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Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Mitch Daniels did a big pitch for making student loans more complex and more profitable for the financial industry in a Washington Post column today. The basic story is that he is pushing “income-share agreements” where students contract with lenders to pay them a fixed share of their income for a number of years after they graduate college in exchange for a student loan.

My bet is that good students will be able to figure out ways to get much of their income after the end date on the ISAs, but that is the lender’s problem. The more obvious problem is that Daniels is making a pitch for special government assistance for his friends in the ISA business.

He wants Congress to pass a law that will make the ISA loans exempt from bankruptcy. This means that if a student has a serious illness that makes him or her unable to work or falls on really bad economic times, he can be harassed for the full term of his contract by ISA lenders. This can be 25 or 30 years after graduation (or possibly not graduating).

That may not sound like such a great way to help our young people deal with college costs, especially since there are much simpler alternatives, like the income-based loan repayment plans initiated by the Obama administration or other proposals to reduce the cost of college. Daniels rejects such plans by telling readers:

“It is fallacious to term such an approach “debt-free”; borrowed by an already bankrupt federal government, the money will be all debt, merely shifted to taxpayers, including these very same students as they enter their working years. Already facing $57,000 per person in federal debt, incurred not for their future but almost entirely for the current consumption of their elders, the last thing today’s young people need is another massive federal entitlement program.”

Sorry folks, but anyone who thinks the federal government is “bankrupt” should be treated like a ranting nut, because this is utter nonsense. If Daniels had access to the business pages, he could see that the United States government can now borrow long-term for an interest rate of less than 2.1 percent. Private sector lenders do not lend money to “bankrupt” borrowers at less than 2.1 percent interest.

If Daniels could take off his tin hat, he might notice that the $57,000 in debt per person corresponds to hundreds of thousands of dollars in assets in the form on infrastructure, technology, natural resources, and the education of its population. In Daniel’s calculation, our children would be better off if we stopped paying for their education altogether to get down the $57,000 debt that he thinks is burdening them.

If anyone wants a serious assessment of the debt burden on the federal government, at present interest payments, net of refunds from the Federal Reserve Board, are less than 0.7 percent of GDP. By contrast they were over 3.0 percent of GDP in the early 1990s.

 

 

 

Mitch Daniels did a big pitch for making student loans more complex and more profitable for the financial industry in a Washington Post column today. The basic story is that he is pushing “income-share agreements” where students contract with lenders to pay them a fixed share of their income for a number of years after they graduate college in exchange for a student loan.

My bet is that good students will be able to figure out ways to get much of their income after the end date on the ISAs, but that is the lender’s problem. The more obvious problem is that Daniels is making a pitch for special government assistance for his friends in the ISA business.

He wants Congress to pass a law that will make the ISA loans exempt from bankruptcy. This means that if a student has a serious illness that makes him or her unable to work or falls on really bad economic times, he can be harassed for the full term of his contract by ISA lenders. This can be 25 or 30 years after graduation (or possibly not graduating).

That may not sound like such a great way to help our young people deal with college costs, especially since there are much simpler alternatives, like the income-based loan repayment plans initiated by the Obama administration or other proposals to reduce the cost of college. Daniels rejects such plans by telling readers:

“It is fallacious to term such an approach “debt-free”; borrowed by an already bankrupt federal government, the money will be all debt, merely shifted to taxpayers, including these very same students as they enter their working years. Already facing $57,000 per person in federal debt, incurred not for their future but almost entirely for the current consumption of their elders, the last thing today’s young people need is another massive federal entitlement program.”

Sorry folks, but anyone who thinks the federal government is “bankrupt” should be treated like a ranting nut, because this is utter nonsense. If Daniels had access to the business pages, he could see that the United States government can now borrow long-term for an interest rate of less than 2.1 percent. Private sector lenders do not lend money to “bankrupt” borrowers at less than 2.1 percent interest.

