Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Fareed Zakaria used his column in the Washington Post this week to approvingly quote former British foreign minister David Miliband saying: “The right has no good answer to the problem that globalization erodes people’s identities. The left has no good answer to the problem that it exacerbates inequality...” Actually, the left has plenty of good answers on inequality, they just get ignored or misrepresented in outlets like the Washington Post. For example, many progressives (including Senator Bernie Sanders) have long supported a financial transactions tax. This would raise tens of billions of dollars annually that would come almost exclusively out of the hides of the high-flyers in the financial sector. Progressives also want to end the government’s “too big to fail” insurance for the country’s largest banks, a subsidy that gives tens of billions of dollars a year to the country’s biggest banks. When these ideas appear at all in the Post they are completely misrepresented, with the paper bizarrely insisting that financial reform is about preventing the 2008 crisis instead of restructuring the financial sector to better serve the productive economy. Beyond finance, many progressives are strongly opposed to the center’s protectionist agenda on trade, which would involves continually making patent and copyright protection stronger and longer. These forms of protection are equivalent to imposing tariffs of several thousand percent on the protected items. However since the beneficiaries in the pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industry tend to be rich and powerful, papers like the Washington Post pretend they are the “free market.”
Fareed Zakaria used his column in the Washington Post this week to approvingly quote former British foreign minister David Miliband saying: “The right has no good answer to the problem that globalization erodes people’s identities. The left has no good answer to the problem that it exacerbates inequality...” Actually, the left has plenty of good answers on inequality, they just get ignored or misrepresented in outlets like the Washington Post. For example, many progressives (including Senator Bernie Sanders) have long supported a financial transactions tax. This would raise tens of billions of dollars annually that would come almost exclusively out of the hides of the high-flyers in the financial sector. Progressives also want to end the government’s “too big to fail” insurance for the country’s largest banks, a subsidy that gives tens of billions of dollars a year to the country’s biggest banks. When these ideas appear at all in the Post they are completely misrepresented, with the paper bizarrely insisting that financial reform is about preventing the 2008 crisis instead of restructuring the financial sector to better serve the productive economy. Beyond finance, many progressives are strongly opposed to the center’s protectionist agenda on trade, which would involves continually making patent and copyright protection stronger and longer. These forms of protection are equivalent to imposing tariffs of several thousand percent on the protected items. However since the beneficiaries in the pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment industry tend to be rich and powerful, papers like the Washington Post pretend they are the “free market.”
Matt O’Brien had a very good piece on the silliness of the robots taking our jobs story. The basic point is that it is silly to worry about a possible future in which robots are taking our jobs, when we currently face a situation in which people don’t have jobs just because Congress won’t spend the money. I couldn’t agree more. We can all see the really cool things that can be done by robots and advanced computers, but the fact is they are not doing it now. As Matt notes, productivity growth has been very slow in the last decade, the story of robots taking our jobs is one in which productivity growth is very fast. There are two points worth adding to Matt’s comments. First, he refers to an often cited analysis that finds 47 percent of all jobs are at risk of being automated over the next twenty years. Sounds pretty scary, right? Well let’s imagine that all of the 47 percent of those at risk jobs gets computerized over the next two decades. (The study just identifies these as “at risk” jobs, a high proportion of which will be computerized, not all of them.) This rate of computerization would translate into 3.1 percent annual productivity growth. That’s a hair higher than the 2.9 percent annual rate of productivity growth that we saw in the Golden Age from 1947–1973. That was a period of low unemployment and rapid real wage and income growth. If there is a reason that we should be scared in this story it is not because of the productivity growth, but rather an institutional structure that prevents most workers from benefitting from this growth.
Matt O’Brien had a very good piece on the silliness of the robots taking our jobs story. The basic point is that it is silly to worry about a possible future in which robots are taking our jobs, when we currently face a situation in which people don’t have jobs just because Congress won’t spend the money. I couldn’t agree more. We can all see the really cool things that can be done by robots and advanced computers, but the fact is they are not doing it now. As Matt notes, productivity growth has been very slow in the last decade, the story of robots taking our jobs is one in which productivity growth is very fast. There are two points worth adding to Matt’s comments. First, he refers to an often cited analysis that finds 47 percent of all jobs are at risk of being automated over the next twenty years. Sounds pretty scary, right? Well let’s imagine that all of the 47 percent of those at risk jobs gets computerized over the next two decades. (The study just identifies these as “at risk” jobs, a high proportion of which will be computerized, not all of them.) This rate of computerization would translate into 3.1 percent annual productivity growth. That’s a hair higher than the 2.9 percent annual rate of productivity growth that we saw in the Golden Age from 1947–1973. That was a period of low unemployment and rapid real wage and income growth. If there is a reason that we should be scared in this story it is not because of the productivity growth, but rather an institutional structure that prevents most workers from benefitting from this growth.

