I probably shouldn’t make too much of a deal about the edging lower part, after all, we’re just talking a few hundredths of a percentage point, but the real issue is that the inflation rate is not edging higher. The Fed has a target of a 2.0 percent average inflation rate for the core personal consumption expenditure deflator. This measure on inflation rate has been well below 2.0 percent ever since the recession began. There had been some evidence that it was rising as the unemployment rate and the labor market tightened.
However, the June data show the core inflation rate at just 1.57 percent over the last year, that is slightly below its reading in prior months. It is very hard to see any story where inflation is about to rise substantially and go above the 2.0 percent target. (And remember, the target is an average, so some period above 2.0 percent is consistent with the target, making up for the years of below 2.0 percent inflation.)
Anyhow, with the inflation rate below the target and showing no signs of accelerating, why would the Fed look to raise rates and slow the economy? If there was a plausible story where inflation could soon pose a serious problem, then a rate hike would be a debatable proposition. But we are in an economy where the labor market continues to show weakness by many measures (low employment rate for prime age workers, high numbers of people involuntarily working part-time, low quit rate, long durations of unemployment spells, and slow wage growth). So what possible basis would the Fed have for raising rates?
I probably shouldn’t make too much of a deal about the edging lower part, after all, we’re just talking a few hundredths of a percentage point, but the real issue is that the inflation rate is not edging higher. The Fed has a target of a 2.0 percent average inflation rate for the core personal consumption expenditure deflator. This measure on inflation rate has been well below 2.0 percent ever since the recession began. There had been some evidence that it was rising as the unemployment rate and the labor market tightened.
However, the June data show the core inflation rate at just 1.57 percent over the last year, that is slightly below its reading in prior months. It is very hard to see any story where inflation is about to rise substantially and go above the 2.0 percent target. (And remember, the target is an average, so some period above 2.0 percent is consistent with the target, making up for the years of below 2.0 percent inflation.)
Anyhow, with the inflation rate below the target and showing no signs of accelerating, why would the Fed look to raise rates and slow the economy? If there was a plausible story where inflation could soon pose a serious problem, then a rate hike would be a debatable proposition. But we are in an economy where the labor market continues to show weakness by many measures (low employment rate for prime age workers, high numbers of people involuntarily working part-time, low quit rate, long durations of unemployment spells, and slow wage growth). So what possible basis would the Fed have for raising rates?
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A NYT article on the prospects for the federal budget deficit under the next president told readers:
“Even without new spending, the federal budget deficit is expected to rise. By 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, the deficit will hit nearly $800 billion, or about 3.7 percent of expected economic output, as increasing entitlement costs for retiring baby boomers take their toll on federal coffers.”
Actually, the main reason the deficit is projected to rise is the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection that interest rates will rise. As a result if higher interest rates, the net interest burden is projected to rise by 1.4 percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2020 (Summary Table 1). This increase is divided into a 0.9 percentage point rise in interest payments and a 0.5 percentage point drop in revenue that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the interest it receives on the bonds it holds.
The implication is that if the Fed doesn’t raise interest rates and sell off its assets then we would not see this rise in the interest burden or the size of the budget deficit. On this point, it is worth noting that CBO has consistently overstated the rise in interest rates since 2010. It appears to have done so again in its 2016 projections.
A NYT article on the prospects for the federal budget deficit under the next president told readers:
“Even without new spending, the federal budget deficit is expected to rise. By 2020, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, the deficit will hit nearly $800 billion, or about 3.7 percent of expected economic output, as increasing entitlement costs for retiring baby boomers take their toll on federal coffers.”
Actually, the main reason the deficit is projected to rise is the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection that interest rates will rise. As a result if higher interest rates, the net interest burden is projected to rise by 1.4 percentage points of GDP between 2016 and 2020 (Summary Table 1). This increase is divided into a 0.9 percentage point rise in interest payments and a 0.5 percentage point drop in revenue that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the interest it receives on the bonds it holds.
