Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The NYT ran a column on helping low income homeowners by Elysse Cherry, the chief executive of Boston Community Capital. The piece includes various proposals designed to help low income homeowners who were hit by the collapse of the housing bubble, but it also includes the bizarre complaint: "In many areas, housing prices are stuck below their inflated pre-bubble levels. Until we deal with this fact, entire communities will continue to struggle with high foreclosure rates and a lack of economic mobility. .... "However, the poorest fifth of Americans already spend more than 40 percent of their income on housing, compared with less than 31 percent for the upper fifth, according to government data. Meanwhile, real wages for most Americans have been flat or falling for decades. Absent an extraordinary increase in income for low-income families, home prices in low-income areas aren’t going anywhere."This disparity between high- and low-income neighborhoods is evident in the numbers. The Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index for March was over the March 2004 index, and national median home prices, according to the real estate website Zillow, are just over what they were 10 years ago." There are two problems with this complaint. First, it is factually wrong, or at least misleading. The weak price performance of lower cost homes depends very much on the time window being considered. If homeowners bought near the peak of the bubble, which disproportionately affected lower income neighborhoods, then their prices would still be depressed, however if they bought before the bubble they would be doing quite well.
The NYT ran a column on helping low income homeowners by Elysse Cherry, the chief executive of Boston Community Capital. The piece includes various proposals designed to help low income homeowners who were hit by the collapse of the housing bubble, but it also includes the bizarre complaint: "In many areas, housing prices are stuck below their inflated pre-bubble levels. Until we deal with this fact, entire communities will continue to struggle with high foreclosure rates and a lack of economic mobility. .... "However, the poorest fifth of Americans already spend more than 40 percent of their income on housing, compared with less than 31 percent for the upper fifth, according to government data. Meanwhile, real wages for most Americans have been flat or falling for decades. Absent an extraordinary increase in income for low-income families, home prices in low-income areas aren’t going anywhere."This disparity between high- and low-income neighborhoods is evident in the numbers. The Standard & Poor’s/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index for March was over the March 2004 index, and national median home prices, according to the real estate website Zillow, are just over what they were 10 years ago." There are two problems with this complaint. First, it is factually wrong, or at least misleading. The weak price performance of lower cost homes depends very much on the time window being considered. If homeowners bought near the peak of the bubble, which disproportionately affected lower income neighborhoods, then their prices would still be depressed, however if they bought before the bubble they would be doing quite well.
The Washington Post is apparently pulling out all the stops in pushing its agenda on trade. It ran a front page news story that included several heroic acts of mind reading and flagrant misrepresentations to help push the deal to its readers. In the later category, the second paragraph told readers: "members of the New Democrat Coalition [a group of centrist Democrats in Congress] heard from frustrated tech executives who pleaded with them to help boost global growth and demanded to know why the president’s party was not lining up behind his trade push." In fact the tech executives were not pleading with them to help "boost global growth," or if they were they were not being honest. There are no models that show the TPP having more than a trivial impact on global growth. In fact, the United States Department of Agriculture projected that the impact on growth in the United States would be too small to measure. If the tech executives were pleading with the New Democratic Coalition to "boost global growth" it was an argument of the form, "give me money, it will be good for the economy." The reality is that they of course want a deal that they helped craft to make themselves richer. Contrary to the assertions in this article, the TPP is absolutely not about expanding trade. In fact, it increases protectionism in important areas in the form of stronger and longer patent and copyright protections. No models have sought to estimate the costs to the economy of these government granted monopolies. It is likely these costs are substantial since they can raise the price of the protected items by a hundredfold or more. (The patent protected price of the Hepatitis C drug Sovaldi is $84,000 per treatment in the United States. A high quality generic is available in India for less than $1000.) This increase in prices is equivalent to a 10,000 percent tariff. It leads to exactly the sort of distortions and corruption that economists predict from high tariffs.
The Washington Post is apparently pulling out all the stops in pushing its agenda on trade. It ran a front page news story that included several heroic acts of mind reading and flagrant misrepresentations to help push the deal to its readers. In the later category, the second paragraph told readers: "members of the New Democrat Coalition [a group of centrist Democrats in Congress] heard from frustrated tech executives who pleaded with them to help boost global growth and demanded to know why the president’s party was not lining up behind his trade push." In fact the tech executives were not pleading with them to help "boost global growth," or if they were they were not being honest. There are no models that show the TPP having more than a trivial impact on global growth. In fact, the United States Department of Agriculture projected that the impact on growth in the United States would be too small to measure. If the tech executives were pleading with the New Democratic Coalition to "boost global growth" it was an argument of the form, "give me money, it will be good for the economy." The reality is that they of course want a deal that they helped craft to make themselves richer. Contrary to the assertions in this article, the TPP is absolutely not about expanding trade. In fact, it increases protectionism in important areas in the form of stronger and longer patent and copyright protections. No models have sought to estimate the costs to the economy of these government granted monopolies. It is likely these costs are substantial since they can raise the price of the protected items by a hundredfold or more. (The patent protected price of the Hepatitis C drug Sovaldi is $84,000 per treatment in the United States. A high quality generic is available in India for less than $1000.) This increase in prices is equivalent to a 10,000 percent tariff. It leads to exactly the sort of distortions and corruption that economists predict from high tariffs.