If Daniels could take off his tin hat, he might notice that the $57,000 in debt per person corresponds to hundreds of thousands of dollars in assets in the form on infrastructure, technology, natural resources, and the education of its population. In Daniel’s calculation, our children would be better off if we stopped paying for their education altogether to get down the $57,000 debt that he thinks is burdening them.

If anyone wants a serious assessment of the debt burden on the federal government, at present interest payments, net of refunds from the Federal Reserve Board, are less than 0.7 percent of GDP. By contrast they were over 3.0 percent of GDP in the early 1990s.

 

 

 

In a blogpost Paul Krugman picked up on a discussion by Rex Nutting of the Carter presidency. Nutting points to many of the positive accomplishments of the Carter years, including the fact that, by many measures, the economy actually performed quite well.

Krugman picks up on this theme and uses a chart of median family income to show that the typical family was actually better off in 1981 when Carter left the White House than they had been in 1977 when he took office. Krugman argues that the problem for Carter’s re-election prospects was that income was declining in the last years of his presidency, which is what people had in their minds when they went to vote.

While this point is undoubtedly accurate, there is another complication when we try to get a sense of people’s perceptions when they went to vote in November of 1980. The measure of inflation that is used to derive real median income in Krugman’s chart is the CPI-U-RS. This applies the methodology that we use today to construct what the CPI should have been in prior years. This gives a very different and much lower measure of inflation than the CPI that the Bureau of Labor Statistics was using at the time.

Here is how the two compare for 1978-1981.

                       CPI         CPI-U-RS

1978             9.0%               7.8%

1979            13.3%             10.7%

1980            12.5%             10.7%

The cumulative difference for these three years is 5.6 percentage points. (Yes, this is just adding and I should be compounding, but let’s keep this simple.) This means that folks going to vote in 1980 would have been seeing in the data a 5.6 percent greater drop in real income by 1980 than what Krugman has in his chart. The question is whether this error in the data would have affected people’s perceptions of their well-being or whether we should only care about what we might think of now as the “true” rate of inflation.

I would argue for the importance of the errors in the data. First, none of us really have a clear idea of the true rate of inflation. It’s based on a basket of goods and services that none of us literally buy. There is a big weight for large purchases, like cars, that we may buy at five year intervals, or even longer. Also, the prices are quality adjusted. Is the typical person’s assessment of the rate of the quality improvement in a cell phone or computer the same as the BLS’s assessment? It’s very likely that if she pays more for a car or computer than for her last purchase, she sees that as a price increase, even if BLS has determined that the quality adjusted price has fallen.

On the other side, back in the late 1970s many contracts were legally tied to the CPI. This meant that workers had reason to know the inflation rate shown by the CPI since it would determine their pay increase that year. This was often true of rents as well. As a result, if the BLS said the rate of inflation was 13.3 percent in 1979, it is likely that many people thought the inflation rate was 13.3 percent, even though our methodology now tells us that the rate of inflation was actually just 10.7 percent.

There is more to this story of mis-perceived inflation—could mis-measured inflation lead to actual inflation? I’d argue yes, but we’ll leave that one for another day. For today, I’ll just say that it was not only Paul Volcker’s Fed that doomed Jimmy Carter’s re-election prospects, but also the mistakes made by the folks at BLS.

In a blogpost Paul Krugman picked up on a discussion by Rex Nutting of the Carter presidency. Nutting points to many of the positive accomplishments of the Carter years, including the fact that, by many measures, the economy actually performed quite well.

Krugman picks up on this theme and uses a chart of median family income to show that the typical family was actually better off in 1981 when Carter left the White House than they had been in 1977 when he took office. Krugman argues that the problem for Carter’s re-election prospects was that income was declining in the last years of his presidency, which is what people had in their minds when they went to vote.

