Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Glenn Kessler, the Washington Post’s fact checker, dished out the maximum four pinocchios in reference to ads by Democratic pacs criticizing Arkansas Representative Tom Cotton over his support of the Republican Medicare plan. This is not the first time such ads have drawn four pinocchios from Kessler or comparable criticism from PolitiFact and FactCheck.Org, the other major media political fact checking sites. 

The essence of the criticism is that the ad cites complaints against an earlier Medicare plan that was passed by Congress in 2011. The specific allegations in the ad, that the plan “essentially ends Medicare and costs seniors $6,000 a year,” are not accurate in describing the revised plan supported Cotton.

Kessler is correct on this point, but is carrying his case too far. The revised plan would allow seniors to continue to buy into a Medicare-type program, but it provides no guarantee that the size of the voucher (Republicans prefer the term “premium support,” but readers are more likely to know what a “voucher” is, hence my use of the word) would be sufficient to pay for the cost of the Medicare plan. The gap could easily be many thousands of dollars a year.

Furthermore, as Kessler notes, depending on the rules set up for structuring enrollment in the various plans, the Medicare option could easily be the victim of adverse selection. This would  mean that only sicker beneficiaries sign up for the Medicare plan, which would raise average costs. This would force the plan to charge a higher premium, which would in turn chase out the more healthy beneficiaries, meaning that the average remaining Medicare enrollee is even sicker. This raises the cost of the plan even further.

This process ends with a collapse of the market for traditional Medicare since no one will be able to afford the plan. While this outcome is certainly not a guaranteed outcome of the Republican plan it is a very real possibility, especially if the program was administered by Republicans who are quite openly hostile to the traditional Medicare plan.

Given that this sort of collapse of Medicare is a very plausible outcome of the Republican plan (if any fact checkers care to dispute this claim, I promise a blogpost of whatever length you like), are Democratic politicians wrong to warn of this risk to one of the country’s most important and popular social programs?

Since there is a long lead time between the passage of the plan and the implementation of the new program, voters could find themselves locking in a program in the next few years that they find very much to their disliking 10 years or so down the road. In this context, it seems entirely appropriate that opponents of the plan should warn of the possible outcomes in as clear terms as possible.

Ideally, they would be careful to focus on the latest plan that the Republicans are now touting and not the prior version, but that seems the less important point. There is a very real risk that Republican plan will end Medicare as we know it. It might be worth a pinocchio or two that these ads get some important facts wrong, but on the big point that would likely get everyone’s attention, they are largely on the mark.

 

Note:

Politifact and Factcheck.com also criticized the ad.

Glenn Kessler, the Washington Post’s fact checker, dished out the maximum four pinocchios in reference to ads by Democratic pacs criticizing Arkansas Representative Tom Cotton over his support of the Republican Medicare plan. This is not the first time such ads have drawn four pinocchios from Kessler or comparable criticism from PolitiFact and FactCheck.Org, the other major media political fact checking sites. 

The essence of the criticism is that the ad cites complaints against an earlier Medicare plan that was passed by Congress in 2011. The specific allegations in the ad, that the plan “essentially ends Medicare and costs seniors $6,000 a year,” are not accurate in describing the revised plan supported Cotton.

Kessler is correct on this point, but is carrying his case too far. The revised plan would allow seniors to continue to buy into a Medicare-type program, but it provides no guarantee that the size of the voucher (Republicans prefer the term “premium support,” but readers are more likely to know what a “voucher” is, hence my use of the word) would be sufficient to pay for the cost of the Medicare plan. The gap could easily be many thousands of dollars a year.

Furthermore, as Kessler notes, depending on the rules set up for structuring enrollment in the various plans, the Medicare option could easily be the victim of adverse selection. This would  mean that only sicker beneficiaries sign up for the Medicare plan, which would raise average costs. This would force the plan to charge a higher premium, which would in turn chase out the more healthy beneficiaries, meaning that the average remaining Medicare enrollee is even sicker. This raises the cost of the plan even further.

