Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

That’s what Washington Post readers are asking after reading an article warning of large price increases in 2017. The piece reported the output from a simulation model developed by Stephen Parente, a University of Minnesota health economist who advised Sen. John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign.

According to the article, Parente’s model predicts a large increase in the price of bronze and catastrophic plans in the exchanges in 2017. It gives the reason for this increase:

“Parente estimates between 4 million and 6 million people will see their existing individual coverage end in the next few years when either their plans lose grandfathered status or the White House’s extension of non-compliant health plans runs out near the end of 2016. These holdovers from the individual market predating the ACA are expected to be younger, healthier and more sensitive to price.

“Parente’s model finds these factors will have the most significant affect on 2017 premiums for less-robust plans in Obamacare’s “metal tiers.” These include catastrophic and bronze-level health plans, which have the cheapest premiums but the highest out-of-pocket costs. The effects will differ by state, but the national picture shows a big price jump for bronze and catastrophic plans between 2016 and 2017 — premiums for the average individual bronze plan, before subsidies, are projected to climb between $2,132 and $4,174 between those two years.”

Let’s see, healthy people raise the cost of insurance? Maybe we can get some older, sick people into the pool.

That’s what Washington Post readers are asking after reading an article warning of large price increases in 2017. The piece reported the output from a simulation model developed by Stephen Parente, a University of Minnesota health economist who advised Sen. John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign.

According to the article, Parente’s model predicts a large increase in the price of bronze and catastrophic plans in the exchanges in 2017. It gives the reason for this increase:

“Parente estimates between 4 million and 6 million people will see their existing individual coverage end in the next few years when either their plans lose grandfathered status or the White House’s extension of non-compliant health plans runs out near the end of 2016. These holdovers from the individual market predating the ACA are expected to be younger, healthier and more sensitive to price.

“Parente’s model finds these factors will have the most significant affect on 2017 premiums for less-robust plans in Obamacare’s “metal tiers.” These include catastrophic and bronze-level health plans, which have the cheapest premiums but the highest out-of-pocket costs. The effects will differ by state, but the national picture shows a big price jump for bronze and catastrophic plans between 2016 and 2017 — premiums for the average individual bronze plan, before subsidies, are projected to climb between $2,132 and $4,174 between those two years.”

Let’s see, healthy people raise the cost of insurance? Maybe we can get some older, sick people into the pool.

David Leonhardt touts (but doesn’t link to) new research from the Economic Policy Institute which shows the wage premium for recent college grads hit a record high in 2013. He then goes on to declare that it would be irrational for people not to go to college given this large pay premium. 

Leonhardt’s analysis ignores the dispersion in pay among college grads, especially among men. Research by my colleague John Schmitt and Heather Boushey shows that near one in five recent male college grads earned less than the average high school grad. This implies that going to college implies substantial risks, especially since attending college is likely to lead to substantial debt. There is also a risk that a student will not complete college, which is especially likely for the marginal college student (a person at the edge of deciding whether to try college or not). It is also likely that the marginal college student faces a much higher risk of being in this bottom fifth than the typical college student. In short, a little deeper analysis indicates that the decision of many people, especially young men, not to attend college could seem very rational. 

Leonhardt also tells readers that the unemployment rate for people with just college degrees (i.e. without advanced degrees) between the ages of 25-34 was just 3.0 percent in April. That seems unlikely. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the unemployment rate for all people over age 25 with college degrees, including those with advanced degrees, was 3.3 percent in April. Since younger grads and those without advanced degrees have higher unemployment rates it is difficult to see how Leonhardt’s assertion can be true. 

David Leonhardt touts (but doesn’t link to) new research from the Economic Policy Institute which shows the wage premium for recent college grads hit a record high in 2013. He then goes on to declare that it would be irrational for people not to go to college given this large pay premium. 

Leonhardt’s analysis ignores the dispersion in pay among college grads, especially among men. Research by my colleague John Schmitt and Heather Boushey shows that near one in five recent male college grads earned less than the average high school grad. This implies that going to college implies substantial risks, especially since attending college is likely to lead to substantial debt. There is also a risk that a student will not complete college, which is especially likely for the marginal college student (a person at the edge of deciding whether to try college or not). It is also likely that the marginal college student faces a much higher risk of being in this bottom fifth than the typical college student. In short, a little deeper analysis indicates that the decision of many people, especially young men, not to attend college could seem very rational. 

