Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Yesterday the Labor Department released October data from its monthly Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The release got surprisingly little attention in the media.

While there were no big surprises, it does not paint a picture of a robust labor market. The number of job opening was down 150,000 from the September level and was almost 300,000 below the peak hit in July. That is not necessarily a big deal; the monthly data are erratic and a monthly change of this size could just be sampling error. Nonetheless, the number of opening has been essentially flat since April, which means that the relatively strong growth reported in the establishment survey does not seem to be making it difficult for firms to find workers.

Consistent with this story, the quit rate remained at a relatively low 1.9 percent. This is a measure of workers’ confidence that they can leave a job they don’t like and either quickly get a new job or survive on savings or the earnings of other family members. The 1.9 percent rate is well above the 1.3 percent rate at the bottom of the downturn, but low relative to pre-recession levels. In fact, in the weak labor market following the 2001 recession (we continued to lose jobs until September of 2003) the quit rate never fell below 1.8 percent. The current reading looks much more like a recession than a strong labor market. (The series only goes back to the end of 2000, so we don’t have long experience with it.)

 

Quit Rate

 

quits rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Yesterday the Labor Department released October data from its monthly Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The release got surprisingly little attention in the media.

While there were no big surprises, it does not paint a picture of a robust labor market. The number of job opening was down 150,000 from the September level and was almost 300,000 below the peak hit in July. That is not necessarily a big deal; the monthly data are erratic and a monthly change of this size could just be sampling error. Nonetheless, the number of opening has been essentially flat since April, which means that the relatively strong growth reported in the establishment survey does not seem to be making it difficult for firms to find workers.

Consistent with this story, the quit rate remained at a relatively low 1.9 percent. This is a measure of workers’ confidence that they can leave a job they don’t like and either quickly get a new job or survive on savings or the earnings of other family members. The 1.9 percent rate is well above the 1.3 percent rate at the bottom of the downturn, but low relative to pre-recession levels. In fact, in the weak labor market following the 2001 recession (we continued to lose jobs until September of 2003) the quit rate never fell below 1.8 percent. The current reading looks much more like a recession than a strong labor market. (The series only goes back to the end of 2000, so we don’t have long experience with it.)

 

Quit Rate

 

quits rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Guest Blog by Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt Co-authors of Private Equity at Work: When Wall Street Manages Main Street The usually perceptive Deal Professor, Steven Davidoff Solomon has swallowed CalPERS’ staff’s spin on the more than $3.4 billion the California public employees’ pension fund has paid to private equity firms in performance fees (so-called carried interest) hook, line, and sinker. In Private Equity Fees Are Sky-High, Yes, but Look at Those Returns, Davidoff Solomon accepts uncritically CalPERS report of its return on its risky PE investments — a report that the industry publication, Private Equity International in its November 27 Friday Letter, labeled a private equity public relations coup. Those high fees are worth it in Davidoff Solomon’s view because of CalPERS stellar private equity returns. If only! Davidoff Solomon failed to note that CalPERS’ staff did not provide information in this report on the risk-adjusted return to its risky private equity investments. The staff provided misleading information because its risk-adjusted PE returns were awful: CalPERS investments in private equity have underperformed its risk-adjusted benchmark over the last 10 years and in 3-year and 5-year sub-periods. The staff no doubt expected to pull the wool over the eyes of public sector workers and taxpayers in California, but has surely succeeded beyond its wildest dreams with this endorsement in The New York Times by someone who should know better. Indeed, over the last 10 years, the pension fund’s PE investments underperformed it stock market benchmark by about 300 basis points. In layman’s language, this means CalPERS would have had exactly the same return over this period if it had invested in the stock market index it uses in its benchmark. Actually, CalPERS would have had a much higher return from investing in this stock market index because it could have invested the $3.4 billion of its members’ retirement savings that it paid PE firms in performance fees. It’s amazing that these ginormous performance bonuses were paid to PE firms for delivering results that did not beat the stock market over 10 years and certainly did not provide a return high enough to compensate the pension fund for the greater risk and lack of liquidity present in PE investments.
Guest Blog by Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt Co-authors of Private Equity at Work: When Wall Street Manages Main Street The usually perceptive Deal Professor, Steven Davidoff Solomon has swallowed CalPERS’ staff’s spin on the more than $3.4 billion the California public employees’ pension fund has paid to private equity firms in performance fees (so-called carried interest) hook, line, and sinker. In Private Equity Fees Are Sky-High, Yes, but Look at Those Returns, Davidoff Solomon accepts uncritically CalPERS report of its return on its risky PE investments — a report that the industry publication, Private Equity International in its November 27 Friday Letter, labeled a private equity public relations coup. Those high fees are worth it in Davidoff Solomon’s view because of CalPERS stellar private equity returns. If only! Davidoff Solomon failed to note that CalPERS’ staff did not provide information in this report on the risk-adjusted return to its risky private equity investments. The staff provided misleading information because its risk-adjusted PE returns were awful: CalPERS investments in private equity have underperformed its risk-adjusted benchmark over the last 10 years and in 3-year and 5-year sub-periods. The staff no doubt expected to pull the wool over the eyes of public sector workers and taxpayers in California, but has surely succeeded beyond its wildest dreams with this endorsement in The New York Times by someone who should know better. Indeed, over the last 10 years, the pension fund’s PE investments underperformed it stock market benchmark by about 300 basis points. In layman’s language, this means CalPERS would have had exactly the same return over this period if it had invested in the stock market index it uses in its benchmark. Actually, CalPERS would have had a much higher return from investing in this stock market index because it could have invested the $3.4 billion of its members’ retirement savings that it paid PE firms in performance fees. It’s amazing that these ginormous performance bonuses were paid to PE firms for delivering results that did not beat the stock market over 10 years and certainly did not provide a return high enough to compensate the pension fund for the greater risk and lack of liquidity present in PE investments.

