Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

There continues to be a large market for pieces saying the big conflict in the US is generational rather than class. The Huffington Post made its latest contribution today. The piece is more than a bit confused, but its headline explicitly gives the intention "America's Defining Divide Is Not Left vs. Right. It's Old vs. Young." Beyond this basic point, as in worry about age, not class, it is difficult to figure out what the article is talking about. The subhead tells readers, "voters over retirement age will continue to dominate US politics until at least 2060." This might lead us to believe that the piece is talking older voters generically, as in people over age 65 or age 62, but then much of the discussion focuses on the baby boomers. By 2060, the youngest baby boomer will be age 96 and the oldest will be 114. It doesn't seem plausible that the survivors among this group will be dominating politics. Most of the baby boomers will have died off by 2040 and their influence will be radically diminished by 2030. But even as a story describing the baby boomers the piece gets many things wrong. It tells readers: "Four out of five older families own homes, compared to just one in four younger families. Most own stocks and a large plurality are business owners. Nearly 1 in 9 older households are millionaires and, according to a 2015 study, are the only age group in America whose net worth has increased since 1989. "Politically speaking, this means older households have a profoundly different narrative of the U.S. economy than every other cohort. Gen Xers and millennials, who have seen their incomes stagnate and their living costs explode, are gravitating toward candidates who prioritize issues like student debt and income inequality. Older voters, by contrast, will be more likely to vote for candidates who promise to boost the stock market, lower taxes and push up property values." While most older people own stock, they do not own very much. In 2016, the average amount of wealth outside of a home for the middle quintile of people between the ages of 55 and 65 $99,200. For the fourth quintile, it was just $25,400. If two-thirds of this wealth was invested in the stock market, it still does not imply a very large stake in the market for most of this cohort.
There continues to be a large market for pieces saying the big conflict in the US is generational rather than class. The Huffington Post made its latest contribution today. The piece is more than a bit confused, but its headline explicitly gives the intention "America's Defining Divide Is Not Left vs. Right. It's Old vs. Young." Beyond this basic point, as in worry about age, not class, it is difficult to figure out what the article is talking about. The subhead tells readers, "voters over retirement age will continue to dominate US politics until at least 2060." This might lead us to believe that the piece is talking older voters generically, as in people over age 65 or age 62, but then much of the discussion focuses on the baby boomers. By 2060, the youngest baby boomer will be age 96 and the oldest will be 114. It doesn't seem plausible that the survivors among this group will be dominating politics. Most of the baby boomers will have died off by 2040 and their influence will be radically diminished by 2030. But even as a story describing the baby boomers the piece gets many things wrong. It tells readers: "Four out of five older families own homes, compared to just one in four younger families. Most own stocks and a large plurality are business owners. Nearly 1 in 9 older households are millionaires and, according to a 2015 study, are the only age group in America whose net worth has increased since 1989. "Politically speaking, this means older households have a profoundly different narrative of the U.S. economy than every other cohort. Gen Xers and millennials, who have seen their incomes stagnate and their living costs explode, are gravitating toward candidates who prioritize issues like student debt and income inequality. Older voters, by contrast, will be more likely to vote for candidates who promise to boost the stock market, lower taxes and push up property values." While most older people own stock, they do not own very much. In 2016, the average amount of wealth outside of a home for the middle quintile of people between the ages of 55 and 65 $99,200. For the fourth quintile, it was just $25,400. If two-thirds of this wealth was invested in the stock market, it still does not imply a very large stake in the market for most of this cohort.

In Praise of Budget Deficits

With the presentation of his 2020 budget, Donald Trump has been getting a ton of grief over the large current and projected future budget deficits. While his budget shows the deficit coming down, this is due to large cuts to programs that middle income and lower income people depend upon, like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. His projections for falling deficits also depend on assuming a faster growth rate than just about anyone thinks is possible. So realistically, we are looking at a story of large deficits for the indefinite future.

