Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The Washington Post had a fact check on Obamacare to explain some of the issues around the widely reported rate hikes for policies in the exchange. It gets a few points wrong in a generally solid piece. First, it explains the problem of the exchanges as being one in which people are more willing to pay the penalty for not having insurance than signing up on the exchange: "The feared individual mandate has not had the expected result of convincing people to buy insurance, with younger and healthier Americans apparently more willing to pay a $695-per-person fine than sign up for health care they think is too costly. So the mix of people in the insurance pools have tended to be people who have chronic illnesses and thus require more care and frequent doctor or hospital visits. The risk pools are also why insurance companies have sought higher premiums and the biggest deductibles." While it is true that the mix of people in the exchanges are less healthy than expected, the problem is not that people are opting to pay the penalty rather than get insurance. This has been a frequent mistake in reporting. In fact, the percentage of the population that is insured is running above the projections at the time the law was passed. This is in spite of the fact that a 2012 Supreme Court ruling allowing states to opt out of the Medicaid expansion provided for in the law. The reason that the exchange population is less healthy than expected is that more people continue to get insurance through their employer than expected. And, since the people who get employer provided insurance are healthier on average than the population as a whole (most are working full-time jobs), this means that relatively healthy people are being kept off of the exchanges.
The Washington Post had a fact check on Obamacare to explain some of the issues around the widely reported rate hikes for policies in the exchange. It gets a few points wrong in a generally solid piece. First, it explains the problem of the exchanges as being one in which people are more willing to pay the penalty for not having insurance than signing up on the exchange: "The feared individual mandate has not had the expected result of convincing people to buy insurance, with younger and healthier Americans apparently more willing to pay a $695-per-person fine than sign up for health care they think is too costly. So the mix of people in the insurance pools have tended to be people who have chronic illnesses and thus require more care and frequent doctor or hospital visits. The risk pools are also why insurance companies have sought higher premiums and the biggest deductibles." While it is true that the mix of people in the exchanges are less healthy than expected, the problem is not that people are opting to pay the penalty rather than get insurance. This has been a frequent mistake in reporting. In fact, the percentage of the population that is insured is running above the projections at the time the law was passed. This is in spite of the fact that a 2012 Supreme Court ruling allowing states to opt out of the Medicaid expansion provided for in the law. The reason that the exchange population is less healthy than expected is that more people continue to get insurance through their employer than expected. And, since the people who get employer provided insurance are healthier on average than the population as a whole (most are working full-time jobs), this means that relatively healthy people are being kept off of the exchanges.

By Lara Merling

The official unemployment rate in the U.S. is currently estimated at 5 percent, a number that is sufficiently low for some to claim that the economy is at full employment. The unemployment rate varies significantly across states. Between September 2015 and March 2016 the unemployment rate has averaged 2.8 percent in North Dakota, 3 percent in Hawaii and New Hampshire, while in West Virginia it was at 6.4 percent, and in Washington DC, and Alaska it averaged 6.6 percent.

Once the labor market is at full employment, it is difficult to have much by way of further employment gains beyond the growth in the working-age population. If the current 5.0 percent unemployment rate is actually close to full employment, then we should expect to see smaller increases in the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) in states with lower unemployment rates, since these states should be running up against the full employment limit. We would then expect higher gains in EPOPs in states that have higher unemployment rates which are further away from reaching full employment.

The figure below compares the change in the EPOP in each state over the period from March 2016 and September 2016, for people between the ages of 18 and 64, with the state’s average unemployment rate for September 2015 to March 2016.

 Book11 8941 image001

As can be seen there is no relationship between the unemployment level and the change in EPOP. Some states with very low unemployment rates have seen large increases in EPOP, while some of the states with the highest unemployment levels have seen much smaller increases, or even decreases in EPOP. While this comparison is far from conclusive, it does not easily fit with a story with the labor market approaching full employment.

By Lara Merling

The official unemployment rate in the U.S. is currently estimated at 5 percent, a number that is sufficiently low for some to claim that the economy is at full employment. The unemployment rate varies significantly across states. Between September 2015 and March 2016 the unemployment rate has averaged 2.8 percent in North Dakota, 3 percent in Hawaii and New Hampshire, while in West Virginia it was at 6.4 percent, and in Washington DC, and Alaska it averaged 6.6 percent.

