Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Robert Samuelson’s column today is devoted to explaining why housing has not recovered. According to Samuelson the problem is lack of credit. This in turn is the result of the fact that lenders are feeling so beaten up that they are scared to make loans. The moral is that if we don’t stop beating up on the banks then no one will be able to buy a house.

This is a nice story that unfortunately does not fit the data. At the most basic level the problem is that people are actually buying just about as many homes as we should expect. Samuelson focuses on the rate of housing starts, which is below trend, but the relevent measure for a discussion of homebuying and credit is the number of homes that people are buying.

Currently people are buying existing homes at close to a 5 million annual rate. They are buying new homes at close to a 500,000 annual rate for a total rate of home purchases of 5.5 million a year. If we go back to the mid-1990s, after the recession but before irrational exuberance began to dominate the housing market, existing home sales averaged around 3.5 million a year (1993-1995). New home sales averaged just under 700,000 a year for total sales of around 4.2 million a year.

The population is roughly 20 percent larger in 2013 than it was in 1994, which means that we should be seeing around 5.2 million home purchases a year if we are even with the pre-bubble pace. That’s about 5 percent fewer sales than we are actually seeing. This means that if we compare current sales levels to the pre-bubble period we are seeing somewhat more sales than we should expect, not less.

We are seeing considerably less construction than trend levels, but this really should not be any surprise to anyone familiar with housing data. Vacancy rates remain well above normal levels. With a large backlog of vacant homes it is hardly surprising that builders would be reluctant to undertake large amounts of new building.

If anyone wanted to check the credit story that Samuelson tells, they could also look at the Mortgage Bankers Association mortgage application index (sorry, no link). If homebuyers were having trouble getting mortgages then there should be a sharp rise in this index relative to sales, as homebuyers have to put in multiple applications to secure a mortgage and some may not even get a mortgage after many applications. The index actually tracked sales fairly closely through the downturn, which suggests that the percentage of people being denied mortgages had not changed much.

In short, Samuelson has a good story about how we are hurting the housing market by holding bankers responsible for reckless and/or fraudelent mortgage issuance, but it doesn’t fit the data. Nice try, though. 

Robert Samuelson’s column today is devoted to explaining why housing has not recovered. According to Samuelson the problem is lack of credit. This in turn is the result of the fact that lenders are feeling so beaten up that they are scared to make loans. The moral is that if we don’t stop beating up on the banks then no one will be able to buy a house.

This is a nice story that unfortunately does not fit the data. At the most basic level the problem is that people are actually buying just about as many homes as we should expect. Samuelson focuses on the rate of housing starts, which is below trend, but the relevent measure for a discussion of homebuying and credit is the number of homes that people are buying.

Currently people are buying existing homes at close to a 5 million annual rate. They are buying new homes at close to a 500,000 annual rate for a total rate of home purchases of 5.5 million a year. If we go back to the mid-1990s, after the recession but before irrational exuberance began to dominate the housing market, existing home sales averaged around 3.5 million a year (1993-1995). New home sales averaged just under 700,000 a year for total sales of around 4.2 million a year.

The population is roughly 20 percent larger in 2013 than it was in 1994, which means that we should be seeing around 5.2 million home purchases a year if we are even with the pre-bubble pace. That’s about 5 percent fewer sales than we are actually seeing. This means that if we compare current sales levels to the pre-bubble period we are seeing somewhat more sales than we should expect, not less.

We are seeing considerably less construction than trend levels, but this really should not be any surprise to anyone familiar with housing data. Vacancy rates remain well above normal levels. With a large backlog of vacant homes it is hardly surprising that builders would be reluctant to undertake large amounts of new building.

If anyone wanted to check the credit story that Samuelson tells, they could also look at the Mortgage Bankers Association mortgage application index (sorry, no link). If homebuyers were having trouble getting mortgages then there should be a sharp rise in this index relative to sales, as homebuyers have to put in multiple applications to secure a mortgage and some may not even get a mortgage after many applications. The index actually tracked sales fairly closely through the downturn, which suggests that the percentage of people being denied mortgages had not changed much.

In short, Samuelson has a good story about how we are hurting the housing market by holding bankers responsible for reckless and/or fraudelent mortgage issuance, but it doesn’t fit the data. Nice try, though. 