While this is supposed to be really bad, people who pay attention to economic data may think otherwise. If we look at the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projections for the unemployment rates for 2018, 2019, and 2020, from 2017, before the tax cut was passed, they were respectively, 4.2 percent, 4.4 percent, and 4.7 percent. If we look at CBO’s latest projections for these three years, they are 3.9 percent (actual)  3.5 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. The difference between the latest projections and the pre-tax cut projections imply a gain of more than 2 million in employment in each of these years.

These two million additional people being employed is a big deal not only for these workers and their families but for tens of millions of other workers who have more bargaining power as a result of a tighter labor market. And, we’re supposed to think this is a bad thing because of the deficit and debt? Tell the children of the people who are now working because of the larger deficit or whose parents have higher pay how the debt is a burden on them.

Of course, giving a big tax cut to corporations and rich people was just about the worst way imaginable to boost the economy. The promised investment boom is not happening. The boost is coming because rich people are spending a portion of their tax cuts and their increased share buybacks and dividends. But we could have also given the money to middle-income and lower-income people who would have been happy to spend it as well.

Even better, we could have used to money to promote clean energy, retrofitting buildings to make them more energy efficient, and subsidizing mass transit. Our children have much more to fear from a wrecked environment than government debt.

In any case, the debt/deficit whiners should acknowledge the substantial economic gains from stimulating the economy with a larger deficit. It is a really big deal for a large number of people at the middle and bottom of the income distribution.

With the presentation of his 2020 budget, Donald Trump has been getting a ton of grief over the large current and projected future budget deficits. While his budget shows the deficit coming down, this is due to large cuts to programs that middle income and lower income people depend upon, like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. His projections for falling deficits also depend on assuming a faster growth rate than just about anyone thinks is possible. So realistically, we are looking at a story of large deficits for the indefinite future.

While this is supposed to be really bad, people who pay attention to economic data may think otherwise. If we look at the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projections for the unemployment rates for 2018, 2019, and 2020, from 2017, before the tax cut was passed, they were respectively, 4.2 percent, 4.4 percent, and 4.7 percent. If we look at CBO’s latest projections for these three years, they are 3.9 percent (actual)  3.5 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. The difference between the latest projections and the pre-tax cut projections imply a gain of more than 2 million in employment in each of these years.

These two million additional people being employed is a big deal not only for these workers and their families but for tens of millions of other workers who have more bargaining power as a result of a tighter labor market. And, we’re supposed to think this is a bad thing because of the deficit and debt? Tell the children of the people who are now working because of the larger deficit or whose parents have higher pay how the debt is a burden on them.

Of course, giving a big tax cut to corporations and rich people was just about the worst way imaginable to boost the economy. The promised investment boom is not happening. The boost is coming because rich people are spending a portion of their tax cuts and their increased share buybacks and dividends. But we could have also given the money to middle-income and lower-income people who would have been happy to spend it as well.

Even better, we could have used to money to promote clean energy, retrofitting buildings to make them more energy efficient, and subsidizing mass transit. Our children have much more to fear from a wrecked environment than government debt.

In any case, the debt/deficit whiners should acknowledge the substantial economic gains from stimulating the economy with a larger deficit. It is a really big deal for a large number of people at the middle and bottom of the income distribution.

In the Soviet Union, for a long time, official publications (which were the only publications) were prohibited from mentioning Leon Trotsky, one of the leaders of the revolution, who subsequently fell out with Stalin and was forced into exile. I’m wondering if The New York Times has the same policy towards mentioning the trade deficit as a cause of economic weakness.

It’s hard to reach any other conclusion after seeing David Leonhardt’s piece on the recurring tendency of forecasters to be overly optimistic about economic growth. Leonhardt points to the persistent shortfall of demand as the major problem slowing growth. Following Larry Summers, he suggests policies that could boost investment and consumption. 

While these are both good ways of increasing demand, so is a lower trade deficit. This is very basic economics. If the trade deficit were 1.0 percent of GDP rather than a bit more than 3.0 percent of GDP, it would provide the same boost to demand as a $400 billion annual stimulus package.

It’s sort of amazing that Leonhardt can leave such a basic and obvious point out of this discussion. Did the NYT’s commissars airbrush the trade deficit out of the article?

