September 16, 2024
The Upcoming Presidential Elections
Although Ecuador’s general elections are still six months away, all participating political parties have already announced their candidates for president and vice president. In total, there are a record-breaking 17 presidential tickets. The candidacies are not yet final, as the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) must still verify that all candidates meet the requirements to run and address any potential objections to the tickets. This process ends on December 30, when a finalized list of candidates will be announced. For now, the candidates have formally accepted their party’s nomination before the CNE, but they can still drop out at any moment.
Ecuador watchers will recognize several familiar faces. Luisa González, who lost in the second round of the last elections in 2023, will again be the presidential nominee for the progressive Revolución Ciudadana (RC) party. This time, however, Andrés Arauz — the party’s 2021 presidential candidate and the 2023 vice presidential candidate — will not be her running mate. Diego Borja, a former minister in Rafael Correa’s administration who later opposed him but has since returned to support the RC, has been chosen instead.
Conservative president Daniel Noboa, the son of billionaire banana magnate and five-time former presidential candidate Álvaro Noboa, will seek reelection with his National Democratic Action (ADN) party. His vice president, Verónica Abad, is not on the ticket; Noboa has made several attempts to force her resignation or impeachment to prevent her from assuming the presidency while he takes a mandatory leave of absence to campaign (more about this below). María José Pinto, a textile industry executive and head of the government’s secretariat against child malnutrition, will be his running mate. The other recurring presidential candidate is Jan Topić the son of a telecommunications mogul and a member of the French Foreign Legion who claims to have fought in Ukraine, Libya, and the Central African Republic. He will run for the SUMA party instead of the traditional Social Christian Party (PSC), which had endorsed his security-centered candidacy in 2023. The conservative PSC, for their part, will go with Henry Kronfle, a metallurgic businessman, party member, and current president of Ecuador’s National Assembly.
On the other end of the political spectrum, the CONAIE, Ecuador’s largest and most influential Indigenous organization, has nominated its leader, Leonidas Iza, for president. Iza will run for president for Pachakutik, the CONAIE’s political-institutional arm, despite serious clashes over the last few years between the social movement and the party.
Early polling by Comunicaliza shows Noboa in the lead with 42.7 percent of the valid vote, González in second with 33.5, Topić in third with 8.3, and Iza in fourth with 3.4. Maluk Research’s poll, on the other hand, gives Luisa Gonzalez 39.9 percent of the valid vote; Noboa, 31.3; and Jan Topić, 6.5.
For weeks leading up to the CNE’s August 30 deadline to register electoral alliances, left-leaning parties and movements — including the RC, Pachakutik, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Center party, and RETO — were in talks to form a broad coalition and a common presidential ticket. This effort stemmed from the Ecuadorian left’s recent losses to conservative candidates in the second round in each of the last two presidential elections. The largest party in this bloc, the RC, failed to secure an outright victory in the first round of both elections, despite finishing in first place. Such an alliance was intended to secure a decisive first-round victory in 2025 or, barring that, to win the vote in the runoff, given that the RC’s core base of support appears to be capped at around one-third of the electorate. However, these left-of-center parties failed to agree on a common ticket by the deadline. In a symbolic move, the RC announced an alliance with only one other party, the small, centrist RETO movement. It is still unclear whether the RC’s ticket will change as a result of this alliance.
Leaked Messages Reveal the Prosecutor General Targeted Opponents and Broke the Law
On August 29, Drop Site News and The Intercept Brasil published a detailed exposé about Ecuadorian prosecutor general Diana Salazar’s politicized wrongdoing that included several claims about Salazar’s strong connection with the US government. Journalists examined over 1,500 leaked messages between Salazar and Ronny Aleaga, a former legislator belonging to the RC. They suggest that Salazar used her position to politically target members of the Ecuadorian left, sometimes with support from officials in the US embassy in Quito, it seems.
Salazar, hailed by the US government as an anti-corruption champion, has long been viewed by the Ecuadorian left as a corrupt prosecutor who uses lawfare to target progressives while delaying or neglecting investigations to protect the country’s conservative elite. She is known for her unabashed anti-RC positions and for having indicted former president Correa and several of his former collaborators in highly politicized court cases that have been denounced for lack of due process. She has also interfered in past elections to favor conservative candidates.
