Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

There's a lot of silliness going around about how the dollar may lose its status as the world's reserve currency if we default. The ordinarily astute Floyd Norris contributed to this confusion in a column last week implying that we may no longer be able to borrow internationally in dollars if this happened. In reality, it is unlikely that we do risk being the world's preeminent currency in any plausible scenario. (This is also Norris' conclusion.) Furthermore, the immediate result of this loss of status would be positive in any case. A first point is useful just for clarification. Being a reserve currency is not a zero-one proposition. The dollar is the preeminent reserve currency, which means that most of the world's reserves (@70 percent, last time I checked) are held in dollars. However other currencies like the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and even the Swiss franc are also held as reserves. If there was a loss of confidence in the dollar, we are presumably talking about a drop in the ratio of reserves held as dollars. Maybe it would fall to 40 percent, perhaps 30 percent. It is almost impossible it will fall anywhere near zero as long as the United States is in one piece with a functioning economy. The effect of this loss of confidence would not be to deny the United States the ability to borrow in its own currency. Many countries borrow in their own currency, including countries like Malaysia and Colombia, which are not ordinarily thought of as titans of the world financial system. Less stable countries typically pay somewhat of risk premium based on the risk of inflation in that country's currency and the risk of the demise of the country (think Yugoslavia). In several cases this risk premium is negative. For example, the interest rates on Japanese, Swedish, and Danish bonds are all lower than the interest rates on U.S. bonds. These countries do not appear to have suffered from not having the world's preeminent reserve currency.  There is the second issue of the dollar falling in value relative to the currencies of other countries if the dollar loses its status as the preeminent reserve currency. This possibility should be cause for celebration, not fear. First of all, a lower valued dollar was the ostensible goal of both the Bush and Obama administration when they demanded that China and other countries stop "manipulating" their currency. In this context, "manipulation" means holding down the value of their currency against the dollar. In other words, it means pushing up the value of the dollar. In spite of it being official policy that we want a lower valued dollar we are now supposed to be terrified that we might get a lower valued dollar. Welcome to economics in Washington. The reason why we would want a lower valued dollar is that it would make U.S. goods more competitive in the world economy. We would cut back our imports and increase our exports. This is hardly a novel theory, this is econ 101. And, in fact the world follows pretty closely on what the textbooks say should happen. The trade deficit exploded in the late 1990s when the value of the dollar soared following the East Asian financial crisis. (This is when developing countries like China first decided that they needed massive amounts of dollar reserves). The trade deficit then shrank in the last decade, with a lag, after the dollar fell in value. The chart shows the non-oil deficit, since we would not expect the demand for oil to be very responsive to the value of the dollar. (The chart does not include the increase in oil exports, since that data was not immediately available when I put the chart together and BEA's website is now down.)  
There's a lot of silliness going around about how the dollar may lose its status as the world's reserve currency if we default. The ordinarily astute Floyd Norris contributed to this confusion in a column last week implying that we may no longer be able to borrow internationally in dollars if this happened. In reality, it is unlikely that we do risk being the world's preeminent currency in any plausible scenario. (This is also Norris' conclusion.) Furthermore, the immediate result of this loss of status would be positive in any case. A first point is useful just for clarification. Being a reserve currency is not a zero-one proposition. The dollar is the preeminent reserve currency, which means that most of the world's reserves (@70 percent, last time I checked) are held in dollars. However other currencies like the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and even the Swiss franc are also held as reserves. If there was a loss of confidence in the dollar, we are presumably talking about a drop in the ratio of reserves held as dollars. Maybe it would fall to 40 percent, perhaps 30 percent. It is almost impossible it will fall anywhere near zero as long as the United States is in one piece with a functioning economy. The effect of this loss of confidence would not be to deny the United States the ability to borrow in its own currency. Many countries borrow in their own currency, including countries like Malaysia and Colombia, which are not ordinarily thought of as titans of the world financial system. Less stable countries typically pay somewhat of risk premium based on the risk of inflation in that country's currency and the risk of the demise of the country (think Yugoslavia). In several cases this risk premium is negative. For example, the interest rates on Japanese, Swedish, and Danish bonds are all lower than the interest rates on U.S. bonds. These countries do not appear to have suffered from not having the world's preeminent reserve currency.  There is the second issue of the dollar falling in value relative to the currencies of other countries if the dollar loses its status as the preeminent reserve currency. This possibility should be cause for celebration, not fear. First of all, a lower valued dollar was the ostensible goal of both the Bush and Obama administration when they demanded that China and other countries stop "manipulating" their currency. In this context, "manipulation" means holding down the value of their currency against the dollar. In other words, it means pushing up the value of the dollar. In spite of it being official policy that we want a lower valued dollar we are now supposed to be terrified that we might get a lower valued dollar. Welcome to economics in Washington. The reason why we would want a lower valued dollar is that it would make U.S. goods more competitive in the world economy. We would cut back our imports and increase our exports. This is hardly a novel theory, this is econ 101. And, in fact the world follows pretty closely on what the textbooks say should happen. The trade deficit exploded in the late 1990s when the value of the dollar soared following the East Asian financial crisis. (This is when developing countries like China first decided that they needed massive amounts of dollar reserves). The trade deficit then shrank in the last decade, with a lag, after the dollar fell in value. The chart shows the non-oil deficit, since we would not expect the demand for oil to be very responsive to the value of the dollar. (The chart does not include the increase in oil exports, since that data was not immediately available when I put the chart together and BEA's website is now down.)  