Leonhardt also tells readers that the unemployment rate for people with just college degrees (i.e. without advanced degrees) between the ages of 25-34 was just 3.0 percent in April. That seems unlikely. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the unemployment rate for all people over age 25 with college degrees, including those with advanced degrees, was 3.3 percent in April. Since younger grads and those without advanced degrees have higher unemployment rates it is difficult to see how Leonhardt’s assertion can be true. 

A NYT piece on the problem of low inflation and weak growth facing the euro zone got just about every aspect of the issue wrong. Near the beginning the piece tells readers:

“the euro zone is at risk of sliding into deflation, a downward price spiral that can ultimately destroy corporate profits and the ability of businesses to hire.”

Actually the euro zone already faces a crisis because the low inflation rate means that the real interest rate (the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate) is much higher than would be desirable given the weakness of the euro zone’s economy and the high unemployment rate. Since it is difficult to make the nominal interest rate negative, the only way to reduce the real interest rate is with a higher inflation rate.

This problem becomes worse when the inflation rate falls, however there is no particular consequence to it turning negative. In this sense, the problem is now, not some hypothetical bad scenario that could happen in the future. The notion of a “downward spiral” suggested in the piece has literally never happened in a wealthy country in the last 70 years. Even Japan, the only major country to experience a prolonged period of deflation, never experienced anything resembling a downward spiral. Its deflation rate was always modest and never exceeded minus 1.0 percent for any substantial period of time.

The idea that deflation will “destroy corporate profits and the ability of businesses to hire,” is also silly. Profits have largely recovered from pre-recession levels. The concern is that lower inflation will reduce the desire to invest. If firms can anticipate that the goods and services will sell for 15 percent more in five years then they will have considerably more incentive to invest than if they anticipate that prices will be unchanged or even lower in five years. 

 

Addendum:

The piece also told readers:

“A negative deposit rate would tend to push down the value of the euro against the dollar and other currencies, because investors would earn little or no return on euros. In his speech on Monday, Mr. Draghi said the increase in the euro’s value against the dollar since 2011 had driven down the price of commodities like fuel in euro terms, contributing to low inflation.”

Actually the main advantage of a fall in the value of the euro is that it will make goods and servcies produced in the euro zone more competitive internationally, thereby increasing net exports and boosting demand.

 

 

A NYT piece on the problem of low inflation and weak growth facing the euro zone got just about every aspect of the issue wrong. Near the beginning the piece tells readers:

“the euro zone is at risk of sliding into deflation, a downward price spiral that can ultimately destroy corporate profits and the ability of businesses to hire.”

Actually the euro zone already faces a crisis because the low inflation rate means that the real interest rate (the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate) is much higher than would be desirable given the weakness of the euro zone’s economy and the high unemployment rate. Since it is difficult to make the nominal interest rate negative, the only way to reduce the real interest rate is with a higher inflation rate.

This problem becomes worse when the inflation rate falls, however there is no particular consequence to it turning negative. In this sense, the problem is now, not some hypothetical bad scenario that could happen in the future. The notion of a “downward spiral” suggested in the piece has literally never happened in a wealthy country in the last 70 years. Even Japan, the only major country to experience a prolonged period of deflation, never experienced anything resembling a downward spiral. Its deflation rate was always modest and never exceeded minus 1.0 percent for any substantial period of time.

The idea that deflation will “destroy corporate profits and the ability of businesses to hire,” is also silly. Profits have largely recovered from pre-recession levels. The concern is that lower inflation will reduce the desire to invest. If firms can anticipate that the goods and services will sell for 15 percent more in five years then they will have considerably more incentive to invest than if they anticipate that prices will be unchanged or even lower in five years. 

 

Addendum:

The piece also told readers:

“A negative deposit rate would tend to push down the value of the euro against the dollar and other currencies, because investors would earn little or no return on euros. In his speech on Monday, Mr. Draghi said the increase in the euro’s value against the dollar since 2011 had driven down the price of commodities like fuel in euro terms, contributing to low inflation.”

Actually the main advantage of a fall in the value of the euro is that it will make goods and servcies produced in the euro zone more competitive internationally, thereby increasing net exports and boosting demand.

 

 

The Los Angeles Times had a news article telling readers that workers in Connecticut are still having a tough time making ends meet even after the minimum wage in the state was increased by 45 cents to $9.15 an hour at the start of 2014. The headline of the piece, which reflected the content of the article, read:

“In Connecticut, some minimum-wage workers say raise has not helped much.”