Once the labor market is at full employment, it is difficult to have much by way of further employment gains beyond the growth in the working-age population. If the current 5.0 percent unemployment rate is actually close to full employment, then we should expect to see smaller increases in the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) in states with lower unemployment rates, since these states should be running up against the full employment limit. We would then expect higher gains in EPOPs in states that have higher unemployment rates which are further away from reaching full employment.

The figure below compares the change in the EPOP in each state over the period from March 2016 and September 2016, for people between the ages of 18 and 64, with the state’s average unemployment rate for September 2015 to March 2016.

 Book11 8941 image001

As can be seen there is no relationship between the unemployment level and the change in EPOP. Some states with very low unemployment rates have seen large increases in EPOP, while some of the states with the highest unemployment levels have seen much smaller increases, or even decreases in EPOP. While this comparison is far from conclusive, it does not easily fit with a story with the labor market approaching full employment.

A Washington Post article told readers that the 2.9 percent GDP growth reported for the third quarter made it more likely the Fed would raise interest rates at its December meeting. Part of its story is that inflation is accelerating.

“Inflation remains below the Fed’s target rate of 2 percent but is creeping closer to that level.”

Actually, the opposite is the case. The report (Appendix Table A) showed that the core personal consumption expenditure deflator increased at a 1.7 percent annual rate in the third quarter. That is down from 2.1 percent in the first quarter and 1.8 percent in the second quarter.

A Washington Post article told readers that the 2.9 percent GDP growth reported for the third quarter made it more likely the Fed would raise interest rates at its December meeting. Part of its story is that inflation is accelerating.

“Inflation remains below the Fed’s target rate of 2 percent but is creeping closer to that level.”

Actually, the opposite is the case. The report (Appendix Table A) showed that the core personal consumption expenditure deflator increased at a 1.7 percent annual rate in the third quarter. That is down from 2.1 percent in the first quarter and 1.8 percent in the second quarter.

Alan Reynolds had a column insisting that the U.S. need not fear trade agreements impact on the United States labor market. The context is an argument that the presidential candidates are wrong to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The piece argues that trade agreements have not led to increased trade deficits and that imports from China really have not had much impact on the manufacturing sector in the U.S. His argument doesn't quite fit the data. The piece lays out the basic argument in its subhead: "If trade agreements are so lousy, why are our largest deficits with countries that lack a U.S. trade deal?" It then notes that the United States largest trade deficits are with China and Japan and that we have trade deals with neither. This might be a good rhetorical point at the Wall Street Journal, but it has nothing to do with the issue at hand. The question is the direction of change following an agreement. While the data on this point is not entirely conclusive, there is evidence that deficits have generally increased with countries following the implementation of trade deals. To take some prominent examples, the U.S. went from a modest trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, before NAFTA went into effect, to a deficit of more than $60 billion in 2015. It went from a trade deficit of $13.2 billion with South Korea in 2011, the year before a trade deal went into effect, to a deficit of $28.3 billion in 2015. It is also important to note that the composition of trade is likely to shift against U.S. manufacturing as a result of trade deals. These deals are quite explicitly designed to increase payments from other countries for licensing fees and royalties to U.S. pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software companies. The more these countries are forced to pay Pfizer for drugs and Disney for Mickey Mouse, the less money they have to spend on U.S. manufactured goods. In other words, the gains for these companies from trade deals imply larger trade deficits in other areas like manufactured goods.
Alan Reynolds had a column insisting that the U.S. need not fear trade agreements impact on the United States labor market. The context is an argument that the presidential candidates are wrong to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The piece argues that trade agreements have not led to increased trade deficits and that imports from China really have not had much impact on the manufacturing sector in the U.S. His argument doesn't quite fit the data. The piece lays out the basic argument in its subhead: "If trade agreements are so lousy, why are our largest deficits with countries that lack a U.S. trade deal?" It then notes that the United States largest trade deficits are with China and Japan and that we have trade deals with neither. This might be a good rhetorical point at the Wall Street Journal, but it has nothing to do with the issue at hand. The question is the direction of change following an agreement. While the data on this point is not entirely conclusive, there is evidence that deficits have generally increased with countries following the implementation of trade deals. To take some prominent examples, the U.S. went from a modest trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, before NAFTA went into effect, to a deficit of more than $60 billion in 2015. It went from a trade deficit of $13.2 billion with South Korea in 2011, the year before a trade deal went into effect, to a deficit of $28.3 billion in 2015. It is also important to note that the composition of trade is likely to shift against U.S. manufacturing as a result of trade deals. These deals are quite explicitly designed to increase payments from other countries for licensing fees and royalties to U.S. pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software companies. The more these countries are forced to pay Pfizer for drugs and Disney for Mickey Mouse, the less money they have to spend on U.S. manufactured goods. In other words, the gains for these companies from trade deals imply larger trade deficits in other areas like manufactured goods.

