Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

It’s rare that people involved in public debates openly acknowledge that they were wrong and change their position. (I’m sure that I would if it ever happened.) For this reason David Crane deserves enormous credit for acknowledging in his Bloomberg column that pension funds should fully disclose the fees and returns from their alternative investments.

This acknowledgement came about as a result of an exchange with David Sirota. Sirota had criticized a number of public pension funds (especially Rhode Island’s pension fund) for turning over a substantial portion of their assets to hedge funds. The managers of these hedge funds charge high fees for managing pension assets, often taking 2 percent off the top and then a share of the earnings.

Crane argues that this arrangement benefits the pension funds because the hedge fund managers are able to outpace the market by enough to cover these fees and still leave the pensions coming out ahead. Sirota disputed this claim, but noted that we don’t have the information that would allow us to answer this question.

It was in this context that Crane acknowledged that most pension funds don’t disclose enough information for the public to be able to determine whether they are benefiting from their investments with hedge funds. There is no excuse for not making this information available to the public and it’s good to see that Crane agrees with this position. 

It’s rare that people involved in public debates openly acknowledge that they were wrong and change their position. (I’m sure that I would if it ever happened.) For this reason David Crane deserves enormous credit for acknowledging in his Bloomberg column that pension funds should fully disclose the fees and returns from their alternative investments.

This acknowledgement came about as a result of an exchange with David Sirota. Sirota had criticized a number of public pension funds (especially Rhode Island’s pension fund) for turning over a substantial portion of their assets to hedge funds. The managers of these hedge funds charge high fees for managing pension assets, often taking 2 percent off the top and then a share of the earnings.

Crane argues that this arrangement benefits the pension funds because the hedge fund managers are able to outpace the market by enough to cover these fees and still leave the pensions coming out ahead. Sirota disputed this claim, but noted that we don’t have the information that would allow us to answer this question.

It was in this context that Crane acknowledged that most pension funds don’t disclose enough information for the public to be able to determine whether they are benefiting from their investments with hedge funds. There is no excuse for not making this information available to the public and it’s good to see that Crane agrees with this position. 

What put the suggestion in my mind was Tamara Keith’s comment on Morning Edition that the Democrats support “small” cuts to Social Security and Medicare as part of a small bargain with Republicans over the budget. The preferred cut to Social Security is to reduce the annual cost-of-living adjustment by roughly 0.3 percentage points annually. If the typical beneficiary collects benefits for twenty years this would amount to roughly a 3 percent reduction in benefits.

Social Security accounts for more than 90 percent of the income for 40 percent of seniors. It accounts for more than half of the income of 70 percent of seniors. As a result, this proposed cut would be a larger share of the income of the typical senior than the hit from the restoration of pre-Bush era tax rates on the typical wealthy person. Morning Edition’s reporters never described that tax increase as “small.”  

It should have been a simple matter to save time in the piece and increase its accuracy to leave out the word “small” in referring to the cuts that President Obama and the Democratic leadership want to impose on Social Security and Medicare.

What put the suggestion in my mind was Tamara Keith’s comment on Morning Edition that the Democrats support “small” cuts to Social Security and Medicare as part of a small bargain with Republicans over the budget. The preferred cut to Social Security is to reduce the annual cost-of-living adjustment by roughly 0.3 percentage points annually. If the typical beneficiary collects benefits for twenty years this would amount to roughly a 3 percent reduction in benefits.

Social Security accounts for more than 90 percent of the income for 40 percent of seniors. It accounts for more than half of the income of 70 percent of seniors. As a result, this proposed cut would be a larger share of the income of the typical senior than the hit from the restoration of pre-Bush era tax rates on the typical wealthy person. Morning Edition’s reporters never described that tax increase as “small.”  

It should have been a simple matter to save time in the piece and increase its accuracy to leave out the word “small” in referring to the cuts that President Obama and the Democratic leadership want to impose on Social Security and Medicare.

The Washington Post joined Republicans in hyping the fact that many individual insurance policies are being cancelled with insurers telling people that the reason is the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The second paragraph comments on this fact:

“The notices [of plan cancellation] appear to contradict President Obama’s promise that despite the changes resulting from the law, Americans can keep their health insurance if they like it.”

It would have been useful to point out that the plans that were in effect as of the passage of the ACA were grandfathered. This means that any insurers that cancel plans that were in effect prior to 2010 are being misleading if they tell their customers that the cancellation was due to the ACA. It was not a mandate of the ACA that led to the cancellation of the plan, but rather a decision of the insurer based on market conditions.