The piece included comments from economists who have criticized the minimum wage, saying both that it would cost jobs and that it is an ineffective way to reduce poverty. The piece did not present the views of any of the large group of economists who have studied the minimum wage and found that it had little or impact on employment.

Nor did it discuss the views of any economists whose research indicated the minimum wage could have a substantial effect in reducing poverty. The Congressional Budget Office agreed with this assessment in the analysis of the minimum wage it released earlier this year. The article instead touted increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as a preferred way to address poverty. The article ignored evidence that the EITC lowers wages for low-paid workers who do not qualify for the credit.

The article tries to present a case that the minimum wage is already costing Connecticut workers jobs:

“Employment growth in Connecticut has lagged behind the nation since December, data show. Nationally, employment grew 0.62% from December through April, while employment in Connecticut fell 0.19% over the same time period.

“Much of that drop-off was related to the elimination of 10,900 jobs in January, the month employers had to start paying 45 cents more. In the previous three years, Connecticut had added an average of 4,000 jobs over the same time period.”

Actually Connecticut has been lagging the country in employment growth throughout the recovery. The country as a whole had created jobs at a 1.1 percent annual rate from the end of the recession in June 2009 to December of 2013. Connecticut had created jobs at just a 0.7 percent annual rate.

Job losses are also not unusual in erratic state data. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Connecticut lost 9,000 jobs from June of 2013 to September of 2013.

The piece also implies that most minimum wage workers are teenagers who are working for spending money:

“Another argument from business owners against increasing the minimum wage: It doesn’t help the presumed beneficiaries — working-poor families — because many minimum-wage workers are young people learning their first jobs or working part time while going to school.

“Case in point: Bridgeport, Connecticut’s largest city and one of its poorest, decided to raise the minimum wage for all city employees to $10.10 on July 1.

“But that will mainly benefit people who work at the city’s golf course, like Meaghan Derry and Yogabeth Arias. Derry’s husband supports the family with a higher-paying job, and Arias is a high school student who will go to college in the fall.

“The extra money Arias has earned this year from the 45-cent raise has mostly gone to pay for her prom.”

In fact, the majority of workers earning near the minimum wage are over age 25 and the vast majority are over the age of 20. Almost 10 percent have a college degree and another 33.3 percent have some college.

The Los Angeles Times had a news article telling readers that workers in Connecticut are still having a tough time making ends meet even after the minimum wage in the state was increased by 45 cents to $9.15 an hour at the start of 2014. The headline of the piece, which reflected the content of the article, read:

“In Connecticut, some minimum-wage workers say raise has not helped much.”

The piece included comments from economists who have criticized the minimum wage, saying both that it would cost jobs and that it is an ineffective way to reduce poverty. The piece did not present the views of any of the large group of economists who have studied the minimum wage and found that it had little or impact on employment.

Nor did it discuss the views of any economists whose research indicated the minimum wage could have a substantial effect in reducing poverty. The Congressional Budget Office agreed with this assessment in the analysis of the minimum wage it released earlier this year. The article instead touted increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as a preferred way to address poverty. The article ignored evidence that the EITC lowers wages for low-paid workers who do not qualify for the credit.

The article tries to present a case that the minimum wage is already costing Connecticut workers jobs:

“Employment growth in Connecticut has lagged behind the nation since December, data show. Nationally, employment grew 0.62% from December through April, while employment in Connecticut fell 0.19% over the same time period.

“Much of that drop-off was related to the elimination of 10,900 jobs in January, the month employers had to start paying 45 cents more. In the previous three years, Connecticut had added an average of 4,000 jobs over the same time period.”

Actually Connecticut has been lagging the country in employment growth throughout the recovery. The country as a whole had created jobs at a 1.1 percent annual rate from the end of the recession in June 2009 to December of 2013. Connecticut had created jobs at just a 0.7 percent annual rate.

Job losses are also not unusual in erratic state data. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Connecticut lost 9,000 jobs from June of 2013 to September of 2013.

The piece also implies that most minimum wage workers are teenagers who are working for spending money:

“Another argument from business owners against increasing the minimum wage: It doesn’t help the presumed beneficiaries — working-poor families — because many minimum-wage workers are young people learning their first jobs or working part time while going to school.