There are two types of people in the world: those who make complicated things simple and those who make simple things complicated. Paul Solman seems determined to convince us he is in the latter camp with his insistence that there is little or nothing we can do to address unemployment. He raises many points in his response to my post, but I will start with a small one. Economics actually does not teach us that “every decision has both benefits and costs.” For example, if we can find a shortcut on our drive to work, that is a decision that will only have benefits. Just like finding a faster way to get to work, there are in fact many cases in economics where we can identify policies that have benefits with little or no obvious costs. Creating jobs in an economy that is suffering from inadequate demand, as is the case in the United States today, is in fact one of these cases. While Solman seems to believe  that something bad happens if we put people to work, he never even hints at what it might be. Will aliens descend from the sky and steal our children? Will rivers flow upstream? What exactly is the bad thing that happens if the government spends money to put people back to work? Economists who oppose such spending usually argue that it will cause inflation, but most have recently  become more quiet arguing this case because the argument suffers from a serious lack of evidence at this point. Inflation has been falling just about everywhere in spite of substantial deficits and vast amounts of money put into the economy by the Fed and other central banks. Of course Solman doesn’t make the inflation argument, so readers can only guess as to what bad event he thinks occurs if we run deficits to put people back to work. His main concern seems to be that demand will not come back to employ people even in the long-term, but this raises two issues. First, why is this an argument not to employ people now? Lives are being ruined today because workers can’t find jobs and properly support their families. Solman certainly gives no reason as to why he thinks demand will not return in the longer term, so what benefit are we getting by ruining people’s lives with unemployment? The second point is that there are intelligent things that can be said about the loss of demand and the long-term prospects for its coming back. Unlike the overwhelming majority of people who talk about economics on the Newshour, some of us were not all surprised by the economic collapse in 2007-2008. I in fact warned about the housing bubble for years and that its collapse would likely lead to a recession. This was not a random bad event from the sky; the downturn was a 100 percent predictable for anyone paying attention to the economy and doing their homework.
There are two types of people in the world: those who make complicated things simple and those who make simple things complicated. Paul Solman seems determined to convince us he is in the latter camp with his insistence that there is little or nothing we can do to address unemployment. He raises many points in his response to my post, but I will start with a small one. Economics actually does not teach us that “every decision has both benefits and costs.” For example, if we can find a shortcut on our drive to work, that is a decision that will only have benefits. Just like finding a faster way to get to work, there are in fact many cases in economics where we can identify policies that have benefits with little or no obvious costs. Creating jobs in an economy that is suffering from inadequate demand, as is the case in the United States today, is in fact one of these cases. While Solman seems to believe  that something bad happens if we put people to work, he never even hints at what it might be. Will aliens descend from the sky and steal our children? Will rivers flow upstream? What exactly is the bad thing that happens if the government spends money to put people back to work? Economists who oppose such spending usually argue that it will cause inflation, but most have recently  become more quiet arguing this case because the argument suffers from a serious lack of evidence at this point. Inflation has been falling just about everywhere in spite of substantial deficits and vast amounts of money put into the economy by the Fed and other central banks. Of course Solman doesn’t make the inflation argument, so readers can only guess as to what bad event he thinks occurs if we run deficits to put people back to work. His main concern seems to be that demand will not come back to employ people even in the long-term, but this raises two issues. First, why is this an argument not to employ people now? Lives are being ruined today because workers can’t find jobs and properly support their families. Solman certainly gives no reason as to why he thinks demand will not return in the longer term, so what benefit are we getting by ruining people’s lives with unemployment? The second point is that there are intelligent things that can be said about the loss of demand and the long-term prospects for its coming back. Unlike the overwhelming majority of people who talk about economics on the Newshour, some of us were not all surprised by the economic collapse in 2007-2008. I in fact warned about the housing bubble for years and that its collapse would likely lead to a recession. This was not a random bad event from the sky; the downturn was a 100 percent predictable for anyone paying attention to the economy and doing their homework.