This is almost certainly the case with one of the plans described in the article. It refers to a “special plan for the hardest to insure” run by Highmark Blue Shield of Pennsylvania. This plan, which the article says covers 40,000 people, is being cancelled.

Highmark Blue Shield likely decided to cancel this plan because its customers would almost certainly be able to buy cheaper insurance through the exchanges. The main point of the ACA is to create a system of insurance in which the “hardest to insure” can buy insurance at the same price as everyone else. In contrast, Highmark Blue Shield was undoubtedly charging them a considerable premium to cover their larger than normal expected health care costs. Contrary to the theme of the article, it is unlikely that many customers of the Highmark Blue Shield plan will be unhappy about losing the opportunity to pay more for their insurance as a result of the ACA. 

The Washington Post joined Republicans in hyping the fact that many individual insurance policies are being cancelled with insurers telling people that the reason is the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The second paragraph comments on this fact:

“The notices [of plan cancellation] appear to contradict President Obama’s promise that despite the changes resulting from the law, Americans can keep their health insurance if they like it.”

It would have been useful to point out that the plans that were in effect as of the passage of the ACA were grandfathered. This means that any insurers that cancel plans that were in effect prior to 2010 are being misleading if they tell their customers that the cancellation was due to the ACA. It was not a mandate of the ACA that led to the cancellation of the plan, but rather a decision of the insurer based on market conditions.

This is almost certainly the case with one of the plans described in the article. It refers to a “special plan for the hardest to insure” run by Highmark Blue Shield of Pennsylvania. This plan, which the article says covers 40,000 people, is being cancelled.

Highmark Blue Shield likely decided to cancel this plan because its customers would almost certainly be able to buy cheaper insurance through the exchanges. The main point of the ACA is to create a system of insurance in which the “hardest to insure” can buy insurance at the same price as everyone else. In contrast, Highmark Blue Shield was undoubtedly charging them a considerable premium to cover their larger than normal expected health care costs. Contrary to the theme of the article, it is unlikely that many customers of the Highmark Blue Shield plan will be unhappy about losing the opportunity to pay more for their insurance as a result of the ACA. 

NPR Shills for Fix the Debt

When Morning Edition had former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers on saying that we may not have to focus so much on reducing the deficit, it immediately followed up with a discussion from Wall Street Journal editor Mike Wessell, which told people that Summers position was not politically serious. In Washington we have to talk about reducing the deficit.

Apparently feeling the need to further refute the idea that the deficit is not a problem, Morning Edition invited Maya MacGuineas, the President of the business backed group Fix the Debt (correctly identified on the show) to explain why the deficit is such a big problem. In the course of her interview she dismissed Paul Krugman’s correct claim that she and her group have been wrong about every single prediction they have made since the crisis began. Most importantly, they have repeatedly asserted that interest rates would skyrocket because of the deficit.

She also wrongly asserted that the debt to GDP ratio is rising. The Congressional Budget Office numbers show that the debt to GDP ratio is falling. While it does reverse direction by the end of the decade, the latest projections show that the debt to GDP ratio will be lower in 2023 than it is today.

 

Book1 7162 image001

                      Source: Congressional Budget Office.

This piece might have caused listeners to be confused about the fact that tens of millions of people are needlessly unemployed, underemployed, or out of the work force altogether because of the efforts of deficit hawks to prevent the government from spending the money necessary to put people back to work. The deficit hawks’ efforts to keep the economy below its full employment level of output also has the effect of reducing wages of the bottom 50-80 percent of the workforce.

 

Note: links fixed.

When Morning Edition had former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers on saying that we may not have to focus so much on reducing the deficit, it immediately followed up with a discussion from Wall Street Journal editor Mike Wessell, which told people that Summers position was not politically serious. In Washington we have to talk about reducing the deficit.

Apparently feeling the need to further refute the idea that the deficit is not a problem, Morning Edition invited Maya MacGuineas, the President of the business backed group Fix the Debt (correctly identified on the show) to explain why the deficit is such a big problem. In the course of her interview she dismissed Paul Krugman’s correct claim that she and her group have been wrong about every single prediction they have made since the crisis began. Most importantly, they have repeatedly asserted that interest rates would skyrocket because of the deficit.

She also wrongly asserted that the debt to GDP ratio is rising. The Congressional Budget Office numbers show that the debt to GDP ratio is falling. While it does reverse direction by the end of the decade, the latest projections show that the debt to GDP ratio will be lower in 2023 than it is today.

 

Book1 7162 image001

                      Source: Congressional Budget Office.