In the Soviet Union, for a long time, official publications (which were the only publications) were prohibited from mentioning Leon Trotsky, one of the leaders of the revolution, who subsequently fell out with Stalin and was forced into exile. I’m wondering if The New York Times has the same policy towards mentioning the trade deficit as a cause of economic weakness.

It’s hard to reach any other conclusion after seeing David Leonhardt’s piece on the recurring tendency of forecasters to be overly optimistic about economic growth. Leonhardt points to the persistent shortfall of demand as the major problem slowing growth. Following Larry Summers, he suggests policies that could boost investment and consumption. 

While these are both good ways of increasing demand, so is a lower trade deficit. This is very basic economics. If the trade deficit were 1.0 percent of GDP rather than a bit more than 3.0 percent of GDP, it would provide the same boost to demand as a $400 billion annual stimulus package.

It’s sort of amazing that Leonhardt can leave such a basic and obvious point out of this discussion. Did the NYT’s commissars airbrush the trade deficit out of the article?

The latest round of layoffs at Buzzfeed, the Huffington Post, and other major news outlets has raised new questions about the future of the traditional model of advertising-supported journalism. While a small number of news outlets, like The New York Times, continue to thrive, few others seem to be profitable in the current environment. This raises the prospect of a future in which there will be ever fewer reporters to keep the public informed and to scrutinize the actions of public officials and regulatory agencies. While we all recognize the inevitability of abuse and corruption with a regime that bans a free press, we will get the same outcome in a world where the market is structured in a way to make the operation of independent media difficult or impossible. We can look to structure the market in a way that overcomes this problem. Specifically, we can have a modest individual tax credit ($100 to $200 per person) that can be used to finance journalism and other creative work. The basic problem faced by news outlets, and other producers of creative work, is that the Internet has made it possible to transfer written material, as well as recorded music and video material, at near zero cost. This means that the condition loved by economists, with the price being equal to the marginal cost, implies that this material would be available for free. If users pay what it costs to deliver a news article, song, or movie over the web, they would pay nothing, leaving no money to support the workers who produced the material.   This problem is not altogether new. The point of a copyright monopoly was to allow the creator of a creative work to charge a price that was well above the marginal cost of transferring material. However, the Internet makes this problem far more serious with the cost of transferring material falling to zero and copyright enforcement becoming ever more difficult. In this context, it makes sense to look to alternative mechanisms. A tax credit for supporting creative work should not be seen as an altogether new concept. This can be viewed as a variation on the tax deduction for charitable contributions. Under this system, the government effectively subsidizes any charitable organization a taxpayer chooses to support.
The latest round of layoffs at Buzzfeed, the Huffington Post, and other major news outlets has raised new questions about the future of the traditional model of advertising-supported journalism. While a small number of news outlets, like The New York Times, continue to thrive, few others seem to be profitable in the current environment. This raises the prospect of a future in which there will be ever fewer reporters to keep the public informed and to scrutinize the actions of public officials and regulatory agencies. While we all recognize the inevitability of abuse and corruption with a regime that bans a free press, we will get the same outcome in a world where the market is structured in a way to make the operation of independent media difficult or impossible. We can look to structure the market in a way that overcomes this problem. Specifically, we can have a modest individual tax credit ($100 to $200 per person) that can be used to finance journalism and other creative work. The basic problem faced by news outlets, and other producers of creative work, is that the Internet has made it possible to transfer written material, as well as recorded music and video material, at near zero cost. This means that the condition loved by economists, with the price being equal to the marginal cost, implies that this material would be available for free. If users pay what it costs to deliver a news article, song, or movie over the web, they would pay nothing, leaving no money to support the workers who produced the material.   This problem is not altogether new. The point of a copyright monopoly was to allow the creator of a creative work to charge a price that was well above the marginal cost of transferring material. However, the Internet makes this problem far more serious with the cost of transferring material falling to zero and copyright enforcement becoming ever more difficult. In this context, it makes sense to look to alternative mechanisms. A tax credit for supporting creative work should not be seen as an altogether new concept. This can be viewed as a variation on the tax deduction for charitable contributions. Under this system, the government effectively subsidizes any charitable organization a taxpayer chooses to support.
