Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The Washington Post repeated one of the major myths about the recovery in an article in the March employment report when it told readers:

“In the long shadow of the recession, the share of the population in the work force sunk to 62.4 percent in September, the lowest level in nearly 40 years. The government calculates that number by counting the people who have a job or are actively looking for one. That means students, retirees and stay-at-home parents are generally not considered part of the labor force.

“Indeed, the shrinking of America’s workforce is largely due to broader demographic shifts. The labor force peaked at 67.3 percent of the popuation in 2000 and has been drifting downward ever since. The biggest driver has been the retirement of Baby Boomers, who are turning 65 at the rate of 10,000 each day. Young people are also staying in school longer and less likely to work during their studies.”

Actually, the main reason the labor force participation rate (LFPR) has fallen has been a drop in the LFPR among prime age workers (ages 25–54). This peaked in 2000 at 82.8 percent in early 2000. In September of 2015 it bottomed out at 79.2 percent, 3.6 percentage points below its 2000 peak. The drop in LFPR in the recession and weak recovery has been primarily a story of workers in their prime working years leaving the labor force, not baby boomers retiring or young people staying in school longer.

The piece also cites reports by Wells Fargo and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank indicating that those with more education are doing much better in finding work in the recovery. This is not clear from the data. In the last year the employment rate of people with college degrees has not changed, while it fell by 0.6 percentage points for those with some college.

By contrast, the employment rate for people with just high school degrees fell by just 0.1 percentage point. It rose by 1.7 percentage points for workers without high school degrees. This gap is even more striking since the retiring baby boomers are less-educated on average than younger workers, so their retirement should be having a disproportionate effect in reducing the employment rate of less-educated workers.

 

Note: Link corrected.

The Washington Post repeated one of the major myths about the recovery in an article in the March employment report when it told readers:

“In the long shadow of the recession, the share of the population in the work force sunk to 62.4 percent in September, the lowest level in nearly 40 years. The government calculates that number by counting the people who have a job or are actively looking for one. That means students, retirees and stay-at-home parents are generally not considered part of the labor force.

“Indeed, the shrinking of America’s workforce is largely due to broader demographic shifts. The labor force peaked at 67.3 percent of the popuation in 2000 and has been drifting downward ever since. The biggest driver has been the retirement of Baby Boomers, who are turning 65 at the rate of 10,000 each day. Young people are also staying in school longer and less likely to work during their studies.”

Actually, the main reason the labor force participation rate (LFPR) has fallen has been a drop in the LFPR among prime age workers (ages 25–54). This peaked in 2000 at 82.8 percent in early 2000. In September of 2015 it bottomed out at 79.2 percent, 3.6 percentage points below its 2000 peak. The drop in LFPR in the recession and weak recovery has been primarily a story of workers in their prime working years leaving the labor force, not baby boomers retiring or young people staying in school longer.

The piece also cites reports by Wells Fargo and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank indicating that those with more education are doing much better in finding work in the recovery. This is not clear from the data. In the last year the employment rate of people with college degrees has not changed, while it fell by 0.6 percentage points for those with some college.

By contrast, the employment rate for people with just high school degrees fell by just 0.1 percentage point. It rose by 1.7 percentage points for workers without high school degrees. This gap is even more striking since the retiring baby boomers are less-educated on average than younger workers, so their retirement should be having a disproportionate effect in reducing the employment rate of less-educated workers.

 

Note: Link corrected.