This piece might have caused listeners to be confused about the fact that tens of millions of people are needlessly unemployed, underemployed, or out of the work force altogether because of the efforts of deficit hawks to prevent the government from spending the money necessary to put people back to work. The deficit hawks’ efforts to keep the economy below its full employment level of output also has the effect of reducing wages of the bottom 50-80 percent of the workforce.

 

Note: links fixed.

The Fed, Inflation, and Wages

If the Fed were to pursue a policy of deliberately promoting a higher rate of inflation, it is not necessarily the case that the higher inflation would precede a rise in wages, as suggested in Binyamin Appelbaum’s Economix post. The point of a higher inflation policy is to convince businesses that prices will be higher in the future than they would have thought otherwise. For example, if they expected 1.0 percent annual inflation, they would think that prices would be 5 percent higher in 5 years than they are today. If the Fed manages to convince them that inflation will average 2.0 percent, then they will think that prices will be 10 percent higher in 5 years. (I’ve ignored compounding for simplicity.)

This should not cause businesses to directly raise their prices. If they thought they could raise their prices, they presumably would have already done so. Rather, it would likely change their investment behavior. They know what it costs to invest in new machinery, research and development, new software, etc. If they think they will be able to sell the products that come from this new investment at a higher price in the future, then they will be likely to undertake more investment today.

This would increase investment in the economy and also the demand for labor. Businesses would also be prepared to pay higher wages to workers to carry through this investment. This would allow them to pull workers away from other firms, as well as hiring currently unemployed workers. If this led to upward pressure on wages, all firms would be seeing higher costs, which then lead to the higher prices that the Fed was trying to bring on. By this logic, higher inflation is the result of higher wages. Therefore, there is little basis for concern that wages on average will not keep pace with inflation.

Of course this will not apply to all workers. Some workers will not be in a position to ensure that their wages keep pace with inflation. These workers will be losers from this policy. This is unfortunate, but there are two points to keep in mind.

First, the reason some workers will not be a position to have wages keep pace with inflation is that there is little demand for their labor. In other words, these are workers who are already in a precarious position. A somewhat higher inflation rate (e.g. 3-4 percent rather than 1-2 percent) may cause their real wages to fall more rapidly than they would have otherwise, but they likely were on a downward path already.

The second point is that we don’t know how to carry through economic policies that don’t result in some people losing. For example, if we have a great new infrastructure project for high speed rail or fast Internet, then people will lose jobs in businesses that were associated with the old modes of transportation or Internet (e.g. restaurants and gas stations along the highway). In some cases, we opt not to think about the losers, but that is a political decision, not a result of having a policy that doesn’t produce losers.

We need safety net policies such as unemployment benefits that protect losers, but if a requirement of economic policy is that it have no losers, then we would have to give up on economic policy.

 

Addendum:

The folks worried about how inflation will leave most workers worse off need to figure out a theory of where the inflation is coming from. I gave a story where the expectation of higher future prices leads firms to increase investment, hiring, and wages, which could then make the expectation of higher inflation self-fulfilling. If we don’t see this additional hiring, investment, and wages, then it is difficult to see the process through the Fed can bring about a higher targeted rate of inflation.

Of course if inflation does comes through this channel, then we don’t have to worry about wages keeping up with inflation, higher wages will have caused the inflation. Again, not everyone’s wages will keep up, but welcome to the world. If increased direct hiring of workers led to a higher rate of inflation, then some workers wages will also not keep up. Should we therefore be fervent supporters of keeping high unemployment forever?

If the Fed were to pursue a policy of deliberately promoting a higher rate of inflation, it is not necessarily the case that the higher inflation would precede a rise in wages, as suggested in Binyamin Appelbaum’s Economix post. The point of a higher inflation policy is to convince businesses that prices will be higher in the future than they would have thought otherwise. For example, if they expected 1.0 percent annual inflation, they would think that prices would be 5 percent higher in 5 years than they are today. If the Fed manages to convince them that inflation will average 2.0 percent, then they will think that prices will be 10 percent higher in 5 years. (I’ve ignored compounding for simplicity.)

This should not cause businesses to directly raise their prices. If they thought they could raise their prices, they presumably would have already done so. Rather, it would likely change their investment behavior. They know what it costs to invest in new machinery, research and development, new software, etc. If they think they will be able to sell the products that come from this new investment at a higher price in the future, then they will be likely to undertake more investment today.

This would increase investment in the economy and also the demand for labor. Businesses would also be prepared to pay higher wages to workers to carry through this investment. This would allow them to pull workers away from other firms, as well as hiring currently unemployed workers. If this led to upward pressure on wages, all firms would be seeing higher costs, which then lead to the higher prices that the Fed was trying to bring on. By this logic, higher inflation is the result of higher wages. Therefore, there is little basis for concern that wages on average will not keep pace with inflation.

