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Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

It would have been worth reminding people of this fact in an article on a proposal in California to lower drug prices. The piece might have led readers to believe that the proposal was interfering with a free market. Actually, it is limiting the ability of companies to take advantage of a government granted monopoly.

It would have been worth reminding people of this fact in an article on a proposal in California to lower drug prices. The piece might have led readers to believe that the proposal was interfering with a free market. Actually, it is limiting the ability of companies to take advantage of a government granted monopoly.

There They Go Again: It's Not Free Trade

The Washington Post is at it again, using a front page piece to repeatedly tell readers that the protectionist pacts crafted by recent administrations are “free trade.” The phrase appears in each of the first two paragraphs.

Of course, the deals are not about free trade. They do deliberately place U.S. manufacturing workers in direct competition with low-paid workers in the developing world. This has the predicted and actual effect of lowering their wages. However, the deals leave in place the protections for highly paid professionals like doctors and lawyers.

It is still illegal to practice medicine in the United States unless you go through a U.S. residency program here. As a result of protectionist measures our doctors earn on average more than twice as much as doctors in other wealthy countries. This costs us roughly $100 billion a year in higher health care bills. “Free traders” would be upset about this.

The trade deals also put in place longer and stronger patent and copyright protections. As a result of these protections, we will spend over $430 billion this year on prescription drugs that would cost around one-tenth of this amount in a free market. Of course, protectionism like this is not free trade.

Educated types think they have to support free trade, so labeling these trade deals as “free trade” pacts undoubtedly wins them support among a substantial segment of the population. However, it is not accurate.

The Washington Post is at it again, using a front page piece to repeatedly tell readers that the protectionist pacts crafted by recent administrations are “free trade.” The phrase appears in each of the first two paragraphs.

Of course, the deals are not about free trade. They do deliberately place U.S. manufacturing workers in direct competition with low-paid workers in the developing world. This has the predicted and actual effect of lowering their wages. However, the deals leave in place the protections for highly paid professionals like doctors and lawyers.

It is still illegal to practice medicine in the United States unless you go through a U.S. residency program here. As a result of protectionist measures our doctors earn on average more than twice as much as doctors in other wealthy countries. This costs us roughly $100 billion a year in higher health care bills. “Free traders” would be upset about this.

The trade deals also put in place longer and stronger patent and copyright protections. As a result of these protections, we will spend over $430 billion this year on prescription drugs that would cost around one-tenth of this amount in a free market. Of course, protectionism like this is not free trade.

Educated types think they have to support free trade, so labeling these trade deals as “free trade” pacts undoubtedly wins them support among a substantial segment of the population. However, it is not accurate.

