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In this edition of Sanctions Watch, covering February 2025:

  • Watchdog says Afghan Fund assets should be fully returned to the US;
  • Western Union shuts down services to Cuba as Trump tightens sanctions;
  • Trump reimposes “maximum pressure” on Iran;
  • A new North Korea sanctions monitoring team is inaugurated;
  • US and Russia begin talks that could include the lifting of sanctions;
  • Vatican, Human Rights Watch, and Caesar Act namesake call to ease Syria sanctions;
  • Trump admin revokes Chevron license to operate in Venezuela;
  • Trump uses emergency economic power authorities to impose tariffs, sparking calls for reform, and more.

Afghanistan (background)

For what appears to be the first time, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) noted in its quarterly report that “the Administration and the Congress may want to examine returning” the nearly $4 billion held in the Afghan Fund — a Switzerland-based organization created with US backing to hold and disburse “for the benefit of the Afghan people” half of the $7 billion in Afghan Central Bank assets frozen by the US — “to the custody and control of the U.S. government.” The Fund has yet to make a single disbursement. As previously reported in Sanctions Watch, the seizure of Afghanistan’s assets has severely restricted the Afghan Central Bank’s capacity, contributing to an economic and humanitarian crisis. In addition, the US government’s decision to freeze foreign aid may significantly worsen the partially sanctions-induced crisis in Afghanistan, which remains heavily dependent on US assistance.

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Cuba (background)

The Trump administration continued to tighten sanctions on Cuba this month. Following January’s redesignation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) and reinstatement of the Cuba Restricted List, Trump reversed the third and final of Biden’s last-minute reforms, implementing Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. This controversial provision, which had been waived by every president since its inception in 1996 until late in the first Trump administration, allows lawsuits against US or foreign persons who do business with Cuban entities that benefit from property expropriated by the Cuban government. Its implementation has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba. The administration also updated the Cuba Restricted List to include Western Union’s local partner in the country, forcing the company to shut down services — a heavy blow to a country where almost 70 percent of the population receives remittances. When Western Union temporarily limited services due to sanctions in 2023, the Associated Press reported, “Cubans abroad would often have to resort to creative techniques to get money to relatives on the island, such as sending money through bitcoin trading apps or lugging large amounts of cash on flights back home.”

Also this month, four UN human rights experts — the special rapporteurs on unilateral coercive measures, and violence against women and girls, respectively, and the respective independent experts on foreign debt, and unilateral coercive measures’ impact on human rights — released a statement lambasting Cuba’s SSOT designation as illegal and inhumane: “We deeply regret this recent decision, which constitutes a regressive step not only for bilateral relations between these two countries, but most importantly for the human rights and well-being of the people in Cuba, with the most devastating impact on vulnerable groups, including women, children, older persons, and persons with disabilities.” Indeed, the island’s sanctions battered and fuel-short electrical grid faltered again this month, causing widespread blackouts and adding to the suffering of, per Reuters, a “population already stressed by widespread shortages of food, fuel and medicine.”

Finally, Secretary Rubio announced the expansion of visa restrictions for individuals involved in Cuba’s international medical missions, which operate in and provide lifesaving support to dozens of countries, many of which are already affected by US aid cuts. Meanwhile, pro-sanctions hardliner Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) introduced new legislation designed to close “existing sanctions gaps” and vowed to further restrict the ability of US citizens to visit Cuba.

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Iran (background)

In advance of his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Trump signed a memorandum directing the return of “maximum economic pressure” against Iran with the goal of “driving Iran’s oil exports to zero,” including by strictly enforcing existing sanctions, implementing new ones, and trying to ensure that US allies trigger the “snapback” of sanctions that had been lifted under the Iran deal. Trump’s relatively softened rhetoric while signing the deal — “I’m reluctant to sign this … hopefully we don’t have to use this document … I don’t want to be tough on Iran … but they can’t have a nuclear weapon” — appears to indicate that this “maximum pressure” is intended to precede negotiations toward a new nuclear deal. Notably, Iran’s nuclear program had been effectively curtailed by the original nuclear deal prior to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal.

Whether such a tactic will be effective is another question. Just days after the memorandum was published, the Treasury Department announced new sanctions against individuals and entities from China, India, and the United Arab Emirates allegedly involved in shipping Iranian oil — the first new Iran sanctions of the second Trump administration. Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, who had previously given a tacit green light to nuclear talks, responded to the new sanctions by saying that negotiating with the US is “not smart, wise or honourable.” Another round of sanctions — against dozens of individuals, entities, and vessels purportedly connected to Iranian oil — at the end of the month was met with harsh remarks by the Iranian foreign minister: “There will be no possibility of direct talks between us and the United States on the nuclear issue as long as the maximum pressure is applied in this way.” Center for International Policy Senior Fellow Sina Toossi remarked of the shift: “If this dynamic holds, it risks fueling a cycle of rapid escalation — especially as Iran’s nuclear program continues to advance at full speed. What’s needed instead is a tit-for-tat cycle of de-escalation: reciprocal concessions and confidence-building measures that can rebuild trust and lay the groundwork for serious negotiations and a broader deal.”