Of course this will not apply to all workers. Some workers will not be in a position to ensure that their wages keep pace with inflation. These workers will be losers from this policy. This is unfortunate, but there are two points to keep in mind.

First, the reason some workers will not be a position to have wages keep pace with inflation is that there is little demand for their labor. In other words, these are workers who are already in a precarious position. A somewhat higher inflation rate (e.g. 3-4 percent rather than 1-2 percent) may cause their real wages to fall more rapidly than they would have otherwise, but they likely were on a downward path already.

The second point is that we don’t know how to carry through economic policies that don’t result in some people losing. For example, if we have a great new infrastructure project for high speed rail or fast Internet, then people will lose jobs in businesses that were associated with the old modes of transportation or Internet (e.g. restaurants and gas stations along the highway). In some cases, we opt not to think about the losers, but that is a political decision, not a result of having a policy that doesn’t produce losers.

We need safety net policies such as unemployment benefits that protect losers, but if a requirement of economic policy is that it have no losers, then we would have to give up on economic policy.

 

Addendum:

The folks worried about how inflation will leave most workers worse off need to figure out a theory of where the inflation is coming from. I gave a story where the expectation of higher future prices leads firms to increase investment, hiring, and wages, which could then make the expectation of higher inflation self-fulfilling. If we don’t see this additional hiring, investment, and wages, then it is difficult to see the process through the Fed can bring about a higher targeted rate of inflation.

Of course if inflation does comes through this channel, then we don’t have to worry about wages keeping up with inflation, higher wages will have caused the inflation. Again, not everyone’s wages will keep up, but welcome to the world. If increased direct hiring of workers led to a higher rate of inflation, then some workers wages will also not keep up. Should we therefore be fervent supporters of keeping high unemployment forever?

That’s what Neil Irwin tells us in his column today. Irwin says the Fed is divided:

“There has been a long-simmering battle within the central bank over this basic question: Should they still be focused all-out on fixing the economic damage wrought by the last crisis? Or should they worry more about risks building in the financial system that could contribute to a future crisis?”

The idea that the Fed should be worried about bubbles in the price of platinum or Twiiter stock is just silly. In a market economy people will always be making bets. Some will pay off and some won’t. The correct answer at the Fed to the prospect of some people making losing bets is “so what?”

The issue that the Fed should concern itself with is a bubble that actually moves the economy as the stock bubble did in the 1990s and the housing bubble did in the last decade. It wasn’t necessary to have complex computer programs and super-sophisticated economic knowledge to see the impact of these bubbles on the economy. Intro econ and third grade arithmetic were pretty much adequate for the job.

In both cases the wealth generated by the bubbles led consumption to soar and savings rates to plummet. In the former case, the ability to sell shares of stock in Garbage.com for billions of dollars led to a boom in investment by nonsense Internet based companies. In the latter case we got a clearly unsustainable construction boom. Both of these booms predictably collapsed when the bubbles burst.

There is no comparable story in the economy today as should be readily apparent to anyone who reads the data. The Fed’s hawks are looking to crack down on phantom bubbles and to keep millions of people out of work as the cost of their war.  

 

Addendum:

As some folks have pointed out — the housing market was getting into worrying ground. My guess is that the interest rate hike spurred by Bernanke’s taper talk headed off that bubble. We will know as more data comes in over the next few months.

That’s what Neil Irwin tells us in his column today. Irwin says the Fed is divided:

“There has been a long-simmering battle within the central bank over this basic question: Should they still be focused all-out on fixing the economic damage wrought by the last crisis? Or should they worry more about risks building in the financial system that could contribute to a future crisis?”

The idea that the Fed should be worried about bubbles in the price of platinum or Twiiter stock is just silly. In a market economy people will always be making bets. Some will pay off and some won’t. The correct answer at the Fed to the prospect of some people making losing bets is “so what?”

The issue that the Fed should concern itself with is a bubble that actually moves the economy as the stock bubble did in the 1990s and the housing bubble did in the last decade. It wasn’t necessary to have complex computer programs and super-sophisticated economic knowledge to see the impact of these bubbles on the economy. Intro econ and third grade arithmetic were pretty much adequate for the job.

In both cases the wealth generated by the bubbles led consumption to soar and savings rates to plummet. In the former case, the ability to sell shares of stock in Garbage.com for billions of dollars led to a boom in investment by nonsense Internet based companies. In the latter case we got a clearly unsustainable construction boom. Both of these booms predictably collapsed when the bubbles burst.

