I have long had fun with the folks who call themselves “free traders.” Essentially, these are people who argue it is a high moral principle to eliminate any barrier to trade that might support the income of working class people, but suddenly get really stupid and defensive when we talk about barriers that support the income of professionals and the wealthy.
This means that a 10 percent tariff on imported steel is an outrage against all that is good and decent in the world. But when it comes to protectionist restrictions that prevent highly qualified foreign doctors from practicing in the United States and bringing the pay of our doctors more in line with other rich countries, they suddenly have no idea what you’re talking about. (FWIW, we spend far more money on doctors than steel.)
The same story applies to patent and copyright protection. (Yes, that is “protection” as in protectionism.) These government-granted monopolies are treated as part of the world’s natural order. Instead of recognizing them as forms of protectionism, countries that don’t have patent and copyright rules as strong as in the U.S. are treated as being violators of free-trade.
In other words, “free trade” is a make it up as you go along rationale for ways to redistribute income upward. This is why I got a big kick out of seeing Charles Lane’s column today on the Export–Import Bank.
The Export–Import Bank is a mechanism for the United States to subsidize its exports by providing below-market interest rate loans and loan guarantees for exporters. There actually can be some argument for this sort of support in cases where small- and medium-sized firms are just getting into the export market. (It’s still a government subsidy.)
However, that was not the story with the Ex–Im Bank. The overwhelming majority of its loan money (in the neighborhood of 90 percent) went to a tiny number of multi-nationals like Boeing, Caterpillar, and GE. This is not a help-the-upstart story, this was a subsidy-to-politically-connected-corporate-giants story.
Incredibly, the vast majority of the self-proclaimed free traders were big advocates of the Ex–Im Bank. They would go along with the absurd games pushed by the hacks.
For example, they would tell people that some very high percentage of the loans went to small businesses. (Yes, this is in Econ Stupid Tricks 101 — a high percentage of the loans go to small businesses, a tiny percentage of the dollars go to small businesses.)
And, we got the story that some huge number of US jobs depending on the Ex–Im Bank. In this story, we assume that the US would lose all the exports supported by Ex–Im loans or guarantees, as opposed to some realistic number like 2–3 percent.
Anyhow, with pushing from the free traders, the Export–Import Bank was reauthorized by Congress. I had thought the free traders had won and got their government subsidies.
But as Lane points out, Republicans in Congress refused to approve new members for the bank’s board. This meant that the board lacked a quorum. And, without a quorum, the board could not approve loans of more than $10 million. This meant the bank was actually in the business of making loans to small- and medium-sized businesses, rather than subsidizing Boeing and Caterpillar.
It turns out the big companies were still able to export without the subsidy, although I’m sure they made somewhat less money. Anyhow, it’s a nice story. It shows how free trade can be better than “free trade.”
I have long had fun with the folks who call themselves “free traders.” Essentially, these are people who argue it is a high moral principle to eliminate any barrier to trade that might support the income of working class people, but suddenly get really stupid and defensive when we talk about barriers that support the income of professionals and the wealthy.
This means that a 10 percent tariff on imported steel is an outrage against all that is good and decent in the world. But when it comes to protectionist restrictions that prevent highly qualified foreign doctors from practicing in the United States and bringing the pay of our doctors more in line with other rich countries, they suddenly have no idea what you’re talking about. (FWIW, we spend far more money on doctors than steel.)
The same story applies to patent and copyright protection. (Yes, that is “protection” as in protectionism.) These government-granted monopolies are treated as part of the world’s natural order. Instead of recognizing them as forms of protectionism, countries that don’t have patent and copyright rules as strong as in the U.S. are treated as being violators of free-trade.
In other words, “free trade” is a make it up as you go along rationale for ways to redistribute income upward. This is why I got a big kick out of seeing Charles Lane’s column today on the Export–Import Bank.
The Export–Import Bank is a mechanism for the United States to subsidize its exports by providing below-market interest rate loans and loan guarantees for exporters. There actually can be some argument for this sort of support in cases where small- and medium-sized firms are just getting into the export market. (It’s still a government subsidy.)
However, that was not the story with the Ex–Im Bank. The overwhelming majority of its loan money (in the neighborhood of 90 percent) went to a tiny number of multi-nationals like Boeing, Caterpillar, and GE. This is not a help-the-upstart story, this was a subsidy-to-politically-connected-corporate-giants story.
Incredibly, the vast majority of the self-proclaimed free traders were big advocates of the Ex–Im Bank. They would go along with the absurd games pushed by the hacks.
For example, they would tell people that some very high percentage of the loans went to small businesses. (Yes, this is in Econ Stupid Tricks 101 — a high percentage of the loans go to small businesses, a tiny percentage of the dollars go to small businesses.)
And, we got the story that some huge number of US jobs depending on the Ex–Im Bank. In this story, we assume that the US would lose all the exports supported by Ex–Im loans or guarantees, as opposed to some realistic number like 2–3 percent.