Since I had been critical of elite economists for using their authority rather than evidence to trash Gerald Friedman’s analysis of Bernie Sanders’ program, I should acknowledge a serious effort to do exactly the sort of analysis I advocated. Christina Romer, one of the four former heads of the Council of Economic Advisers who signed the earlier letter criticizing Friedman’s analysis, along with David Romer (both of whom are now Berkeley economics professors), did a detailed critique of the Friedman analysis.

I could quibble with aspects of their critique, but I would say it is basically right. There clearly is still a large amount of slack in the economy which would allow for 2–4 years of exceptionally strong growth (e.g. 4–5 percent). However, it is very hard to envision a story where this sort of growth rate is maintained for a full eight years of a Sanders’ administration.

Furthermore, many aspects of Sanders’ agenda point to slower growth. For example, universal Medicare and expanded Social Security will make it easier for older people not to work, as will free college for young people. Also, mandated vacations will mean fewer hours per worker, on average. These may all be good things (I happen to think so), but they are likely to mean less GDP growth than would otherwise be the case.

Anyhow, I appreciate that Romer and Romer took the time to do the analysis. We should be having a discussion about how much better the economy can be doing than it is now. This analysis is a step in that direction.

Since I had been critical of elite economists for using their authority rather than evidence to trash Gerald Friedman’s analysis of Bernie Sanders’ program, I should acknowledge a serious effort to do exactly the sort of analysis I advocated. Christina Romer, one of the four former heads of the Council of Economic Advisers who signed the earlier letter criticizing Friedman’s analysis, along with David Romer (both of whom are now Berkeley economics professors), did a detailed critique of the Friedman analysis.

I could quibble with aspects of their critique, but I would say it is basically right. There clearly is still a large amount of slack in the economy which would allow for 2–4 years of exceptionally strong growth (e.g. 4–5 percent). However, it is very hard to envision a story where this sort of growth rate is maintained for a full eight years of a Sanders’ administration.

Furthermore, many aspects of Sanders’ agenda point to slower growth. For example, universal Medicare and expanded Social Security will make it easier for older people not to work, as will free college for young people. Also, mandated vacations will mean fewer hours per worker, on average. These may all be good things (I happen to think so), but they are likely to mean less GDP growth than would otherwise be the case.

Anyhow, I appreciate that Romer and Romer took the time to do the analysis. We should be having a discussion about how much better the economy can be doing than it is now. This analysis is a step in that direction.

Are rivers flowing upstream? Has anyone seen four horsemen? Anyhow, it seems that the Washington Post editorial board is now acknowledging that a financial transactions tax [FTT] could be a serious policy. It ran an editorial which included a few derisive comments directed towards Senator Bernie Sanders, who has advocated a financial transactions tax in his presidential campaign, but favorably cited the Tax Policy Center’s analysis and said:

“They [FTTs] represent a ‘tempting’ option that might help the United States raise revenue while curbing speculative excess.”

There are a few points worth adding to the Post’s comments. The Post told readers:

“However, a tax would undoubtedly dampen some productive trading and not necessarily raise that much revenue, the report found — about $50 billion a year, in contrast to the $75 billion figure Mr. Sanders floats.”