“Case in point: Bridgeport, Connecticut’s largest city and one of its poorest, decided to raise the minimum wage for all city employees to $10.10 on July 1.

“But that will mainly benefit people who work at the city’s golf course, like Meaghan Derry and Yogabeth Arias. Derry’s husband supports the family with a higher-paying job, and Arias is a high school student who will go to college in the fall.

“The extra money Arias has earned this year from the 45-cent raise has mostly gone to pay for her prom.”

In fact, the majority of workers earning near the minimum wage are over age 25 and the vast majority are over the age of 20. Almost 10 percent have a college degree and another 33.3 percent have some college.

The Washington Post told readers that in several countries parties hostile to the European Union won in the elections to the European Parliament over the weekend. One of the countries on its list was Greece, where Syriza, the main opposition party received the most votes.

It is inaccurate to describe Syriza as being opposed to the European Union. The party has not called for Greece to leave the European Union. The party is opposed to austerity policies imposed on Greece by the European Union which have pushed the unemployment rate above 25 percent. By the I.M.F. measures, the lost output in Greece from being below potential GDP since 2010 is now approaching 30 percent of GDP, which would be more than $5.7 trillion in the United States. (This estimate is likely very conservative since the I.M.F. hugely reduced its estimate of Greece’s potential GDP in the last few years.)

Syriza is opposed to these anti-growth policies. It is not opposed to the European Union.

 

The Washington Post told readers that in several countries parties hostile to the European Union won in the elections to the European Parliament over the weekend. One of the countries on its list was Greece, where Syriza, the main opposition party received the most votes.

It is inaccurate to describe Syriza as being opposed to the European Union. The party has not called for Greece to leave the European Union. The party is opposed to austerity policies imposed on Greece by the European Union which have pushed the unemployment rate above 25 percent. By the I.M.F. measures, the lost output in Greece from being below potential GDP since 2010 is now approaching 30 percent of GDP, which would be more than $5.7 trillion in the United States. (This estimate is likely very conservative since the I.M.F. hugely reduced its estimate of Greece’s potential GDP in the last few years.)

Syriza is opposed to these anti-growth policies. It is not opposed to the European Union.

 

There is a popular and ungodly silly line about new businesses being responsible for some very high share of new jobs in the U.S. economy. A version appears in this NYT article on the economic ripple effects of student loan debt. It cites a study showing that recent graduates with large amounts of student debt are less likely to start a business, then adds:

“Considering that 60 percent of jobs are created by small business, ‘if you shut down the ability to create new businesses, you’re going to harm the economy,’ Professor Ambrose [one of the authors of the study] said.”

The problem with Professor Ambrose’s comment is that small businesses also account for close to 60 percent of the job loss in the economy. On a gross basis small businesses do create many more jobs than larger firms, but they also are far more likely to go out of business and therefore lose jobs than large firms. On net, firms of all sizes add jobs at approximately the same rate.

This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be concerned about student debt restricting young people’s ability to start businesses and in other ways limit their career choices. It does mean that the consequences for the economy may not be as large as implied by this comment. 

 

Note: link fixed.

There is a popular and ungodly silly line about new businesses being responsible for some very high share of new jobs in the U.S. economy. A version appears in this NYT article on the economic ripple effects of student loan debt. It cites a study showing that recent graduates with large amounts of student debt are less likely to start a business, then adds:

“Considering that 60 percent of jobs are created by small business, ‘if you shut down the ability to create new businesses, you’re going to harm the economy,’ Professor Ambrose [one of the authors of the study] said.”

The problem with Professor Ambrose’s comment is that small businesses also account for close to 60 percent of the job loss in the economy. On a gross basis small businesses do create many more jobs than larger firms, but they also are far more likely to go out of business and therefore lose jobs than large firms. On net, firms of all sizes add jobs at approximately the same rate.

This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be concerned about student debt restricting young people’s ability to start businesses and in other ways limit their career choices. It does mean that the consequences for the economy may not be as large as implied by this comment. 

 

Note: link fixed.

The Post ran a piece highlighting research by M.I.T. economist David Autor that purportedly shows the wage premium earned by college grads is the main source of inequality in the economy today.This is presented as a counter to much analysis showing that the income gains of the richest 1 percent has been the major source of inequality. The data presented in the piece do not support Autor’s claim.

