Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

There are a lot of economists who are determined to say that technology is responsible for inequality rather than policy. There are many parts to this story that seem absurd on their face. Are doctors, dentists and lawyers really whizs at technology? These occupations make up a very large share of the 1 percent. They sustain their income the old-fashioned way, they have the government arrest the competition. When more middle income workers like nurses and computer engineers start to see their pay rise, their employers run to the government whining about shortages so that they can bring in foreign workers to keep down wages.  The financial sector has become a fraud factory. Top executives at banks can pocket tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars off various illegal schemes and never fear more than repaying a portion in penalties. And of course the laws that protect workers' right to organize unions have become a joke, while the laws that protect employers from organized workers remain sacred. (Union officials who openly support a secondary strike don't risk a slap on the wrist from the National Labor Relations Board, they go to jail.)  I could go on (and do). But there is a big market for economists who produce stories saying that the problem is technology, so there will be economists who respond to the demand. Brad Plummer gives us a couple of examples in a recent blogpost. The first is from Catherine Mulbrandon of Visualizing Economics. She gives us a graph which is supposed to show us that the industries that pay in the middle of the wage distribution are shrinking, while industries at the top and bottom are expanding. This is the story of wage polarization, with a disappearing middle. Perhaps I have a problem with my eyesight, but it's hard to see that story in the graph. The industry with the biggest increase in employment over the period from 2001 to 2011 is health care and social services, which sits almost directly on top of the line showing the average for all industries. Manufacturing, which is somewhat above the average pay rate, shows a big decline as we all know. However the industry grouping "professional, scientific, and technical services," which is only slightly higher on the pay scale, is number 3 in job growth over this period. Retail, which is definitely towards the lower end, is a big source of job loss over this period. Education services, which is closer to the average wage than manufacturing, is a big job gainer. If wage polarization is going on, you won't know it from this graph.
There are a lot of economists who are determined to say that technology is responsible for inequality rather than policy. There are many parts to this story that seem absurd on their face. Are doctors, dentists and lawyers really whizs at technology? These occupations make up a very large share of the 1 percent. They sustain their income the old-fashioned way, they have the government arrest the competition. When more middle income workers like nurses and computer engineers start to see their pay rise, their employers run to the government whining about shortages so that they can bring in foreign workers to keep down wages.  The financial sector has become a fraud factory. Top executives at banks can pocket tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars off various illegal schemes and never fear more than repaying a portion in penalties. And of course the laws that protect workers' right to organize unions have become a joke, while the laws that protect employers from organized workers remain sacred. (Union officials who openly support a secondary strike don't risk a slap on the wrist from the National Labor Relations Board, they go to jail.)  I could go on (and do). But there is a big market for economists who produce stories saying that the problem is technology, so there will be economists who respond to the demand. Brad Plummer gives us a couple of examples in a recent blogpost. The first is from Catherine Mulbrandon of Visualizing Economics. She gives us a graph which is supposed to show us that the industries that pay in the middle of the wage distribution are shrinking, while industries at the top and bottom are expanding. This is the story of wage polarization, with a disappearing middle. Perhaps I have a problem with my eyesight, but it's hard to see that story in the graph. The industry with the biggest increase in employment over the period from 2001 to 2011 is health care and social services, which sits almost directly on top of the line showing the average for all industries. Manufacturing, which is somewhat above the average pay rate, shows a big decline as we all know. However the industry grouping "professional, scientific, and technical services," which is only slightly higher on the pay scale, is number 3 in job growth over this period. Retail, which is definitely towards the lower end, is a big source of job loss over this period. Education services, which is closer to the average wage than manufacturing, is a big job gainer. If wage polarization is going on, you won't know it from this graph.

The Washington Post seems to have made it a goal to get everything possible about the housing market wrong. Its article today on the Case-Shiller June price index attributed the slower price growth in part to higher interest rates. This makes no sense.

The Case-Shiller index is an average of three months data. The June release is based on the price of houses that were closed in April, May, and June. Since there is typically 6-8 weeks between when a contract is signed and when a sale is completed these houses would have come under contract in the period from February to May. This is a period before there was any real rise in interest rates.

 

FRED Graph

Interest rates first exceeded their winter levels at the end of May and then increased more in June and July. We will first begin to see a limited impact of higher interest rates in the Case Shilller index in the July data and the impact of the rise will not be fully apparent until the October index is released.