This process ends with a collapse of the market for traditional Medicare since no one will be able to afford the plan. While this outcome is certainly not a guaranteed outcome of the Republican plan it is a very real possibility, especially if the program was administered by Republicans who are quite openly hostile to the traditional Medicare plan.

Given that this sort of collapse of Medicare is a very plausible outcome of the Republican plan (if any fact checkers care to dispute this claim, I promise a blogpost of whatever length you like), are Democratic politicians wrong to warn of this risk to one of the country’s most important and popular social programs?

Since there is a long lead time between the passage of the plan and the implementation of the new program, voters could find themselves locking in a program in the next few years that they find very much to their disliking 10 years or so down the road. In this context, it seems entirely appropriate that opponents of the plan should warn of the possible outcomes in as clear terms as possible.

Ideally, they would be careful to focus on the latest plan that the Republicans are now touting and not the prior version, but that seems the less important point. There is a very real risk that Republican plan will end Medicare as we know it. It might be worth a pinocchio or two that these ads get some important facts wrong, but on the big point that would likely get everyone’s attention, they are largely on the mark.

 

Note:

Politifact and Factcheck.com also criticized the ad.

It would be wrong to place too much emphasis on short-term movements in stock prices. As a practical matter they can be moved by almost anything, in either direction. Nonetheless, some folks were anxious to note a plunge in stock prices while President Obama was giving his speech on global warming as evidence that the President really meant business. For example, Andrew Revkin told readers: "But if you doubt the reality of this shift [away from coal], just look at the news coverage from Monday of the drop in the price of shares in coal companies ahead of the speech. This headline in Street Insider says it all: 'Coal Stocks Routed as Pres. Obama Preps to Tackle Carbon Emissions.'" Being a curious sort, I checked the price of the coal stocks listed and noticed that most had largely recovered by the end of the day, although they were down for the week. Here's what the picture looks like for the 5 coal companies mentioned in the referenced article. Source: StreetInsider.com.
It would be wrong to place too much emphasis on short-term movements in stock prices. As a practical matter they can be moved by almost anything, in either direction. Nonetheless, some folks were anxious to note a plunge in stock prices while President Obama was giving his speech on global warming as evidence that the President really meant business. For example, Andrew Revkin told readers: "But if you doubt the reality of this shift [away from coal], just look at the news coverage from Monday of the drop in the price of shares in coal companies ahead of the speech. This headline in Street Insider says it all: 'Coal Stocks Routed as Pres. Obama Preps to Tackle Carbon Emissions.'" Being a curious sort, I checked the price of the coal stocks listed and noticed that most had largely recovered by the end of the day, although they were down for the week. Here's what the picture looks like for the 5 coal companies mentioned in the referenced article. Source: StreetInsider.com.
Who can blame them? The vast majority of people across the political spectrum oppose their plans to cut these programs. Furthermore, improved budget projections (partly because of cuts that are very bad news) have drastically reduced both current deficit projections and projections for longer term deficits. Finally, one of their main props for the urgency of deficit reduction turned out to be nothing more than a Harvard Excel spreadsheet error. No, things have not gone well for those wishing to ax Social Security and Medicare, but they are not about to give up. And with the money and access to the media they enjoy, why should they? Hence we have Jon Cowan and Jim Kessler from Third Way giving the Washington Post's house view in a column headlined, "the left needs to get real on Medicare, Social Security and the deficit." The proximate cause for Cowan and Kessler's ire is a column by Neera Tanden and Michael Linden from the Center for American Progress which argued that we should focus on fixing the economy's current problems by improving infrastructure and creating jobs.  To their great credit, Tanden and Linden reversed their earlier concern with deficit reduction based on the evidence. The deficit has shrunk by more than had been projected and the downturn has been longer and deeper than they had expected. Faced with new facts, Tanden and Linden proposed different policies. This makes deficit dead-enders like Cowan and Kessler very unhappy.  Let's see what they have to say. Actually their main trick is pretty simple and right up front. They use the old whack them with a really big number trick. Cowan and Kessler tell us that in 2030 we are projected to have a deficit of $1.6 trillion. Got that, $1.6 TRILLION!!!!!! Yeah, that is lots of money and we're supposed to be really really scared.