Neil Irwin had a good piece discussing the slower job growth reported for February, along with more rapid wage growth. He argued that as a result of recent evidence of slowing growth (not so much from this jobs report) the Fed may be inclined to leave interest rates where they are, or possibly even lower them. However, the pick up in wage growth may lead the Fed to worry about inflation and therefore raise interest rates. While Irwin notes the pick up is modest, so it's not obvious it will lead to higher inflation (also given the large shift from wages to profits in the Great Recession, higher wages could come out of the profit share rather than being passed on in higher prices), there is another important factor in the equation. Productivity growth, which directly reduces the cost of an hour of labor, increased to 1.8 percent last year. This is 0.5 percentage points above its trend rate since 2005. (It is still well below the 3.0 percent pace from 1995 to 2005 and from 1947 to 1973.) Productivity data are notoriously erratic, so it is entirely possible that the 2018 pickup will turn out to be an aberration, but if faster growth is sustained, it would mean that the economy could support a more rapid pace of wage growth. There are some complicating index issues, but as a first approximation, if productivity growth is 1.8 percent, workers can have 3.8 percent nominal wage growth, and we could still keep at the Fed's 2.0 percent inflation target. As some of us have argued, it is reasonable to expect that productivity growth will accelerate as the labor market tightens. The basic logic is that when labor gets scarce, employers have an incentive to try to use less of it. That means productivity growth. There are three channels through which this can work. The first is a simple composition one. When labor becomes more expensive, the least productive jobs go unfilled. My favorite example is the midnight shift at a convenience store. The productivity of this worker has to be very low. (How many people come in to buy grocery items at 2:00 in the morning?) In a tight labor market, the convenience store closes at midnight and opens in the morning. By eliminating the least productive jobs, average productivity rises. The second channel is that employers may be able to reorganize the workplace to do more with fewer workers. Even though our textbooks tell us that employers always have the optimal mix of labor and capital inputs and workplace organization, there are actually places where workers are not employed in the most efficient manner. The bosses may not care when workers are plentiful, but when the bad boss sees all his workers leaving for better jobs, he may think about trying to improve his workplace.
Neil Irwin had a good piece discussing the slower job growth reported for February, along with more rapid wage growth. He argued that as a result of recent evidence of slowing growth (not so much from this jobs report) the Fed may be inclined to leave interest rates where they are, or possibly even lower them. However, the pick up in wage growth may lead the Fed to worry about inflation and therefore raise interest rates. While Irwin notes the pick up is modest, so it's not obvious it will lead to higher inflation (also given the large shift from wages to profits in the Great Recession, higher wages could come out of the profit share rather than being passed on in higher prices), there is another important factor in the equation. Productivity growth, which directly reduces the cost of an hour of labor, increased to 1.8 percent last year. This is 0.5 percentage points above its trend rate since 2005. (It is still well below the 3.0 percent pace from 1995 to 2005 and from 1947 to 1973.) Productivity data are notoriously erratic, so it is entirely possible that the 2018 pickup will turn out to be an aberration, but if faster growth is sustained, it would mean that the economy could support a more rapid pace of wage growth. There are some complicating index issues, but as a first approximation, if productivity growth is 1.8 percent, workers can have 3.8 percent nominal wage growth, and we could still keep at the Fed's 2.0 percent inflation target. As some of us have argued, it is reasonable to expect that productivity growth will accelerate as the labor market tightens. The basic logic is that when labor gets scarce, employers have an incentive to try to use less of it. That means productivity growth. There are three channels through which this can work. The first is a simple composition one. When labor becomes more expensive, the least productive jobs go unfilled. My favorite example is the midnight shift at a convenience store. The productivity of this worker has to be very low. (How many people come in to buy grocery items at 2:00 in the morning?) In a tight labor market, the convenience store closes at midnight and opens in the morning. By eliminating the least productive jobs, average productivity rises. The second channel is that employers may be able to reorganize the workplace to do more with fewer workers. Even though our textbooks tell us that employers always have the optimal mix of labor and capital inputs and workplace organization, there are actually places where workers are not employed in the most efficient manner. The bosses may not care when workers are plentiful, but when the bad boss sees all his workers leaving for better jobs, he may think about trying to improve his workplace.