In the previously mentioned messages, Salazar allegedly admits to having delayed the “León de Troya” corruption investigation (see Ecuador News Round-Up No. 1) against former president Guillermo Lasso and his brother-in-law and close business associate, Danilo Carrera, because she thought the investigation would have helped the RC in the 2023 snap elections. Moreover, she allegedly detailed the US embassy’s opposition to a possible RC victory in those elections. Salazar also appears to have shared confidential information about certain cases and warned potential suspects of imminent arrest. In addition, Salazar claimed that slain 2023 presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio had been a US government informant and suspected that the FBI, which is involved in the investigation into his assassination, erased information from his phone. The alleged messages also reveal that, despite knowing early on that the Lobos gang was responsible for Villavicencio’s murder, Salazar allowed accusations that Correa was involved to spiral, negatively affecting the RC’s performance in the 2023 elections.
Ronny Aleaga went public with his messages in March, but was largely ignored by both the international and domestic media. Drop Site and The Intercept Brasil are the first outlets to conduct a serious and thorough examination of the messages.
Days before the article by Drop Site and The Intercept Brasil, La Posta — an independent Ecuadorian media outlet that had initially exposed the León de Troya corruption and narcotics investigation cover-up during the Lasso government — accused the Prosecutor General’s Office of being infiltrated by the Albanian Mafia. The outlet criticized the lack of progress in the León de Troya case and claimed that the alleged leader of the Albanian Mafia in Ecuador, Dritan Gjika, was tipped off by individuals within the Prosecutor General’s Office about an imminent raid, allowing him to sell off assets, transfer money out of the country, and go into hiding. It is further alleged that, despite being wanted by law enforcement, Gjika continues to operate and has even established new Ecuadorian companies under his name since his arrest warrant.
Impeachment Against Salazar Is Rejected by Legislative Committee Amid Conflict-Ridden Vote
On September 9, Salazar’s impeachment at the National Assembly finally came to an end. Salazar stood accused of delaying prosecution in several high-profile criminal investigations, including the León de Troya, Encuentro, and INA Papers cases, which concern accusations of corruption against former presidents Lenín Moreno and Guillermo Lasso. There were two impeachment requests against Salazar: one submitted by Gisella Garzón and the other by Héctor Valladares, both RC legislators.
In December 2023, the National Assembly’s administrative body (CAL) green-lit the impeachment process. But in May, impeachment proceedings were temporarily suspended after an announcement that Salazar was going through a high-risk pregnancy. Calls for a leave of absence fell on deaf ears.
On August 19, Salazar declared that she had been medically cleared to proceed with the impeachment and requested that the proceedings be reactivated. The CAL then voted to resume the impeachment process on September 4. The next step in the process involved obtaining the Oversight Committee’s (Comisión de Fiscalización) confirmation that the impeachment request met the legal requirements to proceed. This step is typically a formality since the CAL, composed of representatives from the major parties in the National Assembly, requests a nonbinding technical-legal analysis from the body’s Legislative Technical Unit (Unidad de Técnica Legislativa) of impeachment requests. After this, the CAL vets the impeachment request and only proceeds when it is satisfied that all requirements have been met. Therefore, by the time an impeachment request reaches the Oversight Committee, there is little doubt that it complies with the law.
However, in Salazar’s case, what was expected to be a mere formality in the Oversight Committee turned into a conflict-ridden session when, on September 9, the committee refused to allow the impeachment to proceed.
From the outset, César Umajinga, a committee member from the ADN-allied SUMA party, requested that Pamela Aguirre, the committee president and a member of the RC, be removed as chair of the meeting. His request was based on a controversial August 22 court ruling, itself prompted by a complaint from an ADN legislator. In a textbook case of political judicialization, the judge’s ruling ordered the Oversight Committee to suspend its processing of an impeachment request against Interior Minister Mónica Palencia until it reactivated and processed previously archived impeachment cases against three former Lasso officials. But, on September 3, the National Assembly passed a resolution rejecting the ruling, claiming that the judge was overstepping his authority and violating the separation of powers. Despite this, Umajinga motioned for Aguirre’s removal as chair, contending that she had failed to comply with the judge’s decision and had delayed convening a meeting on the issue. Aguirre had in fact previously announced that the committee would adhere to the judge’s order and scheduled a meeting for September 7, but that was postponed due to a nationwide energy blackout. Aguirre was nevertheless removed as chair and replaced by ADN legislator Luis Alvarado, with five votes in favor and four against.