Who can blame them? The vast majority of people across the political spectrum oppose their plans to cut these programs. Furthermore, improved budget projections (partly because of cuts that are very bad news) have drastically reduced both current deficit projections and projections for longer term deficits. Finally, one of their main props for the urgency of deficit reduction turned out to be nothing more than a Harvard Excel spreadsheet error. No, things have not gone well for those wishing to ax Social Security and Medicare, but they are not about to give up. And with the money and access to the media they enjoy, why should they? Hence we have Jon Cowan and Jim Kessler from Third Way giving the Washington Post's house view in a column headlined, "the left needs to get real on Medicare, Social Security and the deficit." The proximate cause for Cowan and Kessler's ire is a column by Neera Tanden and Michael Linden from the Center for American Progress which argued that we should focus on fixing the economy's current problems by improving infrastructure and creating jobs.  To their great credit, Tanden and Linden reversed their earlier concern with deficit reduction based on the evidence. The deficit has shrunk by more than had been projected and the downturn has been longer and deeper than they had expected. Faced with new facts, Tanden and Linden proposed different policies. This makes deficit dead-enders like Cowan and Kessler very unhappy.  Let's see what they have to say. Actually their main trick is pretty simple and right up front. They use the old whack them with a really big number trick. Cowan and Kessler tell us that in 2030 we are projected to have a deficit of $1.6 trillion. Got that, $1.6 TRILLION!!!!!! Yeah, that is lots of money and we're supposed to be really really scared.
Thomas Edsall has a lengthy blogpost on a new measure of income developed by Cornell University Professor and AEI fellow Richard Burkhauser. Burkhauser's measure reverses the widely reported finding that inequality has increased substantially over the last three decades. While Edsall went to great lengths to include extensive comments from other economists (including me) on Burkhauser's methodology and concluded himself that Burkhauser's methodology doesn't measure up, readers may still be led to believe that there is more ambiguity on this issue than is actually the case. This is because Burkhauser's measure is so peculiar and counter-intuitive, that it is unlikely that many readers would understand what he has in fact done. Burkhauser does address a legitimate question -- the treatment of capital gains. Usually economists calculate inequality by both taking income without counting realized capital gains (sales of stock, houses, or businesses) and also including the gains. The latter will generally show higher degrees of inequality since wealthy people are likely to have realized capital gains, whereas middle and lower income people are not. This approach does pose a problem since the decision to sell an asset is an arbitrary one and does not necessarily reflect when the gain actually took place. Also, a lower capital gains tax rate will encourage people to sell their assets more frequently, which by itself would lead to larger reported income. So a methodology that includes realized capital gains is problematic. However Burkhauser's response, to include unrealized gains, makes no sense in a serious measure of income. The reason is that asset prices (especially stock, but in recent years housing as well) are hugely volatile. For people who have substantial assets, the movement in these prices in any given year will often swamp their other income. Gary Burtless and I both made this point in our comments. An implication of Burkhauser's methodology is that our measure of inequality would depend hugely on the exact year we picked for our analysis. In his study, the base year for most of his analysis is 1989, a year in which the S&P 500 rose by more than 27 percent. This hugely increased the earnings of the top quintile in his base year. As a result, the change from 1989 forward would be guaranteed to be small. By contrast, if Burkhauser had chosen 1987, when the S&P fell more than 6 percent, he would have a much lower base. This would make the growth in income for the top quintile appear much larger. To see this, imagine the average income, not counting capital gains, for the