There is no comparable story in the economy today as should be readily apparent to anyone who reads the data. The Fed’s hawks are looking to crack down on phantom bubbles and to keep millions of people out of work as the cost of their war.  

 

Addendum:

As some folks have pointed out — the housing market was getting into worrying ground. My guess is that the interest rate hike spurred by Bernanke’s taper talk headed off that bubble. We will know as more data comes in over the next few months.

If the economy were humming along at 3.0 percent growth and 4.0 percent unemployment it would be reasonable for economists and economics reporters to worry about strange and unlikely state of affairs with little consequence. But at a time when the economy is down almost 9 million jobs from its trend level, wages are going nowhere, and growth is not much above zero, worrying about the Fed losing money on its bond purchases is more than a bit bizarre. But apparently this is the concern that occupies the Los Angeles Times business section and apparently some members of Congress.

The basic idea is that if interest rates suddenly soar then the bonds held by the Fed will be worth less, so the Fed will take a loss on its bond holdings. If the losses are large enough and the Fed realizes its losses by selling its bonds, then it could actually be insolvent.

The idea that long-term bonds fall in value when interest rates rise is not exactly new. Some of us suggested taking advantage of this fact to get around the nutty debt cult that controls Washington these days.

But what would these mean for the Fed? First, we should ask under what circumstances would interest rates rise suddenly? Presumably this would be the result of a rapid recovery of the economy. If that happened, and we suddenly get back the 9 million jobs we lost, a shortfall at the Fed would be a pretty silly thing to worry about.

Alternatively, we get a sudden spike of interest rates because aliens dump their bonds in huge amounts, even though the economy is still weak. Guess what the Fed could do then? That’s right, if the economy is still weak, it can buy up those bonds and keep interest rates low and bond prices high. Are you scared yet?

Alright, but one of these days the economy will recover and the Fed will want to take reserves out of the system to prevent inflation. If it felt it had to sell off its bonds quickly, and then take a loss, it could face insolvency.

There are two points on this one. First, this is pure and simply an accounting issue. Congress could change the law and allow the Fed to have a negative balance. The consequence for the government and the economy would be precisely zero. The other possibility, for those who find the first solution to be too simple, would be to have the Fed slow the economy by raising bank reserve requirements. This would accomplish the same result. It is also a simple and old-fashioned mechanism.

So put the insolvency of the Fed off the list of things to worry about in your lifetime. Unfortunately we do have real world problems to deal with.

If the economy were humming along at 3.0 percent growth and 4.0 percent unemployment it would be reasonable for economists and economics reporters to worry about strange and unlikely state of affairs with little consequence. But at a time when the economy is down almost 9 million jobs from its trend level, wages are going nowhere, and growth is not much above zero, worrying about the Fed losing money on its bond purchases is more than a bit bizarre. But apparently this is the concern that occupies the Los Angeles Times business section and apparently some members of Congress.

The basic idea is that if interest rates suddenly soar then the bonds held by the Fed will be worth less, so the Fed will take a loss on its bond holdings. If the losses are large enough and the Fed realizes its losses by selling its bonds, then it could actually be insolvent.

The idea that long-term bonds fall in value when interest rates rise is not exactly new. Some of us suggested taking advantage of this fact to get around the nutty debt cult that controls Washington these days.

But what would these mean for the Fed? First, we should ask under what circumstances would interest rates rise suddenly? Presumably this would be the result of a rapid recovery of the economy. If that happened, and we suddenly get back the 9 million jobs we lost, a shortfall at the Fed would be a pretty silly thing to worry about.

Alternatively, we get a sudden spike of interest rates because aliens dump their bonds in huge amounts, even though the economy is still weak. Guess what the Fed could do then? That’s right, if the economy is still weak, it can buy up those bonds and keep interest rates low and bond prices high. Are you scared yet?

Alright, but one of these days the economy will recover and the Fed will want to take reserves out of the system to prevent inflation. If it felt it had to sell off its bonds quickly, and then take a loss, it could face insolvency.

There are two points on this one. First, this is pure and simply an accounting issue. Congress could change the law and allow the Fed to have a negative balance. The consequence for the government and the economy would be precisely zero. The other possibility, for those who find the first solution to be too simple, would be to have the Fed slow the economy by raising bank reserve requirements. This would accomplish the same result. It is also a simple and old-fashioned mechanism.

So put the insolvency of the Fed off the list of things to worry about in your lifetime. Unfortunately we do have real world problems to deal with.

