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Paul Krugman and the Economics FringePaul Krugman has devoted two recent blogposts to address complaints from heterodox economists over Thomas Piketty’s new book. I have written several pieces on the book and made my own view quite clear. I think it is a great book and I am happy to see it bring so much attention to the growth in inequality over the last few decades, even if Piketty gives short shrift to policies that could reverse this rise in inequality.
Rather than dealing directly with the dispute over Piketty, I will take some issue with Krugman’s account of the mainstream and the crisis. Krugman writes:
“It is true that economists failed to predict the 2008 crisis (and so did almost everyone). But this wasn’t because economics lacked the tools to understand such things — we’ve long had a pretty good understanding of the logic of banking crises. What happened instead was a failure of real-world observation — failure to notice the rising importance of shadow banking. Economists looked at conventional banks, saw that they were protected by deposit insurance, and failed to realize that more than half the de facto banking system didn’t look like that anymore. This was a case of myopia — but it wasn’t a deep conceptual failure. And as soon as people did recognize the importance of shadow banking, the whole thing instantly fell into place: we were looking at a classic financial crisis.”
To my mind this seriously mischaracterizes the nature of the downturn we have experienced since 2008, with important real world consequences. I have long argued that the crisis is really the story of the housing bubble and its collapse. However entertaining it might have been, the financial crisis was secondary.
Dean Baker / April 26, 2014
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Modern Rules for Modern CareersEileen Appelbaum and / April 25, 2014
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Labor Market Policy Research Reports, April 19-25, 2014The following reports on labor market policy were recently released:
CEPR and / April 25, 2014
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Bond Bubbles? Silly Season at the FedDean Baker
CNN Money, April 25, 2014
Dean Baker / April 25, 2014
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One Million More People Are Eligible for the Exchanges Every MonthDean Baker / April 25, 2014
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NYT Reports Food Industry Claims People Would Not Buy Genetically Modified Foods If Given a ChoiceDean Baker / April 24, 2014
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Problems of Patent Financed Drug Research #43,783, Ignoring Non-Patentable TreatmentsDean Baker / April 23, 2014
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The American Middle Class Is Doing Much Worse Than the NYT SaysDean Baker / April 23, 2014
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Judith Rodin: Director Watch Director of the DayDirectorships, 2008 - 2012: 3
Total director compensation, 2008 - 2012: $3,209,317*
Average annual director compensation, 2008 - 2012: $641-863
Average compensation per full year of service as director: $229,237
Dean Baker / April 23, 2014
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Phantom Bubbles at FiveThirtyEightFiveThirtyEight looks at the bubble horizon and concludes stocks and housing are safe, but we should be worried about bonds. The analysis here is seriously misguided.
First as a sidebar, contrary to what you read at FiveThirtyEight, real house prices are somewhat above, not below, their long-term trend levels. That doesn't mean we have a housing bubble, but anyone anticipating a future rise in nationwide house prices in excess of inflation is likely to be disappointed.
But the more important point is that the concern about a bubble in bonds is largely illusory. The piece constructs a case for a bond bubble that just is not there.
First, I was surprised to read that the size of the U.S. bond market is almost $40 trillion, which the piece rightly points out is considerably larger than the $28 trillion stock market or the $20 trillion housing market. When I checked the source for this number I discovered that the figure referred to the total size of the debt market, not just longer term debt that we would typically refer to as "bonds." The FiveThirtyEight figure includes 90-day T-notes and money market funds.
This is not just a question of semantics. Longer term debt (with a duration of five years or more) has large fluctuations in value in response to a change in interest rates. The price of shorter debt will also vary, but the size of the changes is trivial by comparison. This means that if we are worried about a bubble inflating bond prices, we should really only be looking at longer term debt. The size of this market would be roughly half as large, or less than $20 trillion. That's still big, but a considerably smaller basis for concern than the piece implies.
More importantly, the room for losses in this market is not nearly as large as it was in the case of the stock or housing bubbles. The stock market lost more than half of its value from its 2000 peak to its 2002 trough. House prices lost more than one third of their real value from the 2006 peak to the 2011 trough. By contrast, it is difficult to envision a scenario where the bond market loses even 10 percent of its value.
Dean Baker / April 23, 2014
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The Future of Health Care Costs: What Does History Tell Us?Dean Baker / April 23, 2014
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Piketty and PolicyJohn Schmitt / April 22, 2014
report informe
Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Small FirmsEileen Appelbaum and Helene Jorgensen / April 22, 2014
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The Economy Is Far Too Simple for Economists to Understand #47,654Dean Baker / April 21, 2014
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A Coordinated Refusal to Work Is Usually Called a "Strike," Even on Mount EverestDean Baker / April 21, 2014
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Why Does the NYT Think that Doctors and Other Highly Educated Professionals Need Protection from Foreign Competition?Dean Baker / April 21, 2014