While this point is undoubtedly accurate, there is another complication when we try to get a sense of people’s perceptions when they went to vote in November of 1980. The measure of inflation that is used to derive real median income in Krugman’s chart is the CPI-U-RS. This applies the methodology that we use today to construct what the CPI should have been in prior years. This gives a very different and much lower measure of inflation than the CPI that the Bureau of Labor Statistics was using at the time.

Here is how the two compare for 1978-1981.

                       CPI         CPI-U-RS

1978             9.0%               7.8%

1979            13.3%             10.7%

1980            12.5%             10.7%

The cumulative difference for these three years is 5.6 percentage points. (Yes, this is just adding and I should be compounding, but let’s keep this simple.) This means that folks going to vote in 1980 would have been seeing in the data a 5.6 percent greater drop in real income by 1980 than what Krugman has in his chart. The question is whether this error in the data would have affected people’s perceptions of their well-being or whether we should only care about what we might think of now as the “true” rate of inflation.

I would argue for the importance of the errors in the data. First, none of us really have a clear idea of the true rate of inflation. It’s based on a basket of goods and services that none of us literally buy. There is a big weight for large purchases, like cars, that we may buy at five year intervals, or even longer. Also, the prices are quality adjusted. Is the typical person’s assessment of the rate of the quality improvement in a cell phone or computer the same as the BLS’s assessment? It’s very likely that if she pays more for a car or computer than for her last purchase, she sees that as a price increase, even if BLS has determined that the quality adjusted price has fallen.

On the other side, back in the late 1970s many contracts were legally tied to the CPI. This meant that workers had reason to know the inflation rate shown by the CPI since it would determine their pay increase that year. This was often true of rents as well. As a result, if the BLS said the rate of inflation was 13.3 percent in 1979, it is likely that many people thought the inflation rate was 13.3 percent, even though our methodology now tells us that the rate of inflation was actually just 10.7 percent.

There is more to this story of mis-perceived inflation—could mis-measured inflation lead to actual inflation? I’d argue yes, but we’ll leave that one for another day. For today, I’ll just say that it was not only Paul Volcker’s Fed that doomed Jimmy Carter’s re-election prospects, but also the mistakes made by the folks at BLS.

That’s what millions of people are asking after reading a NYT article contrasting the “bombastic” Donald Trump to Jeb Bush who is described as “the wonky son of a president.” Bush has repeatedly said that he can generate 4.0 percent GDP growth during a Bush presidency.

The baseline projection for the years 2017 though 2025 from the Congressional Budget Office is 2.1 percent. Raising this to 3.0 percent would be a remarkable accomplishment. There is no remotely plausible story that would raise growth to 4.0 percent. It would be sort of like predicting a baseball team going undefeated through 162 game season. It would be difficult to take seriously a team manager who confidently made such predictions. The same should apply to a presidential candidate boasting of 4.0 percent GDP growth.

That’s what millions of people are asking after reading a NYT article contrasting the “bombastic” Donald Trump to Jeb Bush who is described as “the wonky son of a president.” Bush has repeatedly said that he can generate 4.0 percent GDP growth during a Bush presidency.

The baseline projection for the years 2017 though 2025 from the Congressional Budget Office is 2.1 percent. Raising this to 3.0 percent would be a remarkable accomplishment. There is no remotely plausible story that would raise growth to 4.0 percent. It would be sort of like predicting a baseball team going undefeated through 162 game season. It would be difficult to take seriously a team manager who confidently made such predictions. The same should apply to a presidential candidate boasting of 4.0 percent GDP growth.

It might have been worth a few sentences calling attention to the seeming irony in the industry’s objections to proposed regulations that would limit emissions of methane gas. The NYT article noted that a large share of greenhouse gas comes from such methane emissions. At the same time, the industry has promoted fracking as a way of developing a bridge fuel, that emits less greenhouse gas than the coal it replaces, until renewable energy becomes cheaper.