Today’s topic is how we are stuck in a slow growth path and therefore will have to take the ax to programs like Social Security and Medicare. Of course Samuelson always wants to take an ax to programs like Social Security and Medicare; this is just a new reason for cutting back programs that working people depend upon.

Most of his problem stems from the fact that he seems to have forgotten that we are still in a downturn, with the economy operating at a level of output that is more than $1 trillion below its potential according to the Congressional Budget Office. This means that when he complains about the impossibility of finding a political path to closing the structural deficit due to the growth of social spending (“welfare” to Samuelson), he is complaining about a problem that does not exist.

The most recent projections from the Congressional Budget Office show a baseline deficit projection for fiscal 2014 of around $600 billion. If the economy were operating at potential GDP, this would reduce this figure by around $300 billion. (An additional dollar of output will lead to roughly 30 cents in savings to the government due to higher tax collections and lower payments for programs like unemployment benefits and other transfers.)

This leaves a deficit of around $300 billion or roughly 1.8 percent of GDP. With a deficit of this size the debt-to-GDP ratio would be falling, which means that the government can run a deficit of this size in perpetuity.

It is true that in the longer term the deficit is projected to rise due to the rising cost of health care. The United States pays more than twice as much per person for its health care as other countries with nothing to show for this spending in terms of outcomes. Unfortunately, political debate in Washington is dominated by hard-core protectionists like Samuelson and the Washington Post editorial board who refuse to even consider plans to open up U.S. health care in ways that would reduce the income of doctors, drug companies, and insurers.

The high price of health care in the United States imposes an enormous burden on the economy and the budget. If the U.S. paid the same per person costs of health care as people in other countries we would be looking at enormous surpluses for the rest of the century, not deficits. Rather than reducing the extent to which the rich benefit from waste in the health care system, Samuelson and others want working people to get by with less care.

CBO-health care 17343 image001

                         Source: CBO, OECD, and author’s calculations.

Samuelson is also wrong on other parts of his pessimism, most obviously he can’t seem to find his way over the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. He told readers:

“Take women’s labor-force participation. From 1950 to 2000, it surged from 30.9 percent to 59.9 percent; but in 2012, it was 57.7 percent, with the falloff starting before the recession.”

This is wrong. Our friends at the Bureau of Labor Statistics tell us that the labor force participation rate for women over age 20 went from 60.5 percent in 2006 to 60.6 percent in 2007. It dropped after the recession started at the end of 2007.

The basic story is that we are certainly seeing slow growth now, but this is because Congress is working hard to roll back sources of demand, most importantly government spending. For reasons that no one can explain we are not supposed to even talk about raising demand through reducing the value of the dollar and thereby increasing net exports.

As Keynes taught us almost 80 years ago, with weak demand the economy will grow slowly. We know how to fix this — spend money — but that is not in fashion right now. Instead, high unemployment and slow growth is the rage, but this is by design, not a fact of nature. 

Today’s topic is how we are stuck in a slow growth path and therefore will have to take the ax to programs like Social Security and Medicare. Of course Samuelson always wants to take an ax to programs like Social Security and Medicare; this is just a new reason for cutting back programs that working people depend upon.

Most of his problem stems from the fact that he seems to have forgotten that we are still in a downturn, with the economy operating at a level of output that is more than $1 trillion below its potential according to the Congressional Budget Office. This means that when he complains about the impossibility of finding a political path to closing the structural deficit due to the growth of social spending (“welfare” to Samuelson), he is complaining about a problem that does not exist.

The most recent projections from the Congressional Budget Office show a baseline deficit projection for fiscal 2014 of around $600 billion. If the economy were operating at potential GDP, this would reduce this figure by around $300 billion. (An additional dollar of output will lead to roughly 30 cents in savings to the government due to higher tax collections and lower payments for programs like unemployment benefits and other transfers.)

This leaves a deficit of around $300 billion or roughly 1.8 percent of GDP. With a deficit of this size the debt-to-GDP ratio would be falling, which means that the government can run a deficit of this size in perpetuity.

