It is possible to make serious arguments against Donald Trump’s views on trade, but apparently the Washington Post can’t find anyone with sufficient knowledge and skills. Instead they assigned Fareed Zakaria the task and he failed badly.
Zakaria tells readers:
“The appeal of both Trump and Sanders has many politicians mouthing cliches about the deep problems with globalization. It is true that two gifted populists have been able to give voice to people’s fears about a fast-changing world. But this does not alter the truth. Their central charge is false. Free trade has not caused the hollowing out of U.S. manufacturing.
“Manufacturing as a share of all U.S. jobs has been declining for 70 years, as part of a transition experienced by every advanced industrial economy.”
If Zakaria had access to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics he would have better knowledge of trends in employment in U.S. manufacturing.
Jobs in Manufacturing Industries
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
As can be seen, employment in manufacturing hovered near 17.5 million from the late 1960s until 2000. At that point, the explosion in the size of the U.S. trade deficit sent employment in manufacturing plummeting. We lost roughly over 3 million manufacturing jobs in this period, almost 20 percent of total employment, before the onset of the recession. It is difficult to believe that a Washington Post columnist could be so ignorant of these data and still be writing a column on the topic.
It is also important to note that Zakaria insists on saying the United States has been pursuing a policy of free trade even though this is clearly not the case. Under U.S. law, it is necessary to go through a residency program in the United States to practice as a doctor. It is necessary to go to a U.S dental school (or recently a Canadian school) to be a dentist. Does anyone seriously believe that the only way to be a competent doctor is to go through a U.S. residency program or to be a competent dentist is to go to a U.S. dental school?
These protectionist barriers inflate the pay of both doctors and dentists and add over $100 billion a year to our health care bill. Are we supposed to believe columnists at the Post are too stupid (to use Trump’s word) to notice this fact?
What about patent and copyright protection? We will spend over $430 billion this year for prescription drugs that would likely cost around one-tenth this price in a free market. This is massive protectionism that imposes enormous costs on people’s health. Did this also escape Zakaria’s attention? (There are more efficient ways to finance drug research.)
Trump is obviously a blowhard without a coherent trade or economic policy, but in this battle he beats Zakaria hands down.
It is possible to make serious arguments against Donald Trump’s views on trade, but apparently the Washington Post can’t find anyone with sufficient knowledge and skills. Instead they assigned Fareed Zakaria the task and he failed badly.
Zakaria tells readers:
“The appeal of both Trump and Sanders has many politicians mouthing cliches about the deep problems with globalization. It is true that two gifted populists have been able to give voice to people’s fears about a fast-changing world. But this does not alter the truth. Their central charge is false. Free trade has not caused the hollowing out of U.S. manufacturing.
“Manufacturing as a share of all U.S. jobs has been declining for 70 years, as part of a transition experienced by every advanced industrial economy.”
If Zakaria had access to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics he would have better knowledge of trends in employment in U.S. manufacturing.
Jobs in Manufacturing Industries
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
As can be seen, employment in manufacturing hovered near 17.5 million from the late 1960s until 2000. At that point, the explosion in the size of the U.S. trade deficit sent employment in manufacturing plummeting. We lost roughly over 3 million manufacturing jobs in this period, almost 20 percent of total employment, before the onset of the recession. It is difficult to believe that a Washington Post columnist could be so ignorant of these data and still be writing a column on the topic.
It is also important to note that Zakaria insists on saying the United States has been pursuing a policy of free trade even though this is clearly not the case. Under U.S. law, it is necessary to go through a residency program in the United States to practice as a doctor. It is necessary to go to a U.S dental school (or recently a Canadian school) to be a dentist. Does anyone seriously believe that the only way to be a competent doctor is to go through a U.S. residency program or to be a competent dentist is to go to a U.S. dental school?
These protectionist barriers inflate the pay of both doctors and dentists and add over $100 billion a year to our health care bill. Are we supposed to believe columnists at the Post are too stupid (to use Trump’s word) to notice this fact?
What about patent and copyright protection? We will spend over $430 billion this year for prescription drugs that would likely cost around one-tenth this price in a free market. This is massive protectionism that imposes enormous costs on people’s health. Did this also escape Zakaria’s attention? (There are more efficient ways to finance drug research.)