As far as the concern for productive trading, the way the tax would reduce this is by raising the cost of trades. However, the cost of trading has fallen sharply over the last four decades. This means that the tax would, depending on the exact rate, only raise the cost of trading part of the way back to where it was four decades ago.

If the tax were set at a 0.1 percent rate on stock, with lower rates for other assets, then it would be raising the cost of trading to the levels of 10–20 years ago. So unless we see much more productive trading in the markets today than we did in the 1990s, we wouldn’t have much to worry about in this respect.

As far as the amount of money that would be raised, this depends hugely on the sensitivity of trading volume to the size of the tax. The Tax Policy Center assumed an elasticity of 1.5, meaning that the percentage drop in trading volume would be 1.5 times the percentage increase in trading costs associated with the tax. This elasticity assumption is certainly at the high end of the estimates in the literature. An elasticity assumption closer to 1.0, which is more in the center of the estimates in the research, implies the tax would raise roughly twice as much revenue.

It is also is worth noting that the 1.5 elasticity assumption used by the Tax Policy Center implies that trading volume decreases by a larger percentage than the increase in costs due to the tax. It would mean, for example, that if the tax raised trading costs by 40 percent, then trading volume would decline by close to 60 percent.

This means investors would reduce their trading by a larger amount than their costs per trade increased. As a result, investors would on average spend less money on trading, even including the tax, than they did before the tax was put in place. In that scenario, the entire burden of the tax is borne by the financial industry in the form of lost trading revenue.

Arguably the 1.5 elasticity assumption by the Tax Policy Center is too high, but if it is correct, it does mean the tax will raise less revenue, but it also means a much larger hit to the financial industry. Insofar as a purpose of the tax is to reduce the amount of resources being wasted by shuffling stock and derivatives back and forth all day, an FTT would have a huge effect in this case.

Are rivers flowing upstream? Has anyone seen four horsemen? Anyhow, it seems that the Washington Post editorial board is now acknowledging that a financial transactions tax [FTT] could be a serious policy. It ran an editorial which included a few derisive comments directed towards Senator Bernie Sanders, who has advocated a financial transactions tax in his presidential campaign, but favorably cited the Tax Policy Center’s analysis and said:

“They [FTTs] represent a ‘tempting’ option that might help the United States raise revenue while curbing speculative excess.”

There are a few points worth adding to the Post’s comments. The Post told readers:

“However, a tax would undoubtedly dampen some productive trading and not necessarily raise that much revenue, the report found — about $50 billion a year, in contrast to the $75 billion figure Mr. Sanders floats.”

As far as the concern for productive trading, the way the tax would reduce this is by raising the cost of trades. However, the cost of trading has fallen sharply over the last four decades. This means that the tax would, depending on the exact rate, only raise the cost of trading part of the way back to where it was four decades ago.

If the tax were set at a 0.1 percent rate on stock, with lower rates for other assets, then it would be raising the cost of trading to the levels of 10–20 years ago. So unless we see much more productive trading in the markets today than we did in the 1990s, we wouldn’t have much to worry about in this respect.

As far as the amount of money that would be raised, this depends hugely on the sensitivity of trading volume to the size of the tax. The Tax Policy Center assumed an elasticity of 1.5, meaning that the percentage drop in trading volume would be 1.5 times the percentage increase in trading costs associated with the tax. This elasticity assumption is certainly at the high end of the estimates in the literature. An elasticity assumption closer to 1.0, which is more in the center of the estimates in the research, implies the tax would raise roughly twice as much revenue.

It is also is worth noting that the 1.5 elasticity assumption used by the Tax Policy Center implies that trading volume decreases by a larger percentage than the increase in costs due to the tax. It would mean, for example, that if the tax raised trading costs by 40 percent, then trading volume would decline by close to 60 percent.

This means investors would reduce their trading by a larger amount than their costs per trade increased. As a result, investors would on average spend less money on trading, even including the tax, than they did before the tax was put in place. In that scenario, the entire burden of the tax is borne by the financial industry in the form of lost trading revenue.