The NYT apparently thinks this is a common practice. An article discussing a Supreme Court ruling that a second mortgage could not be discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy filing even when the homeowner’s first mortgage vastly exceeded the value of the house, told readers:

“a ruling in favor of the homeowners might have made banks and other lenders less willing to extend second mortgages in the future.”

In a foreclosure, a first mortgage must be paid in full before a dollar can be paid on a second mortgage. In the case before the court, the first mortgage was for $183,000, while the home was valued at $98,000. The homeowner therefore argued that the second mortgage was effectively unsecured debt that should be discharged in bankruptcy.

A ruling in favor of the homeowner would only affect banks’ lending behavior if they think there is a substantial probability that a home will fall below the value of a first mortgage. If they do believe this risk to be large enough to affect their lending, then it is probably best for the homeowner and the economy more generally that the second mortgage not be issued.

The NYT apparently thinks this is a common practice. An article discussing a Supreme Court ruling that a second mortgage could not be discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy filing even when the homeowner’s first mortgage vastly exceeded the value of the house, told readers:

“a ruling in favor of the homeowners might have made banks and other lenders less willing to extend second mortgages in the future.”

In a foreclosure, a first mortgage must be paid in full before a dollar can be paid on a second mortgage. In the case before the court, the first mortgage was for $183,000, while the home was valued at $98,000. The homeowner therefore argued that the second mortgage was effectively unsecured debt that should be discharged in bankruptcy.

A ruling in favor of the homeowner would only affect banks’ lending behavior if they think there is a substantial probability that a home will fall below the value of a first mortgage. If they do believe this risk to be large enough to affect their lending, then it is probably best for the homeowner and the economy more generally that the second mortgage not be issued.

Deflation Nonsense in NYT

It is amazing how economic reporters continue to repeat nonsense about deflation. As fans of arithmetic and logic everywhere know, deflation is bad for the same reason a lower rate of inflation is bad. It raises the real interest rate at a time when we want a lower real interest rate and it increases the real value of debt when we want to see the real value of debt reduced. (The real interest rate is the nominal interest minus the inflation rate.) 

Crossing zero means nothing, which should be obvious to anyone who has given the issue a moment’s thought. The inflation rate is a sum of millions of different price changes. When it is near zero, many prices are already falling. When it crosses zero and becomes negative, that means a somewhat larger share of prices are falling. So what? Since prices are quality adjusted, the prices people pay may still be rising.

Anyhow, the NYT added to the silliness yet again when it told readers that price declines in the euro zone due to falling energy prices are a potential problem. Let’s think this one through for a moment. Suppose that prices are rising at a 1.0 percent annual rate. Given the weakness of the euro zone economy that is lower than would be desirable, but let’s use that as a starting point.

Now let’s have energy prices fall at a 40 percent annual rate so that prices are now falling at a 1.0 percent annual rate. Let’s assume that the rate of inflation for non-energy prices has not changed.

Now how does this make things worse? People used to be pay more for gas and heat, with most of that money ending up outside of the euro zone. With the lower prices, this money stays in their pocket for them to spend on other things. In terms of debt burdens, if wages are rising in step with inflation, then the real value of debt to workers is being eroded at exactly the same rate as before. And since non-energy prices are still rising at the same pace, the real interest rate for investment outside the energy sector has not changed.

So what is the problem? It would be great if the NYT could get someone other than deflation cultists to do their economic reporting.