Trump is obviously a blowhard without a coherent trade or economic policy, but in this battle he beats Zakaria hands down.
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Sure, it’s tough to get a job in reporting that pays a decent wage. But now you can get on the fast track to a successful career in journalism by writing pieces that make fun of opponents of U.S. trade policy.
No knowledge of the economic theory of trade or actual trade practices is required. You just have to be able to trivialize any argument against a current or future trade deal by saying that opponents want to end trade and close borders. Apply at the Atlantic or other major news outlets.
Sure, it’s tough to get a job in reporting that pays a decent wage. But now you can get on the fast track to a successful career in journalism by writing pieces that make fun of opponents of U.S. trade policy.
No knowledge of the economic theory of trade or actual trade practices is required. You just have to be able to trivialize any argument against a current or future trade deal by saying that opponents want to end trade and close borders. Apply at the Atlantic or other major news outlets.
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The NYT ran an article on how France’s far-right sees the vote in the UK for leaving the European Union as a boost to its own efforts. After outlining the state of anti-EU sentiment in France, the piece tells readers:
“Given the array of other issues facing France, including a near-stagnant economy and high unemployment, it remains to be seen how central an issue membership in the bloc might be in the presidential race.”
Actually, since France is in the euro (unlike the UK), its stagnant economy is very directly linked to its membership in the EU. The rules imposed on it by the EU leadership have prevented it from adopting the sort of stimulus that would be needed to boost its growth and reduce unemployment. It would be very surprising if this issue were not front and center in France’s presidential race since it is so important in people’s lives. The EU is forcing both a deterioration in the quality of France’s public services and higher unemployment with its pointless austerity policies.
The NYT ran an article on how France’s far-right sees the vote in the UK for leaving the European Union as a boost to its own efforts. After outlining the state of anti-EU sentiment in France, the piece tells readers:
“Given the array of other issues facing France, including a near-stagnant economy and high unemployment, it remains to be seen how central an issue membership in the bloc might be in the presidential race.”
Actually, since France is in the euro (unlike the UK), its stagnant economy is very directly linked to its membership in the EU. The rules imposed on it by the EU leadership have prevented it from adopting the sort of stimulus that would be needed to boost its growth and reduce unemployment. It would be very surprising if this issue were not front and center in France’s presidential race since it is so important in people’s lives. The EU is forcing both a deterioration in the quality of France’s public services and higher unemployment with its pointless austerity policies.
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This is a serious question. BBC told readers that Fitch and Moody’s both lowered their outlooks for debt issued by the British government following the Brexit vote. The question is, what do these bond-rating agencies mean when they lower the rating of a country that issues debt denominated in a currency it prints.
This issue came up back in 2011 when S&P downgraded the debt of the United States following a long standoff on a budget agreement between President Obama and the Republican Congress. While U.S. debt is also denominated in a currency we print, there was at least a not 100 percent absurd story where another standoff could lead to the government not paying its debt. (It’s only 99.99999999 percent absurd.)
But in the UK there is no possible issue of a division of power blocking normal debt payments since the country has a parliamentary government. So what are the bond rating agencies telling us when they lower its debt rating? For private companies or governments that issue debt in a currency they do not issue, the meaning is clear. There is a possibility they won’t have enough money to pay their debts. In the case of companies, this means a risk of bankruptcy. In the case of governments that can’t go bankrupt, there is still a risk of a write-down in which creditors will have to accept less than full payment on their bonds.
But the UK will always be able to print the pounds needed to pay the bonds it has issued. So what are the credit rating agencies saying when they downgrade them. This could be seen as an inflation risk projection, except the rating agencies don’t have special expertise in inflation projections and furthermore have not historically tied their ratings to inflation. For example, they did not downgrade the debt of the United States and other countries in the seventies even as inflation increased to double-digit rates. (FWIW, inflation in the UK has been close to zero in the last year.)
So what do the bond-rating agencies think they are telling us about the UK? Inquiring minds want to know.
This is a serious question. BBC told readers that Fitch and Moody’s both lowered their outlooks for debt issued by the British government following the Brexit vote. The question is, what do these bond-rating agencies mean when they lower the rating of a country that issues debt denominated in a currency it prints.