It's always fun to have conversations with people who will proclaim themselves great experts on a country about which they may know very little because they have been there. I have encountered people who tell me poor countries are rich because they saw opulent homes and expensive restaurants on a visit, or that there is no unemployment in the middle of a downturn because every business owner they talked to couldn't find enough workers. Steven Pearlstein gives us a wonderful example of such arguments in his piece on Ireland's economy in the Post. Pearlstein tells readers: "In the world beyond its emerald shores, meanwhile, another simple narrative about Ireland’s economy has found a receptive audience, this one about the Draconian spending cuts and tax increases that have been forced on Ireland by its creditors in order to reduce an annual government budget deficit that had reached 32 percent of the country’s annual economic output. The Irish themselves have long since accepted the urgent necessity of belt-tightening. But to Keynesian critics who believe in the healing power of fiscal stimulus, the country’s recent slide back into recession is offered as proof of the futility of austerity. "Neither of these fables — the one about the bank bailout, the other about austerity — is adequate to explain the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger. You don’t have to spend much time here before discovering that the real story turns out to be both more complicated and more interesting. "In fact, you might say that what’s holding back Ireland’s economy is the same thing that is now holding back the once-fast growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. It is the same thing that afflicts Greece, Italy, France and the other struggling economies of Europe. And, to a somewhat lesser degree, it is the same problem bedeviling the U.S. economy. "In each, it is the inability to make fundamental reforms to political and economic institutions that now prevents them from rebalancing their economy, from taking next leap in terms of their productivity and efficiency, from creating a new, more sustainable model for economic growth." Wow, Ireland and all these other countries need to make adjustments to adapt to a changing world! Who could have guessed?
It's always fun to have conversations with people who will proclaim themselves great experts on a country about which they may know very little because they have been there. I have encountered people who tell me poor countries are rich because they saw opulent homes and expensive restaurants on a visit, or that there is no unemployment in the middle of a downturn because every business owner they talked to couldn't find enough workers. Steven Pearlstein gives us a wonderful example of such arguments in his piece on Ireland's economy in the Post. Pearlstein tells readers: "In the world beyond its emerald shores, meanwhile, another simple narrative about Ireland’s economy has found a receptive audience, this one about the Draconian spending cuts and tax increases that have been forced on Ireland by its creditors in order to reduce an annual government budget deficit that had reached 32 percent of the country’s annual economic output. The Irish themselves have long since accepted the urgent necessity of belt-tightening. But to Keynesian critics who believe in the healing power of fiscal stimulus, the country’s recent slide back into recession is offered as proof of the futility of austerity. "Neither of these fables — the one about the bank bailout, the other about austerity — is adequate to explain the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger. You don’t have to spend much time here before discovering that the real story turns out to be both more complicated and more interesting. "In fact, you might say that what’s holding back Ireland’s economy is the same thing that is now holding back the once-fast growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. It is the same thing that afflicts Greece, Italy, France and the other struggling economies of Europe. And, to a somewhat lesser degree, it is the same problem bedeviling the U.S. economy. "In each, it is the inability to make fundamental reforms to political and economic institutions that now prevents them from rebalancing their economy, from taking next leap in terms of their productivity and efficiency, from creating a new, more sustainable model for economic growth." Wow, Ireland and all these other countries need to make adjustments to adapt to a changing world! Who could have guessed?

