker is the co-director of the Center for Economic and
Policy Research. Noriko Chatani is a research associate of the Center for
Economic and Policy Research.
[2] A recent study (DiMasi et al, 2002) estimated the cost of researching a new drug in 2000 at $802 million. An earlier study, using the same methodology (DiMasi et al, 1991), put the cost of developing a new drug in 1987 at $231 million. Inflation would have raised the cost in 2000 dollars to $320 million. By this methodology, the real cost of developing new drugs increased by approximately 150 percent over this 13 year period, a 7.3 percent real annual rate. It is worth noting that there have been numerous questions raised about the methodology used in these studies (e.g. Public Citizen 2001; and Office of Technology Assessment, 1993).
[3] This is a basic theoretical result in public finance economics. The distortion associated with a tax is equal to the reduction in the quantity demanded that results from the tax, multiplied by the lost benefit to consumer for each item not consumed. A discussion of this issue can be found in any standard public finance textbook (e.g. see Bradway and Wildasin, 1984, pp 225-256).
[4] The revenue to pay for government supported research must of course also come from taxes. However, the taxes used to raise this revenue, primary individual and corporate income taxes, are generally viewed as far less distortionary than excise taxes, which is effectively what patents impose. More importantly, the percentage increase in these taxes that would be needed to support additional research into pharmaceuticals would be very small by comparison with the percentage increase in the patent mark-up needed to support more costly drug research. According to the pharmaceutical industry's claims, its current research spending is less than 2.0 percent of the general tax revenue collected by the federal government each year.
[5] It is worth noting that in the context of the patent system copycat drugs can be desirable. They lead to competition in situations where it otherwise would not exist, and could lead to significant reductions in the prices of some drugs. It is also worth noting that a drug is not medically useless just because it is considered to be imitative rather than a breakthrough drug . Patients react differently to the same drugs, so drugs that are safe and effective for one group of patients, may produce bad reactions or be less effective for another group. Therefore, the fact that alternative drugs are available is generally beneficial, although the pursuit of such alternatives might not have been considered a high priority in the absence of the incentives created by patent monopolies.
[6] A system of public/non-profit supported research would benefit from competition, and therefore some duplication, in the research process. However, there would not be the same incentives for secrecy, so research that was less promising could be abandoned in favor of research that was more promising. Also, there would not be the same incentive to continue research in order to recover sunk costs, even after an effective drug was developed. Therefore, while copycat research may continue even without the patent system, the amount of resources wasted on such research is likely to be a small fraction of what it is presently.
[7] One extraordinary measure that drug firms have adopted in order to boost sales has been the invention of new diseases, for which their drugs are the best treatment. In recent years there have been several instances in which drug firms have tried (sometimes very successfully) to promote their drugs as a treatment for diseases, the existence of which is not generally recognized by the medical profession (e.g. "Drug Ads Hyping Anxiety Make Some Uneasy," by Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post, July 16, 2001, Page A1).
[8]
According to some accounts, drug
firms have begun carefully tracking the prescribing patterns of individual
physicians to determine where their marketing efforts are likely to prove
most effective ("High-Tech Stealth Being Used To Sway Doctor
Prescriptions," by Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jeff Gerth, New
York Times, November 16, 2000, page A1).
[9] (http://www.pharma.org/publications/publications/profile01/app_a3.phtml)
[10] There is considerable evidence that the source of funding has influenced research findings in recent years (e.g. Bodenheimer 2000; Friedberg, et al 1999; Stelfox et al, 1998; Cho and Bero, 1996; and Davidson, 1986).
[11]
The possibility that industry
funding may be affecting published research findings is a widely recognized
problem among medical researchers. Several leading medical journals have
recently adopted policies whereby they refuse to publish articles unless the
researchers are willing to sign a statement asserting that they have
complete control over the dissemination of research findings ("A Stand
for Scientific Independence," by Susan Okie, Washington Post, August 5, 2001, Page A1).
[12] This figure includes $6.2 billion in research spending abroad by U.S. based pharmaceuticals.
[13] http://www.pharma.org/publications/publications/profile01/app_a1.phtml.
[14] The possibility that some of the copycat drugs may prove less effective than existing drugs, but nonetheless come into widespread use as a result of effective sales promotion, increases the portion of this spending that should be viewed as wasteful.
[15] This calculation is based on the Internal Revenue Service’s estimate that the industry received $514 million in research and development related tax credits in 1998 (http: //www.irs.gov/pub/irs.soi/98co00nr.xls ). The figure was adjusted for 2000 by multiplying by the ratio of 2000 domestic research expenditures to 1998 expenditures (1.16 to 1).
[16] In fact, this was exactly the course that was advocated by the pharmaceutical industry in the wake of the Anthrax scare in the fall of 2001. The industry wanted the government to contract out the development of an Anthrax vaccine, although it was not clear who would hold any patents that might result from the research ("Industry Seeks U.S. Contracts To Develop Antibiotics," by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, October 31, 2001, page B10).
[17] Researchers may still have incentives in some cases to falsify results—for example, having significant results for a test may be helpful in getting a journal article accepted or in getting a grant renewed—but these incentives are trivial compared to the incentives that drug companies have to protect their profits on popular drugs.
[18] For example, a year prescription of some AIDS cocktails cost approximately $10,000 in the United States. Generic producers in India, meeting international standards, can produce the same drugs for $300 to $400 a year.
[19] http://www.pc.gov.au/research/commres/pbsprices/finalreport/pbsprices.pdf
[20] http://www.cdma-acfpp.org/resourcecentre/odb-99.html
[21] The low and high elasticity assumptions can be reconciled with a Cobb-Douglas utility function with exponents on the drug component of 0.15 and 0.3, respectively.
[22] For example, Fullerton and Henderson (1989) put the deadweight loss from federal income taxes at less than 15 percent of the revenue raised.
[23] Thi2008s estimate may overstate the percentage of sales that will go to R&38.5D. The R&D share of sales peaked at 20.4 percent in 1994, and then fell back modestly in the late nineties. In 2001, PHARMA's data indicates that R&D spending was 18.5 percent of sales (PHARMA 2002, table 2).
[24] This calculation assumes that the percentage of the eventual price reduction from the availability of non-patented drugs increases by 8.75 percentage points beginning in the third year, until the tenth year. After the tenth year, the rate of increase drops to 3 percentage points a year, until 100 percent of the price reduction is realized in the twentieth year.
[25] These impacts were calculated by taking the difference between oil prices in the high price and low price scenarios compared with the baseline, and assessing the differences in projected real GDP for 2010.
[26] http://www.grants.hin.gov/grants/award/trends96/pdfdos/FEDTABLA.PDF
[27] http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/econ/usrndbyperformer.html
[28] If a system of public/non-profit supported research is more efficient than the current patent system, then the nation as a whole would benefit, even if research results are freely available to the rest of the world. Of course, if there were a mechanism whereby the U.S. could collect patent type rents internationally, even without imposing patents domestically, then obviously the U.S. as a whole would benefit more than if it just allowed the research to be freely available.