Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Since Donald Trump has apparently discovered that the US imports more than it exports from China, we can put tariffs on more goods than China can. This means that China has to look to other measures to counter Trump’s trade war. Most coverage of this issue has neglected to mention China’s strongest alternative measure.

The nuclear option, in this case, would be to stop honoring US patents and copyrights. This would be hugely costly to US corporations, especially if they began to export items, like prescription drugs, to the rest of the world. This would likely violate WTO rules, but I suspect China will care about violating WTO rules as much as Trump does.

Anyhow, given this can mean massive savings on drugs and other items for billions of people and a big hit to shareholders in Apple, Pfizer, Microsoft and other high-flying companies, it would go far towards reversing the upward redistribution of income. Like Trump said, it’s easy to win a trade war.

Since Donald Trump has apparently discovered that the US imports more than it exports from China, we can put tariffs on more goods than China can. This means that China has to look to other measures to counter Trump’s trade war. Most coverage of this issue has neglected to mention China’s strongest alternative measure.

The nuclear option, in this case, would be to stop honoring US patents and copyrights. This would be hugely costly to US corporations, especially if they began to export items, like prescription drugs, to the rest of the world. This would likely violate WTO rules, but I suspect China will care about violating WTO rules as much as Trump does.

Anyhow, given this can mean massive savings on drugs and other items for billions of people and a big hit to shareholders in Apple, Pfizer, Microsoft and other high-flying companies, it would go far towards reversing the upward redistribution of income. Like Trump said, it’s easy to win a trade war.

That’s what New York Times readers were wondering when they saw Harvard Economics Professor Greg Mankiw’s column, “Why Aren’t Men Working?” The piece notes the falloff in labor force participation among prime-age men (ages 25 to 54) for the last 70 years and throws out a few possible explanations. We’ll get to the explanations in a moment, but the biggest problem with explaining the drop in labor force participation among men as a problem with men is that since 2000, there has been a drop in labor force participation among prime-age women also. In we take the May data, the employment to population ratio (EPOP) for prime-age women stood at 72.4 percent.[1] That is down modestly from a pre-recession peak of 72.8 percent, but the drop against the 2000 peak of 74.5 percent is more than two full percentage points. That is less of a fall than the drop in EPOPs among prime men since 2000 of 3.2 percentage points, but it is a large enough decline that it deserves some explanation. In fact, the drop looks even worse when we look by education and in more narrow age categories.    In a paper last year that compared EPOPs in the first seven months of 2017 with 2000, Brian Dew found there were considerable sharper declines for less-educated women in the age groups from 35 to 44 and 45 to 54, than for men with the same levels of education. The EPOP for women between the ages of 35 and 44 with a high school degree or less fell by 9.7 percentage points. The corresponding drop for men in this age group was just 3.4 percentage points. The EPOP for women with a high school degree or less between the ages of 45 and 54 fell by 6.7 percentage points. For men, the drop was 3.3 percentage points. Only with the youngest prime-age bracket, ages 25 to 34, did less educated men see a larger falloff in EPOPs than women, 8.2 percentage points for men compared to 6.9 percentage points for women. Looking at these data, it is a bit hard to understand economists’ obsession with explaining the drop in EPOPs for men. It is also worth noting that there are also drops in EPOPs for many groupings of more educated workers. For example, there was a drop of 0.9 percentage points in the EPOP for women between the ages of 35 and 44 with college degrees.  The drop in EPOPs among women with college degrees between the ages of 45 to 54 was 1.6 percentage points.
That’s what New York Times readers were wondering when they saw Harvard Economics Professor Greg Mankiw’s column, “Why Aren’t Men Working?” The piece notes the falloff in labor force participation among prime-age men (ages 25 to 54) for the last 70 years and throws out a few possible explanations. We’ll get to the explanations in a moment, but the biggest problem with explaining the drop in labor force participation among men as a problem with men is that since 2000, there has been a drop in labor force participation among prime-age women also. In we take the May data, the employment to population ratio (EPOP) for prime-age women stood at 72.4 percent.[1] That is down modestly from a pre-recession peak of 72.8 percent, but the drop against the 2000 peak of 74.5 percent is more than two full percentage points. That is less of a fall than the drop in EPOPs among prime men since 2000 of 3.2 percentage points, but it is a large enough decline that it deserves some explanation. In fact, the drop looks even worse when we look by education and in more narrow age categories.    In a paper last year that compared EPOPs in the first seven months of 2017 with 2000, Brian Dew found there were considerable sharper declines for less-educated women in the age groups from 35 to 44 and 45 to 54, than for men with the same levels of education. The EPOP for women between the ages of 35 and 44 with a high school degree or less fell by 9.7 percentage points. The corresponding drop for men in this age group was just 3.4 percentage points. The EPOP for women with a high school degree or less between the ages of 45 and 54 fell by 6.7 percentage points. For men, the drop was 3.3 percentage points. Only with the youngest prime-age bracket, ages 25 to 34, did less educated men see a larger falloff in EPOPs than women, 8.2 percentage points for men compared to 6.9 percentage points for women. Looking at these data, it is a bit hard to understand economists’ obsession with explaining the drop in EPOPs for men. It is also worth noting that there are also drops in EPOPs for many groupings of more educated workers. For example, there was a drop of 0.9 percentage points in the EPOP for women between the ages of 35 and 44 with college degrees.  The drop in EPOPs among women with college degrees between the ages of 45 to 54 was 1.6 percentage points.