 

It is amazing how economic reporters continue to repeat nonsense about deflation. As fans of arithmetic and logic everywhere know, deflation is bad for the same reason a lower rate of inflation is bad. It raises the real interest rate at a time when we want a lower real interest rate and it increases the real value of debt when we want to see the real value of debt reduced. (The real interest rate is the nominal interest minus the inflation rate.) 

Crossing zero means nothing, which should be obvious to anyone who has given the issue a moment’s thought. The inflation rate is a sum of millions of different price changes. When it is near zero, many prices are already falling. When it crosses zero and becomes negative, that means a somewhat larger share of prices are falling. So what? Since prices are quality adjusted, the prices people pay may still be rising.

Anyhow, the NYT added to the silliness yet again when it told readers that price declines in the euro zone due to falling energy prices are a potential problem. Let’s think this one through for a moment. Suppose that prices are rising at a 1.0 percent annual rate. Given the weakness of the euro zone economy that is lower than would be desirable, but let’s use that as a starting point.

Now let’s have energy prices fall at a 40 percent annual rate so that prices are now falling at a 1.0 percent annual rate. Let’s assume that the rate of inflation for non-energy prices has not changed.

Now how does this make things worse? People used to be pay more for gas and heat, with most of that money ending up outside of the euro zone. With the lower prices, this money stays in their pocket for them to spend on other things. In terms of debt burdens, if wages are rising in step with inflation, then the real value of debt to workers is being eroded at exactly the same rate as before. And since non-energy prices are still rising at the same pace, the real interest rate for investment outside the energy sector has not changed.

So what is the problem? It would be great if the NYT could get someone other than deflation cultists to do their economic reporting.

 

American Enterprise economist Andrew Biggs again warned about public pension funding in a Wall Street Journal piece. He’s not altogether wrong. Biggs points out that many states continue to badly underfund their pensions. He also cautions against pension funds taking too much risk with their investments. These points are well taken, but I would raise a few issues about Bigg’s argument. First, it’s good to see that Kansas is Bigg’s poster child as one of the states with a poorly funded pension plan looking for higher market returns rather than making its required contributions. This is worth noting because Kansas is one of the most Republican states in the country, with a very conservative governor. It certainly it is not a hotbed of public sector unionism. This point is important. It was not public sector unions that caused states to have problems with pension funding, it was bad management by elected officials, both Democrats and Republicans. Second, Biggs somewhat misrepresents the issues on returns. He argues the return assumptions used by public pension plans are considerably higher than the recommendations of a group of investment consultants and asset managers. However the asset mix for which this group made their projections was a portfolio of 70 percent equities and 30 percent bonds. The mix of assets held by pensions tends to be oriented towards somewhat higher return assets, with holdings in private equity and venture capital. The returns assumed by the pension funds are much closer the returns recently recommended in a report by the Pension Consulting Alliance. It is also worth noting one source of confusion in these comparisons. Many pension funds assume higher rates of inflation than we have been seeing recently or are expected in the future. For example, the Kansas plan cited by Biggs assumes a 3.0 percent average rate of inflation over its planning horizon. The Congressional Budget Office and most other forecasters assume a 2.0 percent inflation rate. The difference in inflation assumptions should translate one to one into differences in returns. In other words, a 6.0 percent return assumption with a 2.0 percent inflation rate translates into a 7.0 percent return assumption with a 3.0 percent inflation rate. However Biggs is right to raise a flag about some of the risky investments being pursued by pension funds. Private equity and venture capital can both be very risky. In the past these investments have provided a better return than the overall market, but pension funds would be wise to exercise caution if they are relying on this continuing in the future.
American Enterprise economist Andrew Biggs again warned about public pension funding in a Wall Street Journal piece. He’s not altogether wrong. Biggs points out that many states continue to badly underfund their pensions. He also cautions against pension funds taking too much risk with their investments. These points are well taken, but I would raise a few issues about Bigg’s argument. First, it’s good to see that Kansas is Bigg’s poster child as one of the states with a poorly funded pension plan looking for higher market returns rather than making its required contributions. This is worth noting because Kansas is one of the most Republican states in the country, with a very conservative governor. It certainly it is not a hotbed of public sector unionism. This point is important. It was not public sector unions that caused states to have problems with pension funding, it was bad management by elected officials, both Democrats and Republicans. Second, Biggs somewhat misrepresents the issues on returns. He argues the return assumptions used by public pension plans are considerably higher than the recommendations of a group of investment consultants and asset managers. However the asset mix for which this group made their projections was a portfolio of 70 percent equities and 30 percent bonds. The mix of assets held by pensions tends to be oriented towards somewhat higher return assets, with holdings in private equity and venture capital. The returns assumed by the pension funds are much closer the returns recently recommended in a report by the Pension Consulting Alliance. It is also worth noting one source of confusion in these comparisons. Many pension funds assume higher rates of inflation than we have been seeing recently or are expected in the future. For example, the Kansas plan cited by Biggs assumes a 3.0 percent average rate of inflation over its planning horizon. The Congressional Budget Office and most other forecasters assume a 2.0 percent inflation rate. The difference in inflation assumptions should translate one to one into differences in returns. In other words, a 6.0 percent return assumption with a 2.0 percent inflation rate translates into a 7.0 percent return assumption with a 3.0 percent inflation rate. However Biggs is right to raise a flag about some of the risky investments being pursued by pension funds. Private equity and venture capital can both be very risky. In the past these investments have provided a better return than the overall market, but pension funds would be wise to exercise caution if they are relying on this continuing in the future.