Following this, Aguirre motioned for the committee to approve Garzón’s impeachment request against Salazar, but all non-RC legislators rejected it with a five-to-four vote. Subsequently, PSC legislator Lenín Rogel motioned to merge both impeachment requests against Salazar into one. RC legislators objected to this motion because Garzón’s request had just been rejected. The motion to merge both impeachment cases was nonetheless approved, after which the RC legislators, claiming that the committee’s proceedings were illegal, left the room. Umajinga then motioned to reject the merged impeachment request, which was supported by all present committee members with five votes. As a result, the Oversight Committee shut down Salazar’s impeachment.
During and after the Oversight Committee’s proceedings, Aguirre and other RC legislators alleged that Umajinga had been bought out by Salazar or at least had a conflict of interest concerning her impeachment due to Salazar’s order that an investigation into Umajinga for soliciting bribes, favors, or undue payments should be closed on September 6. Just a day before, Umajinga had publicly expressed support for Salazar’s impeachment.
Umajinga responded that he was unaware of an investigation against him or of Salazar’s request to close it. He also denied he was pressured by Salazar and claimed that his statements in favor of impeachment had been taken out of context, clarifying that, while he supported the committee’s right to rule on Salazar’s impeachment, he was not necessarily in favor of it. During the committee session, a photograph was also widely circulated showing Umajinga in a Signal chat with a user called “DS,” discussing who leaked the closing of the investigation. The next morning, Umajinga claimed that “DS” referred not to Diana Salazar but to his lawyer, Dr. Samira.
After the Oversight Committee’s controversial vote, the National Assembly plenary decided to take up the matter on September 10 to lock-in the dismissal of Salazar’s impeachment. This was highly controversial as procedural dismissal of impeachment proceedings is only possible in the committee. With a vote of 76 in favor and 45 against, the National Assembly passed a resolution ratifying the committee’s decision by merging both impeachment requests and archiving them, citing the argument that the legally designated time to process the requests had expired. However, the National Assembly was also voting on the matter because due process had been violated during the Oversight Committee’s meeting.
All votes against archiving Salazar’s impeachment came from the RC, which needed 70 votes to approve the impeachment. This outcome was expected, given that the three other major parties in the National Assembly — PSC, ADN, and Construye — have repeatedly expressed opposition to her impeachment.
Some RC legislators argue that Valladares’s impeachment request remains active, given that the Oversight Committee’s motion to merge his request with Garzón’s request was carried out illegally. As a result, they contend that impeachment proceedings against Salazar can still go ahead. After the plenary vote, the Oversight Committee raised similar objections on its X account, claiming that the plenary had acted illegally because only the committee holds the exclusive authority to merge impeachment requests. However, a member of the committee alleged that the body’s X account is directed by Aguirre with no input from other members.
Even if the plenary ultimately voted against Salazar’s impeachment, the Oversight Committee’s approval of the requests would have been significant. It would have initiated an oversight process, including hearings and questionings, into Salazar’s actions and potentially into her alleged messages with Aleaga.
Noboa Struggles to Remove His Vice President
Relations between President Noboa and his vice president, Verónica Abad, have been frosty since before they were inaugurated. During the presidential campaign, Noboa and Abad rarely appeared together, likely a product of controversial political statements made by Abad during the campaign that positioned her on the far right of the political spectrum. On his first day in office, Noboa decreed that Abad be sent to Israel as “ambassador for peace” to keep her away from domestic politics and to pressure her to resign.
The true source of Noboa’s hostility toward Abad is not entirely clear, though Abad has stated that one of Noboa’s spokespeople accused her of being associated with corruption scandals. Regardless of the reason, Noboa’s behind-the-scenes maneuvering against her has only escalated in recent months. Under Ecuadorian law, officials running for reelection must take a mandatory leave of absence during their campaign. Since Noboa plans to run for reelection in the February 2025 elections, he would have to temporarily transfer the presidency to Abad for one month starting in January — something he is keen to avoid.