It is true that in the longer term the deficit is projected to rise due to the rising cost of health care. The United States pays more than twice as much per person for its health care as other countries with nothing to show for this spending in terms of outcomes. Unfortunately, political debate in Washington is dominated by hard-core protectionists like Samuelson and the Washington Post editorial board who refuse to even consider plans to open up U.S. health care in ways that would reduce the income of doctors, drug companies, and insurers.

The high price of health care in the United States imposes an enormous burden on the economy and the budget. If the U.S. paid the same per person costs of health care as people in other countries we would be looking at enormous surpluses for the rest of the century, not deficits. Rather than reducing the extent to which the rich benefit from waste in the health care system, Samuelson and others want working people to get by with less care.

CBO-health care 17343 image001

                         Source: CBO, OECD, and author’s calculations.

Samuelson is also wrong on other parts of his pessimism, most obviously he can’t seem to find his way over the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. He told readers:

“Take women’s labor-force participation. From 1950 to 2000, it surged from 30.9 percent to 59.9 percent; but in 2012, it was 57.7 percent, with the falloff starting before the recession.”

This is wrong. Our friends at the Bureau of Labor Statistics tell us that the labor force participation rate for women over age 20 went from 60.5 percent in 2006 to 60.6 percent in 2007. It dropped after the recession started at the end of 2007.

The basic story is that we are certainly seeing slow growth now, but this is because Congress is working hard to roll back sources of demand, most importantly government spending. For reasons that no one can explain we are not supposed to even talk about raising demand through reducing the value of the dollar and thereby increasing net exports.

As Keynes taught us almost 80 years ago, with weak demand the economy will grow slowly. We know how to fix this — spend money — but that is not in fashion right now. Instead, high unemployment and slow growth is the rage, but this is by design, not a fact of nature. 

That’s what the NYT told readers at the very beginning of its piece on negotiations over the reopening the government and the debt ceiling. Okay, that line probably was not intended to refer to the NYT’s budget reporting, but it certainly is appropriate in that context.

This stuff is getting to be a really bad joke. At one point this piece tells readers:

“That suggests a less ambitious outcome for any deficit-reduction talks that would spring from the current impasse. In the past, the general goal was $4 trillion in savings in 10 years that would compound over time.”

Less ambitious, really? The $4 trillion referred to in that “grand bargain” scheme was compared to a 2010 baseline that assumed far larger deficits. Over the 10 year horizon from 2014-2023 that baseline would have shown deficits of more $9 trillion (see the “plausible baseline” in figure 14 ). Due to the sharp spending cuts and tax increases that have been put in place in the last two years, the current baseline shows a cumulative deficit over this period of 6.3 trillion. This means that the amount of deficit reduction discussed in this piece is very much in line with, and quite possibly larger than the “grand bargain” for which the NYT apparently lusts.

The reality is that the sharp deficit reduction we have seen in the last three years has thrown millions of people out work and cost the country more than $1 trillion in lost output. It is bizarre that this fact is rarely noted in the NYT’s budget reporting and it instead tries to imply that there is some urgency about addressing deficits projected for the distant future that may not even materialize.

That’s what the NYT told readers at the very beginning of its piece on negotiations over the reopening the government and the debt ceiling. Okay, that line probably was not intended to refer to the NYT’s budget reporting, but it certainly is appropriate in that context.

This stuff is getting to be a really bad joke. At one point this piece tells readers:

“That suggests a less ambitious outcome for any deficit-reduction talks that would spring from the current impasse. In the past, the general goal was $4 trillion in savings in 10 years that would compound over time.”

Less ambitious, really? The $4 trillion referred to in that “grand bargain” scheme was compared to a 2010 baseline that assumed far larger deficits. Over the 10 year horizon from 2014-2023 that baseline would have shown deficits of more $9 trillion (see the “plausible baseline” in figure 14 ). Due to the sharp spending cuts and tax increases that have been put in place in the last two years, the current baseline shows a cumulative deficit over this period of 6.3 trillion. This means that the amount of deficit reduction discussed in this piece is very much in line with, and quite possibly larger than the “grand bargain” for which the NYT apparently lusts.

The reality is that the sharp deficit reduction we have seen in the last three years has thrown millions of people out work and cost the country more than $1 trillion in lost output. It is bizarre that this fact is rarely noted in the NYT’s budget reporting and it instead tries to imply that there is some urgency about addressing deficits projected for the distant future that may not even materialize.

The Wall Street Journal continues to lead the path in the post-truth world, with columnist Andrew Puzder misrepresenting numbers to show that ObamaCare has led to a “part-time economy.” Pudzer’s whole story rests on the growth in part-time employment from January to July as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics household survey. He tells readers:

“The health-care law’s actual consequences unequivocally appear in the jobs data for this period. Between Jan. 1 and June 30, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the economy added 833,000 part-time jobs and lost 97,000 full-time jobs, for net creation of 736,000 jobs. In reality, the economy overall added no full-time jobs. Rather, it lost them.”