Wage Wars at the Fed

The NYT article on the March jobs report featured several economists describing the current state of the economy in glowing terms. Scott Clemons, chief investment strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman, described the current economic situation as being a “near Goldlocks scenario.” He said the jobs and wage gains in March were healthy, but not so strong as to prompt the Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates to slow growth. Michelle Meyer, deputy head of United States economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, described the economic situation as “a best-case scenario.” Michael Gapen, chief United States economist at Barclays, also was very positive about the economy. This view seemed to be reflected in the first two paragraphs in the article which were also overwhelmingly positive about the current state of the economy. (In fairness, the piece included several comments noting how far the economy has yet to go to recover to pre-recession levels. Also, in addition to the optimism from the bank economists, it included a comment from Claire McKenna, a senior policy analyst with the National Employment Law Project.) While there is little doubt that the economy is doing much better in recent months than it had been earlier in the recovery and that workers are seeing some gains, it is important to ask about the implicit base of comparison in these comments. The average hourly wage increased at a 2.3 percent rate over the last year. Its annualized rate of increase over the last three months compared with the prior three months is also 2.3 percent, which indicates no acceleration. Since inflation over the last year was only 1.0 percent, this translates into a 1.3 percent increase in real wages over this period. While this is a decent rate of increase, it is only roughly equal to the trend rate of productivity growth. In other words, this is the rate of wage growth that workers should be able to assume in a normal year. However, there are two reasons to consider this rate inadequate. First, workers lost an enormous amount of ground in the downturn. The average real hourly wage did not pass its 2008 peak until November of 2014. (Workers had also seen almost no wage growth in the prior business cycle, so they had lots of ground to make up even in 2008.)
The NYT article on the March jobs report featured several economists describing the current state of the economy in glowing terms. Scott Clemons, chief investment strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman, described the current economic situation as being a “near Goldlocks scenario.” He said the jobs and wage gains in March were healthy, but not so strong as to prompt the Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates to slow growth. Michelle Meyer, deputy head of United States economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, described the economic situation as “a best-case scenario.” Michael Gapen, chief United States economist at Barclays, also was very positive about the economy. This view seemed to be reflected in the first two paragraphs in the article which were also overwhelmingly positive about the current state of the economy. (In fairness, the piece included several comments noting how far the economy has yet to go to recover to pre-recession levels. Also, in addition to the optimism from the bank economists, it included a comment from Claire McKenna, a senior policy analyst with the National Employment Law Project.) While there is little doubt that the economy is doing much better in recent months than it had been earlier in the recovery and that workers are seeing some gains, it is important to ask about the implicit base of comparison in these comments. The average hourly wage increased at a 2.3 percent rate over the last year. Its annualized rate of increase over the last three months compared with the prior three months is also 2.3 percent, which indicates no acceleration. Since inflation over the last year was only 1.0 percent, this translates into a 1.3 percent increase in real wages over this period. While this is a decent rate of increase, it is only roughly equal to the trend rate of productivity growth. In other words, this is the rate of wage growth that workers should be able to assume in a normal year. However, there are two reasons to consider this rate inadequate. First, workers lost an enormous amount of ground in the downturn. The average real hourly wage did not pass its 2008 peak until November of 2014. (Workers had also seen almost no wage growth in the prior business cycle, so they had lots of ground to make up even in 2008.)
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the paid content and the news stories in the NYT. Farhad Manjoo’s piece on Uber’s new carpooling service could leave any reader confused. Manjoo seems to have taken everything Uber said about this service at face value, just as one would expect in paid content. We can start with the story that sets up the piece. The story is that Abby is going from San Francisco Tenderloin district to the Noe Valley, a trip which the piece tells us would ordinarily take about 25 minutes by car. She decides to use UberPool instead of driving. Before the UberPool trip ends, it picks up four other passengers. According to the article, the total trip takes 55 minutes (not all of it with Abby, who gets out before the last stop) and covers 10 miles. The piece then tells readers: 'In total, Uber collected about $48 for the ride, of which the driver kept $35. The company had collapsed five separate rides into a single trip, saving about six miles of travel and removing several cars from the road.' That might be Uber’s story, but let’s look at this more seriously. The driver has to pay for gas, insurance, and depreciation on the car. The I.R.S. puts these costs at an average of 54 cents a mile. We know the trip covered ten miles, but the driver also has to get to the start point and back from the end point. Let’s conservatively say that adds five miles for a total 15 miles driven. This comes to $8.10, which reduces the hourly pay rate for this ride to $26.90. That’s still not too bad, but remember, this is for the time the driver actually has people in the car. If he has to wait another half hour for his next fare, then the hourly rate falls to $17.90. Keep in mind this is in a city with high living costs where the minimum wage is being raised to $15.00 an hour.