A couple of weeks ago, I joked that it seemed as though Washington Post reporters are not allowed to mention the importance of the value of the dollar in trade. This was after reading a lengthy article on how low farm prices are hurting farmers which never once mentioned the rise in the value of the dollar over the last four years.

The basic story is that, other things equal, the higher the value of the dollar against the euro, yen, and other major currencies, the lower the dollar price of wheat, corn, and other farm commodities. The relatively high dollar has been an important factor depressing prices received by US farmers in recent years, but for some reason, the Post never mentioned this fact.

Steven Mufson gives perhaps an even more egregious example of not talking about currency in his discussion of US trade relations with China over the last three decades. Incredibly, the piece never once mentions the explicit decision by China to keep down the value of its currency against the dollar in order to maintain and expand its trade surplus. This practice, sometimes called “currency manipulation” led China to run a trade surplus that peaked at just under 10 percent of GDP in 2007. This is especially striking since economists would ordinarily expect a rapidly growing developing country like China to be running a large trade deficit, since it would be an importer of capital.

While China’s currency is probably less under-valued today than a decade ago (which explains the large decline in its trade surplus), it is still deliberately held down by the government which is holding more than $4 trillion either as direct central bank reserves or in its sovereign wealth fund. As the CIA World Factbook notes:

note: because China’s exchange rate is determined by fiat rather than by market forces, the official exchange rate measure of GDP is not an accurate measure of China’s output; GDP at the official exchange rate substantially understates the actual level of China’s output vis-a-vis the rest of the world; in China’s situation, GDP at purchasing power parity provides the best measure for comparing output across countries.”

The continued under-valuation of China’s currency is a major factor in the US trade deficit. A president who was committed to more balanced trade would have currency values at the top of their agenda.

A couple of weeks ago, I joked that it seemed as though Washington Post reporters are not allowed to mention the importance of the value of the dollar in trade. This was after reading a lengthy article on how low farm prices are hurting farmers which never once mentioned the rise in the value of the dollar over the last four years.

The basic story is that, other things equal, the higher the value of the dollar against the euro, yen, and other major currencies, the lower the dollar price of wheat, corn, and other farm commodities. The relatively high dollar has been an important factor depressing prices received by US farmers in recent years, but for some reason, the Post never mentioned this fact.

Steven Mufson gives perhaps an even more egregious example of not talking about currency in his discussion of US trade relations with China over the last three decades. Incredibly, the piece never once mentions the explicit decision by China to keep down the value of its currency against the dollar in order to maintain and expand its trade surplus. This practice, sometimes called “currency manipulation” led China to run a trade surplus that peaked at just under 10 percent of GDP in 2007. This is especially striking since economists would ordinarily expect a rapidly growing developing country like China to be running a large trade deficit, since it would be an importer of capital.