The Washington Post seems to have made it a goal to get everything possible about the housing market wrong. Its article today on the Case-Shiller June price index attributed the slower price growth in part to higher interest rates. This makes no sense.

The Case-Shiller index is an average of three months data. The June release is based on the price of houses that were closed in April, May, and June. Since there is typically 6-8 weeks between when a contract is signed and when a sale is completed these houses would have come under contract in the period from February to May. This is a period before there was any real rise in interest rates.

 

FRED Graph

Interest rates first exceeded their winter levels at the end of May and then increased more in June and July. We will first begin to see a limited impact of higher interest rates in the Case Shilller index in the July data and the impact of the rise will not be fully apparent until the October index is released.

That was the missing sentence in a Washington Post article on the battle over the debt ceiling. The article referred to the 2011 battle that brought the country within days of hitting the legal limit on borrowing. It told readers:

“Many economists say that episode led to uncertainty that harmed the economy.”

It’s hard to find evidence for this assertion in the data. The economy grew at a 2.3 percent annual rate in the second and third quarters of 2011, the period most immediately affected by the crisis. This is slightly higher than its 1.9 percent rate over the last three years. Non-residential investment, the category of spending that might be most responsive to such fears, rose at a 13.3 percent annual rate over these two quarters.

There also was no evidence of a lasting effect on the credibility of the government as a debtor. The interest rate on Treasury bonds plummeted following the crisis (they should have risen if people were fearful), although this was primarily due to the euro-zone crisis. When investors became fearful about the future of the euro they turned to Treasury bonds as a safe alternative.

That was the missing sentence in a Washington Post article on the battle over the debt ceiling. The article referred to the 2011 battle that brought the country within days of hitting the legal limit on borrowing. It told readers:

“Many economists say that episode led to uncertainty that harmed the economy.”

It’s hard to find evidence for this assertion in the data. The economy grew at a 2.3 percent annual rate in the second and third quarters of 2011, the period most immediately affected by the crisis. This is slightly higher than its 1.9 percent rate over the last three years. Non-residential investment, the category of spending that might be most responsive to such fears, rose at a 13.3 percent annual rate over these two quarters.

There also was no evidence of a lasting effect on the credibility of the government as a debtor. The interest rate on Treasury bonds plummeted following the crisis (they should have risen if people were fearful), although this was primarily due to the euro-zone crisis. When investors became fearful about the future of the euro they turned to Treasury bonds as a safe alternative.

Andrew Sorkin used his Dealbook column to tell readers that the 2008 bailout “worked.” That is of course true if the definition of success is to keep the Wall Street banks in business and operating as they had prior to the crisis. It is far less apparent that the bailout worked from the standpoint of the economy as a whole.

The piece presents comments from then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson expressing the concern that if bailout money had been tied to real conditions, such as a plan to break up the large banks and real restrictions on executive compensation, then the non-troubled banks would not have taken it. The obvious response would be “who cares?”

If a bank that wasn’t troubled didn’t take the bailout money, there is no obvious reason that should have bothered anyone. For some reason media outlets have not chosen to discuss the 180 degree shift in policy between the TARP bailout in the fall of 2008 and the stress tests in March of 2009. Under the TARP bailout, Paulson tried to conceal the condition of each bank insisting that all the large banks take bailout funds whether they needed them or not.

By contrast, the stress tests were ostensibly designed to expose the condition of each bank, showing the extent to which it was vulnerable as a result of the collapse of the housing bubble. If the stress tests were the right policy, then the TARP secrecy was the wrong policy.

It is also important to note that TARP was actually a small portion of a much larger bailout. The Fed made trillions of dollars of short-term loans available to banks at below market interest rates. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also allowed for large amounts of long-term borrowing. In addition, the government’s actions made the implicit “too big to fail” policy quite explicit. Investors came to accept that in the post-Lehman period the federal government would not allow another major bank to fail.

All of these forms of government assistance to the banks could have come with conditions. Most, if not all, of the major banks would have had little choice to accept them since the alternative would have been bankruptcy. Paulson and Democratic leadership in Congress decided not to impose any real conditions on access to bailout funds, a policy continued in the Obama presidency.

Andrew Sorkin used his Dealbook column to tell readers that the 2008 bailout “worked.” That is of course true if the definition of success is to keep the Wall Street banks in business and operating as they had prior to the crisis. It is far less apparent that the bailout worked from the standpoint of the economy as a whole.