In the case of full-time male workers, Autor’s data show that full-time male workers with a college degree have seen an increase in real wages of just 3.0 percent from their peak in 1973 to 2012. This was a period in which productivity almost doubled. Women college grads did considerably better over this period, but even women with college degrees saw essentially no wage gain from 2001 to 2012, a period in which productivity increased by more than 25 percent.

Autor’s data indicate that most college grads have not shared evenly in the economy’s growth over the last four decades. The much smaller segment of the workforce with advanced degrees have done considerably better, but this puts the cutoff between winners and losers at advanced degrees and everyone else, not between college grads at everyone else.   

The Post ran a piece highlighting research by M.I.T. economist David Autor that purportedly shows the wage premium earned by college grads is the main source of inequality in the economy today.This is presented as a counter to much analysis showing that the income gains of the richest 1 percent has been the major source of inequality. The data presented in the piece do not support Autor’s claim.

In the case of full-time male workers, Autor’s data show that full-time male workers with a college degree have seen an increase in real wages of just 3.0 percent from their peak in 1973 to 2012. This was a period in which productivity almost doubled. Women college grads did considerably better over this period, but even women with college degrees saw essentially no wage gain from 2001 to 2012, a period in which productivity increased by more than 25 percent.

Autor’s data indicate that most college grads have not shared evenly in the economy’s growth over the last four decades. The much smaller segment of the workforce with advanced degrees have done considerably better, but this puts the cutoff between winners and losers at advanced degrees and everyone else, not between college grads at everyone else.   

The continuing weakness of the housing market is a regular theme of the business media. They seem as eager to display their ignorance now as they were during the housing bubble years. 

The Post gave us another item in this series in an AP article on existing home sales in April, which ran at 4.65 million annual rate, according to data from the National Association of Realtors. The fourth paragraph told readers:

“Nearly five years into the recovery from the Great Recession, real estate sales have yet to return to their historic averages.”

If we go back to the pre-bubble years of the mid-1990s, we find that existing home sales averaged just over 3.4 million in the years from 1993-1995. Adjusting this figure upward by 20 percent for population growth would still get is to less than 4.2 million, well below the sales rate reported for April.

New home sales are still running below historic averages, so that would bring the total sales close to their pre-bubble levels but there is not much of a case that they are lower than what should be expected. Furthermore, if we consider the aging of the population, the excuse given by many economists for the drop in labor force participation, we should expect a drop in the ratio of home sales to population.

Older people less frequently buy homes than younger people. It is perhaps an inconvenient truth for economists, but the population that comprises the potential labor force is the same population that comprises the group of potential home buyers.  

 

The continuing weakness of the housing market is a regular theme of the business media. They seem as eager to display their ignorance now as they were during the housing bubble years. 

The Post gave us another item in this series in an AP article on existing home sales in April, which ran at 4.65 million annual rate, according to data from the National Association of Realtors. The fourth paragraph told readers:

“Nearly five years into the recovery from the Great Recession, real estate sales have yet to return to their historic averages.”

If we go back to the pre-bubble years of the mid-1990s, we find that existing home sales averaged just over 3.4 million in the years from 1993-1995. Adjusting this figure upward by 20 percent for population growth would still get is to less than 4.2 million, well below the sales rate reported for April.

New home sales are still running below historic averages, so that would bring the total sales close to their pre-bubble levels but there is not much of a case that they are lower than what should be expected. Furthermore, if we consider the aging of the population, the excuse given by many economists for the drop in labor force participation, we should expect a drop in the ratio of home sales to population.

Older people less frequently buy homes than younger people. It is perhaps an inconvenient truth for economists, but the population that comprises the potential labor force is the same population that comprises the group of potential home buyers.  

 

I’m back (thanks for all the kind comments) and I see I have to correct some seriously misleading commentary from Robert Samuelson earlier in the week. Samuelson concluded a discussion of Timothy Geithner’s new book:

“This is the central lesson of the crisis. Success at stabilizing and stimulating the economy in the short run can destabilize it in the long run. This also happened in the 1960s, when the belief that economists could control the business cycle led to inflation and instability in the 1970s and early 1980s. But the lesson is not acknowledged because its implications are unpopular (an obsession with short-term stability may backfire), and it’s ignored — or even denied — by the post-crisis narratives, including Geithner’s.”