Paul Krugman on Trade and Jobs

Paul Krugman has again waded into trade and employment turf in his latest blog post. I agree completely with the post-Great Recession story where Krugman acknowledges that the trade deficit creates a demand gap that we have not been able to fill. The problem is that fiscal policy is limited by a bizarre austerity cult that works to prevent larger budget deficits even though the economy clearly needs them to reach full employment levels of output. Monetary policy has been helpful, but with the Fed up against the zero lower bound there is not much more the Fed can do by way of traditional monetary policy to boost the economy. As a result, the trade deficit really does mean lost jobs. Where I differ with Krugman is in his assessment that the trade deficit did not cost the economy jobs in the pre-recession period. He argues that we were pretty much at full employment in the period prior to the 2008 recession. "Up through 2007 we basically had a Fed which raised rates whenever it thought the economy was overheating; in the absence of the China shock it would have raised rates sooner and faster..." Just to refresh folks' memory, the unemployment rate was 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000. In the recovery, we bottomed out at 4.4 percent for several months in 2006 and 2007, although we didn't get back below 5.0 percent until the end of 2005. But the unemployment rate doesn't really tell the whole story. The employment rate for prime age men (ages 25–54) peaked at 89.5 percent at the start of 2000. In the recovery, it never crossed 88.0 percent. When the recession hit at the end of 2007 it was at 87.2 percent, more than two full percentage points below its 2000 peak. This gap corresponds to a drop in employment among this group of more than 1 million.
Paul Krugman has again waded into trade and employment turf in his latest blog post. I agree completely with the post-Great Recession story where Krugman acknowledges that the trade deficit creates a demand gap that we have not been able to fill. The problem is that fiscal policy is limited by a bizarre austerity cult that works to prevent larger budget deficits even though the economy clearly needs them to reach full employment levels of output. Monetary policy has been helpful, but with the Fed up against the zero lower bound there is not much more the Fed can do by way of traditional monetary policy to boost the economy. As a result, the trade deficit really does mean lost jobs. Where I differ with Krugman is in his assessment that the trade deficit did not cost the economy jobs in the pre-recession period. He argues that we were pretty much at full employment in the period prior to the 2008 recession. "Up through 2007 we basically had a Fed which raised rates whenever it thought the economy was overheating; in the absence of the China shock it would have raised rates sooner and faster..." Just to refresh folks' memory, the unemployment rate was 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000. In the recovery, we bottomed out at 4.4 percent for several months in 2006 and 2007, although we didn't get back below 5.0 percent until the end of 2005. But the unemployment rate doesn't really tell the whole story. The employment rate for prime age men (ages 25–54) peaked at 89.5 percent at the start of 2000. In the recovery, it never crossed 88.0 percent. When the recession hit at the end of 2007 it was at 87.2 percent, more than two full percentage points below its 2000 peak. This gap corresponds to a drop in employment among this group of more than 1 million.

Mark Landler used his “White House Letter” column to tell readers that President Obama will “need his oratory powers to sell globalization.” This assertion is wrong. Landler is referring to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which can more accurately be described as a protectionist agenda than globalization.

The reality is that the trade barriers between the United States and the other countries in the TPP are already very low. The U.S. already has trade deals with six of the other eleven countries in the TPP and even in the case of the other five most of the barriers are already at or near zero. This is why the International Trade Commission (ITC) projected that in 2032, when the gains from the deal will be mostly realized, it will have increased national income by just 0.23 percent, a bit more than one month’s growth.

While the deal does little to reduce traditional trade barriers, the TPP increases protectionism in the form of stronger and longer copyright and patent protection. The provisions in the TPP will cause people to pay more for everything from prescription drugs and computer software to recorded music and old books. The impact of the protectionist measures in the TPP are likely to be much more important in slowing growth than the tariff reducing measures are in enhancing growth. (The ITC did not include the impact of stronger protections in its analysis.)

New Zealand’s government estimated that the copyright extension required by the TPP, from 50 years to 70 years, would cost the country 0.023 percent of its GDP annually. This assessment implies that this one narrow provision, in a country that already has strong copyright protection, will cost the country one-tenth as much as what the ITC projected the United States will gain from the deal. The impact of the stronger protections for drugs and other products will almost certainly be many times larger than the impact of this copyright provision.

It is also worth noting that stronger patent and copyright protection shifts income upward. Not many low-income people own patents and copyrights. By making these protections stronger, under standard economic assumptions, the United States trade deficit in manufactured goods and other items will increase. (It is worth noting that the TPP does nothing to weaken the protections for highly paid professionals like doctors and dentists. These protections add over $100 billion a year to the country’s health care bill.)

The TPP would also make the far-right legal doctrine of compensation for regulatory takings part of U.S. law. Under current law, if Congress or a state legislature determine that a company’s pollution imposes a health or environmental hazard, they can simply prohibit the company from polluting. However, under the TPP governments would have to compensate foreign investors for the profits they would lose if they are not able to pollute.

NAFTA already has a similar provision, but TPP would greatly expand the number of companies in a position to sue for regulatory takings. It could also create a situation in which U.S. companies pressure Congress to grant them the same treatment as foreign companies in getting compensation for regulatory takings. (U.S. companies could also transfer divisions to a foreign based subsidiary or sell them to a foreign company if they thought it was likely that they could face a reduction in profits due to regulatory measures.)