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the paid content and the news stories in the NYT. Farhad Manjoo’s piece on Uber’s new carpooling service could leave any reader confused. Manjoo seems to have taken everything Uber said about this service at face value, just as one would expect in paid content. We can start with the story that sets up the piece. The story is that Abby is going from San Francisco Tenderloin district to the Noe Valley, a trip which the piece tells us would ordinarily take about 25 minutes by car. She decides to use UberPool instead of driving. Before the UberPool trip ends, it picks up four other passengers. According to the article, the total trip takes 55 minutes (not all of it with Abby, who gets out before the last stop) and covers 10 miles. The piece then tells readers: 'In total, Uber collected about $48 for the ride, of which the driver kept $35. The company had collapsed five separate rides into a single trip, saving about six miles of travel and removing several cars from the road.' That might be Uber’s story, but let’s look at this more seriously. The driver has to pay for gas, insurance, and depreciation on the car. The I.R.S. puts these costs at an average of 54 cents a mile. We know the trip covered ten miles, but the driver also has to get to the start point and back from the end point. Let’s conservatively say that adds five miles for a total 15 miles driven. This comes to $8.10, which reduces the hourly pay rate for this ride to $26.90. That’s still not too bad, but remember, this is for the time the driver actually has people in the car. If he has to wait another half hour for his next fare, then the hourly rate falls to $17.90. Keep in mind this is in a city with high living costs where the minimum wage is being raised to $15.00 an hour.
Eduardo Porter had an interesting piece in the NYT in which he argued that NAFTA actually saved jobs for auto workers in the United States. The argument is that by allowing U.S. manufacturers to have easier access to low cost labor in Mexico for part of their operation, they were able to keep a larger market share than would otherwise be the case. The same would apply to foreign manufacturers choosing to locate operations in the United States rather than staying in Europe, Japan, or elsewhere. The argument is that better access to low cost labor in Mexico made locating part of their operating in the United States more attractive. Currently we import roughly $100 billion a year in cars and parts from Mexico, this compares to total domestic production of around $500 billion. Porter argues that on net, because NAFTA improved the competitiveness of the U.S. industry, it actually saved jobs. This is not impossible, but it does seem implausible. I headlined the case of doctors to see an analogous story. Suppose that we have large numbers of people going to other countries for major medical procedures to take advantage of the fact that the cost is typically less than half as much and sometimes less than one tenth as much for comparable quality care. (Imagine saving $200,000 on open heart surgery by having the operation in Germany. Most of these surgeries are done on a non-emergency basis, so it is possible.) In this scenario, suppose that we have a somewhat different NAFTA that made it much easier for Mexican doctors to train to U.S. standards and come practice in the United States. Let’s imagine 200,000 Mexican doctors, or roughly one fifth of our total, chose to take advantage of this opportunity.
Eduardo Porter had an interesting piece in the NYT in which he argued that NAFTA actually saved jobs for auto workers in the United States. The argument is that by allowing U.S. manufacturers to have easier access to low cost labor in Mexico for part of their operation, they were able to keep a larger market share than would otherwise be the case. The same would apply to foreign manufacturers choosing to locate operations in the United States rather than staying in Europe, Japan, or elsewhere. The argument is that better access to low cost labor in Mexico made locating part of their operating in the United States more attractive. Currently we import roughly $100 billion a year in cars and parts from Mexico, this compares to total domestic production of around $500 billion. Porter argues that on net, because NAFTA improved the competitiveness of the U.S. industry, it actually saved jobs. This is not impossible, but it does seem implausible. I headlined the case of doctors to see an analogous story. Suppose that we have large numbers of people going to other countries for major medical procedures to take advantage of the fact that the cost is typically less than half as much and sometimes less than one tenth as much for comparable quality care. (Imagine saving $200,000 on open heart surgery by having the operation in Germany. Most of these surgeries are done on a non-emergency basis, so it is possible.) In this scenario, suppose that we have a somewhat different NAFTA that made it much easier for Mexican doctors to train to U.S. standards and come practice in the United States. Let’s imagine 200,000 Mexican doctors, or roughly one fifth of our total, chose to take advantage of this opportunity.