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North Korea (background)

On the sidelines of this year’s Munich Security Conference, the United States, Japan, and South Korea released a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to “the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and to “maintain and strengthen the international sanctions regime” against the country. In a recent article for the US Institute of Peace, Dr. Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings explores how the US can peacefully coexist with a nuclear North Korea through engagement that prioritizes the well-being of its people. She writes:

Unilateral and multilateral sanctions against North Korea — despite being aimed at halting its military and ballistic weapons program — have also impacted average North Korean citizens. … there is consensus that sanctions have had an unintentional negative impact on livelihoods for workers in sanctioned industries, as well as in health care and agriculture, due to shortages of fuel, equipment and medical supplies. Additionally, evidence suggests that sanctions have made people-focused engagement more difficult and less agile. … Primary and secondary sanctions have also resulted in issues with banking.

The author therefore recommends changes to sanctions regulations to broaden “the range of activities that could fall under general licenses, including peacebuilding and disarmament engagement by NGOs.” Any additional “revisiting of sanctions legislation,” Zadeh-Cummings writes, “including secondary sanctions that impact even non-U.S. NGOs, with a people-focused lens could also help respond to the unintended consequences of sanctions.”

On February 20, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Australia, and six other countries convened in Washington, DC for the inaugural meeting of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team Steering Committee. This initiative, led by Western countries and their allies, is intended to replace the UN panel of experts whose mandate at the UN Security Council was vetoed by Russia last year. As noted in the March edition of Sanctions Watch, “The veto may have been a reaction to the Council’s failure to adopt Moscow and Beijing’s proposals to reduce the panel’s reporting requirements, and add sunset clauses to the sanctions themselves. Before the vote, Russia’s ambassador to the UN said the West was trying to ‘strangle’ North Korea with sanctions that are ‘detached from reality.’”

British, Australian, and New Zealand sanctions marking the third year of the war in Ukraine also target North Korean officials, including the defense minister, top generals, and senior leaders, for their alleged support of Russia’s war.

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Russia (background)

To the shock of European allies, officials from the United States and Russia, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, held bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia earlier this month to address the ongoing war in Ukraine. According to reports, both parties agreed to pursue efforts to end the conflict and normalize relations, although no representatives from Ukraine were present. The US signaled that sanctions relief would be part of any deal, though Rubio later clarified that the coercive measures would remain in place until a peace deal is reached and there is a noticeable change in Moscow’s behavior. However, according to The New York Times, Rubio “left the door open to easing some sanctions in limited ways if the Russians began taking steps that the administration was seeking.” Other officials, including Vice President JD Vance and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg, stated that the US may increase sanctions if Moscow refuses to agree to a peace settlement. Sources told Reuters that Russia may agree to use over $300 billion of its frozen assets — which the US, EU, and other G7 countries are using to back a $50 billion loan for Ukraine — to rebuild Ukraine if a portion is allocated to Russian-occupied regions of the country. Meanwhile, tough sanctions imposed on Russia’s oil and gas sector during the Biden administration’s final weeks are reportedly causing significant challenges. The measures have disrupted the transportation and off-loading of Russian oil, hindered trade, and driven up delivery costs and oil prices.

Meanwhile, in the European Union, which was also excluded from the recent US-Russia talks, officials are doubling down on sanctions. To mark the third year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted its 16th package of sanctions on February 24, which includes a ban on imports of Russian aluminum and export restrictions on certain chemicals, chrome, video game equipment, and other products. The package also includes measures targeting around 48 individuals and 35 entities, including 13 banks and third-country financial institutions. Additionally, amid signs that the US may reduce its assistance to Ukraine, the EU is reportedly exploring “more aggressive ways to seize Russia’s frozen central bank assets,” according to Bloomberg. However, countries like Germany, France, and Belgium have raised concerns about legal challenges and the plan’s implications for the euro. At the same time, the UK announced its largest sanctions package against Russia since 2022, targeting over 100 individuals and entities. Meanwhile, Switzerland adopted the EU’s 15th sanctions package, and Australia and New Zealand also imposed new measures against Russia.

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Syria (background)

Following the collapse of the Assad government, and after agreeing in January on a general roadmap toward easing sanctions, the European Union agreed to suspend sanctions affecting Syria’s energy, transport, and reconstruction sectors, and to indefinitely extend humanitarian exemptions. UK Minister of State Stephen Doughty has also announced that a plan to loosen sanctions is in the works, though the measures will apparently not be ready for some months. Russia, meanwhile, has followed through on an Assad-era agreement to deliver Syrian currency printed in Russia to Syria, signaling a willingness to foster ties with the one-time enemy. The United States, in contrast, has not made significant moves to ease sanctions since Biden’s initial step in January.

According to Human Rights Watch, US, EU, and UK sanctions “are hindering reconstruction efforts and exacerbating the suffering of millions of Syrians struggling to access critical rights, including to electricity and an adequate standard of living,” and are a “major obstacle to restoring essential services such as health care, water, electricity, and education.” Among the growing chorus of prominent figures urging the US to lift Syria sanctions is the very namesake of the US’s broadest sanctions — the military officer-turned-defector who documented the Assad government’s use of torture, previously known only as “Caesar.” Others calling for action to ease sanctions and address the humanitarian crisis are the Vatican’s humanitarian chief, and the head of the Syrian Investment Agency, who said this month, “Sanctions have stopped everything. Right now, they are primarily on the Syrian people and are increasing their suffering.”