Later adding:

“In August, Keith Hall, who ran the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2008-12, looked at part-time hiring from the end of January through July and told a McClatchy reporter that the results were ‘really remarkable’ and ‘a really high number for a six-month period. I’m not sure that has ever happened over six months before.””

Wow, Keith Hall can’t remember a six-month period where part-time jobs rose by 833,000? How about the six months from June of 2008 to December of 2008 when part-time employment rose by 1,963,000, while full time employment fell by 4,453,000? Is he really not able to remember back five years ago to a period in which he was actually the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics? Perhaps he didn’t count this one because all of that rise in part-time employment was involuntary whereas most of the reported increase in January to July of this year was voluntary.

How about April of 2001 to October of 2001 when part-time employment rose by 1,115,000 (again, all involuntary), while full-time employment fell by 2,053,000? Again, this was all due to a rise in people working part-time involuntarily — they wanted full-time jobs — so maybe Hall doesn’t count this period either.

In fact these data are highly erratic. They jump around by large amounts month to month due to measurement error, not reasons having anything to do with the economy. For this reason, picking January of 2013 as a starting point is a bit of a joke.

Reported part-time employment fell sharply in the second half of 2012 (because of the ACA?), dropping from 26,623,000 in July of 2012 to 26,049,000 in January of 2013. This drop in the reported number of part-time workers almost certainly did not reflect what was going on in the economy, but was rather just random errors that show up in the data from month to month.

A serious analysis would look at an average level of employment over a series of months, for example comparing the first six months of 2013 (when the employers thought the sanctions would be in effect) with the first six months of 2012. My colleague Helene Jorgenson and I did this analysis. We found a small decline in the percentage of workers who were working less than the 30 hour cut-off that makes employers subject to the mandate. I wouldn’t attribute the increase in full-time employment to Obamacare, but at least this claim would have some basis in the data, unlike the complaints in Pudzer’s column.

Btw, there is one last point that should be raised. What’s wrong with people working part-time? We should be concerned if people want full-time jobs but can only find part-time work. This likely means that they will be struggling to support themselves and their families.

But what is wrong with someone voluntarily choosing to work part-time? Many people opt for part-time employment to be with their family, enjoy a partial retirement, or pursue other activities. Does the WSJ think it has to decide for us how many hours we should work?

 

The Wall Street Journal continues to lead the path in the post-truth world, with columnist Andrew Puzder misrepresenting numbers to show that ObamaCare has led to a “part-time economy.” Pudzer’s whole story rests on the growth in part-time employment from January to July as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics household survey. He tells readers:

“The health-care law’s actual consequences unequivocally appear in the jobs data for this period. Between Jan. 1 and June 30, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the economy added 833,000 part-time jobs and lost 97,000 full-time jobs, for net creation of 736,000 jobs. In reality, the economy overall added no full-time jobs. Rather, it lost them.”

Later adding:

“In August, Keith Hall, who ran the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2008-12, looked at part-time hiring from the end of January through July and told a McClatchy reporter that the results were ‘really remarkable’ and ‘a really high number for a six-month period. I’m not sure that has ever happened over six months before.””

Wow, Keith Hall can’t remember a six-month period where part-time jobs rose by 833,000? How about the six months from June of 2008 to December of 2008 when part-time employment rose by 1,963,000, while full time employment fell by 4,453,000? Is he really not able to remember back five years ago to a period in which he was actually the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics? Perhaps he didn’t count this one because all of that rise in part-time employment was involuntary whereas most of the reported increase in January to July of this year was voluntary.

How about April of 2001 to October of 2001 when part-time employment rose by 1,115,000 (again, all involuntary), while full-time employment fell by 2,053,000? Again, this was all due to a rise in people working part-time involuntarily — they wanted full-time jobs — so maybe Hall doesn’t count this period either.

In fact these data are highly erratic. They jump around by large amounts month to month due to measurement error, not reasons having anything to do with the economy. For this reason, picking January of 2013 as a starting point is a bit of a joke.

Reported part-time employment fell sharply in the second half of 2012 (because of the ACA?), dropping from 26,623,000 in July of 2012 to 26,049,000 in January of 2013. This drop in the reported number of part-time workers almost certainly did not reflect what was going on in the economy, but was rather just random errors that show up in the data from month to month.

A serious analysis would look at an average level of employment over a series of months, for example comparing the first six months of 2013 (when the employers thought the sanctions would be in effect) with the first six months of 2012. My colleague Helene Jorgenson and I did this analysis. We found a small decline in the percentage of workers who were working less than the 30 hour cut-off that makes employers subject to the mandate. I wouldn’t attribute the increase in full-time employment to Obamacare, but at least this claim would have some basis in the data, unlike the complaints in Pudzer’s column.