Okay, since it seems the WSJ is recycling a NYT piece, I will recycle a blog post.

Most newspapers try to avoid the self-serving studies that industry groups put out to try to gain public support for their favored policies. But apparently The New York Times does not feel bound by such standards. It ran a major news story on a study by Citigroup that was designed to scare people about the state of public pensions and encourage them to trust more of their retirement savings to the financial industry.

Both the article and the study itself seem intended to scare more than inform. For example, the piece tells readers:

“Twenty countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have promised their retirees a total $78 trillion, much of it unfunded, according to the Citigroup report.

“That is close to twice the $44 trillion total national debt of those 20 countries, and the pension obligations are ‘not on government balance sheets,’ Citigroup said.”

Okay folks, how much is $78 trillion over the rest of the century for the 20 OECD countries mentioned? Is it bigger than a breadbox?

The NYT has committed itself to putting numbers in context, where is the context here? Virtually none of the NYT’s readers has any clue how large a burden $78 trillion is for the OECD countries over the rest of the century. The article did not inform readers with this comment, it tried to scare them. That is not journalism.

For those who are keeping score, GDP in these countries for the next 80 years will be around $2,000 trillion (very rough approximation, not a careful calculation) so we’re talking about a big expense, roughly 4 percent of GDP, but hardly one that should be bankrupting.

Furthermore, the whole treatment of the expense as an “unfunded” liability is problematic. Suppose the United States spends 7 percent of its GDP on education (roughly current spending) and this share is projected to rise to 8 percent over coming decades. We can treat the commitment to educating our children as an “unfunded liability,” after all we don’t have any money set aside from prior years to fund it.

But since we are already spending the 7 percent on education every year, the additional burden will just be the boost to 8 percent. That is a burden of 1 percentage point of GDP or roughly half the cost of the increase in annual military spending associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

There is a similar story with public pensions. In the case of Social Security, the U.S. is currently spending about 5.0 percent of GDP on the program, up from 4.0 percent in 2000. Spending is projected to rise by another percentage point over the next 10–15 years, are you scared?

Almost every item mentioned in this article seems intended to scare from the very paragraph:

“When Detroit went bankrupt in 2013, investors were shocked to learn that the city had promised pensions worth billions more than anyone knew — creating a financial pileup that ultimately meant big, unexpected losses for Detroit’s bondholders.”

Investors were shocked, really? Are the people who invest trillions of dollars morons? The books of Detroit’s pension system were publicly available. The problem was not the actuarial accounting blamed in this piece, the problem was simply that Detroit was a bankrupt city unable to meet its obligations because of a tax base that crashed as it lost two-thirds of its population.

If there were any investors who were shocked by Detroit’s pension liabilities then the NYT should do a major piece profiling these people. They are almost certainly way over their heads in jobs that pay six and seven figure salaries.

Finally, there is little doubt that the Citibank piece itself is intended as a promotional piece for the financial industry. After detailing the alleged crisis facing public pension funds, Citibank tells readers:

“Finally, the silver lining of the pensions crisis is for product providers such as insurers and asset managers. Private pension assets are forecast to grow $5–$11 trillion over the next 10–30 years and strong growth is forecast in insurance pension buy-outs, private pension schemes, and asset and guaranteed retirement income solutions.”

The one small hint that readers get in the article that this study was an industry promotion piece comes when we are told:

“For years there have been frequent reports of pension systems rife with pay-to-play deals, improper payouts, overly risky investment strategies and other problems. But the Citigroup researchers looked beyond such scandals and depicted the worldwide accumulation of giant, invisible pension obligations as a matter of simple demographics.”

Of course, it might have been more useful if instead of telling readers that the study, “looked beyond such scandals,” to tell readers that the study ignored such scandals.

Okay, since it seems the WSJ is recycling a NYT piece, I will recycle a blog post.

Most newspapers try to avoid the self-serving studies that industry groups put out to try to gain public support for their favored policies. But apparently The New York Times does not feel bound by such standards. It ran a major news story on a study by Citigroup that was designed to scare people about the state of public pensions and encourage them to trust more of their retirement savings to the financial industry.

Both the article and the study itself seem intended to scare more than inform. For example, the piece tells readers:

“Twenty countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have promised their retirees a total $78 trillion, much of it unfunded, according to the Citigroup report.

“That is close to twice the $44 trillion total national debt of those 20 countries, and the pension obligations are ‘not on government balance sheets,’ Citigroup said.”

Okay folks, how much is $78 trillion over the rest of the century for the 20 OECD countries mentioned? Is it bigger than a breadbox?