It is very generous of Mr. Landler to call the push for greater protectionism and the advancement of a right-wing legal doctrine “globalization,” however these actions do not fit the normal meaning of the term.

Note: this was altered slightly from an earlier version to clarify the issue on regulatory takings. Thanks to Robert Salzberg.

Mark Landler used his “White House Letter” column to tell readers that President Obama will “need his oratory powers to sell globalization.” This assertion is wrong. Landler is referring to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which can more accurately be described as a protectionist agenda than globalization.

The reality is that the trade barriers between the United States and the other countries in the TPP are already very low. The U.S. already has trade deals with six of the other eleven countries in the TPP and even in the case of the other five most of the barriers are already at or near zero. This is why the International Trade Commission (ITC) projected that in 2032, when the gains from the deal will be mostly realized, it will have increased national income by just 0.23 percent, a bit more than one month’s growth.

While the deal does little to reduce traditional trade barriers, the TPP increases protectionism in the form of stronger and longer copyright and patent protection. The provisions in the TPP will cause people to pay more for everything from prescription drugs and computer software to recorded music and old books. The impact of the protectionist measures in the TPP are likely to be much more important in slowing growth than the tariff reducing measures are in enhancing growth. (The ITC did not include the impact of stronger protections in its analysis.)

New Zealand’s government estimated that the copyright extension required by the TPP, from 50 years to 70 years, would cost the country 0.023 percent of its GDP annually. This assessment implies that this one narrow provision, in a country that already has strong copyright protection, will cost the country one-tenth as much as what the ITC projected the United States will gain from the deal. The impact of the stronger protections for drugs and other products will almost certainly be many times larger than the impact of this copyright provision.

It is also worth noting that stronger patent and copyright protection shifts income upward. Not many low-income people own patents and copyrights. By making these protections stronger, under standard economic assumptions, the United States trade deficit in manufactured goods and other items will increase. (It is worth noting that the TPP does nothing to weaken the protections for highly paid professionals like doctors and dentists. These protections add over $100 billion a year to the country’s health care bill.)

The TPP would also make the far-right legal doctrine of compensation for regulatory takings part of U.S. law. Under current law, if Congress or a state legislature determine that a company’s pollution imposes a health or environmental hazard, they can simply prohibit the company from polluting. However, under the TPP governments would have to compensate foreign investors for the profits they would lose if they are not able to pollute.

NAFTA already has a similar provision, but TPP would greatly expand the number of companies in a position to sue for regulatory takings. It could also create a situation in which U.S. companies pressure Congress to grant them the same treatment as foreign companies in getting compensation for regulatory takings. (U.S. companies could also transfer divisions to a foreign based subsidiary or sell them to a foreign company if they thought it was likely that they could face a reduction in profits due to regulatory measures.)

It is very generous of Mr. Landler to call the push for greater protectionism and the advancement of a right-wing legal doctrine “globalization,” however these actions do not fit the normal meaning of the term.

Note: this was altered slightly from an earlier version to clarify the issue on regulatory takings. Thanks to Robert Salzberg.

The Washington Post had a piece assessing the power relationships in the European Union after the departure of the United Kingdom. The piece discusses whether Germany will play an even more important role. When it turns to potential rivals the piece tells readers:

“France is mired in economic woes and a war on terrorism. Spain and Italy face massive unemployment and political instability.”

It would have been worth pointing out that the reason France is mired in economic woes and that Spain and Italy face massive unemployment and political instability is the austerity policies demanded by the Germans. As a result of these policies, countries are being forced to constrain their budget deficits even as long-term interest rates are near or below zero and inflation is under 1.0 percent.

According to a new study from the European Central Bank, the euro zone’s economy is 6.0 percent below its potential level of output. With Germany near or at its potential level of output this means that the output gap in other countries is considerably larger. In discussion of the roles of various countries in the EU it would have been appropriate to point out how the economic policies demanded by Germany have undermined its rivals.