Paul Krugman and Larry Summers both have very good columns this morning noting the economy’s continuing weakness and warning against excessive rate hikes by the Fed. While I fully agree with their assessment of the state of the economy and the dangers of Fed rate hikes, I think they are overly pessimistic about the Fed’s scope for action if the economy weakens.

While the Fed did adopt unorthodox monetary policy in this recession in the form of quantitative easing, the buying of long-term debt, it has another tool at its disposal that it chose not to use. Specifically, instead of just targeting the overnight interest rate (now zero), the Fed could have targeted a longer term interest rate.

For example, it could set a target of 1.0 percent as the interest rate for the 5-year Treasury note, committing itself to buy more notes to push up the price, and push down the interest rate to keep it at 1.0 percent. It could even do the same with 10-year Treasury notes.

This is an idea that Joe Gagnon at the Peterson Institute for International Economics put forward at the depth of the recession, but for some reason there was little interest in policy circles. The only obvious risk of going the interest rate targeting route is that it could be inflationary if it led to too rapid an expansion, but excessively high inflation will not be our problem if the economy were to again weaken. Furthermore, if it turned out that targeting was prompting too much growth, the Fed could quickly reverse course and let the interest rate rise back to the market level.

Of course, it would be best if we could count on fiscal policy to play a role in getting us back to full employment (lowering supply through reduced workweeks and work years should also be on the agenda), but the Fed does have more ammunition buried away in the basement and we should be pressing them to use it if the need arises.

Paul Krugman and Larry Summers both have very good columns this morning noting the economy’s continuing weakness and warning against excessive rate hikes by the Fed. While I fully agree with their assessment of the state of the economy and the dangers of Fed rate hikes, I think they are overly pessimistic about the Fed’s scope for action if the economy weakens.

While the Fed did adopt unorthodox monetary policy in this recession in the form of quantitative easing, the buying of long-term debt, it has another tool at its disposal that it chose not to use. Specifically, instead of just targeting the overnight interest rate (now zero), the Fed could have targeted a longer term interest rate.

For example, it could set a target of 1.0 percent as the interest rate for the 5-year Treasury note, committing itself to buy more notes to push up the price, and push down the interest rate to keep it at 1.0 percent. It could even do the same with 10-year Treasury notes.