This issue came up back in 2011 when S&P downgraded the debt of the United States following a long standoff on a budget agreement between President Obama and the Republican Congress. While U.S. debt is also denominated in a currency we print, there was at least a not 100 percent absurd story where another standoff could lead to the government not paying its debt. (It’s only 99.99999999 percent absurd.)
But in the UK there is no possible issue of a division of power blocking normal debt payments since the country has a parliamentary government. So what are the bond rating agencies telling us when they lower its debt rating? For private companies or governments that issue debt in a currency they do not issue, the meaning is clear. There is a possibility they won’t have enough money to pay their debts. In the case of companies, this means a risk of bankruptcy. In the case of governments that can’t go bankrupt, there is still a risk of a write-down in which creditors will have to accept less than full payment on their bonds.
But the UK will always be able to print the pounds needed to pay the bonds it has issued. So what are the credit rating agencies saying when they downgrade them. This could be seen as an inflation risk projection, except the rating agencies don’t have special expertise in inflation projections and furthermore have not historically tied their ratings to inflation. For example, they did not downgrade the debt of the United States and other countries in the seventies even as inflation increased to double-digit rates. (FWIW, inflation in the UK has been close to zero in the last year.)
So what do the bond-rating agencies think they are telling us about the UK? Inquiring minds want to know.
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Back in 2011 the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) began warning of the risks of run away inflation associated with the expansionary monetary policy being pursued by the Fed, the European Central Bank and other central banks. It is still making these warnings. Unfortunately, the NYT presented the warnings as being somehow new information that should interest them, rather than old predictions that had been proven wrong repeatedly.
Even better, the piece tells us that one of the main credentials of Jaime Caruana, the managing director of the BIS, is that he missed the massive housing bubble in Spain:
“It is worth noting that Mr. Caruana is familiar with asset bubbles: He was the head of Spain’s central bank a decade ago when reckless lending among the country’s financial institutions resulted in a boom and eventual bust of Spanish property prices.”
Incredibly the piece only presents the views of people who are opposed to expansionary monetary policy. The views of Stephen Jen, a former official at the International Monetary Fund who now manages a hedge fund in London, figure prominently. Jen insists that we have lots of inflation, it’s just in asset markets. Actually, most economists would make a clear distinction between inflation in the markets for goods and services and asset markets. The former tend to feed into inflation and can lead to a wage price spiral. The latter cannot unless Mr. Jen has developed a new theory on inflation dynamics.
The piece also misleadingly implies that rising asset prices are an important factor in wage stagnation in the UK telling readers:
“Thanks to aggressive central bank policies, house prices in London are among the most expensive in the world, yet the inflation-adjusted weekly average wage of 470 pounds, or about $632, is still £20 lower than it was before the financial crisis, according to the Resolution Foundation, a British research organization.”
Actually, house sale prices don’t factor into the inflation index, even if people like Mr. Jen and the reporter writing this piece want them to. The housing component that is used to measure inflation and therefore provides the basis for the real wage calculation cited here is a rental index. This will not be directly affected by house prices. In fact, the low interest rate policies of central banks are likely to go the other direction by making it easier to build more housing and thereby driving down prices.
Also, while there is a strong case that the UK again has a housing bubble (which may now burst in response to Brexit — a good thing), asset prices in most of the world are not out of line with fundamentals. The U.S. stock market has risen roughly in line with GDP from its 2007 peaks, which almost no one considered to be a bubble at the time. Most real estate prices in the U.S. are still far below bubble peaks and only modestly above trends, with the exception of some California cities.
In short, this piece is effectively an opinion piece calling for higher interest rates and an end to expansionary monetary policy. It’s just a lot more confused than the typical NYT column.
Back in 2011 the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) began warning of the risks of run away inflation associated with the expansionary monetary policy being pursued by the Fed, the European Central Bank and other central banks. It is still making these warnings. Unfortunately, the NYT presented the warnings as being somehow new information that should interest them, rather than old predictions that had been proven wrong repeatedly.
Even better, the piece tells us that one of the main credentials of Jaime Caruana, the managing director of the BIS, is that he missed the massive housing bubble in Spain:
“It is worth noting that Mr. Caruana is familiar with asset bubbles: He was the head of Spain’s central bank a decade ago when reckless lending among the country’s financial institutions resulted in a boom and eventual bust of Spanish property prices.”