While China’s currency is probably less under-valued today than a decade ago (which explains the large decline in its trade surplus), it is still deliberately held down by the government which is holding more than $4 trillion either as direct central bank reserves or in its sovereign wealth fund. As the CIA World Factbook notes:

note: because China’s exchange rate is determined by fiat rather than by market forces, the official exchange rate measure of GDP is not an accurate measure of China’s output; GDP at the official exchange rate substantially understates the actual level of China’s output vis-a-vis the rest of the world; in China’s situation, GDP at purchasing power parity provides the best measure for comparing output across countries.”

The continued under-valuation of China’s currency is a major factor in the US trade deficit. A president who was committed to more balanced trade would have currency values at the top of their agenda.

We all know about the problem of people who expect handouts from the government because they are too lazy or incompetent to make it on their own. The Washington Post wrote about a cattle rancher in Oregon who fits this bill, but so badly represented the facts most readers probably did not understand what is at stake.

The piece is about two ranchers in Southeastern Oregon, Dwight Hammond Jr. and his son, Steven, who were convicted of committing arson on federal property. According to the article, they also threatened federal employees. Donald Trump is apparently considering granting the two men pardons.

The article asserts that the Hammonds “advocating public use of federal lands — especially for grazing of livestock.” This statement is self-contradictory. The Hammonds are advocating that they be able to use federal land for their private purpose — grazing of livestock — they are not arguing that it should be open to the public for general use.

Their use of the land for grazing will limit its use for other purposes and, of course everyone cannot use the land for grazing. This is a case where the Hammonds apparently feel the government owes them a handout in the form of free access to public land. The value of this handout almost certainly swamps the value of the benefits that a family might receive from food stamps, TANF, or other anti-poverty programs that set many people into a frenzy. 

 

Addendum

BillB in the comments section informs us that these two ranchers have a history of making violent threats against federal employees and their families. They would seem to fit the definition of “terrorists,” the sort of characters conservatives usually talk about locking up for very long periods of time. It is striking that Donald Trump seems interested in pardoning them.

We all know about the problem of people who expect handouts from the government because they are too lazy or incompetent to make it on their own. The Washington Post wrote about a cattle rancher in Oregon who fits this bill, but so badly represented the facts most readers probably did not understand what is at stake.

The piece is about two ranchers in Southeastern Oregon, Dwight Hammond Jr. and his son, Steven, who were convicted of committing arson on federal property. According to the article, they also threatened federal employees. Donald Trump is apparently considering granting the two men pardons.

The article asserts that the Hammonds “advocating public use of federal lands — especially for grazing of livestock.” This statement is self-contradictory. The Hammonds are advocating that they be able to use federal land for their private purpose — grazing of livestock — they are not arguing that it should be open to the public for general use.

Their use of the land for grazing will limit its use for other purposes and, of course everyone cannot use the land for grazing. This is a case where the Hammonds apparently feel the government owes them a handout in the form of free access to public land. The value of this handout almost certainly swamps the value of the benefits that a family might receive from food stamps, TANF, or other anti-poverty programs that set many people into a frenzy. 

 

Addendum

BillB in the comments section informs us that these two ranchers have a history of making violent threats against federal employees and their families. They would seem to fit the definition of “terrorists,” the sort of characters conservatives usually talk about locking up for very long periods of time. It is striking that Donald Trump seems interested in pardoning them.