This is an idea that Joe Gagnon at the Peterson Institute for International Economics put forward at the depth of the recession, but for some reason there was little interest in policy circles. The only obvious risk of going the interest rate targeting route is that it could be inflationary if it led to too rapid an expansion, but excessively high inflation will not be our problem if the economy were to again weaken. Furthermore, if it turned out that targeting was prompting too much growth, the Fed could quickly reverse course and let the interest rate rise back to the market level.

Of course, it would be best if we could count on fiscal policy to play a role in getting us back to full employment (lowering supply through reduced workweeks and work years should also be on the agenda), but the Fed does have more ammunition buried away in the basement and we should be pressing them to use it if the need arises.

Gretchen Morgensen has an excellent piece in the NYT reporting on the revolving door between Wall Street banks and the Obama administration and the lobbying effort to dismantle Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These banks hope to be able to take over the business of the two mortgage giants with a system under which the government would guarantee 90 percent of the value of the mortgage backed securities they issued. While the piece does a very good job detailing the financial connections of the individuals behind this push, there are several important points which make the case against "reform" even stronger than presented in the piece. To start, the piece tells readers: "For all the problems associated with Fannie and Freddie, some housing experts say, allowing the nation’s largest banks to assume greater control of the mortgage market would most likely increase costs for borrowers." Actually, just about all housing experts agree that the privatized system would raise costs. Wall Street types get paid more than government employees and shareholders expect a profit. Therefore, we can be pretty safe in assuming a privatized system will have higher costs. The range of estimates in a Washington Post article from last year was that it would increase mortgage interest rates by between 0.5–2.0 percentage points. (I put myself near the bottom of that range.) If the roughly $6 trillion in mortgage debt on Fannie and Freddie's books were all switched to this privatized system, the additional cost would be $30 billion a year, assuming the bottom end of this range. That is more than the federal government spends on the TANF program each year.
Gretchen Morgensen has an excellent piece in the NYT reporting on the revolving door between Wall Street banks and the Obama administration and the lobbying effort to dismantle Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These banks hope to be able to take over the business of the two mortgage giants with a system under which the government would guarantee 90 percent of the value of the mortgage backed securities they issued. While the piece does a very good job detailing the financial connections of the individuals behind this push, there are several important points which make the case against "reform" even stronger than presented in the piece. To start, the piece tells readers: "For all the problems associated with Fannie and Freddie, some housing experts say, allowing the nation’s largest banks to assume greater control of the mortgage market would most likely increase costs for borrowers." Actually, just about all housing experts agree that the privatized system would raise costs. Wall Street types get paid more than government employees and shareholders expect a profit. Therefore, we can be pretty safe in assuming a privatized system will have higher costs. The range of estimates in a Washington Post article from last year was that it would increase mortgage interest rates by between 0.5–2.0 percentage points. (I put myself near the bottom of that range.) If the roughly $6 trillion in mortgage debt on Fannie and Freddie's books were all switched to this privatized system, the additional cost would be $30 billion a year, assuming the bottom end of this range. That is more than the federal government spends on the TANF program each year.
By Dean Baker and David Rosnick Over the last seven years there has been a steady drumbeat of complaints from people who are upset by the Fed’s zero interest rate policy. We first heard that it was going to lead to hyperinflation. Then we were told that low interest rates would fuel asset bubbles. More recently a rate hike has become a matter of the Fed’s credibility. One of the most persistent complaints is that the zero interest rate policy is unfair to small savers. The argument is that we have all these elderly people who depend on the income from their savings who are being destroyed by getting near zero interest on their CDs and money market accounts. There are two problems with this story. The first one is a logical problem. Interest rates are low because the economy is extremely weak. In the simple textbook story (very simple), the interest rate is supposed to equate the supply and demand for savings. Ever since the recession began we have had an enormous excess supply of savings. This means that the interest rate should be lower than it actually is. However, interest rates don’t fall further because they will not go below zero, or at least not much below zero. People are not willing to pay banks to borrow their money. Given the market outcome pushing interest rates to zero, those who want the 2–3 percent short-term interest rates of pre-recession years effectively want the government to pay them interest rates that are above the market clearing rate. That’s fine as a demand from a self-interested group — I’d like the government to pay me twice what my house is worth — but it’s not one that deserves much credence in policy debates. Most of us probably think it’s more important to use the Fed’s monetary policy to get people employed than to subsidize the interest received by savers. The other problem is that the story of small saver suffering because of low interest rates doesn’t fit the data. There just are not very many people with substantial amount of savings in CDs, money market, saving accounts, or other short-term assets who don’t also have large amounts of money in stocks and bonds. Anyone who has large sums in stocks and bonds has done very well in the last five years, as both markets have soared, so if they aren’t earning much interest on their savings accounts it is difficult to feel too sorry for them.
By Dean Baker and David Rosnick Over the last seven years there has been a steady drumbeat of complaints from people who are upset by the Fed’s zero interest rate policy. We first heard that it was going to lead to hyperinflation. Then we were told that low interest rates would fuel asset bubbles. More recently a rate hike has become a matter of the Fed’s credibility. One of the most persistent complaints is that the zero interest rate policy is unfair to small savers. The argument is that we have all these elderly people who depend on the income from their savings who are being destroyed by getting near zero interest on their CDs and money market accounts. There are two problems with this story. The first one is a logical problem. Interest rates are low because the economy is extremely weak. In the simple textbook story (very simple), the interest rate is supposed to equate the supply and demand for savings. Ever since the recession began we have had an enormous excess supply of savings. This means that the interest rate should be lower than it actually is. However, interest rates don’t fall further because they will not go below zero, or at least not much below zero. People are not willing to pay banks to borrow their money. Given the market outcome pushing interest rates to zero, those who want the 2–3 percent short-term interest rates of pre-recession years effectively want the government to pay them interest rates that are above the market clearing rate. That’s fine as a demand from a self-interested group — I’d like the government to pay me twice what my house is worth — but it’s not one that deserves much credence in policy debates. Most of us probably think it’s more important to use the Fed’s monetary policy to get people employed than to subsidize the interest received by savers. The other problem is that the story of small saver suffering because of low interest rates doesn’t fit the data. There just are not very many people with substantial amount of savings in CDs, money market, saving accounts, or other short-term assets who don’t also have large amounts of money in stocks and bonds. Anyone who has large sums in stocks and bonds has done very well in the last five years, as both markets have soared, so if they aren’t earning much interest on their savings accounts it is difficult to feel too sorry for them.