The piece presents comments from then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson expressing the concern that if bailout money had been tied to real conditions, such as a plan to break up the large banks and real restrictions on executive compensation, then the non-troubled banks would not have taken it. The obvious response would be “who cares?”

If a bank that wasn’t troubled didn’t take the bailout money, there is no obvious reason that should have bothered anyone. For some reason media outlets have not chosen to discuss the 180 degree shift in policy between the TARP bailout in the fall of 2008 and the stress tests in March of 2009. Under the TARP bailout, Paulson tried to conceal the condition of each bank insisting that all the large banks take bailout funds whether they needed them or not.

By contrast, the stress tests were ostensibly designed to expose the condition of each bank, showing the extent to which it was vulnerable as a result of the collapse of the housing bubble. If the stress tests were the right policy, then the TARP secrecy was the wrong policy.

It is also important to note that TARP was actually a small portion of a much larger bailout. The Fed made trillions of dollars of short-term loans available to banks at below market interest rates. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also allowed for large amounts of long-term borrowing. In addition, the government’s actions made the implicit “too big to fail” policy quite explicit. Investors came to accept that in the post-Lehman period the federal government would not allow another major bank to fail.

All of these forms of government assistance to the banks could have come with conditions. Most, if not all, of the major banks would have had little choice to accept them since the alternative would have been bankruptcy. Paulson and Democratic leadership in Congress decided not to impose any real conditions on access to bailout funds, a policy continued in the Obama presidency.

Robert Samuelson repeats two common myths in his discussion of the battle over the successor to Ben Bernanke as Fed chair. He tells readers that the 2001 recession was mild by historical standards and that Bernanke might have prevented another Great Depression with his actions in 2008-2009.

While the length and severity of the official recession in 2001 would imply that it was mild, at the time it was the longest period without job growth since Great Depression. Arguably the Fed was up against the zero bound with its monetary policy as it reduced the federal funds rate to 1.0 percent for two years. While there was still room to go further since the rate was still above zero, most economists see little additional benefit from the drop from 1.0 percent to 0.0 percent. In fact, many economists have said that the European Central Bank was against the zero lower bound when it had lowered its overnight rate to 1.0 percent.

FRED Graph

It’s difficult to see how anything Bernanke did or did not do in 2008-2009 could have condemned the country to another Great Depression, defined as a decade of double digit unemployment. The United States eventually got out of the last Great Depression through the massive spending associated with World War II. There is no economic reason that the United States cannot undertake the same sort of spending today.

If Bernanke had allowed a complete financial collapse (putting the Wall Street banks forever out of our misery), the government could have begun to pump up the economy the next day with a massive burst of spending. If there were political obstacles, these could have been overcome by telling people that spending on education, infrastructure, energy conservation and other areas was necessary to protect us from an invasion by Martians, as Paul Krugman has suggested. 

Robert Samuelson repeats two common myths in his discussion of the battle over the successor to Ben Bernanke as Fed chair. He tells readers that the 2001 recession was mild by historical standards and that Bernanke might have prevented another Great Depression with his actions in 2008-2009.

While the length and severity of the official recession in 2001 would imply that it was mild, at the time it was the longest period without job growth since Great Depression. Arguably the Fed was up against the zero bound with its monetary policy as it reduced the federal funds rate to 1.0 percent for two years. While there was still room to go further since the rate was still above zero, most economists see little additional benefit from the drop from 1.0 percent to 0.0 percent. In fact, many economists have said that the European Central Bank was against the zero lower bound when it had lowered its overnight rate to 1.0 percent.

FRED Graph

It’s difficult to see how anything Bernanke did or did not do in 2008-2009 could have condemned the country to another Great Depression, defined as a decade of double digit unemployment. The United States eventually got out of the last Great Depression through the massive spending associated with World War II. There is no economic reason that the United States cannot undertake the same sort of spending today.

If Bernanke had allowed a complete financial collapse (putting the Wall Street banks forever out of our misery), the government could have begun to pump up the economy the next day with a massive burst of spending. If there were political obstacles, these could have been overcome by telling people that spending on education, infrastructure, energy conservation and other areas was necessary to protect us from an invasion by Martians, as Paul Krugman has suggested. 