George Will, who likes to mock any and everything the government does, has apparently decided that it is very good at supporting scientific research. He is outraged over the sequester, which is bringing a halt to several major research projects at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

This is truly a fascinating line of argument from Will. He says that we need the government to do this research because it will not produce near term benefits:

“In the private sector, where investors expect a quick turnaround, it is difficult to find dollars for a 10-year program.”

Okay, but this argument implies that the government is not necessarily run by a bunch of bozos. If it were then giving money to NIH would be the same thing as throwing it in the toilet. This means that Will thinks that money spent at NIH actually has useful benefits.

Now let’s carry this logic one step further. Suppose we gave additional funding, not just for basic research, but for actually developing drugs and bringing them through the clinical testing and FDA approval process. We already have Will on record saying that NIH is not run by bozos, so this means that he must think that we can in principle replace the patent supporting research by Pfizer, Merck and the other drug companies with funding from the government. (This doesn’t mean the government does the research. It could contract out the research, possibly even with Pfizer and Merck.) Let’s even hypothesize for the sake of argument, that a dollar of research funding supported by patent monopolies is more efficient than a dollar of funding that passes through the government.

In order to compare the publicly funded route with the patent supported route we would have to weigh the relative efficiency of the research dollars under the two systems with the enormous waste associated with patent monopolies. If a drug was developed through a publicly supported system then it could immediately be sold as a generic for $5 to $10 per prescription instead of selling for hundreds or even thousands of dollars per prescription. No drug company would have an incentive to lie about its effectiveness or hype the drug for inappropriate uses. Also, nearly everyone would be able to get access to the drug without haggling with insurers or government agencies.

In fact, the public system would have advantages in the research process itself. A condition of public support could be that all research findings are publicly posted on the web as soon as practical. This would allow researchers to learn from each others’ successes and failures and to avoid unnecessary duplication. That will not happen with patent supported research where all the findings are proprietary information.

These are the sorts of questions about drug research that serious people would ask if they acknowledge that the government can usefully fund research. But don’t expect to see such follow up questions posed either by Will or anyone else in the Washington Post (except in Wonkblog).

 

George Will, who likes to mock any and everything the government does, has apparently decided that it is very good at supporting scientific research. He is outraged over the sequester, which is bringing a halt to several major research projects at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

This is truly a fascinating line of argument from Will. He says that we need the government to do this research because it will not produce near term benefits:

“In the private sector, where investors expect a quick turnaround, it is difficult to find dollars for a 10-year program.”

Okay, but this argument implies that the government is not necessarily run by a bunch of bozos. If it were then giving money to NIH would be the same thing as throwing it in the toilet. This means that Will thinks that money spent at NIH actually has useful benefits.

Now let’s carry this logic one step further. Suppose we gave additional funding, not just for basic research, but for actually developing drugs and bringing them through the clinical testing and FDA approval process. We already have Will on record saying that NIH is not run by bozos, so this means that he must think that we can in principle replace the patent supporting research by Pfizer, Merck and the other drug companies with funding from the government. (This doesn’t mean the government does the research. It could contract out the research, possibly even with Pfizer and Merck.) Let’s even hypothesize for the sake of argument, that a dollar of research funding supported by patent monopolies is more efficient than a dollar of funding that passes through the government.

In order to compare the publicly funded route with the patent supported route we would have to weigh the relative efficiency of the research dollars under the two systems with the enormous waste associated with patent monopolies. If a drug was developed through a publicly supported system then it could immediately be sold as a generic for $5 to $10 per prescription instead of selling for hundreds or even thousands of dollars per prescription. No drug company would have an incentive to lie about its effectiveness or hype the drug for inappropriate uses. Also, nearly everyone would be able to get access to the drug without haggling with insurers or government agencies.

In fact, the public system would have advantages in the research process itself. A condition of public support could be that all research findings are publicly posted on the web as soon as practical. This would allow researchers to learn from each others’ successes and failures and to avoid unnecessary duplication. That will not happen with patent supported research where all the findings are proprietary information.

These are the sorts of questions about drug research that serious people would ask if they acknowledge that the government can usefully fund research. But don’t expect to see such follow up questions posed either by Will or anyone else in the Washington Post (except in Wonkblog).

 

The Washington Post ran an article on Bill Daley’s decision to run for the Democratic nomination for governor in Illinois. The piece notes that Daley is the son of former Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and the brother of another former mayor, Richard M. Daley.

It probably would have been worth noting that latter connection is not likely to play especially well right now. Richard M. Daley failed to make the required contributions to the city’s pension funds for his last decade in office, leaving them underfunded by more than $27 billion. (This includes the teacher’s fund, which comes from a separate budget.) The current mayor, Rahm Emmanual claims that this is an unpayable burden and want to default on the city’s debt to these funds. (The workers and their unions strongly object to this plan and will fight any default in court.)


Regardless of the outcome of this dispute, allowing pensions to become as underfunded as Chicago’s was remarkably irresponsible, especially in a city such as Chicago with a relatively healthy economy. There are few big city mayors who have been more reckless with public finances in recent decades.

It is probably also worth noting that Emanual has claimed that the city’s schools were a disaster when he came into office. The schools had been under Daley’s direct control for most of his 22 years in office.

 

The Washington Post ran an article on Bill Daley’s decision to run for the Democratic nomination for governor in Illinois. The piece notes that Daley is the son of former Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and the brother of another former mayor, Richard M. Daley.