The NYT has committed itself to putting numbers in context, where is the context here? Virtually none of the NYT’s readers has any clue how large a burden $78 trillion is for the OECD countries over the rest of the century. The article did not inform readers with this comment, it tried to scare them. That is not journalism.

For those who are keeping score, GDP in these countries for the next 80 years will be around $2,000 trillion (very rough approximation, not a careful calculation) so we’re talking about a big expense, roughly 4 percent of GDP, but hardly one that should be bankrupting.

Furthermore, the whole treatment of the expense as an “unfunded” liability is problematic. Suppose the United States spends 7 percent of its GDP on education (roughly current spending) and this share is projected to rise to 8 percent over coming decades. We can treat the commitment to educating our children as an “unfunded liability,” after all we don’t have any money set aside from prior years to fund it.

But since we are already spending the 7 percent on education every year, the additional burden will just be the boost to 8 percent. That is a burden of 1 percentage point of GDP or roughly half the cost of the increase in annual military spending associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

There is a similar story with public pensions. In the case of Social Security, the U.S. is currently spending about 5.0 percent of GDP on the program, up from 4.0 percent in 2000. Spending is projected to rise by another percentage point over the next 10–15 years, are you scared?

Almost every item mentioned in this article seems intended to scare from the very paragraph:

“When Detroit went bankrupt in 2013, investors were shocked to learn that the city had promised pensions worth billions more than anyone knew — creating a financial pileup that ultimately meant big, unexpected losses for Detroit’s bondholders.”

Investors were shocked, really? Are the people who invest trillions of dollars morons? The books of Detroit’s pension system were publicly available. The problem was not the actuarial accounting blamed in this piece, the problem was simply that Detroit was a bankrupt city unable to meet its obligations because of a tax base that crashed as it lost two-thirds of its population.

If there were any investors who were shocked by Detroit’s pension liabilities then the NYT should do a major piece profiling these people. They are almost certainly way over their heads in jobs that pay six and seven figure salaries.

Finally, there is little doubt that the Citibank piece itself is intended as a promotional piece for the financial industry. After detailing the alleged crisis facing public pension funds, Citibank tells readers:

“Finally, the silver lining of the pensions crisis is for product providers such as insurers and asset managers. Private pension assets are forecast to grow $5–$11 trillion over the next 10–30 years and strong growth is forecast in insurance pension buy-outs, private pension schemes, and asset and guaranteed retirement income solutions.”

The one small hint that readers get in the article that this study was an industry promotion piece comes when we are told:

“For years there have been frequent reports of pension systems rife with pay-to-play deals, improper payouts, overly risky investment strategies and other problems. But the Citigroup researchers looked beyond such scandals and depicted the worldwide accumulation of giant, invisible pension obligations as a matter of simple demographics.”

Of course, it might have been more useful if instead of telling readers that the study, “looked beyond such scandals,” to tell readers that the study ignored such scandals.

The prospect of Donald Trump getting the Republican presidential nomination is dominating media attention these days, with some cause, but this has meant that evidence of a weakening economy has been largely ignored. We have seen a series of reports in the last month suggesting that the economy is likely to perform considerably worse than the 2.5 percent growth rate predicted by most economists at the start of the year. (The Congressional Budget Office‘s projection was 2.7 percent.)

The most recent bad news was February’s data on personal income and consumption. It showed real growth in spending for the month of 0.2 percent. While that is not too bad, January’s figure was revised down from 0.4 percent to zero. Given that consumption is 70 percent of GDP, this is not good news on the growth front.

Other evidence of weakness comes from trade, where it seems that the deficit is continuing to expand in the first quarter due to a high dollar and weak growth elsewhere. Non-defense capital goods shipments, which is the largest category in investment, is running behind 2015 levels. Residential construction is holding up, but showing little, if any, increase over the second half of 2015. My bet is that we will see a serious downturn in the non-residential sector as some serious overbuilding of office space in many cities dampens irrational exuberance. Government spending may provide a modest boost in the quarter and year, but austerity fever still dominates politics at all levels.

In short, we could be looking at growth that is close to 1.0 percent for the year. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow puts first quarter growth at just 0.6 percent. It is hard to see how such slow growth can be consistent with rapid job growth and a continuing drop in the unemployment rate, although I have been surprised in this area before. (Basically, it would mean that productivity growth is falling to zero or turning negative.)