There are two major schools in economics, those who know accounting identities and those who don't. Alan Greenspan and Robert Samuelson are both members of the latter group, as Samuelson proudly proclaims in his column. Samuelson wants to give the blame for the economy's collapse on the complacency that followed a quarter century of relatively stable growth with low inflation. He tells readers: "But there was an unrecognized downside: With a less-risky economy, people — homeowners, bankers, investment managers — concluded they could do things once considered more risky. Consumers could borrow more because economic stability enhanced their ability to repay. “Subprime” home mortgages granted to weaker borrowers became safer because housing prices would constantly rise. Banks and investment banks could assume more debt because financial markets were calmer. Hence, the Greenspan Paradox: The belief in less risk created more risk." Of course this is not quite right. Those of us who believe in accounting identities did recognize the downside. We saw a huge trade deficit which was draining hundreds of billions of demand from the U.S. economy. The demand drain from the trade deficit (which was the direct result of the mismanagement of the East Asian financial crisis by Greenspan, Summers and Rubin) was being offset by the demand created by the housing bubble. The bubble was easy to recognize for anyone looking at the economy with open eyes. House prices had sharply diverged from a 100-year long trend in which they had just tracked the overall rate of inflation. It was clear this run-up had no basis in the fundamentals of the market. Income growth was weak and population growth had slowed. Furthermore, rents were still just keeping pace with inflation. And, the extraordinary levels of construction had created record vacancy rates as early as 2003. There seemed little doubt that prices would collapse and bring an end to the building and consumption boom that were driving the economy at the time. The only question was when. The proliferation of fraudulent mortgages allowed the bubble to grow much larger and more dangerous over the years 2002-2007. Apparently Greenspan missed this tidal wave of bad mortgages because he wasn't paying attention to the housing market. Or at least that's what he wants us to believe now. Anyhow, there are no mysteries in this story for people who understood accounting identities, except perhaps that people still take Alan Greenspan's views on the economy seriously. By the way, since Samuelson does a little bit of "what they said then and what they say now" in reference to Greenspan, I'll give my two cents. Here's what I wrote on the eve of the FederalReserve Board's Greenspan retrospective in the summer of 2005:
There are two major schools in economics, those who know accounting identities and those who don't. Alan Greenspan and Robert Samuelson are both members of the latter group, as Samuelson proudly proclaims in his column. Samuelson wants to give the blame for the economy's collapse on the complacency that followed a quarter century of relatively stable growth with low inflation. He tells readers: "But there was an unrecognized downside: With a less-risky economy, people — homeowners, bankers, investment managers — concluded they could do things once considered more risky. Consumers could borrow more because economic stability enhanced their ability to repay. “Subprime” home mortgages granted to weaker borrowers became safer because housing prices would constantly rise. Banks and investment banks could assume more debt because financial markets were calmer. Hence, the Greenspan Paradox: The belief in less risk created more risk." Of course this is not quite right. Those of us who believe in accounting identities did recognize the downside. We saw a huge trade deficit which was draining hundreds of billions of demand from the U.S. economy. The demand drain from the trade deficit (which was the direct result of the mismanagement of the East Asian financial crisis by Greenspan, Summers and Rubin) was being offset by the demand created by the housing bubble. The bubble was easy to recognize for anyone looking at the economy with open eyes. House prices had sharply diverged from a 100-year long trend in which they had just tracked the overall rate of inflation. It was clear this run-up had no basis in the fundamentals of the market. Income growth was weak and population growth had slowed. Furthermore, rents were still just keeping pace with inflation. And, the extraordinary levels of construction had created record vacancy rates as early as 2003. There seemed little doubt that prices would collapse and bring an end to the building and consumption boom that were driving the economy at the time. The only question was when. The proliferation of fraudulent mortgages allowed the bubble to grow much larger and more dangerous over the years 2002-2007. Apparently Greenspan missed this tidal wave of bad mortgages because he wasn't paying attention to the housing market. Or at least that's what he wants us to believe now. Anyhow, there are no mysteries in this story for people who understood accounting identities, except perhaps that people still take Alan Greenspan's views on the economy seriously. By the way, since Samuelson does a little bit of "what they said then and what they say now" in reference to Greenspan, I'll give my two cents. Here's what I wrote on the eve of the FederalReserve Board's Greenspan retrospective in the summer of 2005:

That’s what readers of the paper’s Review and Outlook column would discover today. The basic point is that a large part of the $13 billion settlement that JP Morgan reached with the Justice Department involves payments to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over misrepresentations about the quality of mortgages in mortgage backed securities sold at the peak of the bubble. The WSJ rightly points out that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are really big actors, who should have known what they were doing.