Incredibly the piece only presents the views of people who are opposed to expansionary monetary policy. The views of Stephen Jen, a former official at the International Monetary Fund who now manages a hedge fund in London, figure prominently. Jen insists that we have lots of inflation, it’s just in asset markets. Actually, most economists would make a clear distinction between inflation in the markets for goods and services and asset markets. The former tend to feed into inflation and can lead to a wage price spiral. The latter cannot unless Mr. Jen has developed a new theory on inflation dynamics.
The piece also misleadingly implies that rising asset prices are an important factor in wage stagnation in the UK telling readers:
“Thanks to aggressive central bank policies, house prices in London are among the most expensive in the world, yet the inflation-adjusted weekly average wage of 470 pounds, or about $632, is still £20 lower than it was before the financial crisis, according to the Resolution Foundation, a British research organization.”
Actually, house sale prices don’t factor into the inflation index, even if people like Mr. Jen and the reporter writing this piece want them to. The housing component that is used to measure inflation and therefore provides the basis for the real wage calculation cited here is a rental index. This will not be directly affected by house prices. In fact, the low interest rate policies of central banks are likely to go the other direction by making it easier to build more housing and thereby driving down prices.
Also, while there is a strong case that the UK again has a housing bubble (which may now burst in response to Brexit — a good thing), asset prices in most of the world are not out of line with fundamentals. The U.S. stock market has risen roughly in line with GDP from its 2007 peaks, which almost no one considered to be a bubble at the time. Most real estate prices in the U.S. are still far below bubble peaks and only modestly above trends, with the exception of some California cities.
In short, this piece is effectively an opinion piece calling for higher interest rates and an end to expansionary monetary policy. It’s just a lot more confused than the typical NYT column.
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That’s only a small exaggeration. He touted a study by Steve Rose showing substantial income gains for upper middle class households over the last four decades. The study did not take account of the extent to which incomes rose because households had two earners, as opposed to a situation where people in the household got more pay for each hour worked.
Most people probably expect that a household would have more income if two people are working than one. Economic progress is when people get more money for each hour of work — but hey, if you have a case to sell, you make it up as you go along.
That’s only a small exaggeration. He touted a study by Steve Rose showing substantial income gains for upper middle class households over the last four decades. The study did not take account of the extent to which incomes rose because households had two earners, as opposed to a situation where people in the household got more pay for each hour worked.
Most people probably expect that a household would have more income if two people are working than one. Economic progress is when people get more money for each hour of work — but hey, if you have a case to sell, you make it up as you go along.
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Phillippe Legrain began his NYT column denouncing the supporters of Brexit by noting their contempt for economic expertise. He then went on to give good reasons for such contempt.
Legrain tells readers:
“Experts are, of course, known to make mistakes. But in this case, the people who voted for Brexit will pay a big price for ignoring economic expertise. The harmful effects of this vote are both immediate and lasting.
“Britons are already worse off. The pound has — so far — plunged by nearly 9 percent against the dollar, slashing the value of British assets, with higher import prices likely to follow. The stock market has also taken a hit. The prices of property, most British people’s main asset, are almost certain to fall, too.”
Actually the pound’s fall was a necessary and good development in the long-run, even if it would have been better had it occurred over a longer period of time. The UK was running a trade deficit in the neighborhood of 5.0 percent of GDP (@ $900 billion in the U.S.), this was unsustainable. And, contrary to what Legrain claims in this piece, the best way to get the trade deficit down is to lower the value of the pound.
Legrain incorrectly asserts that the drop in the pound in 2008 did not lead to a reduction in the trade deficit. In fact it led to a substantial reduction, although with a 1–2 year lag as would be expected. (The pound fell from a peak of more than 1.5 euros in 2007 to just over 1.0 euro at its trough in 2008. It remained low until it began to rise sharply in 2013, reaching values of more than 1.4 euros last year, hence the large rise in the trade deficit.)
The inflow of money from abroad was fueling a housing bubble in the UK. This has priced many people out of the real estate market. Bubbles do burst, often with very bad outcomes.
The problem with bubbles is not the factor that causes them to burst, the problem is allowing them to grow in the first place. Apparently the “experts” in the UK had no idea that real estate markets could develop bubbles or that their bursting could lead to harm. The problem Legrain describes here is entirely on the shoulders of the experts, not the Brexiters.