The implication is that if the Fed doesn’t raise interest rates and sell off its assets then we would not see this rise in the interest burden or the size of the budget deficit. On this point, it is worth noting that CBO has consistently overstated the rise in interest rates since 2010. It appears to have done so again in its 2016 projections.
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The NYT gave an analysis of changing attitudes towards trade agreements that completely misrepresented the key issues at stake. The headline pretty much said it all, “both parties used to back free trade. Now they bash it.”
In fact, the current round of deals being negotiated, most importantly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP) have little to do with a conventional free trade agenda of lowering tariff barriers and eliminating quotas. With few exceptions, these barriers are already low or have been eliminated altogether.
Rather these deals are about putting in place a regulatory agenda that is being designed to foster corporate interests. The deals provide a backdoor around the normal legislative process, since many of these measures would not receive the support of democratically elected officials.
The agreements are also protectionist in important ways, making patent and copyright protections stronger and longer. (It doesn’t matter if you like these government granted monopolies, they are still protectionist.)
These deals are being largely negotiated in secrecy, with most of the input coming from top corporate executives. Then they are pushed on to the American public as all or nothing propositions, with the proponents arguing not only the economic merits, but rather claiming they are a geo-political necessity.
In the case of the TPP, the Obama administration is now contending that the defeat of the agreement would be devastating to efforts to maintain an alliance of countries to contain China. If this is in fact true, then it is understandable that the public would be outraged over the administration’s decision to let corporate interests get all sorts of special favors included in a deal that the administration now says is essential for national security.
It is incredible that the NYT tried to present the current debate as a narrow one over traditional issues of trade and protection. This is obviously not the case and there are no shortage of experts who could have explained this fact to its reporter. A good place to start would be the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, who also happens to be a NYT columnist. Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, could have also explained the nature of these trade agreements to its reporter.
It would be great if the paper tried to do serious reporting on trade rather than just repeating long outdated nonsense about free traders vs. protectionists.
The NYT gave an analysis of changing attitudes towards trade agreements that completely misrepresented the key issues at stake. The headline pretty much said it all, “both parties used to back free trade. Now they bash it.”
In fact, the current round of deals being negotiated, most importantly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP) have little to do with a conventional free trade agenda of lowering tariff barriers and eliminating quotas. With few exceptions, these barriers are already low or have been eliminated altogether.
Rather these deals are about putting in place a regulatory agenda that is being designed to foster corporate interests. The deals provide a backdoor around the normal legislative process, since many of these measures would not receive the support of democratically elected officials.
The agreements are also protectionist in important ways, making patent and copyright protections stronger and longer. (It doesn’t matter if you like these government granted monopolies, they are still protectionist.)
These deals are being largely negotiated in secrecy, with most of the input coming from top corporate executives. Then they are pushed on to the American public as all or nothing propositions, with the proponents arguing not only the economic merits, but rather claiming they are a geo-political necessity.
In the case of the TPP, the Obama administration is now contending that the defeat of the agreement would be devastating to efforts to maintain an alliance of countries to contain China. If this is in fact true, then it is understandable that the public would be outraged over the administration’s decision to let corporate interests get all sorts of special favors included in a deal that the administration now says is essential for national security.
It is incredible that the NYT tried to present the current debate as a narrow one over traditional issues of trade and protection. This is obviously not the case and there are no shortage of experts who could have explained this fact to its reporter. A good place to start would be the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, who also happens to be a NYT columnist. Joe Stiglitz, another Nobel Prize-winning economist, could have also explained the nature of these trade agreements to its reporter.
It would be great if the paper tried to do serious reporting on trade rather than just repeating long outdated nonsense about free traders vs. protectionists.
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Max Ehrenfreund had an interesting piece reporting on a new analysis of the first round of wage increases from Seattle’s $15 an hour minimum wage law. The higher wage is being phased in between 2015 and 2020. The study found modest average wage gains of 73 cents an hour for low wage workers. The effect was limited in part because the strong economy helped to boost wages, so the minimum wage had less effect than otherwise might have been expected.
But the piece also notes the finding that average work time fell by roughly 15 minutes per week and employment by 1.2 percent. It is important to recognize that this drop in employment does not mean that 1.2 percent low wage workers will have jobs over the course of the year.