Sorry, this one is not quite right. The pain suffered by people in the 1970s is not in the same ballpark as with the Great Recession. In the 1970s the stock market tanked, but since most people own little or no stock, who gives a damn? The economy generated 19.7 million jobs in the decade, an increase of 27.6 percent. By contrast in the 14 years from January of 2000 to January of 2014 the economy created just 6.5 million jobs, an increase of just 5.0 percent.

Most of this difference is explained by demographics (the baby boomers were entering the labor force in the 1970s, they are starting to leave now), but it was still an impressive feat to accommodate such a large expansion of the labor force in a relatively short period of time. In addition, the economy was hit by two large oil shocks that made the process considerably more difficult.

There was no prolonged period in which the economy was below its potential level of output in the 1970s. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) puts the economy as operating above potential output for part of the decade. By contrast, CBO calculates that the economy has been roughly 6 percent below potential GDP for most of the last 5 years (@ $1 trillion a year). This represents a massive amount of lost output.

And, in direct contradiction of Samuelson’s assertion, the failure to deal with the short-term can lead to serious long-term consequences. A recent paper by the Fed calculates that that potential GDP has fallen sharply as a result of the prolonged downturn. This implies that the failure to carry through short-term stabilization can lead to serious long-term consequences.

In short, Samuelson’s central lesson lacks any evidence or logic to support it.

I’m back (thanks for all the kind comments) and I see I have to correct some seriously misleading commentary from Robert Samuelson earlier in the week. Samuelson concluded a discussion of Timothy Geithner’s new book:

“This is the central lesson of the crisis. Success at stabilizing and stimulating the economy in the short run can destabilize it in the long run. This also happened in the 1960s, when the belief that economists could control the business cycle led to inflation and instability in the 1970s and early 1980s. But the lesson is not acknowledged because its implications are unpopular (an obsession with short-term stability may backfire), and it’s ignored — or even denied — by the post-crisis narratives, including Geithner’s.”

Sorry, this one is not quite right. The pain suffered by people in the 1970s is not in the same ballpark as with the Great Recession. In the 1970s the stock market tanked, but since most people own little or no stock, who gives a damn? The economy generated 19.7 million jobs in the decade, an increase of 27.6 percent. By contrast in the 14 years from January of 2000 to January of 2014 the economy created just 6.5 million jobs, an increase of just 5.0 percent.

Most of this difference is explained by demographics (the baby boomers were entering the labor force in the 1970s, they are starting to leave now), but it was still an impressive feat to accommodate such a large expansion of the labor force in a relatively short period of time. In addition, the economy was hit by two large oil shocks that made the process considerably more difficult.

There was no prolonged period in which the economy was below its potential level of output in the 1970s. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) puts the economy as operating above potential output for part of the decade. By contrast, CBO calculates that the economy has been roughly 6 percent below potential GDP for most of the last 5 years (@ $1 trillion a year). This represents a massive amount of lost output.

And, in direct contradiction of Samuelson’s assertion, the failure to deal with the short-term can lead to serious long-term consequences. A recent paper by the Fed calculates that that potential GDP has fallen sharply as a result of the prolonged downturn. This implies that the failure to carry through short-term stabilization can lead to serious long-term consequences.

In short, Samuelson’s central lesson lacks any evidence or logic to support it.

Actually, he probably doesn’t, but that would be the logic of his complaint (taken from Gene Steuerle) that “dead men” have established priorities for federal spending. After all, dead men made the decision to borrow the money that constitutes the debt, which thereby obligates the country to pay back the interest and principal.

But Samuelson’s complaint is not about the interest and principal being paid back to rich people like Peter Peterson, Samuelson is upset about the money being paid out to ordinary workers (mostly retirees) for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

“In 1990, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid (health insurance for the poor) totaled 6.7 percent of national income, or gross domestic product. By 2010, they were 10 percent of GDP. Using plausible assumptions, the Congressional Budget Office estimates this spending (including the Affordable Care Act) at 15.2 percent of GDP by 2038.”

There are several immediate problems with Samuelson’s complaint.

First, if we are counting the spending on the Affordable Care Act, it is hardly a story of “dead men.” The folks who made this into law are almost all still alive, and the person who pushed it through Congress, Nancy Pelosi, is not a man. In other words, this spending reflects priorities of people who very recently represented public opinion.

The second problem is that including Social Security in the arithmetic simply confuses the issue. Almost all of the rise in spending over this period is due to rising payments for health care programs, not Social Security. In 1990, the government was spending 4.3 percent of GDP on Social Security (it had spent as much as 4.9 percent in the early 1980s). It is projected to spend 6.2 percentage points of GDP on Social Security in 2038.