Btw, there is one last point that should be raised. What’s wrong with people working part-time? We should be concerned if people want full-time jobs but can only find part-time work. This likely means that they will be struggling to support themselves and their families.

But what is wrong with someone voluntarily choosing to work part-time? Many people opt for part-time employment to be with their family, enjoy a partial retirement, or pursue other activities. Does the WSJ think it has to decide for us how many hours we should work?

 

Glenn Kessler has a useful column assessing Senator Rand Paul’s claims about how default could be avoided if we reached the debt ceiling, however he does get one important item wrong. The piece implies that it would be possible to save money to pay debt service or other top priority items by not making Social Security payments.

This is not true. The money held by the Social Security trust fund is part of the debt subject to debt ceiling. If money is not paid out to Social Security beneficiaries then there is more money in the Social Security trust fund.

This is a dollar for dollar relationship. This means that every dollar that the government does not have to borrow on public markets to make Social Security payments is an additional dollar owed to the Social Security trust fund, leaving no net change in the amount of borrowings subject to the debt ceiling. This means that the payment of Social Security benefits does not affect whether or not the government breaches the debt ceiling.

There is one other item in this piece that deserves comment. It reports an assessment from the Government Accountability Office that higher interest rates from the August 2011 standoff will lead to $19 billion more in interest payments over a ten-year period. It is unlikely that many Post readers have the ability to assess the importance of $19 billion in the federal budget over a 10-year period. If we turn to the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s magnificent responsible budget calculator we see that this would be roughly 0.045 percent of projected spending over the period from 2012-2021.

 

Addendum: Kessler added a note making this point.

Glenn Kessler has a useful column assessing Senator Rand Paul’s claims about how default could be avoided if we reached the debt ceiling, however he does get one important item wrong. The piece implies that it would be possible to save money to pay debt service or other top priority items by not making Social Security payments.

This is not true. The money held by the Social Security trust fund is part of the debt subject to debt ceiling. If money is not paid out to Social Security beneficiaries then there is more money in the Social Security trust fund.

This is a dollar for dollar relationship. This means that every dollar that the government does not have to borrow on public markets to make Social Security payments is an additional dollar owed to the Social Security trust fund, leaving no net change in the amount of borrowings subject to the debt ceiling. This means that the payment of Social Security benefits does not affect whether or not the government breaches the debt ceiling.

There is one other item in this piece that deserves comment. It reports an assessment from the Government Accountability Office that higher interest rates from the August 2011 standoff will lead to $19 billion more in interest payments over a ten-year period. It is unlikely that many Post readers have the ability to assess the importance of $19 billion in the federal budget over a 10-year period. If we turn to the Center for Economic and Policy Research’s magnificent responsible budget calculator we see that this would be roughly 0.045 percent of projected spending over the period from 2012-2021.

 

Addendum: Kessler added a note making this point.

When people worry about the security of an asset the price usually plummets, as was the case with mortgage backed securities when the housing bubble burst. It is pretty hard to envision the opposite scenario: that because people get concerned about the security of an asset its price rises.

However this is what Ezra Klein tells us in a column today. The story is that worries over the possibility that the U.S. government is becoming dysfunctional could actually result in the price of U.S. government bonds rising.

“The paradox is that defaulting on our debt could lead to a panic so severe that, in a desperate bid for safety, markets will buy even more of our debt. ‘We are the only country in the world where a fiscal mess, rather than increasing spreads, pushes yields lower,’ El-Erian said [Mohamed El-Erian, chief executive officer of Pacific Investment Management Co.]. ‘If there was another round of debt-ceiling fight with no agreement, we might have lower 10-year Treasury yields, rather than higher.'”

The basis for the idea that uncertainty about the stability of the U.S. government will lead people to buy more U.S. government debt seems to come from the experience in the summer of 2011 when the price of U.S. Treasury bonds soared and interest rates plummeted as we came within days of hitting the debt ceiling.

The problem with this story is that there is a more obvious explanation than people rushing to buy Treasury bonds because they were worried about the instability of the U.S. government. Italy suddenly made the list of euro zone crisis countries that week. While euro zone could have almost certainly withstood a default by Greece, a default by Italy would have almost certainly meant the end of the euro.

The very real risk of the collapse of the euro gives a perfectly plausible explanation for the plunge in world stock markets and U.S. interest rates, even if Boehner and Obama were spending their afternoons having beers together and telling jokes. In other words, the history to date suggests that there is little basis for serious concern about the hostile relationship between the parties imposing a major cost in the form of higher interest rates.

I hate to spoil the efforts at building fear and panic, but this is getting more than a bit overblown. Hitting the debt ceiling would undoubtedly be bad news, but an earth-shaking disaster is pretty unlikely. Everyone will get their money, with interest, even if it is a bit late.