These are high turnover jobs. The 1.2 percent drop in employment means that at a point in time, 1.2 percent fewer workers will be employed. What this means for low-wage workers in Seattle is that they can expect to spend more time looking for a new job when they lose or quit their prior job. If they get roughly 7.0 percent more for the hours that they work, but they put in 1–2 percent fewer hours over the course of the year, then they will likely consider themselves better off.
In other words, the finding of some reduction in employment is not necessarily a bad thing. It doesn’t mean that 1.2 percent of Seattle low-wage workforce has been condemned to go the whole year without a job.
Max Ehrenfreund had an interesting piece reporting on a new analysis of the first round of wage increases from Seattle’s $15 an hour minimum wage law. The higher wage is being phased in between 2015 and 2020. The study found modest average wage gains of 73 cents an hour for low wage workers. The effect was limited in part because the strong economy helped to boost wages, so the minimum wage had less effect than otherwise might have been expected.
But the piece also notes the finding that average work time fell by roughly 15 minutes per week and employment by 1.2 percent. It is important to recognize that this drop in employment does not mean that 1.2 percent low wage workers will have jobs over the course of the year.
These are high turnover jobs. The 1.2 percent drop in employment means that at a point in time, 1.2 percent fewer workers will be employed. What this means for low-wage workers in Seattle is that they can expect to spend more time looking for a new job when they lose or quit their prior job. If they get roughly 7.0 percent more for the hours that they work, but they put in 1–2 percent fewer hours over the course of the year, then they will likely consider themselves better off.
In other words, the finding of some reduction in employment is not necessarily a bad thing. It doesn’t mean that 1.2 percent of Seattle low-wage workforce has been condemned to go the whole year without a job.
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Okay, it’s not like the good old days of 2002–2007, but there are some grounds for concern in certain markets. In particular, the Case-Shiller tiered price indexes are showing extraordinary increases in the bottom tier (lowest third of house sale prices) in several markets.
For example, the index shows that in Denver prices in the bottom tier have risen by 16.7 percent over the last year and by 49.8 percent over the last three years. The comparable figures for the top tier are 6.4 percent and 21.4 percent. The CPI owner equivalent rent (OER) index has risen by 19.6 percent over the last three years.
In Portland, the one years increase for the bottom tier has been 16.2 percent and the three year 44.4 percent. For the top tier, the increases have been 9.9 percent and 26.3 percent. Rents have risen 16.3 percent over the last three years. In Los Angeles, prices in the bottom teir have risen 8.9 percent in the last year and 37.8 percent over the last three years. That compares to 7.0 percent and 21.1 percent for the top tier. Rents have risen by 9.9 percent over the last three years.
In Chicago, prices in the bottom tier have risen by 40.7 percent over the last three years and in Miami by 55.6 percent. Rents over this period rose in the two cities by 6.9 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively.
These numbers should provide serious grounds for caution. This is not a story of a bubble whose collapse will sink the economy and cause a financial crisis, but there is a real possibility that a lot of moderate-income homebuyers may get badly burned if prices turn around. The real estate pushers never care, since they make their money on the turnover, but it won’t be a pretty picture for the families affected.
Okay, it’s not like the good old days of 2002–2007, but there are some grounds for concern in certain markets. In particular, the Case-Shiller tiered price indexes are showing extraordinary increases in the bottom tier (lowest third of house sale prices) in several markets.
For example, the index shows that in Denver prices in the bottom tier have risen by 16.7 percent over the last year and by 49.8 percent over the last three years. The comparable figures for the top tier are 6.4 percent and 21.4 percent. The CPI owner equivalent rent (OER) index has risen by 19.6 percent over the last three years.
In Portland, the one years increase for the bottom tier has been 16.2 percent and the three year 44.4 percent. For the top tier, the increases have been 9.9 percent and 26.3 percent. Rents have risen 16.3 percent over the last three years. In Los Angeles, prices in the bottom teir have risen 8.9 percent in the last year and 37.8 percent over the last three years. That compares to 7.0 percent and 21.1 percent for the top tier. Rents have risen by 9.9 percent over the last three years.