Those who hoped that Jeff Bezos takeover of the Washington Post would lead to a quick improvement in the quality of its budget reporting will be seriously disappointed by the paper's lead story today. The story bemoaned the fact that, "after six budget showdowns, big government is mostly unchanged" [the article's headline]. The article uses four metrics to measure the size of government, none of which would inform readers of anything. Its lead metric is spending in nominal dollars, which it tells us will be $3.455 trillion in fiscal 2013. It tells us that this is down by only a small amount from a "whopping $3.457 trillion" spent in 2010. Incredibly, the article does not even adjust this spending amount for inflation. (The piece does briefly note later that this is a 5 percent decline adjusted for inflation.) Of course a serious analysis would have expressed spending as a share of GDP, which shows that spending dropped from 24.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 21.5 percent of GDP in 2013. This decline in spending of 2.6 percentage points of GDP would be the equivalent of roughly $420 billion in today's economy. Assuming a multiplier of 1.5, this reduction in spending has cost the economy more than $600 billion in annual output since there is no plausible story by which cuts in government spending lead to addition private sector demand in the current economic situation. (To be fair, there is a lot of vigorous handwaving on this topic by proponents of spending cuts.) That would translate into more than 5 million fewer jobs. The piece goes on to tell us that Bezos' paper does not like government spending in general and in particular dislikes Social Security and Medicare. In terms of government spending the piece tells readers:
Those who hoped that Jeff Bezos takeover of the Washington Post would lead to a quick improvement in the quality of its budget reporting will be seriously disappointed by the paper's lead story today. The story bemoaned the fact that, "after six budget showdowns, big government is mostly unchanged" [the article's headline]. The article uses four metrics to measure the size of government, none of which would inform readers of anything. Its lead metric is spending in nominal dollars, which it tells us will be $3.455 trillion in fiscal 2013. It tells us that this is down by only a small amount from a "whopping $3.457 trillion" spent in 2010. Incredibly, the article does not even adjust this spending amount for inflation. (The piece does briefly note later that this is a 5 percent decline adjusted for inflation.) Of course a serious analysis would have expressed spending as a share of GDP, which shows that spending dropped from 24.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 21.5 percent of GDP in 2013. This decline in spending of 2.6 percentage points of GDP would be the equivalent of roughly $420 billion in today's economy. Assuming a multiplier of 1.5, this reduction in spending has cost the economy more than $600 billion in annual output since there is no plausible story by which cuts in government spending lead to addition private sector demand in the current economic situation. (To be fair, there is a lot of vigorous handwaving on this topic by proponents of spending cuts.) That would translate into more than 5 million fewer jobs. The piece goes on to tell us that Bezos' paper does not like government spending in general and in particular dislikes Social Security and Medicare. In terms of government spending the piece tells readers:

We are hearing endless accounts of how technology is displacing middle wage jobs (e.g. see the piece by David Autor and David Dorn in the NYT today). That would be work like manufacturing jobs, bookkeeping jobs, and other jobs that used to provide a middle class standard of living. It’s a comforting story for the people who control the media, but it happens not to be true.

The story told by Autor and Dorn is that technology displaces these jobs putting downward pressure on the wages of formerly middle class workers. At the same time it creates more jobs for the people who program the machines, hence we see higher wages for high end workers.

This story is comforting to the affluent because it means that the upward redistribution of income that we have been seeing is simply an inevitable outcome of technological progress. It might be unfortunate, but what are we supposed to do, smash the machines?

This story should strike people as absurd on its face if they are interested in anything other than a rationale for inequality. After all, how many of the winners in today’s economy are actually programming the robots, as the story implies. The group of big winners includes many doctors, lawyers, and dentists, most of whom have no more computer skills than your average high school senior.

They keep their position not by mastering the technology, but rather through the old-fashion way, restricting supply. They use professional barriers and trade restrictions to limit competition. That’s much easier than mastering the latest in computer technology.

This sort of abuse of market power applies to a large share, if not the majority, of the winners in today’s economy. In fact, if anyone really gave a damn, they could see that the Autor-Dorn story simply does not fit the pattern of job creation that we have seen in the last decade. Their occupation analysis would show that low earning occupations have been the big job gainers since 2000. The employment share of the highest earning occupations has actually fallen slightly over this period.

However that story provides less comfort to the rich and powerful. It implies that upward redistribution is something that they did, rather than something that just happened. Therefore we will not likely see these data featured prominently in news stories and opinion pieces.

 

We are hearing endless accounts of how technology is displacing middle wage jobs (e.g. see the piece by David Autor and David Dorn in the NYT today). That would be work like manufacturing jobs, bookkeeping jobs, and other jobs that used to provide a middle class standard of living. It’s a comforting story for the people who control the media, but it happens not to be true.