top quintile is $200,000 in both 1987 and 1989. Suppose they own $1 million in stock on average. In Burkhauser's methodology their income in 1989 is $470,000. Their income in 1987 is $140,000. (Number corrected, thanks Yoram.) We would be telling a very different story about the growth of income inequality over the next two decades if we opted to choose 1987 as our base year rather than the year picked by Burkhauser. (The year 1989 is often chosen as a base year because it is a business cycle peak. That makes sense in a measure that is primarily reflecting earnings growth which tends to peak at the peak of the cycle. It makes no sense when taking a measure that is moved primarily by capital gains.) There could be an argument for taking unrealized capital gains averaged over a longer period, which is not the methodology that Burkhauser chose. By this methodology we would average the capital gains for households over the period being investigated and add the annual amount to their income. This would be a considerably more defensible methodlogy, but it still would give very misleading results because of the housing bubble.
Thomas Edsall has a lengthy blogpost on a new measure of income developed by Cornell University Professor and AEI fellow Richard Burkhauser. Burkhauser's measure reverses the widely reported finding that inequality has increased substantially over the last three decades. While Edsall went to great lengths to include extensive comments from other economists (including me) on Burkhauser's methodology and concluded himself that Burkhauser's methodology doesn't measure up, readers may still be led to believe that there is more ambiguity on this issue than is actually the case. This is because Burkhauser's measure is so peculiar and counter-intuitive, that it is unlikely that many readers would understand what he has in fact done. Burkhauser does address a legitimate question -- the treatment of capital gains. Usually economists calculate inequality by both taking income without counting realized capital gains (sales of stock, houses, or businesses) and also including the gains. The latter will generally show higher degrees of inequality since wealthy people are likely to have realized capital gains, whereas middle and lower income people are not. This approach does pose a problem since the decision to sell an asset is an arbitrary one and does not necessarily reflect when the gain actually took place. Also, a lower capital gains tax rate will encourage people to sell their assets more frequently, which by itself would lead to larger reported income. So a methodology that includes realized capital gains is problematic. However Burkhauser's response, to include unrealized gains, makes no sense in a serious measure of income. The reason is that asset prices (especially stock, but in recent years housing as well) are hugely volatile. For people who have substantial assets, the movement in these prices in any given year will often swamp their other income. Gary Burtless and I both made this point in our comments. An implication of Burkhauser's methodology is that our measure of inequality would depend hugely on the exact year we picked for our analysis. In his study, the base year for most of his analysis is 1989, a year in which the S&P 500 rose by more than 27 percent. This hugely increased the earnings of the top quintile in his base year. As a result, the change from 1989 forward would be guaranteed to be small. By contrast, if Burkhauser had chosen 1987, when the S&P fell more than 6 percent, he would have a much lower base. This would make the growth in income for the top quintile appear much larger. To see this, imagine the average income, not counting capital gains, for the top quintile is $200,000 in both 1987 and 1989. Suppose they own $1 million in stock on average. In Burkhauser's methodology their income in 1989 is $470,000. Their income in 1987 is $140,000. (Number corrected, thanks Yoram.) We would be telling a very different story about the growth of income inequality over the next two decades if we opted to choose 1987 as our base year rather than the year picked by Burkhauser. (The year 1989 is often chosen as a base year because it is a business cycle peak. That makes sense in a measure that is primarily reflecting earnings growth which tends to peak at the peak of the cycle. It makes no sense when taking a measure that is moved primarily by capital gains.) There could be an argument for taking unrealized capital gains averaged over a longer period, which is not the methodology that Burkhauser chose. By this methodology we would average the capital gains for households over the period being investigated and add the annual amount to their income. This would be a considerably more defensible methodlogy, but it still would give very misleading results because of the housing bubble.