Unfortunately, if recent history has taught us anything it is that highly paid big businesspeople often don’t have a clue what they are doing. For example, Gerald Levin, who was CEO of Time-Warner in 2000, essentially gave the company away for almost nothing when he agreed to a merger in which Time-Warner was sold for shares of AOL stock. Hewlett-Packard made a big investment to get into the tablet computer business, which it then abandoned almost immediately after its product came on the market. And, it seems almost no one on Wall Street saw the housing crash coming.

In short, big actors like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should know what they are doing, but often don’t. This lack of competence on the part of people being paid tens of millions of dollars a year (yes, there is a serious skills shortage), does not excuse acts of fraud by others. JP Morgan is accused of making deliberate misrepresentations in its selling of mortgage backed securities. (In many cases, the misrepresentations were made by banks it acquired.)

If the charges of misrepresentation were not true then presumably Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, would have been prepared to go to trial and show that the Justice Department was wrong. It seems unlikely that he would have given away $13 billion of the bank’s money if he did not think there was a serious case.

It is also worth noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were buying these subprime MBS because they hoped to make money. They were losing market share and were getting pressure from the markets to get into a market that at the time was dominated by private investment banks like Citigroup and Goldman Sachs.

This assessment by Moody’s of Freddie Mac in December of 2006 tells the story very clearly. Moody’s indicated that it would have been concerned about Freddie’s future prospects had it not made the decision to get more deeply involved in the subprime market. The idea that that Fannie and Freddie got into subprime to help poor people get homes is nonsense.

One final point which I should not miss an opportunity to belittle is the idea that Barney Frank was in anyway responsible for Fannie and Freddie’s behavior. Barney Frank was a minority member of Congress until January of 2007. At that point, almost all the bad loans already had gone out the door. Minority members of Congress have as much influence over the actions of Fannie and Freddie as the average shoe salesperson. The folks who want to blame Barney Frank for the housing bubble obviously have no clue of what they are talking about or are making up stories to push an agenda.

That’s what readers of the paper’s Review and Outlook column would discover today. The basic point is that a large part of the $13 billion settlement that JP Morgan reached with the Justice Department involves payments to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over misrepresentations about the quality of mortgages in mortgage backed securities sold at the peak of the bubble. The WSJ rightly points out that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are really big actors, who should have known what they were doing.

Unfortunately, if recent history has taught us anything it is that highly paid big businesspeople often don’t have a clue what they are doing. For example, Gerald Levin, who was CEO of Time-Warner in 2000, essentially gave the company away for almost nothing when he agreed to a merger in which Time-Warner was sold for shares of AOL stock. Hewlett-Packard made a big investment to get into the tablet computer business, which it then abandoned almost immediately after its product came on the market. And, it seems almost no one on Wall Street saw the housing crash coming.

In short, big actors like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should know what they are doing, but often don’t. This lack of competence on the part of people being paid tens of millions of dollars a year (yes, there is a serious skills shortage), does not excuse acts of fraud by others. JP Morgan is accused of making deliberate misrepresentations in its selling of mortgage backed securities. (In many cases, the misrepresentations were made by banks it acquired.)

If the charges of misrepresentation were not true then presumably Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, would have been prepared to go to trial and show that the Justice Department was wrong. It seems unlikely that he would have given away $13 billion of the bank’s money if he did not think there was a serious case.

It is also worth noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were buying these subprime MBS because they hoped to make money. They were losing market share and were getting pressure from the markets to get into a market that at the time was dominated by private investment banks like Citigroup and Goldman Sachs.

This assessment by Moody’s of Freddie Mac in December of 2006 tells the story very clearly. Moody’s indicated that it would have been concerned about Freddie’s future prospects had it not made the decision to get more deeply involved in the subprime market. The idea that that Fannie and Freddie got into subprime to help poor people get homes is nonsense.

One final point which I should not miss an opportunity to belittle is the idea that Barney Frank was in anyway responsible for Fannie and Freddie’s behavior. Barney Frank was a minority member of Congress until January of 2007. At that point, almost all the bad loans already had gone out the door. Minority members of Congress have as much influence over the actions of Fannie and Freddie as the average shoe salesperson. The folks who want to blame Barney Frank for the housing bubble obviously have no clue of what they are talking about or are making up stories to push an agenda.

It’s always fun to see conservatives arguing for the preservation of big government, especially when they don’t even seem to understand this as their position. Ross Douthat gave us a great example of such an argument as he warned that squeezing costs in the U.S. health care system might not just damage the quality of the U.S. health care system, but the quality of health care worldwide.

The story is that without government guaranteed patent monopolies, drug companies and medical device companies would not do all the wonderful research they are now doing into developing better drugs and devices. Of course granting these companies monopolies is a form of big government. That doesn’t get changed just because people like Douthat like the beneficiaries or think the purpose is good.