The annoying part of the fear story is the implication that somehow things are okay now. We are throwing $1 trillion of potential GDP in the toilet every year because Congress and the President won’t approve enough stimulus to get the economy back to full employment. And millions of lives are being ruined because people can’t get jobs and earn enough money to raise their kids properly.

The media want us to get all bent out of shape because we could cross the magic line and then suddenly have to pay a risk premium of 5-20 basis points on government debt for years into the future? Sorry, for those of us who know arithmetic that doesn’t come close to the disaster we are already seeing.

When people worry about the security of an asset the price usually plummets, as was the case with mortgage backed securities when the housing bubble burst. It is pretty hard to envision the opposite scenario: that because people get concerned about the security of an asset its price rises.

However this is what Ezra Klein tells us in a column today. The story is that worries over the possibility that the U.S. government is becoming dysfunctional could actually result in the price of U.S. government bonds rising.

“The paradox is that defaulting on our debt could lead to a panic so severe that, in a desperate bid for safety, markets will buy even more of our debt. ‘We are the only country in the world where a fiscal mess, rather than increasing spreads, pushes yields lower,’ El-Erian said [Mohamed El-Erian, chief executive officer of Pacific Investment Management Co.]. ‘If there was another round of debt-ceiling fight with no agreement, we might have lower 10-year Treasury yields, rather than higher.'”

The basis for the idea that uncertainty about the stability of the U.S. government will lead people to buy more U.S. government debt seems to come from the experience in the summer of 2011 when the price of U.S. Treasury bonds soared and interest rates plummeted as we came within days of hitting the debt ceiling.

The problem with this story is that there is a more obvious explanation than people rushing to buy Treasury bonds because they were worried about the instability of the U.S. government. Italy suddenly made the list of euro zone crisis countries that week. While euro zone could have almost certainly withstood a default by Greece, a default by Italy would have almost certainly meant the end of the euro.

The very real risk of the collapse of the euro gives a perfectly plausible explanation for the plunge in world stock markets and U.S. interest rates, even if Boehner and Obama were spending their afternoons having beers together and telling jokes. In other words, the history to date suggests that there is little basis for serious concern about the hostile relationship between the parties imposing a major cost in the form of higher interest rates.

I hate to spoil the efforts at building fear and panic, but this is getting more than a bit overblown. Hitting the debt ceiling would undoubtedly be bad news, but an earth-shaking disaster is pretty unlikely. Everyone will get their money, with interest, even if it is a bit late.

The annoying part of the fear story is the implication that somehow things are okay now. We are throwing $1 trillion of potential GDP in the toilet every year because Congress and the President won’t approve enough stimulus to get the economy back to full employment. And millions of lives are being ruined because people can’t get jobs and earn enough money to raise their kids properly.

The media want us to get all bent out of shape because we could cross the magic line and then suddenly have to pay a risk premium of 5-20 basis points on government debt for years into the future? Sorry, for those of us who know arithmetic that doesn’t come close to the disaster we are already seeing.

Glenn Hubbard and Justin Muzinich had an interesting piece in the Post today discussing whether the Fed’s mandate should be explicitly broadened to include preserving financial stability. While I am inclined to agree with Fed governor Jeremy Stein, that attacking bubbles is already implicit in the Fed’s goal of maintaining full employment, the more interesting issue is Hubbard and Muzinch’s shyness in dealing with the problem of groupthink at the Fed and among other economic policymakers.

They write:

“This propensity to follow the herd is at the root of financial instability. In the most recent crisis, homeowners, investors and, notably, the Fed so succumbed to groupthink that we were almost unanimously blind to the risks of rising housing prices and bank leverage. So, how to create a Fed that guides its governors to be skeptical of crowd-induced financial excess?”

Their answer of course is a change in the Fed’s mandate. The more obvious solution would be to change incentives. Economists usually think it is important that it is possible to fire workers who perform their jobs badly. This gives workers the incentive to do their jobs well.

If Fed officials, along with other economists in policymaking positions, could lose their jobs and see their careers ruined by failing to stem the growth of destructive asset bubbles then they would have some real incentive not to engage in mindless groupthink. As it is, economists suffer almost no consequence for even the most momentous failures.

None of the Fed governors lost their jobs for failing to stem the growth of the housing bubble. In fact, according to administration sources, President Obama was considering two of these governors (Donald Kohn and Roger Ferguson) as possible replacements for Ben Bernanke as Fed chair.

Unless economists know that they can face real career consequences from engaging in groupthink their incentive is to go along with the herd. Resisting the herd will always carry risks, since it is possible that they will be shown wrong or at least will not be proven right before they lose their job. Given such asymmetric incentives basic economics would show that economists in policymaking positions will almost always choose to just follow the herd. 

 

Note: Typos corrected.