Donald Trump's trade wars seem to lack any logic and are likely to end up badly for both the United States and our trading partners, but that is not a good reason for serious people to start making up numbers to bolster their arguments. That is the route the NYT took in its latest editorial attacking Trump's tariffs. While the piece makes many valid points, it includes many assertions that can at best be called "truthful hyperbole." For example, the piece tells readers that Trump's steel tariffs "meant a 40 percent increase since January in the cost of steel for their customers who use it in their finished products, according to the US Chamber of Commerce." It's not clear where the Chamber of Commerce came up with this number, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that the price of steel mill products are up 10.4 percent over the last year. BLS is likely a more reliable source on this issue than the Chamber of Commerce which has been known to produce studies showing massive job loss from policies like minimum wage hikes or mandated family leave. The piece also warns us about the impact of aluminum tariffs on domestic beer producers. "Brewers are forecasting that they’ll pay $347.7 million more for aluminum cans. That has small craft-beer makers such as Melvin Brewing in Alpine, Wyo., which packages 75 percent of its products in cans, fretting about impending prices rises and the risks of passing them along to consumers." It would have been useful to put this $347.7 million figure in context. Beer sales in the U.S. were over $34 billion in 2016, which means that the increased cost of aluminum is equal to roughly 1.0 percent of what the public spends on beer. We are supposed to believe that people paying $10 a six-pack for their craft beer, will get seriously bent out of shape if the six-pack now costs $10.10? (I actually would have thought most craft-beer is sold in bottles, but whatever.)
Donald Trump's trade wars seem to lack any logic and are likely to end up badly for both the United States and our trading partners, but that is not a good reason for serious people to start making up numbers to bolster their arguments. That is the route the NYT took in its latest editorial attacking Trump's tariffs. While the piece makes many valid points, it includes many assertions that can at best be called "truthful hyperbole." For example, the piece tells readers that Trump's steel tariffs "meant a 40 percent increase since January in the cost of steel for their customers who use it in their finished products, according to the US Chamber of Commerce." It's not clear where the Chamber of Commerce came up with this number, but the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that the price of steel mill products are up 10.4 percent over the last year. BLS is likely a more reliable source on this issue than the Chamber of Commerce which has been known to produce studies showing massive job loss from policies like minimum wage hikes or mandated family leave. The piece also warns us about the impact of aluminum tariffs on domestic beer producers. "Brewers are forecasting that they’ll pay $347.7 million more for aluminum cans. That has small craft-beer makers such as Melvin Brewing in Alpine, Wyo., which packages 75 percent of its products in cans, fretting about impending prices rises and the risks of passing them along to consumers." It would have been useful to put this $347.7 million figure in context. Beer sales in the U.S. were over $34 billion in 2016, which means that the increased cost of aluminum is equal to roughly 1.0 percent of what the public spends on beer. We are supposed to believe that people paying $10 a six-pack for their craft beer, will get seriously bent out of shape if the six-pack now costs $10.10? (I actually would have thought most craft-beer is sold in bottles, but whatever.)

The Federal Reserve Board’s monthly reports on industrial production used to get a fair bit of attention in the business press, but May’s 0.7 percent decline in manufacturing activity seems to have passed largely unnoticed. These data are erratic and subject to large revisions, so this is hardly an end of the world kind of number, but it certainly is not a figure consistent with the investment boom promised by proponents of the tax cut.

It is also consistent with the reported fall in the length of the average workweek in manufacturing reported in the May employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This decline in hours led to a 0.3 percent decline in the index of aggregate hours for the month.

These are the sort of drops that are expected when there is an unusual weather event like a big snowstorm or a hurricane hitting a major population center. However, there were no obvious events in this category in May, which does raise the possibility that we may be seeing a turning point in manufacturing with the brief upturn over the last couple of years petering out.

The Federal Reserve Board’s monthly reports on industrial production used to get a fair bit of attention in the business press, but May’s 0.7 percent decline in manufacturing activity seems to have passed largely unnoticed. These data are erratic and subject to large revisions, so this is hardly an end of the world kind of number, but it certainly is not a figure consistent with the investment boom promised by proponents of the tax cut.

It is also consistent with the reported fall in the length of the average workweek in manufacturing reported in the May employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This decline in hours led to a 0.3 percent decline in the index of aggregate hours for the month.

These are the sort of drops that are expected when there is an unusual weather event like a big snowstorm or a hurricane hitting a major population center. However, there were no obvious events in this category in May, which does raise the possibility that we may be seeing a turning point in manufacturing with the brief upturn over the last couple of years petering out.

The Trump Tax Cut: The Story Is Investment

In a Washington Post analysis, Philip Bump assessed the evidence as to whether the Republican tax cuts passed last year are leading to the promised wage growth. He notes promises from Donald Trump about how the tax cut would lead to more hiring, which would push up wages.

While this is in fact what Trump promised on many occasions, this is likely due to the fact he didn’t understand the logic of his own tax cut. His economists justified the promised wage gains not by any immediate hiring effect, but rather by the effect the tax cut would have on investment. The tax cut was supposed to induce a flood of new investment. This would, in turn, lead to more rapid productivity growth. The big wage dividend would come from the workers’ share of this increased productivity.

For this reason, the key factor to watch at this point is investment, not month-to-month wage movements. By this measure, the tax cut is striking out badly. There is zero evidence of any uptick in investment, or investment plans, over the pre-tax cut pace.