The story told by Autor and Dorn is that technology displaces these jobs putting downward pressure on the wages of formerly middle class workers. At the same time it creates more jobs for the people who program the machines, hence we see higher wages for high end workers.

This story is comforting to the affluent because it means that the upward redistribution of income that we have been seeing is simply an inevitable outcome of technological progress. It might be unfortunate, but what are we supposed to do, smash the machines?

This story should strike people as absurd on its face if they are interested in anything other than a rationale for inequality. After all, how many of the winners in today’s economy are actually programming the robots, as the story implies. The group of big winners includes many doctors, lawyers, and dentists, most of whom have no more computer skills than your average high school senior.

They keep their position not by mastering the technology, but rather through the old-fashion way, restricting supply. They use professional barriers and trade restrictions to limit competition. That’s much easier than mastering the latest in computer technology.

This sort of abuse of market power applies to a large share, if not the majority, of the winners in today’s economy. In fact, if anyone really gave a damn, they could see that the Autor-Dorn story simply does not fit the pattern of job creation that we have seen in the last decade. Their occupation analysis would show that low earning occupations have been the big job gainers since 2000. The employment share of the highest earning occupations has actually fallen slightly over this period.

However that story provides less comfort to the rich and powerful. It implies that upward redistribution is something that they did, rather than something that just happened. Therefore we will not likely see these data featured prominently in news stories and opinion pieces.

 

Earlier this year the NYT gained considerable notoriety for claiming the Danish welfare state was on its last legs. While the article included several stories that made this point, the data refused to cooperate. By almost any measure Denmark's economy looks considerably stronger than the U.S. economy. Having struck out in its effort to push its Danish welfare state scare story, it now appears to be turning its attention to France. An article in today's paper, which was headlined "a proud nation ponders how to halt its slow decline," told readers: "Today, however, Europe is talking about “the French question”: can the Socialist government of President François Hollande pull France out of its slow decline and prevent it from slipping permanently into Europe’s second tier? "At stake is whether a social democratic system that for decades prided itself on being the model for providing a stable and high standard of living for its citizens can survive the combination of globalization, an aging population and the acute fiscal shocks of recent years. "Those close to Mr. Hollande say that he is largely aware of what must be done to cut government spending and reduce regulations weighing down the economy, and is carefully gauging the political winds. But what appears to be missing is the will; ..." None of these assertions are backed up by any evidence. For example, "Europe" is clearly not talking about the "the French question." Unnamed individuals who the NYT views as important may be talking about the French question, but this is most definitely not a major topic of conversation for people across the continent. What the article is revealing is an agenda that a small group of people, presumably most of whom are wealthy and powerful, have for France. In the same vein it later tells readers; "There is a broad consensus that real social and structural renovation can be carried out only by the left." It never reveals who is part of this "broad consensus." Obviously the consensus does not include the vast majority of French people who clearly do not want to see major changes to French society.
Earlier this year the NYT gained considerable notoriety for claiming the Danish welfare state was on its last legs. While the article included several stories that made this point, the data refused to cooperate. By almost any measure Denmark's economy looks considerably stronger than the U.S. economy. Having struck out in its effort to push its Danish welfare state scare story, it now appears to be turning its attention to France. An article in today's paper, which was headlined "a proud nation ponders how to halt its slow decline," told readers: "Today, however, Europe is talking about “the French question”: can the Socialist government of President François Hollande pull France out of its slow decline and prevent it from slipping permanently into Europe’s second tier? "At stake is whether a social democratic system that for decades prided itself on being the model for providing a stable and high standard of living for its citizens can survive the combination of globalization, an aging population and the acute fiscal shocks of recent years. "Those close to Mr. Hollande say that he is largely aware of what must be done to cut government spending and reduce regulations weighing down the economy, and is carefully gauging the political winds. But what appears to be missing is the will; ..." None of these assertions are backed up by any evidence. For example, "Europe" is clearly not talking about the "the French question." Unnamed individuals who the NYT views as important may be talking about the French question, but this is most definitely not a major topic of conversation for people across the continent. What the article is revealing is an agenda that a small group of people, presumably most of whom are wealthy and powerful, have for France. In the same vein it later tells readers; "There is a broad consensus that real social and structural renovation can be carried out only by the left." It never reveals who is part of this "broad consensus." Obviously the consensus does not include the vast majority of French people who clearly do not want to see major changes to French society.