Furthermore, taxes were raised explicitly to pay for this increase. While Samuelson may think it’s reasonable to tax people for Social Security and then use the money to pay for the military or other purposes, most of the public does not share his perspective. According to Steuerle, people will be paying slightly more money in Social Security taxes than they receive in benefits, so there doesn’t seem much basis for his complaint about “giveaway politics.”

The real story here is health care and there is a real giveaway, but not to the folks in Samuelson’s rifle scope. The United States pays more than twice as much per person for its health care than people in other wealthy countries. It has nothing to show for this additional spending in outcomes. If we spent the same amount per person as Germany, Canada, the U.K., or any other wealthy country, the government would be looking at large budget surpluses for the rest of the century.

The additional costs are due to fact that our doctors get paid twice as much as doctors elsewhere, we pay twice as much for drugs and medical equipment, and we have an insurance system that drains away almost 20 percent of spending on needless administrative costs. Unfortunately these groups are so powerful that the excessive costs they impose on the government and the country rarely even come up in public debate. (Increasing trade in physician services is not even on the agenda in current trade agreements and a main goal is increasing the cost of prescription drugs.)

In short, there is a very simple story here that Samuelson is grossly misrepresenting by including Social Security in the discussion. We are being badly ripped off by our health care system. And, the beneficiaries are so powerful they mostly prevent the ripoff from even being discussed. Instead, we get people like Samuelson who want us to beat up seniors.

Actually, he probably doesn’t, but that would be the logic of his complaint (taken from Gene Steuerle) that “dead men” have established priorities for federal spending. After all, dead men made the decision to borrow the money that constitutes the debt, which thereby obligates the country to pay back the interest and principal.

But Samuelson’s complaint is not about the interest and principal being paid back to rich people like Peter Peterson, Samuelson is upset about the money being paid out to ordinary workers (mostly retirees) for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

“In 1990, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid (health insurance for the poor) totaled 6.7 percent of national income, or gross domestic product. By 2010, they were 10 percent of GDP. Using plausible assumptions, the Congressional Budget Office estimates this spending (including the Affordable Care Act) at 15.2 percent of GDP by 2038.”

There are several immediate problems with Samuelson’s complaint.

First, if we are counting the spending on the Affordable Care Act, it is hardly a story of “dead men.” The folks who made this into law are almost all still alive, and the person who pushed it through Congress, Nancy Pelosi, is not a man. In other words, this spending reflects priorities of people who very recently represented public opinion.

The second problem is that including Social Security in the arithmetic simply confuses the issue. Almost all of the rise in spending over this period is due to rising payments for health care programs, not Social Security. In 1990, the government was spending 4.3 percent of GDP on Social Security (it had spent as much as 4.9 percent in the early 1980s). It is projected to spend 6.2 percentage points of GDP on Social Security in 2038.

Furthermore, taxes were raised explicitly to pay for this increase. While Samuelson may think it’s reasonable to tax people for Social Security and then use the money to pay for the military or other purposes, most of the public does not share his perspective. According to Steuerle, people will be paying slightly more money in Social Security taxes than they receive in benefits, so there doesn’t seem much basis for his complaint about “giveaway politics.”

The real story here is health care and there is a real giveaway, but not to the folks in Samuelson’s rifle scope. The United States pays more than twice as much per person for its health care than people in other wealthy countries. It has nothing to show for this additional spending in outcomes. If we spent the same amount per person as Germany, Canada, the U.K., or any other wealthy country, the government would be looking at large budget surpluses for the rest of the century.

The additional costs are due to fact that our doctors get paid twice as much as doctors elsewhere, we pay twice as much for drugs and medical equipment, and we have an insurance system that drains away almost 20 percent of spending on needless administrative costs. Unfortunately these groups are so powerful that the excessive costs they impose on the government and the country rarely even come up in public debate. (Increasing trade in physician services is not even on the agenda in current trade agreements and a main goal is increasing the cost of prescription drugs.)

In short, there is a very simple story here that Samuelson is grossly misrepresenting by including Social Security in the discussion. We are being badly ripped off by our health care system. And, the beneficiaries are so powerful they mostly prevent the ripoff from even being discussed. Instead, we get people like Samuelson who want us to beat up seniors.

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