Joe Nocera gets the story mostly right in his skepticism toward a bill put forward by Senators Mark Warner and Bob Corker that would replace Fannie and Freddie with a convoluted system of government guarantees. I would add three points.

First, the 30-year fixed rate mortgage is not necessarily dependent on a government guarantee. In the pre-bubble days banks did hold a substantial portion of the mortgages on their books. They also issued 30-year jumbo mortgages which could not be guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie, so apparently there is a market for these mortgages even without government guarantees.

Second, an important goal of policy in housing finance should be efficiency. In other words, the point is to make it possible for people to buy homes with as few moving parts as possible. This could probably be best accomplished with something like the old Fannie Mae.

In the pre-privatization period, Fannie was a publicly owned company that bought and held mortgages. There were no mortgage backed securities. There is little obvious purpose to move from a government company/agency holding mortgages to a government company/agency guaranteeing mortgage backed securities. In the latter case the government still has the credit risk, it only shields itself from timing risk (fluctuations in interest rates), but that is a risk the government has no problem bearing.

There are political reasons why the old Fannie system might be difficult to reinstate, but we can at least be clear that it would be the most efficient way to manage housing finance. Other methods are political compromises.

Which brings us to the third point, the waste created by these compromises is income to the financial industry: hence the argument for the sort of convoluted system of guarantees in the Warner-Corker bill.

So if we want the most efficient system that is politically feasible, it’s probably best to just shut down Fannie and Freddie altogether. The 30-year mortgage will not disappear, although it may cost somewhat more.

Joe Nocera gets the story mostly right in his skepticism toward a bill put forward by Senators Mark Warner and Bob Corker that would replace Fannie and Freddie with a convoluted system of government guarantees. I would add three points.

First, the 30-year fixed rate mortgage is not necessarily dependent on a government guarantee. In the pre-bubble days banks did hold a substantial portion of the mortgages on their books. They also issued 30-year jumbo mortgages which could not be guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie, so apparently there is a market for these mortgages even without government guarantees.

Second, an important goal of policy in housing finance should be efficiency. In other words, the point is to make it possible for people to buy homes with as few moving parts as possible. This could probably be best accomplished with something like the old Fannie Mae.

In the pre-privatization period, Fannie was a publicly owned company that bought and held mortgages. There were no mortgage backed securities. There is little obvious purpose to move from a government company/agency holding mortgages to a government company/agency guaranteeing mortgage backed securities. In the latter case the government still has the credit risk, it only shields itself from timing risk (fluctuations in interest rates), but that is a risk the government has no problem bearing.

There are political reasons why the old Fannie system might be difficult to reinstate, but we can at least be clear that it would be the most efficient way to manage housing finance. Other methods are political compromises.

Which brings us to the third point, the waste created by these compromises is income to the financial industry: hence the argument for the sort of convoluted system of guarantees in the Warner-Corker bill.

So if we want the most efficient system that is politically feasible, it’s probably best to just shut down Fannie and Freddie altogether. The 30-year mortgage will not disappear, although it may cost somewhat more.

Niall Ferguson, who was last seen predicting soaring interest rates and hyperinflation as a result of the Obama stimulus and Fed’s QE policy is now calling for generational warfare as the best route to rescue the country’s young. In a piece for the Daily Beast, Ferguson complains about the lack of social mobility in the United States, noting that it now trails many other wealthy countries in the percentage of low income children who move up into higher income quintiles.

Ferguson goes through some of the usual conservative stuff about bad families from Charles Murray, but then he settles on the real problem, Social Security and Medicare. He tells readers that 10 percent of the federal budget goes to children compared to 41 percent for the non-children part of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. He then points out that even adding in state spending, which accounts for most education spending, the government spends twice as much on seniors as it does on kids. He then says to readers:

“Ask yourself: how can social mobility possibly increase in a society that cares twice as much for Grandma as junior?”

There are two big problems with Ferguson’s logic. First, most of the payments for Grandma that he describes are part of programs with designated revenue streams. Social Security is essentially a publicly run pension system. We make people pay for their benefits. The same is true with Medicare. (In the case of Medicare people do typically get back more than they pay in but this is because we pay doctors, drug companies, and other providers so much. If our providers received the same sort of compensation as providers in other countries, Medicare taxes would be pretty much adequate to cover benefits.)

Ferguson’s outrage over seniors getting the benefit for which they have paid would be like being outraged over farmers getting payments for flood damage when they collect a federally run flood insurance program. In Ferguson’s world this would translate to caring more about farmers who are flood victims than kids, but to most other people it looks like paying back money that is owed.

The other major flaw in Ferguson’s logic is the implication that our ability to support our kids is limited by the money we spend on seniors. Countries that spend more on their seniors also tend to spend more on their kids. it seems that the question is more of national priorities for ensuring that people get treated decently at both ends of life.