In a Washington Post analysis, Philip Bump assessed the evidence as to whether the Republican tax cuts passed last year are leading to the promised wage growth. He notes promises from Donald Trump about how the tax cut would lead to more hiring, which would push up wages.

While this is in fact what Trump promised on many occasions, this is likely due to the fact he didn’t understand the logic of his own tax cut. His economists justified the promised wage gains not by any immediate hiring effect, but rather by the effect the tax cut would have on investment. The tax cut was supposed to induce a flood of new investment. This would, in turn, lead to more rapid productivity growth. The big wage dividend would come from the workers’ share of this increased productivity.

For this reason, the key factor to watch at this point is investment, not month-to-month wage movements. By this measure, the tax cut is striking out badly. There is zero evidence of any uptick in investment, or investment plans, over the pre-tax cut pace.

The Federal Reserve Board yesterday raised interest rates. According to comments from Chair Jerome Powell and other Fed board members, they believe that the unemployment rate is approaching, if not below, levels where it could trigger inflation. The hike yesterday, along with prior hikes and projected future hikes, was done with the intention of keeping the unemployment rate from getting so low that inflation would start to spiral upward.

This is not the same as “express[ing] confidence that raising borrowing costs now won’t hurt growth,” which is the view attributed to Fed officials in the NYT’s “Thursday Briefing” section. The point of raising interest rates is to slow growth, so they absolutely believe that higher interest rates will hurt growth. The point is that the Fed wants to slow growth because it is worried that more rapid growth, and the resulting further decline in unemployment, will trigger inflation.

Chair Powell did say that he didn’t expect higher borrowing costs to choke off growth, but that is not the same as saying that he doesn’t believe it will slow growth.

Thanks to Robert Salzberg for calling this to my attention.

The Federal Reserve Board yesterday raised interest rates. According to comments from Chair Jerome Powell and other Fed board members, they believe that the unemployment rate is approaching, if not below, levels where it could trigger inflation. The hike yesterday, along with prior hikes and projected future hikes, was done with the intention of keeping the unemployment rate from getting so low that inflation would start to spiral upward.

This is not the same as “express[ing] confidence that raising borrowing costs now won’t hurt growth,” which is the view attributed to Fed officials in the NYT’s “Thursday Briefing” section. The point of raising interest rates is to slow growth, so they absolutely believe that higher interest rates will hurt growth. The point is that the Fed wants to slow growth because it is worried that more rapid growth, and the resulting further decline in unemployment, will trigger inflation.

Chair Powell did say that he didn’t expect higher borrowing costs to choke off growth, but that is not the same as saying that he doesn’t believe it will slow growth.

Thanks to Robert Salzberg for calling this to my attention.

Neil Irwin had an interesting piece discussing various proposals that would ensure that workers share in productivity gains if we start to see massive job displacement due to robots (not much to date). At one point, he says this list would imply more activist government. This is not true. Most of the proposals (which can be found in my 2016 [free] book Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer ) involve different ways in which the government would structure the market, not necessarily more intervention.

For example, weaker and shorter patents and copyrights actually imply less government intervention in the market. Patents and copyrights are of course government granted monopolies that raise the prices of protected items by several thousand percent, sometimes tens of thousands of percent. Reducing this protection is a move towards a freer market.

Monetary policy that targets full employment is no more “activist” than monetary policy that focuses on keeping inflation down, it is simply a question of priorities. The question is whether the government is working towards ensuring that workers can get jobs or whether it is focused on protecting the wealth of the wealthy.

Work sharing is an alternative to unemployment insurance. With standard unemployment insurance, the government is effectively paying workers half their salary to be completely unemployed. By contrast, work sharing involves half of the wages lost from being partially unemployed due to a cutback in hours. While this is arguably better for workers and employers, since it keeps workers attached to the labor force, this arrangement does not in any obvious way imply more activist government.

It is striking that the rules that set in place the current market structure and the resulting upward redistribution are somehow regarded as natural and that efforts to alter them are regarded as “activist.” In fact, the upward redistribution of the last four decades was engineered by a series of policy shifts, not any natural process of market evolution.