That seems pretty much definitional, but many readers of this Washington Post piece, on what is in effect insider trading by top management, may miss this point. As CEO pay has exploded over the last four decades, from 20 to 30 times the pay of a typical worker to 200 or 300 times, many have discussed this rise as though it is somehow in collusion with shareholders.

That makes zero sense. The money that CEOs and top management pocket is money that otherwise could have gone to shareholders. Shareholders have no more interest in CEOs getting big paychecks than they do in seeing assembly line workers or retail clerks getting big paychecks. Contrary to the view that shareholders have been making out like bandits, stock market returns over the last two decades have actually been low by historical standards.

When it comes to reining in CEO pay, shareholders should be viewed as allies. This matters not just because CEOs don’t deserve such outrageous paychecks, but because bloated CEO pay affects pay scales throughout the economy. If this is hard to understand, ask a high-level university administrator near you how much they get paid. 

That seems pretty much definitional, but many readers of this Washington Post piece, on what is in effect insider trading by top management, may miss this point. As CEO pay has exploded over the last four decades, from 20 to 30 times the pay of a typical worker to 200 or 300 times, many have discussed this rise as though it is somehow in collusion with shareholders.

That makes zero sense. The money that CEOs and top management pocket is money that otherwise could have gone to shareholders. Shareholders have no more interest in CEOs getting big paychecks than they do in seeing assembly line workers or retail clerks getting big paychecks. Contrary to the view that shareholders have been making out like bandits, stock market returns over the last two decades have actually been low by historical standards.

When it comes to reining in CEO pay, shareholders should be viewed as allies. This matters not just because CEOs don’t deserve such outrageous paychecks, but because bloated CEO pay affects pay scales throughout the economy. If this is hard to understand, ask a high-level university administrator near you how much they get paid. 

It is always fun, even if tiresome, to mock Donald Trump for getting things wrong. This is why the jump in the merchandise trade deficit last year to $891.2 billion was especially newsworthy.

Trump had made the trade deficit one of the central issues in his campaign and promised to reduce it to bring back good-paying jobs in manufacturing. He was going to use his skills as a negotiator to get better deals from our trading partners. For this reason, the fact that the deficit is going up, not down, is somewhat amusing. In this case, unlike the last decade, the rise in the trade deficit is associated with a modest increase in manufacturing employment rather than a crash, so the implications of the rise are not nearly as serious. 

Nonetheless, it is worth getting the story straight. It is somewhat misleading to refer to the 2018 trade deficit as “record-breaking” as in this Washington Post headline. While the $891.2 billion deficit is considerably larger in nominal terms than the previous record of $838.3 billion, set in 2006, it is considerably smaller measured relative to the size of the economy.

The 2018 deficit is equal to 4.3 percent of GDP. The 2006 deficit was equal to 6.1 percent of GDP. If we are making historical comparisons, this is the more relevant figure, not the dollar amount.

It is always fun, even if tiresome, to mock Donald Trump for getting things wrong. This is why the jump in the merchandise trade deficit last year to $891.2 billion was especially newsworthy.

Trump had made the trade deficit one of the central issues in his campaign and promised to reduce it to bring back good-paying jobs in manufacturing. He was going to use his skills as a negotiator to get better deals from our trading partners. For this reason, the fact that the deficit is going up, not down, is somewhat amusing. In this case, unlike the last decade, the rise in the trade deficit is associated with a modest increase in manufacturing employment rather than a crash, so the implications of the rise are not nearly as serious. 

Nonetheless, it is worth getting the story straight. It is somewhat misleading to refer to the 2018 trade deficit as “record-breaking” as in this Washington Post headline. While the $891.2 billion deficit is considerably larger in nominal terms than the previous record of $838.3 billion, set in 2006, it is considerably smaller measured relative to the size of the economy.