Undoubtedly millions of readers are wondering about the NYT’s use of the term when it told readers that one of the goals of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is to, “protect intellectual property from theft.” Actually one of the goals of the TPP is to strengthen and lengthen patent and copyright protections.

After this is done, those who do not respect the new laws can be accused of “theft,” however it makes no sense to accuse someone of theft for breaking laws that do not exist. The NYT may want strong and long protections, but a newspaper should not be calling people who do not adhere to its views of intellectual property “thieves.”

 

Undoubtedly millions of readers are wondering about the NYT’s use of the term when it told readers that one of the goals of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is to, “protect intellectual property from theft.” Actually one of the goals of the TPP is to strengthen and lengthen patent and copyright protections.

After this is done, those who do not respect the new laws can be accused of “theft,” however it makes no sense to accuse someone of theft for breaking laws that do not exist. The NYT may want strong and long protections, but a newspaper should not be calling people who do not adhere to its views of intellectual property “thieves.”

 

Robert Samuelson used his Monday column to tell readers that the problem with the economy is that we are suffering the psychological fallout of the Great Recession:

“My main explanation for this — as I’ve argued before — is the hangover from the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the Great Recession. These events changed economic psychology, precisely because they were unanticipated and horrific. They transcended the experience of most Americans (that is, anyone who hadn’t lived through the Great Depression). Corporate executives and consumers alike became more defensive; they saved and hoarded a bit more. If a novel calamity struck once, it could strike again. They’d better prepare.”

The problem is that the data refuses to agree with his psychoanalysis. As I pointed out yesterday, consumption is actually higher as a share of GDP than it was before the downturn, indicating that fear is not keeping households from consuming in any obvious way.

Samuelson also points to the rise in temporary employment as evidence that firms are scared to commit themselves to permanent employees. The problem with this one is that temporary employment as a share of total employment is just rising back to the levels of the late 1990s, a time when the economy was booming.

If we look at the narrow category of temporary employment agencies, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports the number stood at 2,880,000 in April. That compares to 2,605,000 in December of 1999. Measured as a share of total employment, it stood at 2.03 percent in December of 1999, compared with 2.04 percent of total employment in April.

If we use the somewhat broader category of employment services, BLS reports the number at 3,547,000 in April. That compared to 3,776,000 in December of 1999. Measured as a share of total employment, jobs at employment service agencies fell from 3.77 percent in December of 1999 to 3.55 percent in April.

In short, if employment in temporary agencies is supposed to be a measure of insecurity, it doesn’t appear to be going in the right direction to make Samuelson’s point.

 

Addendum:

The most obvious explanation for the continuing weakness of the economy is that there is nothing to fill the gap in demand created by a $500 billion annual trade deficit (@ 3 percent of GDP). In the last decade, the demand generated by the housing bubble filled the gap, while in the 1990s the demand from a stock bubble filled the gap. In the absence of another bubble and a refusal to run large budget deficits, there is no obvious source of demand to fill this gap.

Unfortunately this explanation is far too simple to be used by economists or those writing on economy.

Robert Samuelson used his Monday column to tell readers that the problem with the economy is that we are suffering the psychological fallout of the Great Recession:

“My main explanation for this — as I’ve argued before — is the hangover from the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the Great Recession. These events changed economic psychology, precisely because they were unanticipated and horrific. They transcended the experience of most Americans (that is, anyone who hadn’t lived through the Great Depression). Corporate executives and consumers alike became more defensive; they saved and hoarded a bit more. If a novel calamity struck once, it could strike again. They’d better prepare.”