The Washington Post’s housing reporting during the bubble years became world famous for its reliance on David Lereah as its main source for information on the housing market. Lereah, in addition to being the chief economist of the National Association of Realtors, was also the author of the 2006 best seller, Why the Real Estate Boom Will Not Bust and How You Can Profit From It. Somehow it never occurred to the great minds at the Washington Post that Lereah may have any motive other than dispensing information about the housing market.

Apparently the learning process is very slow over at Fox on 15th Street. Today’s article on the sharp drop in new home sales in July prominently featured the views of Lawrence Yun, Lereah’s successor at the National Association of Realtors. We also got wisdom from the chief economist of the National Association of Homebuilders, as well as the views of several people employed directly by builders. There is no source from outside of the industry.

Among the tidbits of knowledge that readers could not find elsewhere is the news that builders are struggling to keep up with demand. That tidbit comes to us courtesy of Mr. Yun, who according to the Post said, “the pace of building needs to be at least 50 percent faster than it is now to meet demand.”

The piece continues:

“Builders say they’re trying to keep up. Economists expect that it will take two years for construction to get back to normal levels — about 1.2 million to 1.5 million homes per year. …

“Builders are facing three issues borne of the housing crisis: a labor shortage, a dearth of available land and tighter lending standards.”

There you have it, there is a shortage of construction workers. What happened to structural unemployment? Believers in structural unemployment would say things like the problem is that we have too many people who have skills as construction workers, but not enough who are trained to do X, where X is supposed to be an unidentified sector of the economy where we have a labor shortage.

Okay, this makes no sense. The idea that builders can’t put up enough houses is ridiculous. There continues to be a far higher than normal number of vacant units, indicating that the market is still experiencing excess supply, not excess demand. Excess demand shows up in rising prices, just as shortages of labor show up in rising wages, something that we have not seen in the construction industry in recent years.

There was actually a very interesting story in the July new homes sales numbers. It is the first major data release that reveals the response of the housing markets to the recent jump in mortgage interest rates. New home sales measure contracts signed, most other housing data is based on completed sales. Since there is typically a 6-8 week gap between the signing of a contract and a closing, other data on the housing market are still giving us information about contracts that were signed before the jump in interest rates.

The July data indicate that the interest rate hike had a big effect on the market. Given the extraordinary rate of price increases that we had been seeing, which were threatening to push many markets back into bubble territory, this is clearly good news. But you wouldn’t find anything about this issue in Jeff Bezos’ newspaper.

 

The Washington Post’s housing reporting during the bubble years became world famous for its reliance on David Lereah as its main source for information on the housing market. Lereah, in addition to being the chief economist of the National Association of Realtors, was also the author of the 2006 best seller, Why the Real Estate Boom Will Not Bust and How You Can Profit From It. Somehow it never occurred to the great minds at the Washington Post that Lereah may have any motive other than dispensing information about the housing market.

Apparently the learning process is very slow over at Fox on 15th Street. Today’s article on the sharp drop in new home sales in July prominently featured the views of Lawrence Yun, Lereah’s successor at the National Association of Realtors. We also got wisdom from the chief economist of the National Association of Homebuilders, as well as the views of several people employed directly by builders. There is no source from outside of the industry.

Among the tidbits of knowledge that readers could not find elsewhere is the news that builders are struggling to keep up with demand. That tidbit comes to us courtesy of Mr. Yun, who according to the Post said, “the pace of building needs to be at least 50 percent faster than it is now to meet demand.”

The piece continues:

“Builders say they’re trying to keep up. Economists expect that it will take two years for construction to get back to normal levels — about 1.2 million to 1.5 million homes per year. …

“Builders are facing three issues borne of the housing crisis: a labor shortage, a dearth of available land and tighter lending standards.”

There you have it, there is a shortage of construction workers. What happened to structural unemployment? Believers in structural unemployment would say things like the problem is that we have too many people who have skills as construction workers, but not enough who are trained to do X, where X is supposed to be an unidentified sector of the economy where we have a labor shortage.

Okay, this makes no sense. The idea that builders can’t put up enough houses is ridiculous. There continues to be a far higher than normal number of vacant units, indicating that the market is still experiencing excess supply, not excess demand. Excess demand shows up in rising prices, just as shortages of labor show up in rising wages, something that we have not seen in the construction industry in recent years.