The Washington Post had a piece assessing the power relationships in the European Union after the departure of the United Kingdom. The piece discusses whether Germany will play an even more important role. When it turns to potential rivals the piece tells readers:

“France is mired in economic woes and a war on terrorism. Spain and Italy face massive unemployment and political instability.”

It would have been worth pointing out that the reason France is mired in economic woes and that Spain and Italy face massive unemployment and political instability is the austerity policies demanded by the Germans. As a result of these policies, countries are being forced to constrain their budget deficits even as long-term interest rates are near or below zero and inflation is under 1.0 percent.

According to a new study from the European Central Bank, the euro zone’s economy is 6.0 percent below its potential level of output. With Germany near or at its potential level of output this means that the output gap in other countries is considerably larger. In discussion of the roles of various countries in the EU it would have been appropriate to point out how the economic policies demanded by Germany have undermined its rivals.

The folks at National Public Radio assume you all know the answer to that question. Why else would they tell listeners in a piece on migrant workers in the UK after the Brexit vote that:

“Analysts estimate that Lithuanian workers abroad send home more than $300 million a year.”

Hmmm, is that a big deal for Lithuania’s economy? If you had to look up Lithuania’s GDP to answer that question, you probably weren’t alone among NPR listeners. The IMF tells us that Lithuania’s GDP will be around $43 billion for 2016, which means that the $300 million in annual wages being repatriated is equal to roughly 0.7 percent of the country’s GDP.

If harsher immigration rules caused this sum to be cut back by a third or even half, that would be bad news for Lithuania’s economy, but not the sort of thing that is likely to send it into a recession. Anyhow, it would not have taken NPR’s reporters too much time to look up Lithuania’s GDP so that they could have presented a meaningful number to their listeners. As it is, they could have just saved some time by leaving this number out altogether. They were not providing information with it.

The folks at National Public Radio assume you all know the answer to that question. Why else would they tell listeners in a piece on migrant workers in the UK after the Brexit vote that:

“Analysts estimate that Lithuanian workers abroad send home more than $300 million a year.”

Hmmm, is that a big deal for Lithuania’s economy? If you had to look up Lithuania’s GDP to answer that question, you probably weren’t alone among NPR listeners. The IMF tells us that Lithuania’s GDP will be around $43 billion for 2016, which means that the $300 million in annual wages being repatriated is equal to roughly 0.7 percent of the country’s GDP.

If harsher immigration rules caused this sum to be cut back by a third or even half, that would be bad news for Lithuania’s economy, but not the sort of thing that is likely to send it into a recession. Anyhow, it would not have taken NPR’s reporters too much time to look up Lithuania’s GDP so that they could have presented a meaningful number to their listeners. As it is, they could have just saved some time by leaving this number out altogether. They were not providing information with it.

Neil Irwin raises the question of whether economists have been too single-minded in pushing efficiency, while ignoring issues of distribution. This is way, way too generous to economists. In fact, economists have been totally happy to ignore efficiency considerations when the inefficiencies redistribute income upward. This situation pops up all the time. As I frequently point out in comments here and elsewhere, we protect doctors, dentists and other highly paid professionals from competition with their lower paid counterparts in the developing world or even other wealthy countries. We have maintained these protections even while our trade negotiators did everything they could to make steel workers and textile workers compete against their low-paid counterparts in Mexico, China, and other developing countries. This protectionism is obviously inefficient and cost U.S. consumers more than $100 billion a year in higher medical bills and other costs. Yet economists act really dumb when questioned about it. Apparently, it never occurred to them that competent doctors could be trained in Mexico, India, or even Germany. Sorry folks, economists don't give a damn about efficiency in this case. They want to protect the income of highly paid professionals.
Neil Irwin raises the question of whether economists have been too single-minded in pushing efficiency, while ignoring issues of distribution. This is way, way too generous to economists. In fact, economists have been totally happy to ignore efficiency considerations when the inefficiencies redistribute income upward. This situation pops up all the time. As I frequently point out in comments here and elsewhere, we protect doctors, dentists and other highly paid professionals from competition with their lower paid counterparts in the developing world or even other wealthy countries. We have maintained these protections even while our trade negotiators did everything they could to make steel workers and textile workers compete against their low-paid counterparts in Mexico, China, and other developing countries. This protectionism is obviously inefficient and cost U.S. consumers more than $100 billion a year in higher medical bills and other costs. Yet economists act really dumb when questioned about it. Apparently, it never occurred to them that competent doctors could be trained in Mexico, India, or even Germany. Sorry folks, economists don't give a damn about efficiency in this case. They want to protect the income of highly paid professionals.