The problem is that the data refuses to agree with his psychoanalysis. As I pointed out yesterday, consumption is actually higher as a share of GDP than it was before the downturn, indicating that fear is not keeping households from consuming in any obvious way.

Samuelson also points to the rise in temporary employment as evidence that firms are scared to commit themselves to permanent employees. The problem with this one is that temporary employment as a share of total employment is just rising back to the levels of the late 1990s, a time when the economy was booming.

If we look at the narrow category of temporary employment agencies, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports the number stood at 2,880,000 in April. That compares to 2,605,000 in December of 1999. Measured as a share of total employment, it stood at 2.03 percent in December of 1999, compared with 2.04 percent of total employment in April.

If we use the somewhat broader category of employment services, BLS reports the number at 3,547,000 in April. That compared to 3,776,000 in December of 1999. Measured as a share of total employment, jobs at employment service agencies fell from 3.77 percent in December of 1999 to 3.55 percent in April.

In short, if employment in temporary agencies is supposed to be a measure of insecurity, it doesn’t appear to be going in the right direction to make Samuelson’s point.

 

Addendum:

The most obvious explanation for the continuing weakness of the economy is that there is nothing to fill the gap in demand created by a $500 billion annual trade deficit (@ 3 percent of GDP). In the last decade, the demand generated by the housing bubble filled the gap, while in the 1990s the demand from a stock bubble filled the gap. In the absence of another bubble and a refusal to run large budget deficits, there is no obvious source of demand to fill this gap.

Unfortunately this explanation is far too simple to be used by economists or those writing on economy.

A NYT article reported on a turn to the right of politics in France and in much of the rest of Europe. Remarkably, the piece never once mentioned the decision by the European Central Bank (ECB) to impose a policy of austerity and high unemployment on the continent. Since the mainstream left parties do not want to challenge the ECB, this means they have few plausible routes for reducing unemployment and restoring wage growth for the bulk of the population.

This opens the stage for right-wing nationalist parties, which promise a better economic situation by blaming immigrants for the weak economy. It also forces the traditional left parties to the center since they must accede to the ECB’s demand for austere budgets and labor market reforms.

The United States will be in the same situation if the Federal Reserve Board starts raising interest rates to slow the economy and keep the labor market so weak that most workers cannot get wage gains.

A NYT article reported on a turn to the right of politics in France and in much of the rest of Europe. Remarkably, the piece never once mentioned the decision by the European Central Bank (ECB) to impose a policy of austerity and high unemployment on the continent. Since the mainstream left parties do not want to challenge the ECB, this means they have few plausible routes for reducing unemployment and restoring wage growth for the bulk of the population.

This opens the stage for right-wing nationalist parties, which promise a better economic situation by blaming immigrants for the weak economy. It also forces the traditional left parties to the center since they must accede to the ECB’s demand for austere budgets and labor market reforms.

The United States will be in the same situation if the Federal Reserve Board starts raising interest rates to slow the economy and keep the labor market so weak that most workers cannot get wage gains.

As the world awaits the final word on the negotiations between Greece and its creditors, it’s worth a quick flashback to 2010 and the report of Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, the co-chairs of President Obama’s deficit commission. (This report is often referred to as a report of the commission. That is not true. The by-laws clearly state that to issue a report it was necessary to have the support of 12 of the 16 commission members. While no formal vote was ever taken, the co-chairs’ report only had the support of 10 members.)

Anyhow, getting back to matters at hand, one of the Simpson-Bowles proposals was to raise the normal retirement age for Social Security to 69 from its current level of 66 (soon to be 67). The report recognized that many people work in physically demanding and/or dangerous jobs where it would be unreasonable to expect people to work this late in life. It therefore proposed having special lower retirement ages for certain occupations.

The reason this is relevant to Greece is that one of the sticking points at the moment is the reform of Greece’s public pension system. One of the main issues is that the current system allows people in many occupations to start collecting benefits well before the normal retirement age. For example, hairdressers are apparently among this group because they are exposed to dangerous chemicals on the job.

While the Greek system was a universal target of ridicule among serious minded people everywhere, many of these same people embraced the Simpson-Bowles report as a gem of thoughtful, non-partisan, policy-making. The ability to ignore the fact that the supposedly thoughtful Bowles-Simpson gang were advocating the adoption of a pension system subject to universal ridicule is yet another example of the lack of seriousness of the serious people. 