Anyhow, the spate of weak economic reports deserve more attention than they have gotten. It could be bad news for lots of people.

By the way, I actually don’t think a recession is likely, just exceptionally slow growth. The use of the R word was click bait to get you away from the Trump stories.

The prospect of Donald Trump getting the Republican presidential nomination is dominating media attention these days, with some cause, but this has meant that evidence of a weakening economy has been largely ignored. We have seen a series of reports in the last month suggesting that the economy is likely to perform considerably worse than the 2.5 percent growth rate predicted by most economists at the start of the year. (The Congressional Budget Office‘s projection was 2.7 percent.)

The most recent bad news was February’s data on personal income and consumption. It showed real growth in spending for the month of 0.2 percent. While that is not too bad, January’s figure was revised down from 0.4 percent to zero. Given that consumption is 70 percent of GDP, this is not good news on the growth front.

Other evidence of weakness comes from trade, where it seems that the deficit is continuing to expand in the first quarter due to a high dollar and weak growth elsewhere. Non-defense capital goods shipments, which is the largest category in investment, is running behind 2015 levels. Residential construction is holding up, but showing little, if any, increase over the second half of 2015. My bet is that we will see a serious downturn in the non-residential sector as some serious overbuilding of office space in many cities dampens irrational exuberance. Government spending may provide a modest boost in the quarter and year, but austerity fever still dominates politics at all levels.

In short, we could be looking at growth that is close to 1.0 percent for the year. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow puts first quarter growth at just 0.6 percent. It is hard to see how such slow growth can be consistent with rapid job growth and a continuing drop in the unemployment rate, although I have been surprised in this area before. (Basically, it would mean that productivity growth is falling to zero or turning negative.)

Anyhow, the spate of weak economic reports deserve more attention than they have gotten. It could be bad news for lots of people.

By the way, I actually don’t think a recession is likely, just exceptionally slow growth. The use of the R word was click bait to get you away from the Trump stories.

I'm tied up with many other things, but since folks asked, I will give a quick comment/explanation of the Vox analysis of Bernie Sanders' tax plans. For those who haven't seen it, Vox put together a calculator that allows people to plug in their income and then see how their tax bill would change under the tax plans proposed by Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. For the first two, most people get tax cuts. There is little change with Clinton, but big tax increases with Sanders. For example, I took a single person with one kid, who earns $30,000 a year. According to the tax calculator, this person would see an increase in their tax bill of $3,680 as a result of the Sanders' tax package. I can't quite follow the math here, because the calculator says that Sanders plan gives this a person a tax rate of 18.1 percent, compared with 10.3 percent for the current system. This implies an increase in the tax rate of 7.8 percentage points of this person's income. But 7.8 percentage points of $30,000 would get you $2,340 not the $3,680 indicated by the calculator. Okay, but let's ignore the math problem and get to the underlying issues. Most of the basis for this tax increase for moderate income workers is Sanders' tax to pay for his universal Medicare plan. This would impose a payroll tax on employers of 6.2 percent and a 2.2 tax on individuals for income in excess of the standard deduction (roughly $9,500 for this person). There is also a 0.2 percentage point tax increase to cover the cost of paid family leave. In addition, some of the other taxes will have feedback that will affect moderate income earners, but these taxes are the bulk of the story.
I'm tied up with many other things, but since folks asked, I will give a quick comment/explanation of the Vox analysis of Bernie Sanders' tax plans. For those who haven't seen it, Vox put together a calculator that allows people to plug in their income and then see how their tax bill would change under the tax plans proposed by Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. For the first two, most people get tax cuts. There is little change with Clinton, but big tax increases with Sanders. For example, I took a single person with one kid, who earns $30,000 a year. According to the tax calculator, this person would see an increase in their tax bill of $3,680 as a result of the Sanders' tax package. I can't quite follow the math here, because the calculator says that Sanders plan gives this a person a tax rate of 18.1 percent, compared with 10.3 percent for the current system. This implies an increase in the tax rate of 7.8 percentage points of this person's income. But 7.8 percentage points of $30,000 would get you $2,340 not the $3,680 indicated by the calculator. Okay, but let's ignore the math problem and get to the underlying issues. Most of the basis for this tax increase for moderate income workers is Sanders' tax to pay for his universal Medicare plan. This would impose a payroll tax on employers of 6.2 percent and a 2.2 tax on individuals for income in excess of the standard deduction (roughly $9,500 for this person). There is also a 0.2 percentage point tax increase to cover the cost of paid family leave. In addition, some of the other taxes will have feedback that will affect moderate income earners, but these taxes are the bulk of the story.