If the net effect of fracking is to reduce emissions, then regulations that ensure this outcome should not pose a problem for the industry. The regulations should only be a major issue for the industry if it turns out that methane gas emissions largely or completely offset any reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.

It might have been worth a few sentences calling attention to the seeming irony in the industry’s objections to proposed regulations that would limit emissions of methane gas. The NYT article noted that a large share of greenhouse gas comes from such methane emissions. At the same time, the industry has promoted fracking as a way of developing a bridge fuel, that emits less greenhouse gas than the coal it replaces, until renewable energy becomes cheaper.

If the net effect of fracking is to reduce emissions, then regulations that ensure this outcome should not pose a problem for the industry. The regulations should only be a major issue for the industry if it turns out that methane gas emissions largely or completely offset any reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.

The Post has an interesting piece on a St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank study which shows that African American and Hispanics with college degrees have far less wealth than their white counterparts. (Stay tuned for CEPR study showing this story with wages.) The study also shows a large decline in wealth for African Americans and Hispanics with college degrees over the last two decades.

It attributes much of this decline to subprime mortgages pushed by lenders during the bubble years:

“But African American and Hispanics were often steered into high-cost home loans that many could not afford once the housing market crashed. Those who managed to stave off a foreclosure still watched the value of their properties took a nosedive, especially if they lived in minority neighborhoods.”

While a subprime loan made it more difficult for homeowners to keep their homes in the crash, the loss of wealth was due to plunging house prices. Even if an African American or Hispanic family bought a house with a traditional fixed rate 30-year mortgage they still would have seen a huge hit to their wealth when the housing bubble collapsed.

This point is important because the warning signs were everywhere for economists and policy analysts to see. However, they chose to ignore them and encouraged minorities to buy homes at bubble-inflated prices where they were virtually guaranteed to see large losses. Unfortunately, most of the people who were involved in setting housing policy during the bubble years are still in the same business today. Most do not appear to have learned much from the experience.

The Post has an interesting piece on a St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank study which shows that African American and Hispanics with college degrees have far less wealth than their white counterparts. (Stay tuned for CEPR study showing this story with wages.) The study also shows a large decline in wealth for African Americans and Hispanics with college degrees over the last two decades.

It attributes much of this decline to subprime mortgages pushed by lenders during the bubble years:

“But African American and Hispanics were often steered into high-cost home loans that many could not afford once the housing market crashed. Those who managed to stave off a foreclosure still watched the value of their properties took a nosedive, especially if they lived in minority neighborhoods.”

While a subprime loan made it more difficult for homeowners to keep their homes in the crash, the loss of wealth was due to plunging house prices. Even if an African American or Hispanic family bought a house with a traditional fixed rate 30-year mortgage they still would have seen a huge hit to their wealth when the housing bubble collapsed.

This point is important because the warning signs were everywhere for economists and policy analysts to see. However, they chose to ignore them and encouraged minorities to buy homes at bubble-inflated prices where they were virtually guaranteed to see large losses. Unfortunately, most of the people who were involved in setting housing policy during the bubble years are still in the same business today. Most do not appear to have learned much from the experience.

In an interesting piece on the decline of the political center, E.J. Dionne wrongly lists globalization as a villain. He tells readers:

“Globalization weakens the ability of moderate governments of both varieties to deliver on their promises. Capital can flee easily to more congenial climes, undercutting a nation’s tax base and its regulatory efforts.”

Globalization should also have the effect of reducing inequality by making it easier to take advantage of lower cost professional services (e.g. physicians services, lawyers’ services, dentists’ services) except that the United States has acted to maintain or even increase barriers to trade in these areas. It should also make it easier to circumvent patent and copyright monopolies that redistribute income upward, except we have consciously pursued policies to strengthen these forms of monopolies to limit the extent to which developing countries might provide vehicles for avoidance (in contrast to tax policy).