Arguably the 1.5 elasticity assumption by the Tax Policy Center is too high, but if it is correct, it does mean the tax will raise less revenue, but it also means a much larger hit to the financial industry. Insofar as a purpose of the tax is to reduce the amount of resources being wasted by shuffling stock and derivatives back and forth all day, an FTT would have a huge effect in this case.

It must be tough for flat earth believers; people insist on rejecting their views on the shape of the earth based on evidence. Robert Samuelson seems to be in the same situation. He used his column to complain about economists not caring about balanced budgets, just because there is no evidence that they should.

The immediate provocation for this diatribe is Doug Elmendorf, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office. Elmendorf used to be a big advocate of smaller deficits, but he now is arguing that Congress take advantage of near record low interest rates to undertake a major infrastructure initiative.

Samuelson concluded his piece:

“Destroyed is the pre-1960s consensus: a crude allegiance to a balanced budget. Since 1961, the government has run annual deficits in all but five years. Allowing for desirable deficits when the economy is well below capacity or when there’s a national emergency, we need to go back to the future. Before making vast new commitments — a la Elmendorf — we should balance the ones we already have.”

Ah yes, the country is being destroyed by deficits. That is why the government has to pay almost 2.0 percent to borrow long-term. And the interest on our horrible debt costs us almost 0.8 percent of GDP in annual interest payments. Sound pretty awful? Interest cost us more than 3.0 percent of GDP back in the early 1990s.

It is amazing that people like Samuelson, and more importantly our politicians in Washington, continue to try to run the government based on nostrums they learned from their parents rather than the real world. Elmendorf changed his view on economic priorities based on evidence.

There is a clear story of how excessive deficits can hurt the economy. They drive up interest rates if the Fed does not accommodate them and they lead to inflation if the Fed does. The rationale is simple: excess deficits cause us to push the economy too hard. They lead to too much demand given the economy’s ability to produce goods and services.

We clearly are not seeing this constraint. There are still millions of unemployed or underemployed workers who would like full-time jobs. This means that the concern about balanced budgets is needlessly keeping these people unemployed. And the weakness of the labor market is keeping tens of millions of workers from having the bargaining power necessary to get their share of the benefits from economic growth in higher wages.

Perhaps even worse, the obsession with deficits prevents us from doing things we really need to do. The neglected items form a long list, from early childhood education and affordable college to keeping the kids in Flint from being poisoned.

But hey, why look at the real world when we have the words of wisdom on balanced budgets that Robert Samuelson learned from his parents.

It must be tough for flat earth believers; people insist on rejecting their views on the shape of the earth based on evidence. Robert Samuelson seems to be in the same situation. He used his column to complain about economists not caring about balanced budgets, just because there is no evidence that they should.

The immediate provocation for this diatribe is Doug Elmendorf, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office. Elmendorf used to be a big advocate of smaller deficits, but he now is arguing that Congress take advantage of near record low interest rates to undertake a major infrastructure initiative.

Samuelson concluded his piece:

“Destroyed is the pre-1960s consensus: a crude allegiance to a balanced budget. Since 1961, the government has run annual deficits in all but five years. Allowing for desirable deficits when the economy is well below capacity or when there’s a national emergency, we need to go back to the future. Before making vast new commitments — a la Elmendorf — we should balance the ones we already have.”

Ah yes, the country is being destroyed by deficits. That is why the government has to pay almost 2.0 percent to borrow long-term. And the interest on our horrible debt costs us almost 0.8 percent of GDP in annual interest payments. Sound pretty awful? Interest cost us more than 3.0 percent of GDP back in the early 1990s.

It is amazing that people like Samuelson, and more importantly our politicians in Washington, continue to try to run the government based on nostrums they learned from their parents rather than the real world. Elmendorf changed his view on economic priorities based on evidence.

There is a clear story of how excessive deficits can hurt the economy. They drive up interest rates if the Fed does not accommodate them and they lead to inflation if the Fed does. The rationale is simple: excess deficits cause us to push the economy too hard. They lead to too much demand given the economy’s ability to produce goods and services.