Paul Krugman, Brexit, and Bubbles

Paul Krugman has an excellent blog post ridiculing the doomsayers on Brexit. I agree with just about everything he says. His basic point is that, while the UK will pay a substantial economic price if it leaves the European Union (especially if the EU imposes punitive tariffs), there is not a plausible story that Brexit will lead to a near-term recession. Krugman furthermore makes the point that many economists feel the need to exaggerate their case when arguing on trade. The point is that they believe their "free trade" policies to be good and therefore are willing to sort of make stuff up to advance their case. (Can you say "TPP?") This is all very well-taken and I agree with Krugman 100 percent on these issues. Where I would differ is on the assumption that Brexit won't lead to a recession in the near-term. The argument is not that the reduction in trade resulting from the withdrawal would be so large as to lead to a recession. Rather, the reason stems from the fallout of collapsing bubbles. There is a very credible case that the UK was experiencing a serious housing bubble, especially in the London market. Brexit may be bringing this to an end for two reasons. First, UK real estate was seen as a safe haven for rich people across the globe. Therefore, they were willing to sink large chunks of money to purchase condos and houses in the UK. This perception of safety may no longer hold in the post-Brexit world. Instead of money flowing into London real estate it may start to flow out. The other reason has to do with the strength of the London economy. It is virtually certain that the financial industry will take a big hit from the Brexit vote; the only question is how large a hit. The London finance boys were big buyers of London real estate. If they have to relocate to Paris, Frankfurt, or elsewhere, it could send London prices plummeting.  The net effect of a plunge in real estate prices could very well be a recession. The construction sector will see a sharp fall in demand, leading a major contraction and large-scale layoffs. Similarly, as millions of homeowners see their house prices plummet they will cut back spending in response to the loss of wealth. (Have we ever seen anything like this?)
Paul Krugman has an excellent blog post ridiculing the doomsayers on Brexit. I agree with just about everything he says. His basic point is that, while the UK will pay a substantial economic price if it leaves the European Union (especially if the EU imposes punitive tariffs), there is not a plausible story that Brexit will lead to a near-term recession. Krugman furthermore makes the point that many economists feel the need to exaggerate their case when arguing on trade. The point is that they believe their "free trade" policies to be good and therefore are willing to sort of make stuff up to advance their case. (Can you say "TPP?") This is all very well-taken and I agree with Krugman 100 percent on these issues. Where I would differ is on the assumption that Brexit won't lead to a recession in the near-term. The argument is not that the reduction in trade resulting from the withdrawal would be so large as to lead to a recession. Rather, the reason stems from the fallout of collapsing bubbles. There is a very credible case that the UK was experiencing a serious housing bubble, especially in the London market. Brexit may be bringing this to an end for two reasons. First, UK real estate was seen as a safe haven for rich people across the globe. Therefore, they were willing to sink large chunks of money to purchase condos and houses in the UK. This perception of safety may no longer hold in the post-Brexit world. Instead of money flowing into London real estate it may start to flow out. The other reason has to do with the strength of the London economy. It is virtually certain that the financial industry will take a big hit from the Brexit vote; the only question is how large a hit. The London finance boys were big buyers of London real estate. If they have to relocate to Paris, Frankfurt, or elsewhere, it could send London prices plummeting.  The net effect of a plunge in real estate prices could very well be a recession. The construction sector will see a sharp fall in demand, leading a major contraction and large-scale layoffs. Similarly, as millions of homeowners see their house prices plummet they will cut back spending in response to the loss of wealth. (Have we ever seen anything like this?)