One of the most serious moves against Abad involved her son’s being jailed on influence peddling charges at La Roca, a maximum-security prison typically reserved for violent criminals. Fearful that she would be dismissed from her role or disciplined if she returned to Ecuador to visit him, Abad decided to remain in Israel. Noboa spokespeople attacked her for this decision, and Abad was eventually implicated in the case involving her son, but as vice president, the National Assembly had to decide whether to lift her immunity. Legislators ultimately voted against moving forward with the case. Abad also claims that the Foreign Ministry denied her request for vacation days to address medical issues and visit her family, stating that she feels “kidnapped” in Israel.
In another attempt, a public official lodged a complaint against Abad for campaigning earlier than legally permitted during local elections in 2023. Noboa may have a reason to dismiss her if Abad is found to have violated the law; however, Ecuadorian candidates commonly begin unofficial campaigning well before the legally designated campaign period, which starts about a month before elections.
Noboa has sought legal guidance from the General Counsel’s Office (Procuraduría) on whether he must take a leave of absence to campaign for the 2025 elections. Noboa’s argument rests on the fact that he is running for his first full term and not for reelection, as he is currently finishing out Guillermo Lasso’s term. This appears to defeat the point of the mandatory leave, which seeks to prevent incumbents from using their office in the electoral campaign. The General Counsel’s Office abstained from responding, saying it lacked the authority to give an opinion on the question.
On September 12, Noboa requested that the Ministry of Labor initiate an administrative inquiry into Abad. Citing security concerns, he signed a decree on August 8 ordering her temporary transfer to Turkey starting on September 1, where she would continue her work related to Israel remotely. However, Abad arrived in Ankara on September 9, and so the inquiry will investigate the reasons for her delayed arrival. Abad cannot be dismissed from her position as vice president if she is found to have committed an infraction, but an unfavorable outcome could lead to disciplinary action from Noboa. Abad claims she never requested the transfer and sees it as a tactic to silence her, noting that no other staff from the Ecuadorian embassy in Israel were transferred. She also alleges that she received orders prohibiting her from discussing topics related to Israel, Palestine, or Ecuadorian internal affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by stating that the transfer was initiated at Abad’s request due to her expressing concerns about her safety in Israel.
Noboa and his allies have openly expressed their disdain for Abad, especially because she has criticized Noboa and spoken out about her treatment. Members of his government have called for her resignation, labeling her an “enemy” and warning that “it would be disastrous if she assumes power.” Noboa has stated that Abad will “leave on her own” and added, “We will take measures allowed by the Constitution.” Foreign Minister Gabriela Sommerfeld also criticized Abad’s diplomatic performance, accusing her of “acting against Ecuador.” In response, Abad has filed a complaint against Noboa, Sommerfeld, and other officials before the Electoral Dispute Tribunal for gender-based political violence, asking they be dismissed from office. Diana Jácome, one of Noboa’s advisors who was targeted by Abad’s complaint, has filed a counter-complaint requesting the removal of the vice president.
The IMF Executive Board Approves an Agreement with Ecuador
After reaching a staff-level agreement in April, the IMF and Ecuador cleared a final hurdle on May 31 when the IMF’s Executive Board approved a two-year Extended Fund Facility arrangement for the country. This medium-term credit program, which includes structural reform conditions, will give Ecuador access to $4 billion. Quito has reportedly already received $1 billion from the IMF as part of the agreement.
This agreement has been presented as a win for Noboa, who had been courting the IMF since before his inauguration by pledging and implementing policies to attract financing. His moves have included proposing a significantly slashed budget, passing a tax reform with cuts and a fiscal residence program for foreign investors, and increasing the value-added tax. The month after the Executive Board approved the agreement, Noboa followed through on his most notable and controversial proposal — raising fuel costs or, as he puts it, eliminating certain fuel subsidies (the existence of these subsidies is debated since — before the price hike described below — prices were still above production cost but below international market prices, meaning there is an opportunity cost for the state).