The Paradox of the Paradox on Hotels and Airbnb

The coverage of the new law in New York state, which would prohibit the short-term renting of whole apartments in New York City, has been difficult to understand. It presents as competing claims that it would increase the supply of affordable housing in New York City and that it will allow hotels to raise their fees. (This Washington Post piece is an excellent example.) Actually, it will likely do both.

The basic story is that the city has a large number of units that are subject to some form of rent control. The purpose is to keep these units affordable for people who don’t work on Wall Street. This purpose is defeated if it is possible for either the landlord or tenant to rent out the unit through a service like Airbnb. If the landord is going the Airbnb route then it removes a unit of otherwise affordable housing from the market. If the tenant is going the Airbnb route then they are taking advantage of rent control to make a profit on arbitrage.

This is also bad news for the hotel industry, since people who might have otherwise stayed in hotels will instead stay in Airbnb units, thereby lowering occupancy rates and putting downward pressure on hotel prices. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing contradictory about the argument this measure will both increase the supply of affordable housing and benefit the hotel industry.

The long-run story may be somewhat different. In the long-run the construction of hotels is responsive to demand. If there is a high vacancy rate in the city’s hotels, there will be fewer hotels built in future years. This will leave more land for the construction of apartments and other uses. In that case, the restriction on Airbnb rentals may not ultimately lead to an increase in the number of affordable housing units in the city (a financial transactions tax would be more effective), but is perfectly reasonable to believe that in the short-term this restriction on Airbnb rentals will both increase the supply of affordable housing units and benefit the hotel industry.                                        

The coverage of the new law in New York state, which would prohibit the short-term renting of whole apartments in New York City, has been difficult to understand. It presents as competing claims that it would increase the supply of affordable housing in New York City and that it will allow hotels to raise their fees. (This Washington Post piece is an excellent example.) Actually, it will likely do both.

The basic story is that the city has a large number of units that are subject to some form of rent control. The purpose is to keep these units affordable for people who don’t work on Wall Street. This purpose is defeated if it is possible for either the landlord or tenant to rent out the unit through a service like Airbnb. If the landord is going the Airbnb route then it removes a unit of otherwise affordable housing from the market. If the tenant is going the Airbnb route then they are taking advantage of rent control to make a profit on arbitrage.

This is also bad news for the hotel industry, since people who might have otherwise stayed in hotels will instead stay in Airbnb units, thereby lowering occupancy rates and putting downward pressure on hotel prices. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing contradictory about the argument this measure will both increase the supply of affordable housing and benefit the hotel industry.

The long-run story may be somewhat different. In the long-run the construction of hotels is responsive to demand. If there is a high vacancy rate in the city’s hotels, there will be fewer hotels built in future years. This will leave more land for the construction of apartments and other uses. In that case, the restriction on Airbnb rentals may not ultimately lead to an increase in the number of affordable housing units in the city (a financial transactions tax would be more effective), but is perfectly reasonable to believe that in the short-term this restriction on Airbnb rentals will both increase the supply of affordable housing units and benefit the hotel industry.                                        

The New York Times had a major adventure in fantasy land when it ran a front page article asserting that the problem with the health care exchanges under the Affordable Care Act is that the penalties have not been large enough to coerce people into getting health care insurance. The begins by telling readers:

“The architects of the Affordable Care Act thought they had a blunt instrument to force people — even young and healthy ones — to buy insurance through the law’s online marketplaces: a tax penalty for those who remain uninsured.

“It has not worked all that well, and that is at least partly to blame for soaring premiums next year on some of the health law’s insurance exchanges.”

The piece then explains that many people are opting not to buy insurance and instead pay the penalty.