In Chicago, prices in the bottom tier have risen by 40.7 percent over the last three years and in Miami by 55.6 percent. Rents over this period rose in the two cities by 6.9 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively.
These numbers should provide serious grounds for caution. This is not a story of a bubble whose collapse will sink the economy and cause a financial crisis, but there is a real possibility that a lot of moderate-income homebuyers may get badly burned if prices turn around. The real estate pushers never care, since they make their money on the turnover, but it won’t be a pretty picture for the families affected.
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That’s the question millions are asking after reading his column noting that both the Democratic and Republican platforms call for re-instating Glass-Steagall. (It is important to note that the Democrats refer to the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren. This measure would also address some of the problems created by the shadow banking system by changing rules on repayment in bankruptcy. This would put a check on the ability of troubled institutions to have access to credit markets.) Sorkin indicates that he doesn’t approve of Glass-Steagall.
At one point he tells readers:
“Whether reinstating the law is good idea or not, the short-term implications are decidedly negative: It would most likely mean a loss of jobs as part of a slowdown in lending from the biggest banks.
“There is a reasonable argument to make that it would also put the United States banking industry at a competitive disadvantage relative to international peers, some of which face fewer restrictions.”
It would be interesting to know how Sorkin decided that reinstating Glass-Steagall would reduce lending in the economy or even big bank lending. (It is possible that a reduction in big bank lending would be offset by more lending by smaller banks.) The big banks were supposed to keep a strict separation between their investment bank divisions and their commercial bank operations, so it’s not obvious why a separation would reduce lending if they had been following the law.
It is also worth noting, that according to standard trade theory, if our surplus on banking services is reduced by a new Glass-Steagall, our trade deficit in other areas, like manufacturing, would decline. Many people might consider this a desirable outcome. Of course, this assumes that people follow the trade theory that ostensibly underlies NAFTA, the TPP, and other recent trade deals.
It is worth noting that Sorkin is right that Glass-Steagall would not have prevented the economic crisis in 2008. The problem was allowing a massive housing bubble to grow unchecked. When house prices collapsed the mortgages, and other assets that depended on house prices, plunged in value. The repeal of Glass-Steagall did not in any obvious way contribute to the bubble.
That’s the question millions are asking after reading his column noting that both the Democratic and Republican platforms call for re-instating Glass-Steagall. (It is important to note that the Democrats refer to the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren. This measure would also address some of the problems created by the shadow banking system by changing rules on repayment in bankruptcy. This would put a check on the ability of troubled institutions to have access to credit markets.) Sorkin indicates that he doesn’t approve of Glass-Steagall.
At one point he tells readers:
“Whether reinstating the law is good idea or not, the short-term implications are decidedly negative: It would most likely mean a loss of jobs as part of a slowdown in lending from the biggest banks.
“There is a reasonable argument to make that it would also put the United States banking industry at a competitive disadvantage relative to international peers, some of which face fewer restrictions.”
It would be interesting to know how Sorkin decided that reinstating Glass-Steagall would reduce lending in the economy or even big bank lending. (It is possible that a reduction in big bank lending would be offset by more lending by smaller banks.) The big banks were supposed to keep a strict separation between their investment bank divisions and their commercial bank operations, so it’s not obvious why a separation would reduce lending if they had been following the law.
It is also worth noting, that according to standard trade theory, if our surplus on banking services is reduced by a new Glass-Steagall, our trade deficit in other areas, like manufacturing, would decline. Many people might consider this a desirable outcome. Of course, this assumes that people follow the trade theory that ostensibly underlies NAFTA, the TPP, and other recent trade deals.
It is worth noting that Sorkin is right that Glass-Steagall would not have prevented the economic crisis in 2008. The problem was allowing a massive housing bubble to grow unchecked. When house prices collapsed the mortgages, and other assets that depended on house prices, plunged in value. The repeal of Glass-Steagall did not in any obvious way contribute to the bubble.
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