Dan Balz Libels Paul Ryan

Dan Balz ignored more than a decade of Speaker of the House Paul Ryan’s writing and work in politics in an analysis that contrasts Ryan’s “conservative, problem-solving party” with “a Cruz-style radical anti-government party content with blowing things up as they now stand.” If Balz had paid any attention to the budgets that Paul Ryan eagerly touted as head of the House Budget Committee he would know that there is no one who has a better claim to being “anti-government” and “blowing things up as they now stand” than Mr. Ryan. 

Ryan’s budgets essentially proposed eliminating everything the government does except for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the military. The Congressional Budget Office’s analysis of the his budget, which Ryan directed, showed that it would reduce all discretionary spending, plus non-Medicare and Medicaid entitlements to just 3.5 percent of GDP by 2050. This is roughly the current size of the military budget, which Ryan has indicated he wants to increase.

This means the Ryan budget called for eliminating everything else the government does, such as build and maintain infrastructure, monitor food and drug safety, support basic research in health care and other areas, protect the environment, and support early childhood education and nutrition. If eliminating just about the entire government is not “radical anti-government” it is hard to know what would be. 

Balz owes Speaker Ryan an apology.

Dan Balz ignored more than a decade of Speaker of the House Paul Ryan’s writing and work in politics in an analysis that contrasts Ryan’s “conservative, problem-solving party” with “a Cruz-style radical anti-government party content with blowing things up as they now stand.” If Balz had paid any attention to the budgets that Paul Ryan eagerly touted as head of the House Budget Committee he would know that there is no one who has a better claim to being “anti-government” and “blowing things up as they now stand” than Mr. Ryan. 

Ryan’s budgets essentially proposed eliminating everything the government does except for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the military. The Congressional Budget Office’s analysis of the his budget, which Ryan directed, showed that it would reduce all discretionary spending, plus non-Medicare and Medicaid entitlements to just 3.5 percent of GDP by 2050. This is roughly the current size of the military budget, which Ryan has indicated he wants to increase.

This means the Ryan budget called for eliminating everything else the government does, such as build and maintain infrastructure, monitor food and drug safety, support basic research in health care and other areas, protect the environment, and support early childhood education and nutrition. If eliminating just about the entire government is not “radical anti-government” it is hard to know what would be. 

Balz owes Speaker Ryan an apology.

I know that no one reads the Washington Post’s opinion pages for their insights on economic issues, but can’t we hope for at least some connection with reality. In his column today warning that productivity growth is likely to be weak forever more, George Will told readers:

“America’s entitlement state is buckling beneath the pressure of an aging population retiring into Social Security and Medicare during chronically slow economic growth.”

The entitlement state is “buckling.” If we tried to make sense of this assertion it presumably means that excessive spending on these programs is leading to high interest rates and/or high inflation. The problem is that we are creating more demand than the economy is able to supply. The only problem with this analysis is that long-term interest rates remain near post-World War II lows and inflation remains well below even the Fed’s unnecessarily low 2.0 percent target.

The only evidence the entitlement state is “buckling” from these programs seems to be the complaints from the folks at the Post and other Very Serious People. This does not appear to be a problem that exists in the real world.

On the more general claim about future productivity growth, which Will takes from Robert Gordon, it is worth recounting the past record of Gordon and other economists. There were three major shifts in productivity trends in the post-war era. There was a sharp slowdown in 1973, an upturn in 1995, and then a slowdown again beginning somewhere between 2005 and 2007. 

No one saw the 1973 slowdown coming. More than forty years later there is no agreed upon explanation as to its cause. There were very few economists who saw the 1995 pick-up coming, although it is generally accepted that the information technology boom was its cause. Almost no one saw the slowdown coming in 2005-2007, and there is no agreement as to its cause.

Given the past record of economists (including Robert Gordon) in projecting the future path of productivity growth, we might be skeptical about a book that projects slow productivity growth for the indefinite future.