There was actually a very interesting story in the July new homes sales numbers. It is the first major data release that reveals the response of the housing markets to the recent jump in mortgage interest rates. New home sales measure contracts signed, most other housing data is based on completed sales. Since there is typically a 6-8 week gap between the signing of a contract and a closing, other data on the housing market are still giving us information about contracts that were signed before the jump in interest rates.

The July data indicate that the interest rate hike had a big effect on the market. Given the extraordinary rate of price increases that we had been seeing, which were threatening to push many markets back into bubble territory, this is clearly good news. But you wouldn’t find anything about this issue in Jeff Bezos’ newspaper.

 

Sorry, we’re trying out some catchy lines to help the Republicans in their effort to stop Obamacare. They keep pressing the one about how it is causing businesses to shift to part-time workers to avoid the employer sanctions. The basis for these sanctions was originally supposed to be the number of workers employed for an average of more than 30 hours a week in 2013, however in early July the Obama administration announced that it would put off the sanctions for a year.

Nonetheless, we still have many folks pushing the part-time line. Reporters seem to buy it, even if the data don’t.

For example, Reuters told us that “three out of every four of the nearly 1 million hires this year are part-time.”

That’s not what our friends at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report. If we look at the household survey (which gives us part-time employment), there were 1,119,000 more people employed in July than in January of 2012. According to the survey, the number of people involuntarily working part-time (i.e. would prefer full-time employment) increased by 327,000 over this period. The number of people voluntarily working part-time increased by 365,000 over this period. That gives us 692,000 in total. That would be 61.8 percent, which is considerably less than three quarters.

However their story gets worse if we look at the data more closely. These numbers are always erratic. There actually was a sharp fall in the number of people who reported working part-time at the end of 2012 which makes rise in 2013 look larger. If we use July 2012 as the basis of our comparison, then involuntary part-time unemployment is unchanged, while voluntary part-time is up by 282,000. By comparison, total employment is up 966,000. This means that part-time employment accounted for 29.2 percent of the jobs created over the last year.

It is also worth noting that part-time is defined by BLS as working less than 35 hours a week. Since companies would still have been forced to pay a penalty for workers putting in 30-34 hours, we should be seeing an increase in the number of workers putting in just under 30 hours a week if Obamacare is having the bad effect promised by its opponents. Helene Jorgensen and I looked at this issue a couple of months back. We found that, at least through April, the number of people working 26-29 hours a week was actually slightly lower in 2013 than in 2012. Oh well.

Thanks to Michael Ash for calling this one to my attention.

Sorry, we’re trying out some catchy lines to help the Republicans in their effort to stop Obamacare. They keep pressing the one about how it is causing businesses to shift to part-time workers to avoid the employer sanctions. The basis for these sanctions was originally supposed to be the number of workers employed for an average of more than 30 hours a week in 2013, however in early July the Obama administration announced that it would put off the sanctions for a year.

Nonetheless, we still have many folks pushing the part-time line. Reporters seem to buy it, even if the data don’t.

For example, Reuters told us that “three out of every four of the nearly 1 million hires this year are part-time.”

That’s not what our friends at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report. If we look at the household survey (which gives us part-time employment), there were 1,119,000 more people employed in July than in January of 2012. According to the survey, the number of people involuntarily working part-time (i.e. would prefer full-time employment) increased by 327,000 over this period. The number of people voluntarily working part-time increased by 365,000 over this period. That gives us 692,000 in total. That would be 61.8 percent, which is considerably less than three quarters.

However their story gets worse if we look at the data more closely. These numbers are always erratic. There actually was a sharp fall in the number of people who reported working part-time at the end of 2012 which makes rise in 2013 look larger. If we use July 2012 as the basis of our comparison, then involuntary part-time unemployment is unchanged, while voluntary part-time is up by 282,000. By comparison, total employment is up 966,000. This means that part-time employment accounted for 29.2 percent of the jobs created over the last year.

It is also worth noting that part-time is defined by BLS as working less than 35 hours a week. Since companies would still have been forced to pay a penalty for workers putting in 30-34 hours, we should be seeing an increase in the number of workers putting in just under 30 hours a week if Obamacare is having the bad effect promised by its opponents. Helene Jorgensen and I looked at this issue a couple of months back. We found that, at least through April, the number of people working 26-29 hours a week was actually slightly lower in 2013 than in 2012. Oh well.

Thanks to Michael Ash for calling this one to my attention.

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