The context is Nigeria’s economic relationship with China. The NYT complains to readers that China is providing goods at a lower cost than other other countries or the country’s domestic industry.

“Chinese goods are so dominant that consumers have few other choices.”

The article points out that the goods are of varying quality and some, in the case of electronic items, may pose safety problems. Of course, the reason that consumers have few other choices is that the Chinese products sell for much lower prices than the goods produced by competitors.

The piece also complains that China’s firms are willing to accept a lower return on investment in Nigeria:

“The risks [associated with investing in Nigeria] have prompted Western companies to demand very fat profits before putting money into the country — returns on the order of 25 to 40 percent a year. Their Chinese counterparts have been willing to accept 10 percent or less.”

The piece points out that low cost Chinese imports have displaced hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers in Nigeria. While this is likely true, this is an entirely predictable outcome of the removal of trade barriers, a process that the NYT usually celebrates in both its opinion and news pages.

The standard argument is that the gains from consumers in the form of lower prices easily exceed the losses to the workers who lose their jobs. There may be an issue of redirecting some of these gains to help the unemployed workers, but the country as a whole still gains. It is striking that the NYT seems reluctant to accept economic orthodoxy on trade when it comes to China’s role in Nigeria and the rest of Africa.

The context is Nigeria’s economic relationship with China. The NYT complains to readers that China is providing goods at a lower cost than other other countries or the country’s domestic industry.

“Chinese goods are so dominant that consumers have few other choices.”

The article points out that the goods are of varying quality and some, in the case of electronic items, may pose safety problems. Of course, the reason that consumers have few other choices is that the Chinese products sell for much lower prices than the goods produced by competitors.

The piece also complains that China’s firms are willing to accept a lower return on investment in Nigeria:

“The risks [associated with investing in Nigeria] have prompted Western companies to demand very fat profits before putting money into the country — returns on the order of 25 to 40 percent a year. Their Chinese counterparts have been willing to accept 10 percent or less.”