We clearly are not seeing this constraint. There are still millions of unemployed or underemployed workers who would like full-time jobs. This means that the concern about balanced budgets is needlessly keeping these people unemployed. And the weakness of the labor market is keeping tens of millions of workers from having the bargaining power necessary to get their share of the benefits from economic growth in higher wages.

Perhaps even worse, the obsession with deficits prevents us from doing things we really need to do. The neglected items form a long list, from early childhood education and affordable college to keeping the kids in Flint from being poisoned.

But hey, why look at the real world when we have the words of wisdom on balanced budgets that Robert Samuelson learned from his parents.

Ronald Reagan and Keynesian Stimulus

Jacob Weisberg wasn’t quite straight with readers when he said that Ronald Reagan supported “Keynesian stimulus” in a NYT column on how the Republican Party has changed since the days of Reagan. The Keynesian stimulus took the form of a large permanent tax cut that was highly skewed toward the wealthy. He also had large increases in military spending.

The current crew of Republican presidential candidates seems to be very much in this same mode, also urging large tax cuts that would primarily benefit the wealthy and spending more on the military. Reagan did agree to roll back some of his tax cut when it appeared that deficits were getting too large in 1982 and 1983. We can’t know whether the Republican candidates would be prepared to raise taxes again if deficits were leading to high interest rates and/or inflation, but in their platforms they are very much following Reagan, contrary to what Weisberg claims.

Jacob Weisberg wasn’t quite straight with readers when he said that Ronald Reagan supported “Keynesian stimulus” in a NYT column on how the Republican Party has changed since the days of Reagan. The Keynesian stimulus took the form of a large permanent tax cut that was highly skewed toward the wealthy. He also had large increases in military spending.

The current crew of Republican presidential candidates seems to be very much in this same mode, also urging large tax cuts that would primarily benefit the wealthy and spending more on the military. Reagan did agree to roll back some of his tax cut when it appeared that deficits were getting too large in 1982 and 1983. We can’t know whether the Republican candidates would be prepared to raise taxes again if deficits were leading to high interest rates and/or inflation, but in their platforms they are very much following Reagan, contrary to what Weisberg claims.

The NYT had an article this morning on how European tech start-ups were seeing new capital dry up in the same way as Silicon Valley firms. The piece portrayed this as largely a negative event. Undoubtedly, it is bad news for the founders and top employees of these firms, but it’s not clear it is bad news for the economy.

The huge capitalizations of many start-ups has allowed a small number of people to get very rich, however it is not clear that their valuations bore any resemblance to their value to the economy. For example, both Groupon and Dropbox at one point had market capitalizations of more than $10 billion.

While selling coupons over the web and an efficient offsite Internet storage system are both items that will provide benefits to many individuals, so is combining peanut butter and jelly in a single jar. It is not clear that we should expect to see someone becoming a billionaire for coming up with the idea of combining peanut butter and jelly in one jar, nor is obvious that the contributions of many of these start-ups should cause people to become billionaires.

If capital markets are hugely overpricing start-ups relative to their actual value to the economy, as subsequently determined by the market, then they are effectively redistributing wealth from others to the leading actors in these start-ups. Insofar as the money is coming from other wealthy people, this is simply a matter of money going from the old rich to newly created rich. In this case, it need not be matter of concern for the rest of us. However if pension fund assets or money held in mutual funds through individual retirement accounts are going into over-valued start-ups, then this is a redistribution from the rest of us to the new rich.

Insofar as that is the story of the Silicon Valley boom and the parallel boom in Europe, we should applaud the collapse of the price of these companies’ stock. An over-valued stock price has the same impact on the economy as counterfeit money that passes for real. It gives some individuals purchasing power who should not have a claim to it. Catching the counterfeiter and bringing the stock price back in line with the fundamentals is good news. (Of course in an economy that is operating below its capacity like ours, we actually would benefit from the demand that would be generated by a successful counterfeiter, but that is another story.)