Also, governments with their own currency (e.g. the United States, the U.K., and the euro zone collectively) need not be restricted by their tax take in terms of spending, as long as they are below full employment. The decision not to use fiscal policy to bring economies to full employment is due to superstitions, not actual limits imposed by globalization.

In an interesting piece on the decline of the political center, E.J. Dionne wrongly lists globalization as a villain. He tells readers:

“Globalization weakens the ability of moderate governments of both varieties to deliver on their promises. Capital can flee easily to more congenial climes, undercutting a nation’s tax base and its regulatory efforts.”

Globalization should also have the effect of reducing inequality by making it easier to take advantage of lower cost professional services (e.g. physicians services, lawyers’ services, dentists’ services) except that the United States has acted to maintain or even increase barriers to trade in these areas. It should also make it easier to circumvent patent and copyright monopolies that redistribute income upward, except we have consciously pursued policies to strengthen these forms of monopolies to limit the extent to which developing countries might provide vehicles for avoidance (in contrast to tax policy).

Also, governments with their own currency (e.g. the United States, the U.K., and the euro zone collectively) need not be restricted by their tax take in terms of spending, as long as they are below full employment. The decision not to use fiscal policy to bring economies to full employment is due to superstitions, not actual limits imposed by globalization.

Yes, it can be hard getting access to information in the barren heart of the nation's capital. Therefore it is not surprising that the Washington Post seems completely unaware of the economic situation in Japan at present. In an account of the economic problems facing the world the Washington Post told readers: "Japan, meanwhile, has recorded years of slow growth, has alarming public debt levels and is perpetually on the brink of deflation." Actually in terms of employment growth, which is probably what matters most to the Japanese people (as opposed to GDP growth), the country has been doing pretty well as of late. According to the OECD, Japan's employment to population ratio (EPOP) has risen by 2.4 percentage points from 70.8 percent to 73.2 percent since the new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took power in the fourth quarter of 2012 and embarked on a policy of aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus. By comparison, the EPOP in the United States rose by 1.4 percentage points to 68.7 percent in this period. If the EPOP in the United States had risen by the same amount as in Japan it would correspond to another 2.5 million jobs.  It's not clear who the current levels of Japanese debt are supposed to be alarming to, but clearly financial markets do not fall into this group. The interest rate on long-term Japanese government bonds is 0.38 percent. In terms of being on the brink of deflation, fans of economics everywhere would say, "so what?" The United States, Europe, and Japan all have inflation rates that are lower than is desirable. If the inflation rate ends up being a small negative number rather than a small positive number it doesn't matter. Any fall in the inflation rate, regardless of whether it means crossing zero makes debt burdens worse and raises real interest rates.
Yes, it can be hard getting access to information in the barren heart of the nation's capital. Therefore it is not surprising that the Washington Post seems completely unaware of the economic situation in Japan at present. In an account of the economic problems facing the world the Washington Post told readers: "Japan, meanwhile, has recorded years of slow growth, has alarming public debt levels and is perpetually on the brink of deflation." Actually in terms of employment growth, which is probably what matters most to the Japanese people (as opposed to GDP growth), the country has been doing pretty well as of late. According to the OECD, Japan's employment to population ratio (EPOP) has risen by 2.4 percentage points from 70.8 percent to 73.2 percent since the new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took power in the fourth quarter of 2012 and embarked on a policy of aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus. By comparison, the EPOP in the United States rose by 1.4 percentage points to 68.7 percent in this period. If the EPOP in the United States had risen by the same amount as in Japan it would correspond to another 2.5 million jobs.  It's not clear who the current levels of Japanese debt are supposed to be alarming to, but clearly financial markets do not fall into this group. The interest rate on long-term Japanese government bonds is 0.38 percent. In terms of being on the brink of deflation, fans of economics everywhere would say, "so what?" The United States, Europe, and Japan all have inflation rates that are lower than is desirable. If the inflation rate ends up being a small negative number rather than a small positive number it doesn't matter. Any fall in the inflation rate, regardless of whether it means crossing zero makes debt burdens worse and raises real interest rates.
The NYT went a couple of miles over the top with Peter Eavis' analysis of China's currency devaluation. It begins by telling readers; "For years, China looked like the principled noncombatant. As other countries, seeking to secure an economic advantage, let the value of their currencies slide on international markets, China held firm on the value of its money." "The principled noncombatant?" What are they smoking over there? China accumulated more than $4 trillion in reserves to keep its currency from rising against the dollar. China looked to the world outside of the NYT like the principal combatant. This massive intervention led China to run massive trade surpluses, peaking at more than 10 percent of GDP in 2007. Fans of economics everywhere know that fast growing developing countries like China are supposed to run large trade deficits, as capital is supposed to flow from slow growing rich countries to fast growing developing countries. Given China's 10 percent plus annual GDP growth a trade deficit of 10 percent of GDP would have been reasonable, instead China had that reversed. This also explains the massive housing bubble in the United States and other wealthy countries. With trade deficits creating enormous gaps in demand, the only way they could be easily filled was with demand driven by asset bubbles. (We could have filled the demand gap with large budget deficits, but people in positions of power in Washington are superstituous, so we can't run large budget deficits to fill demand gaps.) The rest of the article is no more in touch with reality. It tells readers:
The NYT went a couple of miles over the top with Peter Eavis' analysis of China's currency devaluation. It begins by telling readers; "For years, China looked like the principled noncombatant. As other countries, seeking to secure an economic advantage, let the value of their currencies slide on international markets, China held firm on the value of its money." "The principled noncombatant?" What are they smoking over there? China accumulated more than $4 trillion in reserves to keep its currency from rising against the dollar. China looked to the world outside of the NYT like the principal combatant. This massive intervention led China to run massive trade surpluses, peaking at more than 10 percent of GDP in 2007. Fans of economics everywhere know that fast growing developing countries like China are supposed to run large trade deficits, as capital is supposed to flow from slow growing rich countries to fast growing developing countries. Given China's 10 percent plus annual GDP growth a trade deficit of 10 percent of GDP would have been reasonable, instead China had that reversed. This also explains the massive housing bubble in the United States and other wealthy countries. With trade deficits creating enormous gaps in demand, the only way they could be easily filled was with demand driven by asset bubbles. (We could have filled the demand gap with large budget deficits, but people in positions of power in Washington are superstituous, so we can't run large budget deficits to fill demand gaps.) The rest of the article is no more in touch with reality. It tells readers:

The $4 Trillion That No One Can See

Economists and people who write about the economy are not known for being especially astute when it comes to economic issues. After all, there were almost no people in this group who were able to see the $8 trillion housing bubble whose collapse sank the economy. More recently, we have a substantial clique running around yelling that the robots will take all the jobs. This is at the same time that we continue to have most of the Washington elite types fretting that the retirement of the baby boomers will leave us without any workers. These concerns are 180 degrees opposite, sort of like complaining that the soup is too hot and too cold, but that's the sort of conceptual absurdities folks have come to expect from people who write about the economy. The usually astute Catherine Rampell is one of the guilty parties today, telling readers that the recent drop in the value of the Chinese yuan is a response to the market, not the result of currency management by China's government. The problem in this story is that it ignores that China's central bank is holding more than $4 trillion of reserves, about $3 trillion more than would be expected for an economy of China's size. This stock of reserves has the effect of raising the value of the dollar and other reserve currencies against the yuan. If that is not obvious, consider the analogous situation with the Federal Reserve Board and its holding of more than $3 trillion in assets as a result of it quantitative easing (QE) policy. Under this policy, the Fed bought up large amounts of government bonds and mortgage backed securities. The idea was that the Fed's purchases would drive up the price of these bonds and thereby directly lower long-term interest rates.
Economists and people who write about the economy are not known for being especially astute when it comes to economic issues. After all, there were almost no people in this group who were able to see the $8 trillion housing bubble whose collapse sank the economy. More recently, we have a substantial clique running around yelling that the robots will take all the jobs. This is at the same time that we continue to have most of the Washington elite types fretting that the retirement of the baby boomers will leave us without any workers. These concerns are 180 degrees opposite, sort of like complaining that the soup is too hot and too cold, but that's the sort of conceptual absurdities folks have come to expect from people who write about the economy. The usually astute Catherine Rampell is one of the guilty parties today, telling readers that the recent drop in the value of the Chinese yuan is a response to the market, not the result of currency management by China's government. The problem in this story is that it ignores that China's central bank is holding more than $4 trillion of reserves, about $3 trillion more than would be expected for an economy of China's size. This stock of reserves has the effect of raising the value of the dollar and other reserve currencies against the yuan. If that is not obvious, consider the analogous situation with the Federal Reserve Board and its holding of more than $3 trillion in assets as a result of it quantitative easing (QE) policy. Under this policy, the Fed bought up large amounts of government bonds and mortgage backed securities. The idea was that the Fed's purchases would drive up the price of these bonds and thereby directly lower long-term interest rates.