Glenn Hubbard and Justin Muzinich had an interesting piece in the Post today discussing whether the Fed’s mandate should be explicitly broadened to include preserving financial stability. While I am inclined to agree with Fed governor Jeremy Stein, that attacking bubbles is already implicit in the Fed’s goal of maintaining full employment, the more interesting issue is Hubbard and Muzinch’s shyness in dealing with the problem of groupthink at the Fed and among other economic policymakers.

They write:

“This propensity to follow the herd is at the root of financial instability. In the most recent crisis, homeowners, investors and, notably, the Fed so succumbed to groupthink that we were almost unanimously blind to the risks of rising housing prices and bank leverage. So, how to create a Fed that guides its governors to be skeptical of crowd-induced financial excess?”

Their answer of course is a change in the Fed’s mandate. The more obvious solution would be to change incentives. Economists usually think it is important that it is possible to fire workers who perform their jobs badly. This gives workers the incentive to do their jobs well.

If Fed officials, along with other economists in policymaking positions, could lose their jobs and see their careers ruined by failing to stem the growth of destructive asset bubbles then they would have some real incentive not to engage in mindless groupthink. As it is, economists suffer almost no consequence for even the most momentous failures.

None of the Fed governors lost their jobs for failing to stem the growth of the housing bubble. In fact, according to administration sources, President Obama was considering two of these governors (Donald Kohn and Roger Ferguson) as possible replacements for Ben Bernanke as Fed chair.

Unless economists know that they can face real career consequences from engaging in groupthink their incentive is to go along with the herd. Resisting the herd will always carry risks, since it is possible that they will be shown wrong or at least will not be proven right before they lose their job. Given such asymmetric incentives basic economics would show that economists in policymaking positions will almost always choose to just follow the herd. 

 

Note: Typos corrected.

The New York Times has an excellent piece on the high cost of asthma medicines in the United States. However there is one major error in the piece. It attributes the high prices to the market. In fact the whole piece points to the opposite. It details how government granted monopolies allow drug companies to charge prices that are close to ten times as high as the price in other countries.

Without government intervention the market would lead to much lower prices. The United States is unique in having the government play such a large role in raising prices to consumers. 

The New York Times has an excellent piece on the high cost of asthma medicines in the United States. However there is one major error in the piece. It attributes the high prices to the market. In fact the whole piece points to the opposite. It details how government granted monopolies allow drug companies to charge prices that are close to ten times as high as the price in other countries.

Without government intervention the market would lead to much lower prices. The United States is unique in having the government play such a large role in raising prices to consumers. 