It is also worth noting that a high stock market is not an economic good. It is a distributional measure. It means that the owners of stock have more claim on society’s income. There is very little direct relationship between the stock market’s value and investment. (In the U.S. the investment share of GDP peaked in the late 1970s when the stock market was in the doldrums.)
The piece also implies that the UK will face punitive tariffs from the EU after it leaves. This is possible, but the fault will then be with the EU leadership. They will be deliberately making the EU poorer so that they can extract revenge on the UK for leaving.
Phillippe Legrain began his NYT column denouncing the supporters of Brexit by noting their contempt for economic expertise. He then went on to give good reasons for such contempt.
Legrain tells readers:
“Experts are, of course, known to make mistakes. But in this case, the people who voted for Brexit will pay a big price for ignoring economic expertise. The harmful effects of this vote are both immediate and lasting.
“Britons are already worse off. The pound has — so far — plunged by nearly 9 percent against the dollar, slashing the value of British assets, with higher import prices likely to follow. The stock market has also taken a hit. The prices of property, most British people’s main asset, are almost certain to fall, too.”
Actually the pound’s fall was a necessary and good development in the long-run, even if it would have been better had it occurred over a longer period of time. The UK was running a trade deficit in the neighborhood of 5.0 percent of GDP (@ $900 billion in the U.S.), this was unsustainable. And, contrary to what Legrain claims in this piece, the best way to get the trade deficit down is to lower the value of the pound.
Legrain incorrectly asserts that the drop in the pound in 2008 did not lead to a reduction in the trade deficit. In fact it led to a substantial reduction, although with a 1–2 year lag as would be expected. (The pound fell from a peak of more than 1.5 euros in 2007 to just over 1.0 euro at its trough in 2008. It remained low until it began to rise sharply in 2013, reaching values of more than 1.4 euros last year, hence the large rise in the trade deficit.)
The inflow of money from abroad was fueling a housing bubble in the UK. This has priced many people out of the real estate market. Bubbles do burst, often with very bad outcomes.
The problem with bubbles is not the factor that causes them to burst, the problem is allowing them to grow in the first place. Apparently the “experts” in the UK had no idea that real estate markets could develop bubbles or that their bursting could lead to harm. The problem Legrain describes here is entirely on the shoulders of the experts, not the Brexiters.
It is also worth noting that a high stock market is not an economic good. It is a distributional measure. It means that the owners of stock have more claim on society’s income. There is very little direct relationship between the stock market’s value and investment. (In the U.S. the investment share of GDP peaked in the late 1970s when the stock market was in the doldrums.)
The piece also implies that the UK will face punitive tariffs from the EU after it leaves. This is possible, but the fault will then be with the EU leadership. They will be deliberately making the EU poorer so that they can extract revenge on the UK for leaving.
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Jim Tankersley had an interesting piece arguing that the Brexit vote ended “globalization as we know it.” I am less optimistic on that front. The folks who profit from the current path of globalization are incredibly powerful and very effective at working around democracy and things like that. But that aside, the article had an interesting graph that caught my attention.
The graph shows the ratio of international trade in goods and services to GDP over the last two decades. After rising sharply from 1995 to 2007, it has been largely flat and still has not recovered to its 2007 peak. This change in trends is of course striking.
However, there is another aspect to this story worth considering. In the debate over the productivity slowdown, there is a camp which argues that it is largely illusory. The story goes that we are undercounting GDP, and therefore productivity, because we are missing the value of things like video downloads on the web, undercounting the value of the camera in our iPhones, and other such things.
While there is obviously some non-zero amount here (we are missing some things in our GDP accounting), I have never been convinced that it could be enough to change the basic story. (Remember it has to be cumulative. If we are undercounting by 0.5 percentage points annually, after 20 years we are undercounting GDP by 10 percent.)
But this connects to the trade story in an interesting way. The items that are likely to be missed in GDP accounts are also items that are heavily involved in trade. For example, people everywhere get information, music, and videos off the web. This means that if we are even undercounting GDP by a small amount, like 0.2 percentage points, we may be undercounting trade by a large amount.