The problem with this line of argument for fans of reality is that the number of uninsured has actually fallen by more than had been projected at the time the law was passed. This is in spite of the fact that many states were allowed to opt out of the Medicare expansion by a 2012 Supreme Court decision making expansion optional. (It was mandatory in the law passed by Congress.)

It is not difficult to find the evidence that the number of uninsured has fallen more than projected. In March of 2012, the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Tax Committee projected that there would be 32 million uninsured non-elderly people in 2015. Estimates from the Kaiser Family Foundation put the actual number at just under 29 million. In other words, three million more people were getting insured as of last year (our most recent data) than had been projected before most of the ACA took effect.

So, if more people are getting insured than had been expected, how could the penalties have been a failure? I leave that one for the folks at the NYT responsible for this front page story.

I will add one other item in this story worth correcting. The piece includes a quote from Joseph J. Thorndike, the director of the tax history project at Tax Analysts, telling readers:

“If it [the mandate] were effective, we would have higher enrollment, and the population buying policies in the insurance exchange would be healthier and younger.”

While we do care whether the people in the exchanges are healthy, it doesn’t matter if they are young. In fact, healthy older people are far more profitable to insurers than healthy young people since their premiums are on average three times as high. There is a slight skewing against the young in the structure of premiums, but this has little consequence for the costs of the system.

As a practical matter, the people signing up on the exchanges are probably somewhat less healthy than had been expected, but this is largely because more people are getting insurance through employers than had been expected. The people who get insurance through their employers are more healthy than the population as a whole, since for the most part they are healthy enough to be working full-time jobs.

The New York Times had a major adventure in fantasy land when it ran a front page article asserting that the problem with the health care exchanges under the Affordable Care Act is that the penalties have not been large enough to coerce people into getting health care insurance. The begins by telling readers:

“The architects of the Affordable Care Act thought they had a blunt instrument to force people — even young and healthy ones — to buy insurance through the law’s online marketplaces: a tax penalty for those who remain uninsured.

“It has not worked all that well, and that is at least partly to blame for soaring premiums next year on some of the health law’s insurance exchanges.”

The piece then explains that many people are opting not to buy insurance and instead pay the penalty.

The problem with this line of argument for fans of reality is that the number of uninsured has actually fallen by more than had been projected at the time the law was passed. This is in spite of the fact that many states were allowed to opt out of the Medicare expansion by a 2012 Supreme Court decision making expansion optional. (It was mandatory in the law passed by Congress.)

It is not difficult to find the evidence that the number of uninsured has fallen more than projected. In March of 2012, the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Tax Committee projected that there would be 32 million uninsured non-elderly people in 2015. Estimates from the Kaiser Family Foundation put the actual number at just under 29 million. In other words, three million more people were getting insured as of last year (our most recent data) than had been projected before most of the ACA took effect.

So, if more people are getting insured than had been expected, how could the penalties have been a failure? I leave that one for the folks at the NYT responsible for this front page story.

I will add one other item in this story worth correcting. The piece includes a quote from Joseph J. Thorndike, the director of the tax history project at Tax Analysts, telling readers:

“If it [the mandate] were effective, we would have higher enrollment, and the population buying policies in the insurance exchange would be healthier and younger.”

While we do care whether the people in the exchanges are healthy, it doesn’t matter if they are young. In fact, healthy older people are far more profitable to insurers than healthy young people since their premiums are on average three times as high. There is a slight skewing against the young in the structure of premiums, but this has little consequence for the costs of the system.

As a practical matter, the people signing up on the exchanges are probably somewhat less healthy than had been expected, but this is largely because more people are getting insurance through employers than had been expected. The people who get insurance through their employers are more healthy than the population as a whole, since for the most part they are healthy enough to be working full-time jobs.

The Social Security scare story is a long established Washington ritual. Bloomberg news decided to bring it out again in time for Halloween. The basic story is that the Social Security trust fund is projected to face a shortfall in less than two decades. This means that unless Congress appropriates additional revenue, the program is projected to only be able to pay a bit more than 80 percent of scheduled benefits.

This much is not really in dispute. The question is how much should we be worried about this projected shortfall and what should we do about it. Bloomberg’s answer to the first question is that we should be very worried. It goes through the list of potential fixes and implies that all would be difficult or impossible.