This is consistent with data that show a negative relationship between the share of the economy that goes to the financial sector and spending on kids. It also turns out that a larger share of output going to the richest one percent is associated with lower payments to kids. So if Ferguson wants to see more money going to kids he should probably be looking to target the financial sector and one percent, not the Social Security and Medicare benefits of retirees.

 

Niall Ferguson, who was last seen predicting soaring interest rates and hyperinflation as a result of the Obama stimulus and Fed’s QE policy is now calling for generational warfare as the best route to rescue the country’s young. In a piece for the Daily Beast, Ferguson complains about the lack of social mobility in the United States, noting that it now trails many other wealthy countries in the percentage of low income children who move up into higher income quintiles.

Ferguson goes through some of the usual conservative stuff about bad families from Charles Murray, but then he settles on the real problem, Social Security and Medicare. He tells readers that 10 percent of the federal budget goes to children compared to 41 percent for the non-children part of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. He then points out that even adding in state spending, which accounts for most education spending, the government spends twice as much on seniors as it does on kids. He then says to readers:

“Ask yourself: how can social mobility possibly increase in a society that cares twice as much for Grandma as junior?”

There are two big problems with Ferguson’s logic. First, most of the payments for Grandma that he describes are part of programs with designated revenue streams. Social Security is essentially a publicly run pension system. We make people pay for their benefits. The same is true with Medicare. (In the case of Medicare people do typically get back more than they pay in but this is because we pay doctors, drug companies, and other providers so much. If our providers received the same sort of compensation as providers in other countries, Medicare taxes would be pretty much adequate to cover benefits.)

Ferguson’s outrage over seniors getting the benefit for which they have paid would be like being outraged over farmers getting payments for flood damage when they collect a federally run flood insurance program. In Ferguson’s world this would translate to caring more about farmers who are flood victims than kids, but to most other people it looks like paying back money that is owed.

The other major flaw in Ferguson’s logic is the implication that our ability to support our kids is limited by the money we spend on seniors. Countries that spend more on their seniors also tend to spend more on their kids. it seems that the question is more of national priorities for ensuring that people get treated decently at both ends of life.

This is consistent with data that show a negative relationship between the share of the economy that goes to the financial sector and spending on kids. It also turns out that a larger share of output going to the richest one percent is associated with lower payments to kids. So if Ferguson wants to see more money going to kids he should probably be looking to target the financial sector and one percent, not the Social Security and Medicare benefits of retirees.

 

The Wall Street Journal seems to have completely missed the story of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. It begins an article telling readers:

“After a slow start early in the economic recovery, consumer spending has begun to pick up. The question is whether Americans are ready to open their wallets more widely.”

It is just mind-boggling to see this in the country’s leading business newspaper. Umm, no actually wallets have been pretty wide open for a long time. The way that economists determine the width of the opening is by looking at the saving rate. In the good old days before the stock and housing bubbles, savings out of disposable income averaged more than 8.0 percent.

The savings rate began to fall in the late 1980s in the response to the beginnings of the stock bubble. It fell further in the late 1990s as the bubble peaked. The savings rate bottomed out at just over 2.0 percent in 2000. It rose again after the bubble burst but then fell back to 2.0 percent as a result of the wealth created by the housing bubble. (Actually the saving rate fell to near zero by some measures.)

Predictably, the saving rate rose again following the collapse of the housing bubble and the loss of $8 trillion in housing wealth. However it has remained unusually low, at less than 4.0 percent in recent quarters. This means that consumers are actually spending quite freely. It is not clear what data the piece is referring to when it complains that consumers have been reluctant to spend. Clearly the opposite is true.

The Wall Street Journal seems to have completely missed the story of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. It begins an article telling readers:

“After a slow start early in the economic recovery, consumer spending has begun to pick up. The question is whether Americans are ready to open their wallets more widely.”

It is just mind-boggling to see this in the country’s leading business newspaper. Umm, no actually wallets have been pretty wide open for a long time. The way that economists determine the width of the opening is by looking at the saving rate. In the good old days before the stock and housing bubbles, savings out of disposable income averaged more than 8.0 percent.