If the government allows drug companies to pull in an extra $300 billion a year (@1.8 percent of GDP), by threatening to arrest anyone who competes with them, it is pretty much the same thing as if the government were to raise taxes by $300 billion and hand it to the drug companies. The biggest difference is that in the latter case there would be more public control over what happened to their tax dollars.

There are other more efficient and more market oriented mechanisms for financing drug research. It is striking that people like Douthat seem unable to even conceive of alternatives to a grotesquely inefficient and corrupt system. (Ask any economist what they would expect to see if we had a tariff of 2000 percent in a market. That’s the story with prescription drugs.) 

Of course we also could have enormous savings from freer immigration for doctors bringing their wages in line with doctors in other countries. That would come to around $1 trillion (@$7,000 per household) over the next decade. But again, conservatives seem to have little interest in the free market. Perhaps they have too many friends and family members who are doctors.  

 

Addendum:

I have a few quick thoughts in response to comments below.

Yes, around 25 percent of our doctors were trained abroad, and the point is what? If 25 percent of our shirts were manufactured overseas, this would be evidence of huge protectionist barriers. That is the story with doctors as well.

We’re supposed to believe that more doctors won’t lower their wages. Really? So if we double the number of doctors in the country we would double what we pay for doctors? Sorry, I don’t think the world works that way and the doctors’ lobbies that fight for protection agree with me.

No, excessive pay for doctors is not the only source of waste in health care, but $1 trillion over the course of a decade (@ 2.5 percent of federal spending) is real money no matter how you slice it.

Could we bring down doctors’ pay by other mechanisms? Sure, but none of those seem very likely right now and this one has the beauty (to me) that we can make conservatives argue against the market and free trade. Perhaps there is some huge force for radical change that I haven’t seen, but until that force shows up, I can see few better options than to show that the professed advocates of free markets and free trade are harsh opponents of freedom when it might hurt the income of their friends.

We must recognize that the only ideology these people support is that the ideology that the wealthy should have more money.

It’s always fun to see conservatives arguing for the preservation of big government, especially when they don’t even seem to understand this as their position. Ross Douthat gave us a great example of such an argument as he warned that squeezing costs in the U.S. health care system might not just damage the quality of the U.S. health care system, but the quality of health care worldwide.

The story is that without government guaranteed patent monopolies, drug companies and medical device companies would not do all the wonderful research they are now doing into developing better drugs and devices. Of course granting these companies monopolies is a form of big government. That doesn’t get changed just because people like Douthat like the beneficiaries or think the purpose is good.

If the government allows drug companies to pull in an extra $300 billion a year (@1.8 percent of GDP), by threatening to arrest anyone who competes with them, it is pretty much the same thing as if the government were to raise taxes by $300 billion and hand it to the drug companies. The biggest difference is that in the latter case there would be more public control over what happened to their tax dollars.

There are other more efficient and more market oriented mechanisms for financing drug research. It is striking that people like Douthat seem unable to even conceive of alternatives to a grotesquely inefficient and corrupt system. (Ask any economist what they would expect to see if we had a tariff of 2000 percent in a market. That’s the story with prescription drugs.) 

Of course we also could have enormous savings from freer immigration for doctors bringing their wages in line with doctors in other countries. That would come to around $1 trillion (@$7,000 per household) over the next decade. But again, conservatives seem to have little interest in the free market. Perhaps they have too many friends and family members who are doctors.  

 

Addendum:

I have a few quick thoughts in response to comments below.

Yes, around 25 percent of our doctors were trained abroad, and the point is what? If 25 percent of our shirts were manufactured overseas, this would be evidence of huge protectionist barriers. That is the story with doctors as well.

We’re supposed to believe that more doctors won’t lower their wages. Really? So if we double the number of doctors in the country we would double what we pay for doctors? Sorry, I don’t think the world works that way and the doctors’ lobbies that fight for protection agree with me.

No, excessive pay for doctors is not the only source of waste in health care, but $1 trillion over the course of a decade (@ 2.5 percent of federal spending) is real money no matter how you slice it.

Could we bring down doctors’ pay by other mechanisms? Sure, but none of those seem very likely right now and this one has the beauty (to me) that we can make conservatives argue against the market and free trade. Perhaps there is some huge force for radical change that I haven’t seen, but until that force shows up, I can see few better options than to show that the professed advocates of free markets and free trade are harsh opponents of freedom when it might hurt the income of their friends.

We must recognize that the only ideology these people support is that the ideology that the wealthy should have more money.

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