I will just take one potential fix, which is raising the payroll tax by 2.58 percentage points to cover the projected shortfall. Bloomberg tells us:

“…it’s doubtful that the American public would accept such jarring changes.”

That’s an interesting political assessment. It would be worth knowing the basis for this assertion. We had comparably jarring changes in the form of Social Security tax increases in the decades of 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. There was no massive tax revolt against any of these tax increases; what has convinced Bloomberg that we can never again have a comparable increase in the payroll tax?

A piece of evidence suggesting that tax increases necessary to support Social Security might be politically viable is the fact that few people even noticed the 2.0 percentage point increase in the payroll tax at the start of 2013 when the payroll tax holiday ended. This was at a time when the labor market was still very weak from the recession and wages had been stagnant for more than a decade. (A survey conducted for the National Academy for Social Insurance also found that people were willing to pay higher taxes to support the scheduled level of Social Security benefits.)

Given this history and evidence, Bloomberg’s claim that the public won’t tolerate the sort of tax increases necessary to fully fund Social Security looks like an unsupported assertion.

The other point on this topic is that economists usually believe that workers care first and foremost about their after-tax wage, not the tax rate. The Social Security trustees project that real before-tax wages will rise on average by more than 50 percent over the next three decades. By comparison, the tax increase needed to fully fund Social Security seems relatively small, as shown below.

wage projection 29243 image002

Source: Social Security trustees report, 2015 and author’s calculations.

Most workers have not seen their wages increase as much as the average wage over the last four decades since a disproportionate share went to those at top. These are people like CEOs, Wall Street traders, and doctors and other highly paid professionals. Workers stand to lose much more in terms of after-tax income if this upward redistribution continues over the next three decades than they would from the “jarring” Social Security tax increase that Bloomberg feels the need to warn us about.

So, of course people could get really worried about Social Security, as Bloomberg wants, or they can focus on the upward redistribution which will have far more impact on their well-being and that of their children. (Yes, this is the topic of my new book, Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer, which can be downloaded for free.)

The Social Security scare story is a long established Washington ritual. Bloomberg news decided to bring it out again in time for Halloween. The basic story is that the Social Security trust fund is projected to face a shortfall in less than two decades. This means that unless Congress appropriates additional revenue, the program is projected to only be able to pay a bit more than 80 percent of scheduled benefits.

This much is not really in dispute. The question is how much should we be worried about this projected shortfall and what should we do about it. Bloomberg’s answer to the first question is that we should be very worried. It goes through the list of potential fixes and implies that all would be difficult or impossible.

I will just take one potential fix, which is raising the payroll tax by 2.58 percentage points to cover the projected shortfall. Bloomberg tells us:

“…it’s doubtful that the American public would accept such jarring changes.”

That’s an interesting political assessment. It would be worth knowing the basis for this assertion. We had comparably jarring changes in the form of Social Security tax increases in the decades of 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. There was no massive tax revolt against any of these tax increases; what has convinced Bloomberg that we can never again have a comparable increase in the payroll tax?

A piece of evidence suggesting that tax increases necessary to support Social Security might be politically viable is the fact that few people even noticed the 2.0 percentage point increase in the payroll tax at the start of 2013 when the payroll tax holiday ended. This was at a time when the labor market was still very weak from the recession and wages had been stagnant for more than a decade. (A survey conducted for the National Academy for Social Insurance also found that people were willing to pay higher taxes to support the scheduled level of Social Security benefits.)

Given this history and evidence, Bloomberg’s claim that the public won’t tolerate the sort of tax increases necessary to fully fund Social Security looks like an unsupported assertion.

The other point on this topic is that economists usually believe that workers care first and foremost about their after-tax wage, not the tax rate. The Social Security trustees project that real before-tax wages will rise on average by more than 50 percent over the next three decades. By comparison, the tax increase needed to fully fund Social Security seems relatively small, as shown below.

wage projection 29243 image002

Source: Social Security trustees report, 2015 and author’s calculations.

Most workers have not seen their wages increase as much as the average wage over the last four decades since a disproportionate share went to those at top. These are people like CEOs, Wall Street traders, and doctors and other highly paid professionals. Workers stand to lose much more in terms of after-tax income if this upward redistribution continues over the next three decades than they would from the “jarring” Social Security tax increase that Bloomberg feels the need to warn us about.