I know that no one reads the Washington Post’s opinion pages for their insights on economic issues, but can’t we hope for at least some connection with reality. In his column today warning that productivity growth is likely to be weak forever more, George Will told readers:

“America’s entitlement state is buckling beneath the pressure of an aging population retiring into Social Security and Medicare during chronically slow economic growth.”

The entitlement state is “buckling.” If we tried to make sense of this assertion it presumably means that excessive spending on these programs is leading to high interest rates and/or high inflation. The problem is that we are creating more demand than the economy is able to supply. The only problem with this analysis is that long-term interest rates remain near post-World War II lows and inflation remains well below even the Fed’s unnecessarily low 2.0 percent target.

The only evidence the entitlement state is “buckling” from these programs seems to be the complaints from the folks at the Post and other Very Serious People. This does not appear to be a problem that exists in the real world.

On the more general claim about future productivity growth, which Will takes from Robert Gordon, it is worth recounting the past record of Gordon and other economists. There were three major shifts in productivity trends in the post-war era. There was a sharp slowdown in 1973, an upturn in 1995, and then a slowdown again beginning somewhere between 2005 and 2007. 

No one saw the 1973 slowdown coming. More than forty years later there is no agreed upon explanation as to its cause. There were very few economists who saw the 1995 pick-up coming, although it is generally accepted that the information technology boom was its cause. Almost no one saw the slowdown coming in 2005-2007, and there is no agreement as to its cause.

Given the past record of economists (including Robert Gordon) in projecting the future path of productivity growth, we might be skeptical about a book that projects slow productivity growth for the indefinite future.

Neil Irwin takes issue with Donald Trump using the trade surplus between countries as a scorecard on trade. He is largely right with a couple of important qualifications. Irwin notes that a country with a trade surplus should see its currency rise against the dollar if it doesn’t reinvest the money in dollar assets. He then comments that if it does reinvest the money in dollar assets, whether or not it benefits the United States depends on what the money is used for. As Irwin points out, in the last decade the money was used in large part to invest in residential housing and to inflate the housing bubble. This was of course not useful. But there is a deeper point here. In an era of “secular stagnation,” which means there is not enough demand in the economy, the foreign assets may in effect be invested in nothing. Most of the foreign capital that went into the United States in the housing bubble years did not get directly invested in housing. It was invested in government bonds and short-term deposits. These investments don’t directly create any jobs; they are simply assets on a balance sheet. Insofar as foreigners invest their surplus dollars in U.S. assets not directly linked to employment (which will generally be the case) a trade deficit will be associated with higher unemployment, unless the economy has some other force generating employment to offset it. Currently we are running an annual trade deficit of around $540 billion (@ 3 percent of GDP). This could be offset by spending more on education, infrastructure, clean technology or other areas, but the Very Serious People will not let us run larger budget deficits. In that context, it is quite reasonable to link a trade deficit to higher unemployment, so Trump is not wrong in that respect.
Neil Irwin takes issue with Donald Trump using the trade surplus between countries as a scorecard on trade. He is largely right with a couple of important qualifications. Irwin notes that a country with a trade surplus should see its currency rise against the dollar if it doesn’t reinvest the money in dollar assets. He then comments that if it does reinvest the money in dollar assets, whether or not it benefits the United States depends on what the money is used for. As Irwin points out, in the last decade the money was used in large part to invest in residential housing and to inflate the housing bubble. This was of course not useful. But there is a deeper point here. In an era of “secular stagnation,” which means there is not enough demand in the economy, the foreign assets may in effect be invested in nothing. Most of the foreign capital that went into the United States in the housing bubble years did not get directly invested in housing. It was invested in government bonds and short-term deposits. These investments don’t directly create any jobs; they are simply assets on a balance sheet. Insofar as foreigners invest their surplus dollars in U.S. assets not directly linked to employment (which will generally be the case) a trade deficit will be associated with higher unemployment, unless the economy has some other force generating employment to offset it. Currently we are running an annual trade deficit of around $540 billion (@ 3 percent of GDP). This could be offset by spending more on education, infrastructure, clean technology or other areas, but the Very Serious People will not let us run larger budget deficits. In that context, it is quite reasonable to link a trade deficit to higher unemployment, so Trump is not wrong in that respect.

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