For reasons I cannot imagine, Niall Ferguson has achieved some standing as an intellectual with interesting things to say about the economy. Whenever I have read one of his pieces I almost always find it so confused that it would take a blog post at least as long as the original to set it straight. This is why I generally ignore Ferguson, except when prodded by friends and readers. For this reason I was struck to see that my occasional Niall Ferguson corrections got me on the list of Paul Krugman’s “like-minded bloggers who play a sinister game of tag with him, endorsing his attacks and adding vitriol of their own. I would like to name and shame in this context Dean Baker, Josh Barro, Brad DeLong, Matthew O'Brien, Noah Smith, Matthew Yglesias and Justin Wolfers.” This was in the concluding segment of a three part tirade from Ferguson directed at Krugman. Krugman is of course highly visible, and has been especially effective in calling attention to some of Ferguson’s more absurd claims. I have great respect for Paul Krugman and consider him a friend, but Ferguson’s list of “like-minded” bloggers seems more than a bit bizarre. There is certainly overlap in the views of this group of bloggers, but not all that much. For example, I believe that Josh Barro considers himself a libertarian. The only attribute that we really have in common is that we took offense at some of the ridiculous pronouncements from Ferguson and used our blogs to correct them. But it is hardly worth wasting time and killing electrons in a tit for tat with Ferguson. What matters is the underlying issues of economic policy. These affect the lives of billions of people. The absurdities pushed by Ferguson and like-minded people in positions of power, in direct defiance of massive evidence to the contrary, have ruined millions of lives and cost the world more than $10 trillion in lost output since the crisis began. First, contrary to what Ferguson claims, the downturn is not primarily a “financial crisis.” The story of the downturn is a simple story of a collapsed housing bubble. The $8 trillion housing bubble was driving demand in the U.S. economy in the last decade until it collapsed in 2007. When the bubble burst we lost more than 4 percentage points of GDP worth of demand due to a plunge in residential construction. We lost roughly the same amount of demand due to a falloff in consumption associated with the disappearance of $8 trillion in housing wealth. (FWIW, none of this was a surprise to folks who follow the economy with their eyes open. I warned of this disaster beginning in 2002, see also here and here.) The collapse of the bubble created a hole in annual demand equal to 8 percent of GDP, which would be $1.3 trillion in today’s economy. The central problem facing the U.S., the euro zone, and the U.K. was finding ways to fill this hole. Government stimulus is the most obvious answer. This is where the Ferguson types first began to obstruct efforts to boost the economy. They warned that stimulus would not be an effective way to boost growth and create jobs. We also heard dire tale of exploding interest rates and runaway inflation. In fact, the stimulus in the United States went pretty much according to the textbook. It was far too small and too short to get the economy back to full employment (again, this was predictable at the time, see here and here), but it did create around 2-3 million jobs. The problem was that that the economy needed 10-12 million jobs.
For reasons I cannot imagine, Niall Ferguson has achieved some standing as an intellectual with interesting things to say about the economy. Whenever I have read one of his pieces I almost always find it so confused that it would take a blog post at least as long as the original to set it straight. This is why I generally ignore Ferguson, except when prodded by friends and readers. For this reason I was struck to see that my occasional Niall Ferguson corrections got me on the list of Paul Krugman’s “like-minded bloggers who play a sinister game of tag with him, endorsing his attacks and adding vitriol of their own. I would like to name and shame in this context Dean Baker, Josh Barro, Brad DeLong, Matthew O'Brien, Noah Smith, Matthew Yglesias and Justin Wolfers.” This was in the concluding segment of a three part tirade from Ferguson directed at Krugman. Krugman is of course highly visible, and has been especially effective in calling attention to some of Ferguson’s more absurd claims. I have great respect for Paul Krugman and consider him a friend, but Ferguson’s list of “like-minded” bloggers seems more than a bit bizarre. There is certainly overlap in the views of this group of bloggers, but not all that much. For example, I believe that Josh Barro considers himself a libertarian. The only attribute that we really have in common is that we took offense at some of the ridiculous pronouncements from Ferguson and used our blogs to correct them. But it is hardly worth wasting time and killing electrons in a tit for tat with Ferguson. What matters is the underlying issues of economic policy. These affect the lives of billions of people. The absurdities pushed by Ferguson and like-minded people in positions of power, in direct defiance of massive evidence to the contrary, have ruined millions of lives and cost the world more than $10 trillion in lost output since the crisis began. First, contrary to what Ferguson claims, the downturn is not primarily a “financial crisis.” The story of the downturn is a simple story of a collapsed housing bubble. The $8 trillion housing bubble was driving demand in the U.S. economy in the last decade until it collapsed in 2007. When the bubble burst we lost more than 4 percentage points of GDP worth of demand due to a plunge in residential construction. We lost roughly the same amount of demand due to a falloff in consumption associated with the disappearance of $8 trillion in housing wealth. (FWIW, none of this was a surprise to folks who follow the economy with their eyes open. I warned of this disaster beginning in 2002, see also here and here.) The collapse of the bubble created a hole in annual demand equal to 8 percent of GDP, which would be $1.3 trillion in today’s economy. The central problem facing the U.S., the euro zone, and the U.K. was finding ways to fill this hole. Government stimulus is the most obvious answer. This is where the Ferguson types first began to obstruct efforts to boost the economy. They warned that stimulus would not be an effective way to boost growth and create jobs. We also heard dire tale of exploding interest rates and runaway inflation. In fact, the stimulus in the United States went pretty much according to the textbook. It was far too small and too short to get the economy back to full employment (again, this was predictable at the time, see here and here), but it did create around 2-3 million jobs. The problem was that that the economy needed 10-12 million jobs.

The NYT is doing cover up work for Paul Ryan telling readers about his plan for:

“a debt ceiling increase tied to changes to Medicare and Medigap plans that would save more than enough money to ease some of the across-the-board cuts to domestic and defense programs …”

Ryan is not going to save money from changing Medicare, he will save public dollars by cutting Medicare. In other words, Ryan wants seniors to pay more money for their health care. It’s very polite of the NYT to assist Ryan in pushing his agenda by attempting to conceal its impact, but what happened to the old days when newspapers were about informing readers.

Under the Ryan’s proposals, seniors will pay more money out of pocket because Medicare benefits will be cut. That shouldn’t be too hard for a NYT article to print. Ryan can defend his proposed cuts by arguing that other priorities are more important, but people should understand what is at stake.

The NYT is doing cover up work for Paul Ryan telling readers about his plan for:

“a debt ceiling increase tied to changes to Medicare and Medigap plans that would save more than enough money to ease some of the across-the-board cuts to domestic and defense programs …”

Ryan is not going to save money from changing Medicare, he will save public dollars by cutting Medicare. In other words, Ryan wants seniors to pay more money for their health care. It’s very polite of the NYT to assist Ryan in pushing his agenda by attempting to conceal its impact, but what happened to the old days when newspapers were about informing readers.

Under the Ryan’s proposals, seniors will pay more money out of pocket because Medicare benefits will be cut. That shouldn’t be too hard for a NYT article to print. Ryan can defend his proposed cuts by arguing that other priorities are more important, but people should understand what is at stake.

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