Paul Krugman had a nice blogpost outlining some of the key issues in the literature on optimal currency unions. The question is what happens in a currency union like the euro zone, which is not optimal for many reasons, if there is free mobility of labor.

Krugman points to the experience of Portugal and argues that mobility of labor actually makes the situation worse, not better. The story is that much of Portugal’s prime age labor force is emigrating to other countries in the European Union, leaving behind a population of retirees, without a working age population to pay their benefits. This is similar to the story with Puerto Rico, although as Krugman points out, due to the fiscal union with the rest of the United States, retirees in Puerto Rico can still count on their Social Security and Medicare, as well as other payments that flow from Washington.

It is worth taking another step with this one to think about Detroit. There we have a situation where the the downturn in the auto industry is a big hit to the city and the region. However, white workers were able to escape many of the bad effects by stepping over the city lines and move to the suburbs. Due to discrimination in housing and lending, African Americans find the move to the suburbs much more difficult, therefore leaving many of them stuck dealing with the effects of the loss of much of the city’s employment base.

This picture is clearly somewhat exaggerated. People can move to other cities and many African Americans have moved to Detroit’s suburbs, but the reality of discrimination, certainly in the very recent past and which undoubtedly continues to some extent into the present, has made it considerably more difficult for African Americans in Detroit to escape the fallout from the collapse of the auto industry than for its white population.  

Paul Krugman had a nice blogpost outlining some of the key issues in the literature on optimal currency unions. The question is what happens in a currency union like the euro zone, which is not optimal for many reasons, if there is free mobility of labor.

Krugman points to the experience of Portugal and argues that mobility of labor actually makes the situation worse, not better. The story is that much of Portugal’s prime age labor force is emigrating to other countries in the European Union, leaving behind a population of retirees, without a working age population to pay their benefits. This is similar to the story with Puerto Rico, although as Krugman points out, due to the fiscal union with the rest of the United States, retirees in Puerto Rico can still count on their Social Security and Medicare, as well as other payments that flow from Washington.

It is worth taking another step with this one to think about Detroit. There we have a situation where the the downturn in the auto industry is a big hit to the city and the region. However, white workers were able to escape many of the bad effects by stepping over the city lines and move to the suburbs. Due to discrimination in housing and lending, African Americans find the move to the suburbs much more difficult, therefore leaving many of them stuck dealing with the effects of the loss of much of the city’s employment base.

This picture is clearly somewhat exaggerated. People can move to other cities and many African Americans have moved to Detroit’s suburbs, but the reality of discrimination, certainly in the very recent past and which undoubtedly continues to some extent into the present, has made it considerably more difficult for African Americans in Detroit to escape the fallout from the collapse of the auto industry than for its white population.  

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