It probably would have been worth noting that latter connection is not likely to play especially well right now. Richard M. Daley failed to make the required contributions to the city’s pension funds for his last decade in office, leaving them underfunded by more than $27 billion. (This includes the teacher’s fund, which comes from a separate budget.) The current mayor, Rahm Emmanual claims that this is an unpayable burden and want to default on the city’s debt to these funds. (The workers and their unions strongly object to this plan and will fight any default in court.)


Regardless of the outcome of this dispute, allowing pensions to become as underfunded as Chicago’s was remarkably irresponsible, especially in a city such as Chicago with a relatively healthy economy. There are few big city mayors who have been more reckless with public finances in recent decades.

It is probably also worth noting that Emanual has claimed that the city’s schools were a disaster when he came into office. The schools had been under Daley’s direct control for most of his 22 years in office.

 

Paul Krugman devotes his column today to the unreality of the debate in Washington on the budget and the deficit. Towards the end of the piece he refers Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson the co-chairs of President Obama’s deficit commission:

“People like Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, the co-chairmen of President Obama’s deficit commission, did a lot to feed public anxiety about the deficit when it was high. Their report was ominously titled ‘The Moment of Truth.'”

While Krugman is correct in referring to the report as “their report,” Simpson and Bowles were not so honest. The website for the commission refers to the report as the “report of the national commission on fiscal responsibility and reform.” However, this is not true.

Those who prefer truth to truthiness might notice that the bylaws say:

“The Commission shall vote on the approval of a final report containing a set of recommendations to achieve the objectives set forth in the Charter no later than December 1, 2010. The issuance of a final report of the Commission shall require the approval of not less than 14 of the 18 members of the Commission.”

There in fact is no record of an official vote of the commisssion and certainly not by the December 1, 2010 deadline. There was an informal vote of December 3rd, in which 11 of the commission’s members, 3 fewer than required under the by-laws, voted in favor of the final report.

Therefore under the bylaws that govern the operation of the commission, there was no final report. In other words, the “moment of truth” was a lie. The report that appears as the commission’s “report” is not in fact a report of the commission.

Paul Krugman devotes his column today to the unreality of the debate in Washington on the budget and the deficit. Towards the end of the piece he refers Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson the co-chairs of President Obama’s deficit commission:

“People like Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, the co-chairmen of President Obama’s deficit commission, did a lot to feed public anxiety about the deficit when it was high. Their report was ominously titled ‘The Moment of Truth.'”

While Krugman is correct in referring to the report as “their report,” Simpson and Bowles were not so honest. The website for the commission refers to the report as the “report of the national commission on fiscal responsibility and reform.” However, this is not true.

Those who prefer truth to truthiness might notice that the bylaws say:

“The Commission shall vote on the approval of a final report containing a set of recommendations to achieve the objectives set forth in the Charter no later than December 1, 2010. The issuance of a final report of the Commission shall require the approval of not less than 14 of the 18 members of the Commission.”

There in fact is no record of an official vote of the commisssion and certainly not by the December 1, 2010 deadline. There was an informal vote of December 3rd, in which 11 of the commission’s members, 3 fewer than required under the by-laws, voted in favor of the final report.

Therefore under the bylaws that govern the operation of the commission, there was no final report. In other words, the “moment of truth” was a lie. The report that appears as the commission’s “report” is not in fact a report of the commission.

Readers might think that they would after reading Wonkblog’s piece, “Five facts about household debt in the United States.” The piece begins by telling readers:

“The U.S. economy has been growing glacially for the last four years. And, by almost all tellings, the overhang of debt from the pre-crisis years is a big part of the reason why.”

Is that so? There seems to be a very simple story that does not hinge on debt overhang. When the housing bubble collapsed it destroyed $8 trillion iin housing wealth. This bubble wealth was driving the economy in two ways.

First, record high house prices led to an extraordinary construction boom. Residential construction, which is normally around 3.5 percent of GDP, surged to more than 6.0 percent of GDP at its peak in 2005. After the collapse of the bubble, the overbuilding led to a period of well-below-normal levels, with construction falling to less than 2.0 percent of GDP. The difference of more than 4 percentage points of GDP implies a loss in annual demand of around $640 billion in today’s economy. (Residential construction is now recovering and is currently a bit more than 3.0 percent of GDP.) 