The NYT had an article this morning on how European tech start-ups were seeing new capital dry up in the same way as Silicon Valley firms. The piece portrayed this as largely a negative event. Undoubtedly, it is bad news for the founders and top employees of these firms, but it’s not clear it is bad news for the economy.

The huge capitalizations of many start-ups has allowed a small number of people to get very rich, however it is not clear that their valuations bore any resemblance to their value to the economy. For example, both Groupon and Dropbox at one point had market capitalizations of more than $10 billion.

While selling coupons over the web and an efficient offsite Internet storage system are both items that will provide benefits to many individuals, so is combining peanut butter and jelly in a single jar. It is not clear that we should expect to see someone becoming a billionaire for coming up with the idea of combining peanut butter and jelly in one jar, nor is obvious that the contributions of many of these start-ups should cause people to become billionaires.

If capital markets are hugely overpricing start-ups relative to their actual value to the economy, as subsequently determined by the market, then they are effectively redistributing wealth from others to the leading actors in these start-ups. Insofar as the money is coming from other wealthy people, this is simply a matter of money going from the old rich to newly created rich. In this case, it need not be matter of concern for the rest of us. However if pension fund assets or money held in mutual funds through individual retirement accounts are going into over-valued start-ups, then this is a redistribution from the rest of us to the new rich.

Insofar as that is the story of the Silicon Valley boom and the parallel boom in Europe, we should applaud the collapse of the price of these companies’ stock. An over-valued stock price has the same impact on the economy as counterfeit money that passes for real. It gives some individuals purchasing power who should not have a claim to it. Catching the counterfeiter and bringing the stock price back in line with the fundamentals is good news. (Of course in an economy that is operating below its capacity like ours, we actually would benefit from the demand that would be generated by a successful counterfeiter, but that is another story.)

Claire Cain Miller had an interesting Upshot piece about differences in the way men and women divide child care and other unpaid household labor across countries. Some countries, notably the Nordic countries and the United States have made substantial progress in lessening the gap between women and men’s hours, although women still do substantially more unpaid work even in these countries (over 50 percent more in the United States). Other countries on the list, mostly those in Asia and southern Europe have done much worse by this measure, still having ratios of more than two to one. While this is a very important issue which I would not want to trivialize, I couldn’t help but notice the substantial differences in total hours per day of unpaid labor reported across countries. The figure below sum the hours reported in each country for men and women. Source: New York Times. At low end is South Korea, where the total reported hours of unpaid work are just 4.5 per day. Next in line is China at 5.4 hours, and then Japan at 6.0 hours. The big outlier at the other extreme is Australia at 8.1 hours per day, a full hour below Denmark, where total hours are 7.1 per day. The United States comes in close to the average at 6.8 hours per day.
Claire Cain Miller had an interesting Upshot piece about differences in the way men and women divide child care and other unpaid household labor across countries. Some countries, notably the Nordic countries and the United States have made substantial progress in lessening the gap between women and men’s hours, although women still do substantially more unpaid work even in these countries (over 50 percent more in the United States). Other countries on the list, mostly those in Asia and southern Europe have done much worse by this measure, still having ratios of more than two to one. While this is a very important issue which I would not want to trivialize, I couldn’t help but notice the substantial differences in total hours per day of unpaid labor reported across countries. The figure below sum the hours reported in each country for men and women. Source: New York Times. At low end is South Korea, where the total reported hours of unpaid work are just 4.5 per day. Next in line is China at 5.4 hours, and then Japan at 6.0 hours. The big outlier at the other extreme is Australia at 8.1 hours per day, a full hour below Denmark, where total hours are 7.1 per day. The United States comes in close to the average at 6.8 hours per day.

Robert Samuelson used his column today to back up Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s claim that expansions do not die of old age. In a column titled “Janet Yellen is wrong. Expansions do die of old age,” Samuelson briefly recounted the history of recoveries and recessions over the last half century.