Anyhow, with pushing from the free traders, the Export–Import Bank was reauthorized by Congress. I had thought the free traders had won and got their government subsidies.
But as Lane points out, Republicans in Congress refused to approve new members for the bank’s board. This meant that the board lacked a quorum. And, without a quorum, the board could not approve loans of more than $10 million. This meant the bank was actually in the business of making loans to small- and medium-sized businesses, rather than subsidizing Boeing and Caterpillar.
It turns out the big companies were still able to export without the subsidy, although I’m sure they made somewhat less money. Anyhow, it’s a nice story. It shows how free trade can be better than “free trade.”
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I was going to really tee off on this NYT article, calling Medicare for All an “ambitious and expensive left-wing” policy, but I think Paul Waldman did a nice job making the point in his Washington Post column.The basic point is that reporters should leave these sorts of adjectives out of their coverage of the debate over reforming the health care system.
Every other wealthy country has some sort of universal health care system, many with government-run insurance that look a lot like Medicare for All. This has not bankrupted any of them. So the idea that we should move to something like this sort of system in the United States should not be treated as an extreme left far out position.
On the other hand, there is an accurate adjective that could be applied to the assertion by billionaire Michael Bloomberg that a universal Medicare system “would bankrupt us for a very long time.” That adjective is “wrong.”
If the NYT is trying to better inform its readers about health care policy for the 2020 election, rather than telling them Medicare for All is an extreme position, it would point out when its critics make untrue assertions about the policy.
I was going to really tee off on this NYT article, calling Medicare for All an “ambitious and expensive left-wing” policy, but I think Paul Waldman did a nice job making the point in his Washington Post column.The basic point is that reporters should leave these sorts of adjectives out of their coverage of the debate over reforming the health care system.
Every other wealthy country has some sort of universal health care system, many with government-run insurance that look a lot like Medicare for All. This has not bankrupted any of them. So the idea that we should move to something like this sort of system in the United States should not be treated as an extreme left far out position.
On the other hand, there is an accurate adjective that could be applied to the assertion by billionaire Michael Bloomberg that a universal Medicare system “would bankrupt us for a very long time.” That adjective is “wrong.”
If the NYT is trying to better inform its readers about health care policy for the 2020 election, rather than telling them Medicare for All is an extreme position, it would point out when its critics make untrue assertions about the policy.
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The New York Times had an article on the status of Trump’s trade war with China. While the piece pointed out Trump’s claim that his trade war is responsible for China’s economic problems, it didn’t point out that this is almost certainly not true.
In spite of Trump’s tariffs, China’s exports to the United States were up by more than $30 billion in the first ten months of 2018 compared to 2017. While their exports may have grown even faster without the tariffs, it doesn’t make sense that slower than expected growth in exports to the United States could be too big a hit to the Chinese economy.
It is also worth noting that China’s exports to the United States are actually not that large a share of its economy. If we just take the reported value of China’s exports to the United States, it comes to less than 3.9 percent of its GDP.
This overstates the actual share of Chinese value-added in these exports, since we record the full price of a product as an export, even though much of the value-added comes from other countries. For example, we would record the full value-added of an iPhone assembled in China as an export from China, even though the vast majority of the value added in the product comes from the United States and other countries.
This is offset in part by Chinese value-added in items from third countries. For example, cars we import from Germany and electronic items we buy from Japan or Korea are likely to include a substantial amount of parts produced in China. But these items will not be affected by Trump’s tariffs on China.
If we conservatively reduce the value-added of the items we import from China by 25 percent to account for foreign inputs, this means the value-added in Chinese exports to the United States accounts for less than 3.0 percent of its GDP. This means that even if Trump’s tariffs reduced its exports by one third (a huge reduction), it would only imply a loss of less than 1.0 percentage point of GDP. By contrast, following the collapse of the housing bubble, residential construction in the United States dropped by almost four percentage points of GDP.
In short, the idea that Trump’s tariffs are a major factor in China’s economic problems is absurd on its face, just like his claim that he had the largest inaugural crowd in history or that millions of illegal votes were cast in California. Just as the NYT would not report these claims without pointing out they are not true, it should not report Trump’s claim that his tariffs are doing great harm to China’s economy without noting that it is false.
The New York Times had an article on the status of Trump’s trade war with China. While the piece pointed out Trump’s claim that his trade war is responsible for China’s economic problems, it didn’t point out that this is almost certainly not true.
In spite of Trump’s tariffs, China’s exports to the United States were up by more than $30 billion in the first ten months of 2018 compared to 2017. While their exports may have grown even faster without the tariffs, it doesn’t make sense that slower than expected growth in exports to the United States could be too big a hit to the Chinese economy.
It is also worth noting that China’s exports to the United States are actually not that large a share of its economy. If we just take the reported value of China’s exports to the United States, it comes to less than 3.9 percent of its GDP.