Neil Irwin had an interesting piece discussing various proposals that would ensure that workers share in productivity gains if we start to see massive job displacement due to robots (not much to date). At one point, he says this list would imply more activist government. This is not true. Most of the proposals (which can be found in my 2016 [free] book Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer ) involve different ways in which the government would structure the market, not necessarily more intervention.

For example, weaker and shorter patents and copyrights actually imply less government intervention in the market. Patents and copyrights are of course government granted monopolies that raise the prices of protected items by several thousand percent, sometimes tens of thousands of percent. Reducing this protection is a move towards a freer market.

Monetary policy that targets full employment is no more “activist” than monetary policy that focuses on keeping inflation down, it is simply a question of priorities. The question is whether the government is working towards ensuring that workers can get jobs or whether it is focused on protecting the wealth of the wealthy.

Work sharing is an alternative to unemployment insurance. With standard unemployment insurance, the government is effectively paying workers half their salary to be completely unemployed. By contrast, work sharing involves half of the wages lost from being partially unemployed due to a cutback in hours. While this is arguably better for workers and employers, since it keeps workers attached to the labor force, this arrangement does not in any obvious way imply more activist government.

It is striking that the rules that set in place the current market structure and the resulting upward redistribution are somehow regarded as natural and that efforts to alter them are regarded as “activist.” In fact, the upward redistribution of the last four decades was engineered by a series of policy shifts, not any natural process of market evolution.

No, this one is not at all a joke. Harvard Professor and former AIG director (yes, the one the government bailed out in 2008) Martin Feldstein wants the Fed to stop worrying about unemployment and just focus on inflation. His Wall Street Journal column argues for ending the Fed's dual mandate and instead just having an inflation target. Before getting to the substance, it is worth a short digression on Feldstein's track record. Feldstein was sitting on AIG's board of directors as the insurer issued hundreds of billions of dollars worth of credit default swaps on mortgage-backed securities at the peak of the housing bubble. Mr. Feldstein apparently saw no problem with this. While the company had to be saved from bankruptcy by a massive government bailout, Feldstein was pocketing well over $100,000 a year for his oversight work as a director. While Feldstein missed the bubble that sank the economy, he did manage to finger a bubble that didn't exist. Four years ago he wrote a column with former Citigroup honcho (yes, the one the government bailed out in 2008) Robert Rubin, his Democratic counterpart as a purveyor of wisdom from the financial sector. The column urged the Fed to raise interest rates in order to deflate the bubble they saw building in financial markets. (Here is my comment at the time.) Had the Fed taken their advice, the unemployment rate would almost certainly be several percentage points higher today and tens of millions of workers would not have seen the modest real wage gains they've experienced in the last four years. The fact that someone with a track record as consistently bad as Martin Feldstein can get a column in the country's leading financial paper (he also argued in the 1993 that Clinton's tax increase wouldn't raise any revenue) shows what a great country we have. But let's get to the substance.
No, this one is not at all a joke. Harvard Professor and former AIG director (yes, the one the government bailed out in 2008) Martin Feldstein wants the Fed to stop worrying about unemployment and just focus on inflation. His Wall Street Journal column argues for ending the Fed's dual mandate and instead just having an inflation target. Before getting to the substance, it is worth a short digression on Feldstein's track record. Feldstein was sitting on AIG's board of directors as the insurer issued hundreds of billions of dollars worth of credit default swaps on mortgage-backed securities at the peak of the housing bubble. Mr. Feldstein apparently saw no problem with this. While the company had to be saved from bankruptcy by a massive government bailout, Feldstein was pocketing well over $100,000 a year for his oversight work as a director. While Feldstein missed the bubble that sank the economy, he did manage to finger a bubble that didn't exist. Four years ago he wrote a column with former Citigroup honcho (yes, the one the government bailed out in 2008) Robert Rubin, his Democratic counterpart as a purveyor of wisdom from the financial sector. The column urged the Fed to raise interest rates in order to deflate the bubble they saw building in financial markets. (Here is my comment at the time.) Had the Fed taken their advice, the unemployment rate would almost certainly be several percentage points higher today and tens of millions of workers would not have seen the modest real wage gains they've experienced in the last four years. The fact that someone with a track record as consistently bad as Martin Feldstein can get a column in the country's leading financial paper (he also argued in the 1993 that Clinton's tax increase wouldn't raise any revenue) shows what a great country we have. But let's get to the substance.

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