According to Samuelson’s account, they differed a great deal in length, with the economy experiencing four recessions over the twelve years from 1970 to 1982, as the Fed struggled to slow inflation by raising interest rates and pushing up the unemployment rate. The recessions in 2001 and 2007–2009 came about as a result of collapsed asset bubbles. The former came after an almost decade long expansion.

The obvious take-away from the evidence presented by Samuelson is that expansions don’t just die, they have to be killed. The most common way they get killed is by the Fed’s efforts to curb inflation with higher interest rates. The other leading cause of death is a collapsing asset bubble.

So the question is, does anyone think current rates of inflation warrant sharp interest rate hikes from the Fed? If not, then we need to find an asset bubble whose collapse will sink the economy. If neither of these stories seems plausible, we have good reason to expect this recovery to go on for some time longer, even if the speed may be considerably slower than many of us would like.

Robert Samuelson used his column today to back up Fed Chair Janet Yellen’s claim that expansions do not die of old age. In a column titled “Janet Yellen is wrong. Expansions do die of old age,” Samuelson briefly recounted the history of recoveries and recessions over the last half century.

According to Samuelson’s account, they differed a great deal in length, with the economy experiencing four recessions over the twelve years from 1970 to 1982, as the Fed struggled to slow inflation by raising interest rates and pushing up the unemployment rate. The recessions in 2001 and 2007–2009 came about as a result of collapsed asset bubbles. The former came after an almost decade long expansion.

The obvious take-away from the evidence presented by Samuelson is that expansions don’t just die, they have to be killed. The most common way they get killed is by the Fed’s efforts to curb inflation with higher interest rates. The other leading cause of death is a collapsing asset bubble.

So the question is, does anyone think current rates of inflation warrant sharp interest rate hikes from the Fed? If not, then we need to find an asset bubble whose collapse will sink the economy. If neither of these stories seems plausible, we have good reason to expect this recovery to go on for some time longer, even if the speed may be considerably slower than many of us would like.

Okay, that’s not exactly true, but the new Economic Report of the President (ERP) has an interesting section that provides insight into the question of how fast the economy can grow, and more importantly how low the unemployment rate can go. The ERP re-examined the evidence on the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Economists have long held the view that lower rates of unemployment would be associated with rising rates of inflation and vice versa. When the Federal Reserve Board decides to raise interest rates to slow the economy it is based on the belief that unemployment is falling to a level that would be associated with a rising rate of inflation. Most economists now put the unemployment rate at which inflation starts to rise somewhere near the current 4.9 percent rate. (This is called the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment or NAIRU.) So does the ERP. But its analysis suggests a somewhat different story. Figure 2-xiv shows the estimate of the NAIRU based on a simple regression measuring the change in the inflation rate against the level of unemployment using data from the last twenty years. The graph shows that the estimate has been falling consistently over the last two decades and is now near 4.0 percent. Furthermore, because the relationship is so weak, there is a huge range of uncertainty around this estimate. In fact, the figure shows that a zero percent unemployment rate is within the 95 percent confidence interval. (Don’t try that at home folks.)
Okay, that’s not exactly true, but the new Economic Report of the President (ERP) has an interesting section that provides insight into the question of how fast the economy can grow, and more importantly how low the unemployment rate can go. The ERP re-examined the evidence on the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Economists have long held the view that lower rates of unemployment would be associated with rising rates of inflation and vice versa. When the Federal Reserve Board decides to raise interest rates to slow the economy it is based on the belief that unemployment is falling to a level that would be associated with a rising rate of inflation. Most economists now put the unemployment rate at which inflation starts to rise somewhere near the current 4.9 percent rate. (This is called the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment or NAIRU.) So does the ERP. But its analysis suggests a somewhat different story. Figure 2-xiv shows the estimate of the NAIRU based on a simple regression measuring the change in the inflation rate against the level of unemployment using data from the last twenty years. The graph shows that the estimate has been falling consistently over the last two decades and is now near 4.0 percent. Furthermore, because the relationship is so weak, there is a huge range of uncertainty around this estimate. In fact, the figure shows that a zero percent unemployment rate is within the 95 percent confidence interval. (Don’t try that at home folks.)

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