The 2018 deficit is equal to 4.3 percent of GDP. The 2006 deficit was equal to 6.1 percent of GDP. If we are making historical comparisons, this is the more relevant figure, not the dollar amount.

David Brooks likes to present himself as a voice of reason in the midst of crazy ideologues of the left and the right. He gave us an example of his voice of reason routine today in a piece telling us that Medicare for All is an impossibility.

While the piece raises some reasonable points (the transition will be difficult) the highlight is a condemnation of the Canadian health care system, which is often held up as a model by supporters of Medicare for All.

“Finally, patient expectations would have to transition. Today, getting a doctor’s appointment is annoying but not onerous. In Canada, the median wait time between seeing a general practitioner and a specialist is 8.7 weeks; between a G.P. referral and an orthopedic surgeon, it’s nine months. That would take some adjusting.”

While it is true that Canada has longer wait times than the United States for seeing a specialist, this is one area in which its health care system does especially poorly. In other areas, it does better than the United States. Also, other systems, which all cost far less per person than in the United States, do better in this and other categories, as shown in a recent analysis by the Commonwealth Fund.

If Brooks wants to make the point that transitioning to a universal Medicare-type system will be difficult, he’s on solid ground. But to imply that we can’t do better requires ignoring a vast amount on evidence from other wealthy countries, all of whom do better in providing universal coverage at a lower per capita price than we pay for our far from universal coverage.

This is very far from a voice of reason in the health care debate.

David Brooks likes to present himself as a voice of reason in the midst of crazy ideologues of the left and the right. He gave us an example of his voice of reason routine today in a piece telling us that Medicare for All is an impossibility.

While the piece raises some reasonable points (the transition will be difficult) the highlight is a condemnation of the Canadian health care system, which is often held up as a model by supporters of Medicare for All.

“Finally, patient expectations would have to transition. Today, getting a doctor’s appointment is annoying but not onerous. In Canada, the median wait time between seeing a general practitioner and a specialist is 8.7 weeks; between a G.P. referral and an orthopedic surgeon, it’s nine months. That would take some adjusting.”

While it is true that Canada has longer wait times than the United States for seeing a specialist, this is one area in which its health care system does especially poorly. In other areas, it does better than the United States. Also, other systems, which all cost far less per person than in the United States, do better in this and other categories, as shown in a recent analysis by the Commonwealth Fund.

If Brooks wants to make the point that transitioning to a universal Medicare-type system will be difficult, he’s on solid ground. But to imply that we can’t do better requires ignoring a vast amount on evidence from other wealthy countries, all of whom do better in providing universal coverage at a lower per capita price than we pay for our far from universal coverage.

This is very far from a voice of reason in the health care debate.