The piece points out that low cost Chinese imports have displaced hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers in Nigeria. While this is likely true, this is an entirely predictable outcome of the removal of trade barriers, a process that the NYT usually celebrates in both its opinion and news pages.

The standard argument is that the gains from consumers in the form of lower prices easily exceed the losses to the workers who lose their jobs. There may be an issue of redirecting some of these gains to help the unemployed workers, but the country as a whole still gains. It is striking that the NYT seems reluctant to accept economic orthodoxy on trade when it comes to China’s role in Nigeria and the rest of Africa.

A NYT article on cuts to government subsidies for solar and wind energy were put in place by a conservative government, “determined to tighten spending and balance the budget in a program to grow the economy.” The piece does not indicate how budget cuts in the current economic situation are supposed to “grow the economy.”

As the article points out, Denmark’s economy is suffering from a lack of demand.

“Shortly after taking over in June, the new government was forced to cut its forecast for economic growth to 1.5 percent this year and 1.9 percent in 2016, citing a slow recovery in domestic demand.”

Cutting spending on clean technologies means less demand, not more. This would mean that the government’s plans to reduce its subsidies are in direct conflict with its stated desire to increase growth.

While it is certainly the case that in some contexts lower government spending can lead to lower interest rates, which will spur consumption and investment (the Danish Kroner is tied to the euro, so interest rates have no effect on the exchange rate), this is hardly a plausible story in the case of Denmark. The interest rate on its 10-year government bonds is currently 0.91 percent. By comparison, the rate in the United States is 2.27 percent. In this context, it is unlikely that cuts to government spending can have much of a further effect in lower interest rates, nor that any further reduction in rates would have a noticeable effect on spending.

 

A NYT article on cuts to government subsidies for solar and wind energy were put in place by a conservative government, “determined to tighten spending and balance the budget in a program to grow the economy.” The piece does not indicate how budget cuts in the current economic situation are supposed to “grow the economy.”

As the article points out, Denmark’s economy is suffering from a lack of demand.

“Shortly after taking over in June, the new government was forced to cut its forecast for economic growth to 1.5 percent this year and 1.9 percent in 2016, citing a slow recovery in domestic demand.”

Cutting spending on clean technologies means less demand, not more. This would mean that the government’s plans to reduce its subsidies are in direct conflict with its stated desire to increase growth.

While it is certainly the case that in some contexts lower government spending can lead to lower interest rates, which will spur consumption and investment (the Danish Kroner is tied to the euro, so interest rates have no effect on the exchange rate), this is hardly a plausible story in the case of Denmark. The interest rate on its 10-year government bonds is currently 0.91 percent. By comparison, the rate in the United States is 2.27 percent. In this context, it is unlikely that cuts to government spending can have much of a further effect in lower interest rates, nor that any further reduction in rates would have a noticeable effect on spending.

 

The state of economics is pretty dismal these days, which is demonstrated constantly in the reporting on major issues. The NYT gave us a beautiful example this morning in a piece on a pledge by China’s government of $60 billion in aid to Africa.

The third paragraph told readers:

“Against longstanding accusations that China benefits from a lopsided relationship with Africa, contentions that have recently gained traction as China’s trade deficits with many African nations have widened, Mr. Xi said that ‘China has the strong political commitment to supporting Africa in achieving development and prosperity.'”

Okay folks, get those scorecards ready. In standard textbook theory, poor countries are supposed to run trade deficits with rich countries. The story goes that capital is plentiful in rich countries while it’s scare in poor countries. Rich countries should therefore lend capital to poor countries where it will get a better return.

The flip side of this flow of capital (it is an accounting identity) is that poor countries run trade deficits with rich countries. These trade deficits allow the poor countries to build up their infrastructure and capital stock while still have enough goods and services to meet the needs of their populations. If relatively better off countries like China are willing to give money, rather than lend it, the developing country trade deficits should be even larger.

This means that folks who believe the textbook trade theory should see the widening of the trade deficits that African nations are running with China as evidence that they are gaining from the relationship, not as evidence that the relationship is lopsided.