David Brooks apparently thinks he has things down. The major divide isn't between supporters of big government and small government, it's a debate between supporters of an open economy that looks to increase trade and a closed economy that looks to protectionism. This is the theme of his column that tells us about "the coming political realignment." To make his case, he gets a lot of things wrong. For example, he seriously misrepresents research on the impact of trade liberalization. Brooks refers to a study by the Peterson Institute that "found that past trade liberalization laws added between $7,100 to 12,900 in additional income to the average household." The vast majority of the gains estimated from liberalization by this study occurred before 1980, a point at which trade was largely non-controversial. The gains estimated from the trade deals of the last quarter century (post-NAFTA) have been far more limited. Brooks then notes a study from the Peterson Institute for International Economics which projects that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would increase national income by $131 billion. It would have been useful to point out that this gain is projected for 2030, a point at which it would be equal to 0.5 percent of GDP. This means that if the study projections are correct, we will as wealthy on January 1, 2030 with the TPP as we would be in mid-March of 2030 without the TPP. It is also worth noting the Peterson Institute's projection of gains from the TPP assumes the economy is at full employment. It also does not calculate any costs associated with the increased protections in the TPP as a result of stronger and longer patent and copyright protections. This increased protectionism could easily offset the projected gains from the modest tariff reductions in the TPP. It is also worth noting that the non-partisan International Trade Commission projected gains that were less than half as large (roughly one month's growth) also while assuming full employment and not counting any negative impact from the increased protections in the TPP.
David Brooks apparently thinks he has things down. The major divide isn't between supporters of big government and small government, it's a debate between supporters of an open economy that looks to increase trade and a closed economy that looks to protectionism. This is the theme of his column that tells us about "the coming political realignment." To make his case, he gets a lot of things wrong. For example, he seriously misrepresents research on the impact of trade liberalization. Brooks refers to a study by the Peterson Institute that "found that past trade liberalization laws added between $7,100 to 12,900 in additional income to the average household." The vast majority of the gains estimated from liberalization by this study occurred before 1980, a point at which trade was largely non-controversial. The gains estimated from the trade deals of the last quarter century (post-NAFTA) have been far more limited. Brooks then notes a study from the Peterson Institute for International Economics which projects that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would increase national income by $131 billion. It would have been useful to point out that this gain is projected for 2030, a point at which it would be equal to 0.5 percent of GDP. This means that if the study projections are correct, we will as wealthy on January 1, 2030 with the TPP as we would be in mid-March of 2030 without the TPP. It is also worth noting the Peterson Institute's projection of gains from the TPP assumes the economy is at full employment. It also does not calculate any costs associated with the increased protections in the TPP as a result of stronger and longer patent and copyright protections. This increased protectionism could easily offset the projected gains from the modest tariff reductions in the TPP. It is also worth noting that the non-partisan International Trade Commission projected gains that were less than half as large (roughly one month's growth) also while assuming full employment and not counting any negative impact from the increased protections in the TPP.

A new study from the European Central Bank (not official bank policy) estimated the size of the output gap in the euro area at 6.0 percent of GDP. Most analyses put the cost to the UK’s from its exit from the European Union at around 2.0 percent of GDP. If the ECB’s estimate of the output gap is correct, then austerity is imposing three times as much harm on the euro zone countries as Brexit is projected to impose on the UK.

A new study from the European Central Bank (not official bank policy) estimated the size of the output gap in the euro area at 6.0 percent of GDP. Most analyses put the cost to the UK’s from its exit from the European Union at around 2.0 percent of GDP. If the ECB’s estimate of the output gap is correct, then austerity is imposing three times as much harm on the euro zone countries as Brexit is projected to impose on the UK.

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