As the world awaits the final word on the negotiations between Greece and its creditors, it’s worth a quick flashback to 2010 and the report of Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, the co-chairs of President Obama’s deficit commission. (This report is often referred to as a report of the commission. That is not true. The by-laws clearly state that to issue a report it was necessary to have the support of 12 of the 16 commission members. While no formal vote was ever taken, the co-chairs’ report only had the support of 10 members.)

Anyhow, getting back to matters at hand, one of the Simpson-Bowles proposals was to raise the normal retirement age for Social Security to 69 from its current level of 66 (soon to be 67). The report recognized that many people work in physically demanding and/or dangerous jobs where it would be unreasonable to expect people to work this late in life. It therefore proposed having special lower retirement ages for certain occupations.

The reason this is relevant to Greece is that one of the sticking points at the moment is the reform of Greece’s public pension system. One of the main issues is that the current system allows people in many occupations to start collecting benefits well before the normal retirement age. For example, hairdressers are apparently among this group because they are exposed to dangerous chemicals on the job.

While the Greek system was a universal target of ridicule among serious minded people everywhere, many of these same people embraced the Simpson-Bowles report as a gem of thoughtful, non-partisan, policy-making. The ability to ignore the fact that the supposedly thoughtful Bowles-Simpson gang were advocating the adoption of a pension system subject to universal ridicule is yet another example of the lack of seriousness of the serious people. 

Economists may not be very good at understanding the economy, but they are quite good at finding ways to keep themselves employed, generally at very high wages. The Washington Post treated us to one such make work project as it reported on a change in consumer psychology due to the recession that has left:

“Americans of all ages less willing to inject their money back into the economy in the form of vacations, clothing and nights out.

“It’s a sharp contrast to the 1990s, when consumers spent freely as their wages rose robustly, and the 2000s, when Americans funded more lavish lifestyles with easy access to credit cards and home-equity loans.”

 

Really? That sounds like a startling development. Let’s see if we can find it in the data.

cons gdp

The chart shows consumption as a percentage of GDP. I went back to the late fifties so folks can see the longer term picture. People are spending far more today relative to the size of the economy than they did in the sixties, seventies, eighties, or even nineties. In fact, consumer expenditures are higher now relative to the size of economy than they were in the housing bubble days.

So, let’s ask about that psychology story. Apparently the concern is that we fell from a ratio of 68.8 percent in the first quarter of last year all the way down to 68.6 percent in the most recent quarter. My guess is that modest decline is best explained by unusually bad weather in the first quarter that discouraged people from shopping and going out for meals. Also, extraordinarily strong car sales in the second half of 2014 probably let to some falloff in the first quarter since people who buy a new car in the fall generally don’t buy another one in the winter.

But hey, I don’t want to see a lot of unemployed economists. There should be lots of work in looking for a plunge in consumption that isn’t there.

 

Economists may not be very good at understanding the economy, but they are quite good at finding ways to keep themselves employed, generally at very high wages. The Washington Post treated us to one such make work project as it reported on a change in consumer psychology due to the recession that has left:

“Americans of all ages less willing to inject their money back into the economy in the form of vacations, clothing and nights out.

“It’s a sharp contrast to the 1990s, when consumers spent freely as their wages rose robustly, and the 2000s, when Americans funded more lavish lifestyles with easy access to credit cards and home-equity loans.”

 

Really? That sounds like a startling development. Let’s see if we can find it in the data.

cons gdp

The chart shows consumption as a percentage of GDP. I went back to the late fifties so folks can see the longer term picture. People are spending far more today relative to the size of the economy than they did in the sixties, seventies, eighties, or even nineties. In fact, consumer expenditures are higher now relative to the size of economy than they were in the housing bubble days.

So, let’s ask about that psychology story. Apparently the concern is that we fell from a ratio of 68.8 percent in the first quarter of last year all the way down to 68.6 percent in the most recent quarter. My guess is that modest decline is best explained by unusually bad weather in the first quarter that discouraged people from shopping and going out for meals. Also, extraordinarily strong car sales in the second half of 2014 probably let to some falloff in the first quarter since people who buy a new car in the fall generally don’t buy another one in the winter.

But hey, I don’t want to see a lot of unemployed economists. There should be lots of work in looking for a plunge in consumption that isn’t there.

 

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