The other way that the housing bubble was driving the economy was through the housing wealth effect. Economists estimate that homeowners increase their consumption by 5-7 cents for each additional dollar of home equity. This would imply that bubble wealth increased annual consumption by $400 to $560 billion a year. When the bubble wealth disappeared, so did this excess consumption.

The question then is where does debt figure into this picture? The answer is it doesn’t really. People will spend based on their equity, net of debt. This means that we would expect a person with a $300,000 home and a $100,000 mortgage to spend roughly the same amount as a result of her housing equity as a person with a $200,000 home and no mortgage. It is the amount of equity that matters, not the amount of debt.

This doesn’t mean that there may not be some differences across households. If the value of Bill Gates’ home rises by $10 million, it would probably have less effect on consumption than if 100 miiddle income homeowners saw the price of their homes increase by an average of $100,000. But this has nothing directly to do with debt. It is a question of the distribution of wealth.

In fact, it is just wrong to imply that consumption is currently depressed. It isn’t. The saving rate in the first half of 2013 was less than 4.3 percent. This is less than half of the average saving rate in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It is lower than the saving rate at any points in the post-ware era except the peaks of the stock and housing bubbles. Unless we see a return of a bubble, there is no reason to expect consumption to increase further relative to income.

The reality is, consumption is high, not low. This is yet another which way is up problem in economics.

We still see a slump because of the unmentionable trade deficit. We need a source of demand to replace the demand lost to this deficit, as widely recognized by fans of national income accounting everywhere. 

Readers might think that they would after reading Wonkblog’s piece, “Five facts about household debt in the United States.” The piece begins by telling readers:

“The U.S. economy has been growing glacially for the last four years. And, by almost all tellings, the overhang of debt from the pre-crisis years is a big part of the reason why.”

Is that so? There seems to be a very simple story that does not hinge on debt overhang. When the housing bubble collapsed it destroyed $8 trillion iin housing wealth. This bubble wealth was driving the economy in two ways.

First, record high house prices led to an extraordinary construction boom. Residential construction, which is normally around 3.5 percent of GDP, surged to more than 6.0 percent of GDP at its peak in 2005. After the collapse of the bubble, the overbuilding led to a period of well-below-normal levels, with construction falling to less than 2.0 percent of GDP. The difference of more than 4 percentage points of GDP implies a loss in annual demand of around $640 billion in today’s economy. (Residential construction is now recovering and is currently a bit more than 3.0 percent of GDP.) 

The other way that the housing bubble was driving the economy was through the housing wealth effect. Economists estimate that homeowners increase their consumption by 5-7 cents for each additional dollar of home equity. This would imply that bubble wealth increased annual consumption by $400 to $560 billion a year. When the bubble wealth disappeared, so did this excess consumption.

The question then is where does debt figure into this picture? The answer is it doesn’t really. People will spend based on their equity, net of debt. This means that we would expect a person with a $300,000 home and a $100,000 mortgage to spend roughly the same amount as a result of her housing equity as a person with a $200,000 home and no mortgage. It is the amount of equity that matters, not the amount of debt.

This doesn’t mean that there may not be some differences across households. If the value of Bill Gates’ home rises by $10 million, it would probably have less effect on consumption than if 100 miiddle income homeowners saw the price of their homes increase by an average of $100,000. But this has nothing directly to do with debt. It is a question of the distribution of wealth.

In fact, it is just wrong to imply that consumption is currently depressed. It isn’t. The saving rate in the first half of 2013 was less than 4.3 percent. This is less than half of the average saving rate in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It is lower than the saving rate at any points in the post-ware era except the peaks of the stock and housing bubbles. Unless we see a return of a bubble, there is no reason to expect consumption to increase further relative to income.

The reality is, consumption is high, not low. This is yet another which way is up problem in economics.

We still see a slump because of the unmentionable trade deficit. We need a source of demand to replace the demand lost to this deficit, as widely recognized by fans of national income accounting everywhere. 

It is standard practice in elite circles to blame U.S. workers for their lack of jobs and low wages. The problem is they lack the right skills to compete in the global economy. The NYT gave us another example of this complaint with Stephan Richter’s column today.