(This post originally appeared on my Patreon page.) Bill Niskanen was the rarest of all creatures, an honest libertarian. He actually believed in libertarian ideas, rather than just using them as an excuse for policies to redistribute income upward. He headed the Cato Institute for more than two decades, from 1985 until 2008. While CATO generally took conservative views, it also followed Niskanen’s principled libertarianism. This meant the institute was anti-imperialist. Niskanen argued that we needed a defense budget to protect the United States, not to police the world. Cato regularly called for sharper declines in military spending than almost all the liberal think tanks in DC. He also was a strong opponent of the Iraq War. I remember in the months leading up to the war, bumping into him at various events. Bill would point to the various Republican foreign policy experts (not those in the Bush administration) who had publicly warned of the dangers of the war. He would ask me “where are the Democrats?” While I could point to then fringe figures, like Bernie Sanders, the fact was that most of the Democratic leadership had fallen in line in support of the war. (Nancy Pelosi was a notable exception.) Bill’s opposition to the war angered many prominent Republicans, including Cato donors. Anyhow, when I was on a panel with him, it was usually to discuss economic issues. I always appreciated his honesty. I remember, back in the 1990s, debating replacing the progressive income tax with a flat tax, which was a popular idea among Republicans at the time. Most of the flat tax proponents would come up with absurd stories about everyone would pay less, and we would end up with just as much revenue. Once with Bill, I got to go first, and said something to the effect of “a flat tax is about having the middle class pay more so that the rich can pay less.” Bill responded by saying that this is essentially right, but went on to explain how this would be a good thing, because it would lead to a more efficient tax system, and therefore more growth, and make everyone better off. Bill believed this, so he didn’t have to lie.
(This post originally appeared on my Patreon page.) Bill Niskanen was the rarest of all creatures, an honest libertarian. He actually believed in libertarian ideas, rather than just using them as an excuse for policies to redistribute income upward. He headed the Cato Institute for more than two decades, from 1985 until 2008. While CATO generally took conservative views, it also followed Niskanen’s principled libertarianism. This meant the institute was anti-imperialist. Niskanen argued that we needed a defense budget to protect the United States, not to police the world. Cato regularly called for sharper declines in military spending than almost all the liberal think tanks in DC. He also was a strong opponent of the Iraq War. I remember in the months leading up to the war, bumping into him at various events. Bill would point to the various Republican foreign policy experts (not those in the Bush administration) who had publicly warned of the dangers of the war. He would ask me “where are the Democrats?” While I could point to then fringe figures, like Bernie Sanders, the fact was that most of the Democratic leadership had fallen in line in support of the war. (Nancy Pelosi was a notable exception.) Bill’s opposition to the war angered many prominent Republicans, including Cato donors. Anyhow, when I was on a panel with him, it was usually to discuss economic issues. I always appreciated his honesty. I remember, back in the 1990s, debating replacing the progressive income tax with a flat tax, which was a popular idea among Republicans at the time. Most of the flat tax proponents would come up with absurd stories about everyone would pay less, and we would end up with just as much revenue. Once with Bill, I got to go first, and said something to the effect of “a flat tax is about having the middle class pay more so that the rich can pay less.” Bill responded by saying that this is essentially right, but went on to explain how this would be a good thing, because it would lead to a more efficient tax system, and therefore more growth, and make everyone better off. Bill believed this, so he didn’t have to lie.

I had a longer piece on this Vox article, but our site ate it, so I will be very brief. This Vox piece on the financial transactions tax introduced by Hawaii Senator Brian Schatz gets the story badly wrong.

The CBO revenue estimate does assume a substantial reduction in trading volume. It does not assume that trading volume remains unchanged, as the piece seems to imply.

Of course, the reduction in volume could be larger than CBO assumes, but this would not be a bad thing. In principle, we want the financial markets to operate using as few resources as possible, this means that they are more efficient. If we can operate the markets with half as many trades (like we did in the 1990s) and the markets just as effectively allocate capital, then the markets are more efficient, just as the trucking sector would be more efficient if we could deliver the same amounts of goods with half as many trucks and truckers.

From the standpoint of the individual investor the tax will mean a higher cost per trade, but they will do fewer trades, leaving their trading costs pretty much the same even with the tax. For example, if the tax raises cost by 30 percent, then they (or their fund manager) will reduce trading volume by roughly 30 percent.

In this way, the financial sector eats pretty much the whole cost of the tax. This is why it is so popular among economists.

I had a longer piece on this Vox article, but our site ate it, so I will be very brief. This Vox piece on the financial transactions tax introduced by Hawaii Senator Brian Schatz gets the story badly wrong.

The CBO revenue estimate does assume a substantial reduction in trading volume. It does not assume that trading volume remains unchanged, as the piece seems to imply.

Of course, the reduction in volume could be larger than CBO assumes, but this would not be a bad thing. In principle, we want the financial markets to operate using as few resources as possible, this means that they are more efficient. If we can operate the markets with half as many trades (like we did in the 1990s) and the markets just as effectively allocate capital, then the markets are more efficient, just as the trucking sector would be more efficient if we could deliver the same amounts of goods with half as many trucks and truckers.

From the standpoint of the individual investor the tax will mean a higher cost per trade, but they will do fewer trades, leaving their trading costs pretty much the same even with the tax. For example, if the tax raises cost by 30 percent, then they (or their fund manager) will reduce trading volume by roughly 30 percent.

In this way, the financial sector eats pretty much the whole cost of the tax. This is why it is so popular among economists.

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