This overstates the actual share of Chinese value-added in these exports, since we record the full price of a product as an export, even though much of the value-added comes from other countries. For example, we would record the full value-added of an iPhone assembled in China as an export from China, even though the vast majority of the value added in the product comes from the United States and other countries.
This is offset in part by Chinese value-added in items from third countries. For example, cars we import from Germany and electronic items we buy from Japan or Korea are likely to include a substantial amount of parts produced in China. But these items will not be affected by Trump’s tariffs on China.
If we conservatively reduce the value-added of the items we import from China by 25 percent to account for foreign inputs, this means the value-added in Chinese exports to the United States accounts for less than 3.0 percent of its GDP. This means that even if Trump’s tariffs reduced its exports by one third (a huge reduction), it would only imply a loss of less than 1.0 percentage point of GDP. By contrast, following the collapse of the housing bubble, residential construction in the United States dropped by almost four percentage points of GDP.
In short, the idea that Trump’s tariffs are a major factor in China’s economic problems is absurd on its face, just like his claim that he had the largest inaugural crowd in history or that millions of illegal votes were cast in California. Just as the NYT would not report these claims without pointing out they are not true, it should not report Trump’s claim that his tariffs are doing great harm to China’s economy without noting that it is false.
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The NYT did a very simple step today and performed a great public service. In an article on allegations by Texas Secretary of State that 95,000 non-citizens in Texas might be registered, it put the numbers in the context of the total number of registered voters in Texas.
The piece reported on the conclusions from an investigation which found that 58,000 of these people voted since 1996. The NYT article points out that even if all 58,000 of these votes were cast in 2018, it would amount to 0.69 percent of the votes in the state. It notes that no one claims that all 58,000 votes from these people were cast in 2018.
The article also points out that the secretary of state’s office did not determine that the 95,000 registered voters it identified were in fact not US citizens. It just could not be certain that these people were US citizens. This could be due to name changes or simply inaccurate record keeping. The actual number of non-citizens in this group is certainly less than this figure and possibly much less.
The NYT did a very simple step today and performed a great public service. In an article on allegations by Texas Secretary of State that 95,000 non-citizens in Texas might be registered, it put the numbers in the context of the total number of registered voters in Texas.
The piece reported on the conclusions from an investigation which found that 58,000 of these people voted since 1996. The NYT article points out that even if all 58,000 of these votes were cast in 2018, it would amount to 0.69 percent of the votes in the state. It notes that no one claims that all 58,000 votes from these people were cast in 2018.
The article also points out that the secretary of state’s office did not determine that the 95,000 registered voters it identified were in fact not US citizens. It just could not be certain that these people were US citizens. This could be due to name changes or simply inaccurate record keeping. The actual number of non-citizens in this group is certainly less than this figure and possibly much less.
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Economists have been concerned about the sharp slowdown in productivity growth since 2005 and wondering whether it will persist indefinitely. Productivity (a.k.a. “automation”) grew at an annual rate of almost 3.0 percent from 1995 to 2005, roughly the same pace as during the long Golden Age from 1947 to 1973. For reasons that are not clear, growth then slowed sharply to a 1.3 percent annual rate in the years since 2005.
Productivity: Non-farm Business Sector
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Projections from the Congressional Budget Office, Social Security Administration, and elsewhere assume that the rate of productivity growth will remain slow for the indefinite future.
But there is good news. In a New York Times column, Kevin Roose tells us about the secret he learned from talking to rich people at Davos. They apparently all have great plans for increasing productivity at their businesses but are keeping them a secret.
If the word from Roose’s rich friends turns out to be accurate, then we can expect to see more rapid wage growth. We also don’t have to worry at all about budget deficits. The more rapid productivity growth will mean more rapid economic growth and higher tax revenues. Also, with more rapid productivity growth, there will be less reason to fear that large budget deficits will push the economy too far and lead to inflation.
Economists have been concerned about the sharp slowdown in productivity growth since 2005 and wondering whether it will persist indefinitely. Productivity (a.k.a. “automation”) grew at an annual rate of almost 3.0 percent from 1995 to 2005, roughly the same pace as during the long Golden Age from 1947 to 1973. For reasons that are not clear, growth then slowed sharply to a 1.3 percent annual rate in the years since 2005.
Productivity: Non-farm Business Sector
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Projections from the Congressional Budget Office, Social Security Administration, and elsewhere assume that the rate of productivity growth will remain slow for the indefinite future.
But there is good news. In a New York Times column, Kevin Roose tells us about the secret he learned from talking to rich people at Davos. They apparently all have great plans for increasing productivity at their businesses but are keeping them a secret.
If the word from Roose’s rich friends turns out to be accurate, then we can expect to see more rapid wage growth. We also don’t have to worry at all about budget deficits. The more rapid productivity growth will mean more rapid economic growth and higher tax revenues. Also, with more rapid productivity growth, there will be less reason to fear that large budget deficits will push the economy too far and lead to inflation.
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