Sanctions were discussed extensively at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria this month. Asked by Sen. Duckworth (D-IL) about how sanctions “impede Syria’s ability to obtain relief needed to rebuild and heal,” witness Dana Stroul noted, “There’s no doubt that the state-level sanctions on Syria … are preventing others from coming in to further stabilize and reconstruct Syria, are [making it] difficult for Syrians abroad to send remittances home, and are creating nervousness within the NGO community on how much they can engage.”

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Venezuela (background)

A meeting between Special Envoy Ric Grenell and the Maduro government at the end of January appeared to indicate that the second Trump administration would take a pragmatic, negotiatory approach to Venezuela, rather than the maximum-pressure, regime-change efforts of the previous Trump presidency, which Grenell has firmly disavowed. However, Trump announced at the end of the month that Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela, which was granted by the Biden administration in November 2022, has been revoked. Prior to the decision, Chevron warned that if it were blocked from operating, China and Russia would likely move in, while effects on the local economy would drive more migration to the US. (As reported previously in Sanctions Watch, economist and CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez has found that a return to maximum pressure could induce one million more Venezuelans to leave their home in the coming years.) Further, as energy market expert Cyril Widdershoven writes, “the US needs Venezuelan oil.” How Trump will square this apparent return to “maximum pressure” with other policy goals — minimizing Chinese and Russian influence in Latin America, limiting migration, and keeping oil prices down — remains to be seen.

A new article by economist and CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez finds that Venezuela’s debilitating hunger crisis was caused by a collapse in import capacity, which was driven by a decline in oil revenue itself caused in large part by US sanctions.

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Other

President Trump cited the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) as his authority to impose tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China at the start of the month, drawing renewed attention to — and in some cases calls for further congressional oversight over — the 1977 law. IEEPA allows the executive considerable leeway to “regulate” international commerce without congressional approval following the declaration of a national emergency, and provides the most used authority for US sanctions. Critics have long held that IEEPA presidential emergency powers have been abused, resulting in the unchecked proliferation of US sanctions underpinned by dubious national emergency declarations. Some members of Congress have sought to rein in IEEPA authorities.

A fragile ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas seems to be holding, despite numerous challenges. While the flow of aid to the Gaza Strip has increased significantly, several obstacles persist. Distribution remains a major hurdle due to damaged infrastructure, and humanitarian workers on the ground report ongoing obstacles to the entry of essential items, including tents, mobile homes, and heavy machinery needed to clear rubble. A UN News report states, “Despite the massive aid boost, it is still not enough to provide the immediate relief that more than two million Gazans require. This will only happen when commercial goods begin to flow into the Strip once again, humanitarians have said repeatedly, including the UN Children’s Fund.” A World Health Organization official also noted, “The health system is ruined. Malnutrition is rising. The risk of famine persists. … We are ready to scale up our response — but we urgently need systematic and sustained access to the population across Gaza, and we need an end to restrictions on the entry of essential supplies.”

On February 6, President Trump signed an executive order authorizing sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC). The order accused the ICC of “illegitimate and baseless actions” following its issuance of arrest warrants in November for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior Israeli government officials over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The executive order authorizes the president to impose asset freezes and travel bans on ICC staff and their family members if the Court investigates or prosecutes alleged crimes committed by citizens of the US or its allies. Karim Khan, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, was the first official targeted under this order. Following this news, UN experts, dozens of countries, and human rights organizations issued statements condemning the sanctions as an attack on the international rule of law.

A Brookings Institute expert noted, “Sanctions haven’t stopped the court’s work in the past and could backfire this time too. At best, sanctions are punitive and performative and will ultimately make U.S. leaders look ineffectual. At worst, sanctions will undermine U.S. credibility on the world stage and give cover to U.S. adversaries such as Russia that also oppose the ICC, thereby eroding the international rule of law.”’ Meanwhile, Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch, highlighted that Trump’s claim — that the ICC lacks jurisdiction because neither Israel nor the US are parties to its founding treaty — ignores the Court’s authority to investigate and prosecute crimes committed on the territory of member states, which includes Palestine, regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality. Roth also pointed out that the US abandoned this argument in 2022 when the ICC charged Vladimir Putin, with Biden calling the charges “justified” and the Senate unanimously endorsing the prosecution, despite Russia not being an ICC member.

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About Sanctions Watch

Economic sanctions have become one of the main tools of US foreign policy despite widespread evidence that they can cause severe harm to civilian populations (which may, in fact, be the point). Though now a defining feature of the global economic order, sanctions and their human costs receive relatively little attention in most US media outlets.

CEPR’s Sanctions Watch news bulletin aims to generate more awareness on the use and impact of sanctions through monthly round-ups of news and analysis on US sanctions policy.

Previous editions of the Sanctions Watch can be found here. CEPR’s US Sanctions Policy FAQ can be found here.

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