While it would be desirable to have a better trained and educated workforce, the reason why our manufacturing workers lose out to international competition, while highly educated workers like doctors and lawyers don’t, is that the latter are highly protected. By contrast, it has been explicit policy to put manufacturing workers in direct competition with the lowest paid workers in the developing world.

If we had free traders directing policy, our trade deals would have been as focused on removing the barriers that make it difficult for smart and ambituous kids in the developing world from becoming doctors, dentists, and lawyers in the United States. This would have driven down wages in these fields and led to enormous savings to consumers on health care, legal fees and other professional services. However trade policy in the United States has been dominated by protectionists who want to limit competition for the most highly paid workers, while using international competition to drive down the wages for those workers at the middle and bottom of the pay ladder. 

 

It is standard practice in elite circles to blame U.S. workers for their lack of jobs and low wages. The problem is they lack the right skills to compete in the global economy. The NYT gave us another example of this complaint with Stephan Richter’s column today.

While it would be desirable to have a better trained and educated workforce, the reason why our manufacturing workers lose out to international competition, while highly educated workers like doctors and lawyers don’t, is that the latter are highly protected. By contrast, it has been explicit policy to put manufacturing workers in direct competition with the lowest paid workers in the developing world.

If we had free traders directing policy, our trade deals would have been as focused on removing the barriers that make it difficult for smart and ambituous kids in the developing world from becoming doctors, dentists, and lawyers in the United States. This would have driven down wages in these fields and led to enormous savings to consumers on health care, legal fees and other professional services. However trade policy in the United States has been dominated by protectionists who want to limit competition for the most highly paid workers, while using international competition to drive down the wages for those workers at the middle and bottom of the pay ladder. 

 

The NYT ran a Reuters piece touting the UK’s return to growth after enduring a prolonged period of recession and stagnation. It would have been worth mentioning that even on its current path, the UK will just be passing its 2008 level of output in 2014. Even with the return to growth, the IMF projects that per capita GDP in the UK will not pass its 2007 level until 2018.

uk-gdp-2013-08-btp

Source: International Monetary Fund.

The NYT ran a Reuters piece touting the UK’s return to growth after enduring a prolonged period of recession and stagnation. It would have been worth mentioning that even on its current path, the UK will just be passing its 2008 level of output in 2014. Even with the return to growth, the IMF projects that per capita GDP in the UK will not pass its 2007 level until 2018.

uk-gdp-2013-08-btp

Source: International Monetary Fund.

That’s a good question, but this Washington Post article probably won’t help people answer it. A 0.3 percent growth rate sounds depressingly close to zero, but in fact this number refers to the quarterly growth, not the annual growth rate, which is the standard way of reporting growth numbers in the United States.

This one should be really simple. GDP growth data in the U.S. is always reported as an annual rate. Did anyone see a report that the U.S. economy grew 0.4 percent in the second quarter? Multiplying by four will quickly transform these quarterly growth numbers into annual rates. (Okay, to be precise you want to take the growth to the fourth power, as in 1.003^4.) There is no excuse for not reporting GDP growth numbers in a way that would make their meaning clear to most readers.

FWIW, I can’t tell you whether the euro zone should be happy or mourning its 1.2 percent growth rate in the second quarter. Given the severity of its downturn, it’s not much of a bounceback. On the other hand, it is certainly better than seeing another fall in output.

That’s a good question, but this Washington Post article probably won’t help people answer it. A 0.3 percent growth rate sounds depressingly close to zero, but in fact this number refers to the quarterly growth, not the annual growth rate, which is the standard way of reporting growth numbers in the United States.

This one should be really simple. GDP growth data in the U.S. is always reported as an annual rate. Did anyone see a report that the U.S. economy grew 0.4 percent in the second quarter? Multiplying by four will quickly transform these quarterly growth numbers into annual rates. (Okay, to be precise you want to take the growth to the fourth power, as in 1.003^4.) There is no excuse for not reporting GDP growth numbers in a way that would make their meaning clear to most readers.

FWIW, I can’t tell you whether the euro zone should be happy or mourning its 1.2 percent growth rate in the second quarter. Given the severity of its downturn, it’s not much of a bounceback. On the other hand, it is certainly better than seeing another fall in output.

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