So, of course people could get really worried about Social Security, as Bloomberg wants, or they can focus on the upward redistribution which will have far more impact on their well-being and that of their children. (Yes, this is the topic of my new book, Rigged: How Globalization and the Rules of the Modern Economy Were Structured to Make the Rich Richer, which can be downloaded for free.)

Confusion on This American Life on Trade

The usually excellent radio show This American Life may have misled listeners in its discussion of NAFTA and trade this week. The piece misrepresents both some of the key issues on trade and also economists' attitudes towards trade deals. On the key issues, the piece notes that deals like NAFTA have led to job losses. It uses the figure of 700,000 jobs. It then compares this to the gains to the economy that are projected from lower tariff barriers and therefore lower priced goods. What this discussion leaves out of the picture is the fact that the jobs lost are disproportionately for non-college educated workers. This puts downward pressure on the wages of non-college educated workers more generally as the displaced workers crowd into retail, services, and other sectors of the economy. So it is not just the 700,000 displaced workers who suffer as a result of this pattern of trade, it is non-college educated workers more generally who see their wages fall as a result of the deal. This issue of wage inequality is important to remember when the segment tells listeners: "In fact, there's this survey that the University of Chicago did where they asked all these economists all across the political spectrum, are Americans better off, on average, because of NAFTA?  95% said yes. 5% said they were unsure." This might be taken as meaning that nearly all economists think that NAFTA benefited the country. Whether or not this is true, that is not the question they answered. This question asks the economists whether American "on average" are better off because of NAFTA. The question does not ask about distribution. This means that if NAFTA gave Bill Gates $100 billion and cost the rest of the country $99 billion, then the correct answer to this question is that NAFTA made the country on average better off. Even economists who think NAFTA was bad policy might think that it led to gains on average.
The usually excellent radio show This American Life may have misled listeners in its discussion of NAFTA and trade this week. The piece misrepresents both some of the key issues on trade and also economists' attitudes towards trade deals. On the key issues, the piece notes that deals like NAFTA have led to job losses. It uses the figure of 700,000 jobs. It then compares this to the gains to the economy that are projected from lower tariff barriers and therefore lower priced goods. What this discussion leaves out of the picture is the fact that the jobs lost are disproportionately for non-college educated workers. This puts downward pressure on the wages of non-college educated workers more generally as the displaced workers crowd into retail, services, and other sectors of the economy. So it is not just the 700,000 displaced workers who suffer as a result of this pattern of trade, it is non-college educated workers more generally who see their wages fall as a result of the deal. This issue of wage inequality is important to remember when the segment tells listeners: "In fact, there's this survey that the University of Chicago did where they asked all these economists all across the political spectrum, are Americans better off, on average, because of NAFTA?  95% said yes. 5% said they were unsure." This might be taken as meaning that nearly all economists think that NAFTA benefited the country. Whether or not this is true, that is not the question they answered. This question asks the economists whether American "on average" are better off because of NAFTA. The question does not ask about distribution. This means that if NAFTA gave Bill Gates $100 billion and cost the rest of the country $99 billion, then the correct answer to this question is that NAFTA made the country on average better off. Even economists who think NAFTA was bad policy might think that it led to gains on average.

Just kidding. Actually, insurance costs have slowed sharply in the years since the Affordable Care Act was passed, but it is unlikely many readers of the NYT would know this. Instead, it has focused on the large increase (not levels) in premium costs for the relatively small segment of the population insured on the exchanges. In keeping with this pattern, it gives us a front page piece telling readers about the 25 percent average increase in premiums facing people on the exchange this year. There are two points to keep in mind on this issue.

First, the focus on premiums is exclusively on the relatively small segment of the population getting insurance through the exchanges and specifically through the exchanges managed through the federal government. According to the latest numbers, 12.7 million people are now getting insurance through the exchanges (roughly 4.0 percent of the total population). This article refers to the premiums being paid by the 9.6 million people insured through the federally managed exchange (3.0 percent of the total population). Many states, such as California, have well run exchanges that have been more successful in keeping cost increases down.