In the 0.2 percentage point case, suppose that half of this is in items that cross national borders. This means that we are understating the growth of trade by 0.1 percentage points annually. Over the stretch of time covered by the graph, this would translate into 2.0 additional percentage points of world GDP involved in trade. In this story, it is very plausible that much of the drop in the trade to GDP ratio is a result of mis-measurement, even if the measurement problem is not a big deal from the standpoint of the world as a whole.
There is one other thing worth noting in this story. Suppose the protectionists get defeated and we find a way to finance innovation and creative work other than patent and copyright protection. In that case, drugs are all cheap and books, recorded music and video material all cross borders at zero cost. This explosion in globalization would be associated with a plunge in the trade to GDP ratios. This indicates that it may not be a very good measure of what we are interested in.
Jim Tankersley had an interesting piece arguing that the Brexit vote ended “globalization as we know it.” I am less optimistic on that front. The folks who profit from the current path of globalization are incredibly powerful and very effective at working around democracy and things like that. But that aside, the article had an interesting graph that caught my attention.
The graph shows the ratio of international trade in goods and services to GDP over the last two decades. After rising sharply from 1995 to 2007, it has been largely flat and still has not recovered to its 2007 peak. This change in trends is of course striking.
However, there is another aspect to this story worth considering. In the debate over the productivity slowdown, there is a camp which argues that it is largely illusory. The story goes that we are undercounting GDP, and therefore productivity, because we are missing the value of things like video downloads on the web, undercounting the value of the camera in our iPhones, and other such things.
While there is obviously some non-zero amount here (we are missing some things in our GDP accounting), I have never been convinced that it could be enough to change the basic story. (Remember it has to be cumulative. If we are undercounting by 0.5 percentage points annually, after 20 years we are undercounting GDP by 10 percent.)
But this connects to the trade story in an interesting way. The items that are likely to be missed in GDP accounts are also items that are heavily involved in trade. For example, people everywhere get information, music, and videos off the web. This means that if we are even undercounting GDP by a small amount, like 0.2 percentage points, we may be undercounting trade by a large amount.
In the 0.2 percentage point case, suppose that half of this is in items that cross national borders. This means that we are understating the growth of trade by 0.1 percentage points annually. Over the stretch of time covered by the graph, this would translate into 2.0 additional percentage points of world GDP involved in trade. In this story, it is very plausible that much of the drop in the trade to GDP ratio is a result of mis-measurement, even if the measurement problem is not a big deal from the standpoint of the world as a whole.
There is one other thing worth noting in this story. Suppose the protectionists get defeated and we find a way to finance innovation and creative work other than patent and copyright protection. In that case, drugs are all cheap and books, recorded music and video material all cross borders at zero cost. This explosion in globalization would be associated with a plunge in the trade to GDP ratios. This indicates that it may not be a very good measure of what we are interested in.
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An NYT article on the upcoming elections in Iceland told readers that, “gross national income per capita is down by a quarter since 2007.” The I.M.F. doesn’t agree. According to the I.M.F. data, per capital GDP in Iceland is around 2.0 percent higher now than its pre-recession peak. That is a very different story.
In fairness, the NYT piece refers to gross national income (GNI), not gross domestic product. Generally these are very close, but in a small country like Iceland they may differ by large amounts. GDP is usually the preferred measure, but it can be inflated by things like foreign companies claiming profits in the country for tax purposes, as happens in Ireland.
If the NYT’s GNI numbers are correct, it is most likely due to foreign profits of Iceland’s major banks in the bubble years before the crisis. It’s not clear that the loss of these profits, which were based on speculation and fraud, is a negative for Iceland’s economy.
An NYT article on the upcoming elections in Iceland told readers that, “gross national income per capita is down by a quarter since 2007.” The I.M.F. doesn’t agree. According to the I.M.F. data, per capital GDP in Iceland is around 2.0 percent higher now than its pre-recession peak. That is a very different story.
In fairness, the NYT piece refers to gross national income (GNI), not gross domestic product. Generally these are very close, but in a small country like Iceland they may differ by large amounts. GDP is usually the preferred measure, but it can be inflated by things like foreign companies claiming profits in the country for tax purposes, as happens in Ireland.
If the NYT’s GNI numbers are correct, it is most likely due to foreign profits of Iceland’s major banks in the bubble years before the crisis. It’s not clear that the loss of these profits, which were based on speculation and fraud, is a negative for Iceland’s economy.
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