The state of economics is pretty dismal these days, which is demonstrated constantly in the reporting on major issues. The NYT gave us a beautiful example this morning in a piece on a pledge by China’s government of $60 billion in aid to Africa.

The third paragraph told readers:

“Against longstanding accusations that China benefits from a lopsided relationship with Africa, contentions that have recently gained traction as China’s trade deficits with many African nations have widened, Mr. Xi said that ‘China has the strong political commitment to supporting Africa in achieving development and prosperity.'”

Okay folks, get those scorecards ready. In standard textbook theory, poor countries are supposed to run trade deficits with rich countries. The story goes that capital is plentiful in rich countries while it’s scare in poor countries. Rich countries should therefore lend capital to poor countries where it will get a better return.

The flip side of this flow of capital (it is an accounting identity) is that poor countries run trade deficits with rich countries. These trade deficits allow the poor countries to build up their infrastructure and capital stock while still have enough goods and services to meet the needs of their populations. If relatively better off countries like China are willing to give money, rather than lend it, the developing country trade deficits should be even larger.

This means that folks who believe the textbook trade theory should see the widening of the trade deficits that African nations are running with China as evidence that they are gaining from the relationship, not as evidence that the relationship is lopsided.

The Post has an interesting piece discussing Janet Yellen’s tenure as Fed chair as she prepares to possibly raise interest rates for the first time since the onset of the recession. The piece discusses Yellen’s Republican critics in Congress who want to rein in the power of the Fed to conduct monetary policy. These critics complain that the Fed has been too loose with the money supply and that this will result in runaway inflation.

It would have been worth noting that these critics have been repeatedly proven wrong. They have been complaining about loose monetary policy for over five years yet the inflation rate has consistently been well below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. This information would have been useful to readers trying to evaluate the seriousness of their complaints.

The Post has an interesting piece discussing Janet Yellen’s tenure as Fed chair as she prepares to possibly raise interest rates for the first time since the onset of the recession. The piece discusses Yellen’s Republican critics in Congress who want to rein in the power of the Fed to conduct monetary policy. These critics complain that the Fed has been too loose with the money supply and that this will result in runaway inflation.

It would have been worth noting that these critics have been repeatedly proven wrong. They have been complaining about loose monetary policy for over five years yet the inflation rate has consistently been well below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. This information would have been useful to readers trying to evaluate the seriousness of their complaints.

Neil Irwin had a piece in the Upshot section of the NYT raising the possibility that the Fed could have negative interest rates on reserves, rather than its current near zero rate, as a way to provide an additional boost to the economy. The argument is that it is very inconvenient to carry cash, so deposits would not flee banks even if the interest rate were a small negative number.

The problem is that this analysis does not consider the realities of the banked population. Banks have millions (tens of millions?) of customers with relatively low balances. These customers are marginally profitable to the banks. (Often the banks profit on fees from these people, like overdraft charges.)

If banks had to pay interest on reserves then these accounts would be even less desirable for banks, since they now would have to pay interest on the reserves that the small account holders had brought to their bank. For this reason, they may opt to raise their fees for opening and maintaining a bank account. The result would be that more people would be getting by without bank accounts.

Any serious discussion of negative interest rates has to deal with this problem.

Neil Irwin had a piece in the Upshot section of the NYT raising the possibility that the Fed could have negative interest rates on reserves, rather than its current near zero rate, as a way to provide an additional boost to the economy. The argument is that it is very inconvenient to carry cash, so deposits would not flee banks even if the interest rate were a small negative number.

The problem is that this analysis does not consider the realities of the banked population. Banks have millions (tens of millions?) of customers with relatively low balances. These customers are marginally profitable to the banks. (Often the banks profit on fees from these people, like overdraft charges.)

If banks had to pay interest on reserves then these accounts would be even less desirable for banks, since they now would have to pay interest on the reserves that the small account holders had brought to their bank. For this reason, they may opt to raise their fees for opening and maintaining a bank account. The result would be that more people would be getting by without bank accounts.

Any serious discussion of negative interest rates has to deal with this problem.

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