There are two reasons that costs on the exchanges have been rising rapidly. The first is that insurers probably priced their policies too low initially. Even with the increases this year premium prices are still lower than had been expected in 2010 when the law was passed. In fact, there has been a sharp slowing in the pace of health care cost growth in the last six years. While not all of this was due to the ACA, it was undoubtedly a factor in this slowdown. In the years from 1999 to 2010, health care costs per insured person rose at an average annual rate of 5.7 percent. In the years from 2010 to 2015 costs per insured person rose at an average rate of just 2.3 percent.

HCsoendinginsuredperson1999 1016

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculations.

The other reason that premiums on the exchanges have risen rapidly is that more people are stiill getting insurance through employers than had been expected. The people who get insurance through employers tend to be healthier on average than the population as a whole. The Obama administration expected that more employers would stop providing insurance, sending their workers to get insurance on the exchanges. Since they have continued to provide insurance, the mix of people getting insurance through the exchanges is less healthy than had been expected.

Note that this has nothing to do with the “young invincible” story that had been widely touted in the years leading up to the ACA. The problem is not that healthy young people are not signing up. The problem is simply that healthy people of all ages are getting their insurance elsewhere. The overall percentage of the population getting insured is higher than projected, not lower as the young invincible silliness would imply.

 

Addendum

Robert Salzberg reminds me that the vast majority of people buying insurance in the exchanges get subsidies. For most people these subsidies will fully cover these cost increases. Even after the increases noted in this NYT article, almost 80 percent of the people buying insurance in the exchanges will be able to get a plan for less than $100 per month.

Just kidding. Actually, insurance costs have slowed sharply in the years since the Affordable Care Act was passed, but it is unlikely many readers of the NYT would know this. Instead, it has focused on the large increase (not levels) in premium costs for the relatively small segment of the population insured on the exchanges. In keeping with this pattern, it gives us a front page piece telling readers about the 25 percent average increase in premiums facing people on the exchange this year. There are two points to keep in mind on this issue.

First, the focus on premiums is exclusively on the relatively small segment of the population getting insurance through the exchanges and specifically through the exchanges managed through the federal government. According to the latest numbers, 12.7 million people are now getting insurance through the exchanges (roughly 4.0 percent of the total population). This article refers to the premiums being paid by the 9.6 million people insured through the federally managed exchange (3.0 percent of the total population). Many states, such as California, have well run exchanges that have been more successful in keeping cost increases down.

There are two reasons that costs on the exchanges have been rising rapidly. The first is that insurers probably priced their policies too low initially. Even with the increases this year premium prices are still lower than had been expected in 2010 when the law was passed. In fact, there has been a sharp slowing in the pace of health care cost growth in the last six years. While not all of this was due to the ACA, it was undoubtedly a factor in this slowdown. In the years from 1999 to 2010, health care costs per insured person rose at an average annual rate of 5.7 percent. In the years from 2010 to 2015 costs per insured person rose at an average rate of just 2.3 percent.

HCsoendinginsuredperson1999 1016

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s calculations.

The other reason that premiums on the exchanges have risen rapidly is that more people are stiill getting insurance through employers than had been expected. The people who get insurance through employers tend to be healthier on average than the population as a whole. The Obama administration expected that more employers would stop providing insurance, sending their workers to get insurance on the exchanges. Since they have continued to provide insurance, the mix of people getting insurance through the exchanges is less healthy than had been expected.

Note that this has nothing to do with the “young invincible” story that had been widely touted in the years leading up to the ACA. The problem is not that healthy young people are not signing up. The problem is simply that healthy people of all ages are getting their insurance elsewhere. The overall percentage of the population getting insured is higher than projected, not lower as the young invincible silliness would imply.

 

Addendum

Robert Salzberg reminds me that the vast majority of people buying insurance in the exchanges get subsidies. For most people these subsidies will fully cover these cost increases. Even after the increases noted in this NYT article, almost 80 percent of the people buying insurance in the exchanges will be able to get a plan for less than $100 per month.

Yes, that is what he advocated in this column calling on people to vote for Hillary Clinton and Republican members of Congress. The Republicans are a party of climate deniers. Perhaps Samuelson doesn’t know this, but who cares. He urged the readers of his column to support a party that denies well-established science on climate change.

Yes, that is what he advocated in this column calling on people to vote for Hillary Clinton and Republican members of Congress. The Republicans are a party of climate deniers. Perhaps Samuelson doesn’t know this, but who cares. He urged the readers of his column to support a party that denies well-established science on climate change.

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