The fuel price adjustment is widely unpopular, especially among Indigenous groups and labor unions that have protested and organized national strikes against similar policies in the past. Starting on June 28, prices for widely consumed, low-octane gasoline (known as Ecopaís and Extra) were allowed to fluctuate in line with international oil prices. Prices then rose from $2.47 to $2.75 per gallon by July 12. In October, prices will fall to $2.59 per gallon. The government’s plan caps monthly price increases at 5 percent and decreases at 10 percent. A compensation scheme for owners of approximately 84,000 vehicles in the transportation industry, including taxis, vans, trucks, and motorbikes, has been set up. Labor unions organized numerous protests in response to the fuel price adjustment, and while the CONAIE Indigenous organization did not participate, it publicly supported the protests. Transportation unions called for a national strike on July 16 and 17; ultimately, they backed down due to the government’s declaration of a security-related state of emergency that suspended the right to freedom of assembly. Labor unions are currently mulling a national strike.
The IMF agreement envisages another tax reform to increase public revenue and expand the tax base as well as a gradual elimination of the tax on capital exiting the country, which has been essential for past governments’ financing of public spending. The agreement also calls for an increase in oil production, a limit to public sector employment and salaries, and labor reforms to address “rigid labor contracts, high separation costs, and high minimum wages.” The RC has criticized the agreement, arguing that it should have been sent to the National Assembly for approval. Jaime Nebot, the leader of the PSC, also came out against it, saying, “How many agreements with the International Monetary Fund do you know of, and do you know of any that have worked?”
In June, at the request of the National Assembly plenary, the Assembly’s Transparency Committee initiated an audit of the IMF agreement. Legislators were reportedly left unconvinced by the minister of economy’s presentation, with several saying his remarks were confusing and general and failed to clarify how the funds would be allocated. The committee’s report on the agreement recommends that the National Assembly declare it unconstitutional, deem the acquired debt illegitimate, and impeach the minister of economy. The report concluded that the IMF loan would not be used for social spending or economic, social, and cultural investments. Instead, the committee continued, it would be used to service existing IMF debt and other creditors.
Ecuador has sought IMF financing since 2017, and austerity and other conditions attached to loans — coupled with the COVID pandemic — have contributed to declining economic growth, increasing poverty and inequality, and the worsening security situation. In turn, these factors have led to historic rates of out-migration. Moreover, IMF surcharges — additional fees on loans to highly indebted middle-income borrowers, on top of regular interest payments and fees — divert scarce resources from human needs and other priorities. This creates pressure for borrowers like Ecuador, which is set to pay $752 million in surcharges in the next five years, to take on more debt.
Noboa Asks for Extension on the Closure of an Important Oil Block
President Noboa has requested additional time from the Constitutional Court to shut down operations at the 43-ITT oil block. On August 20, 2023, Ecuadorian citizens voted in a popular referendum to halt oil extraction in block 43-ITT, which is primarily located within the Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. This set a one-year deadline for the government to comply with the referendum’s outcome. However, just 10 days before the deadline, Noboa submitted a proposal to the Constitutional Court in which he outlined a five-and-a-half-year time line to gradually dismantle the block’s oil infrastructure and seal its 247 oil wells. According to the plan, 10 wells will be sealed in 2024, with 48 wells closing per year starting in 2025. Oil extraction will continue at wells that remain open during the gradual closure.
Noboa has faced criticism, including from UN experts and the CONAIE, for not taking sufficient action to meet the Constitutional Court’s deadline. Up until August 28, when Petroecuador, the state-run oil company, sealed its first well at the block, Noboa’s only action had been the formation of a committee in May to implement the referendum’s outcome. In addition, Petroecuador’s statistics indicate that normal operations continued at the block until at least June. As a candidate, Noboa initially favored stopping the block’s oil production, but as president, he signaled his intention to postpone its closure in January, arguing that halting extraction would be too much of a hit on the economy. YASunidos, the environmental organization that led the campaign for the referendum on block 43-ITT, accused Noboa of “mocking Ecuadorians” with his plan. They claim his true intention is to buy as much time as possible to continue oil exploitation — a sentiment echoed by experts interviewed by the Associated Press.