The savings rate began to fall in the late 1980s in the response to the beginnings of the stock bubble. It fell further in the late 1990s as the bubble peaked. The savings rate bottomed out at just over 2.0 percent in 2000. It rose again after the bubble burst but then fell back to 2.0 percent as a result of the wealth created by the housing bubble. (Actually the saving rate fell to near zero by some measures.)

Predictably, the saving rate rose again following the collapse of the housing bubble and the loss of $8 trillion in housing wealth. However it has remained unusually low, at less than 4.0 percent in recent quarters. This means that consumers are actually spending quite freely. It is not clear what data the piece is referring to when it complains that consumers have been reluctant to spend. Clearly the opposite is true.

The NYT headlined an article on the release of the newest Case-Shiller housing price data, “housing market shrugging off rise in mortgage interest rates.” This may or may not be true, but the new Case-Shiller data will not provide us much information on this question.

The data released today was for the three month period ending in April. This means that the typical home in the sample was sold in March. It is also important to remember that the index picks up closings. Since it typically takes roughly two months between contracting and closing, the Case-Shiller data released today is telling us about house sales that were contracted back in January. That is not going to give us much information about how the housing market is responding to a rise in mortgage rates that has mostly occurred over the last two months.

The piece also tells readers:

“If mortgage rates rise to 4 percent by the end of the year, as the Mortgage Bankers Association forecasts, they will still be much lower than the rates most Americans have experienced over the last few decades. In May, the average interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage stood at 3.5 percent.”

This statement is bizarre because interest rates have already crossed 4.0 percent. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that the average contracted rate two weeks ago was 4.17 percent. It is almost certain to be higher now since Treasury rates have risen substantially in the last two weeks.

The NYT headlined an article on the release of the newest Case-Shiller housing price data, “housing market shrugging off rise in mortgage interest rates.” This may or may not be true, but the new Case-Shiller data will not provide us much information on this question.

The data released today was for the three month period ending in April. This means that the typical home in the sample was sold in March. It is also important to remember that the index picks up closings. Since it typically takes roughly two months between contracting and closing, the Case-Shiller data released today is telling us about house sales that were contracted back in January. That is not going to give us much information about how the housing market is responding to a rise in mortgage rates that has mostly occurred over the last two months.

The piece also tells readers:

“If mortgage rates rise to 4 percent by the end of the year, as the Mortgage Bankers Association forecasts, they will still be much lower than the rates most Americans have experienced over the last few decades. In May, the average interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage stood at 3.5 percent.”

This statement is bizarre because interest rates have already crossed 4.0 percent. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that the average contracted rate two weeks ago was 4.17 percent. It is almost certain to be higher now since Treasury rates have risen substantially in the last two weeks.

Okay, this is cheap line day, but in fact this is true. Even in a best case scenario, where there are no more hazard issues, the bill for a reshaped government mortgage loan guarantee put forward by senators Bob Corker and Mark Warner would be a job killer in standard economic models, like those used by the Congressional Budget Office and others. The logic is simple. The guarantee would subsidize loans to housing thereby steering more capital to housing and away from other forms of investment. The result is lower productivity growth, which would mean lower real wages and fewer jobs. It would have been worth including the views of an economist who could have explained this scenario to the Washington Post’s readers.

It is also unlikely that the system will be able to escape the problem of moral hazard that has afflicted the current system. (Wall Street types are smart.) The real question that should be posed is whether this additional form of housing subsidy, on top of the mortgage interest deduction, is the best use of public money. Unfortunately the article never frames the issue this way.

 

Note: Warner’s first name has been corrected — thanks Barkley.

Okay, this is cheap line day, but in fact this is true. Even in a best case scenario, where there are no more hazard issues, the bill for a reshaped government mortgage loan guarantee put forward by senators Bob Corker and Mark Warner would be a job killer in standard economic models, like those used by the Congressional Budget Office and others. The logic is simple. The guarantee would subsidize loans to housing thereby steering more capital to housing and away from other forms of investment. The result is lower productivity growth, which would mean lower real wages and fewer jobs. It would have been worth including the views of an economist who could have explained this scenario to the Washington Post’s readers.

It is also unlikely that the system will be able to escape the problem of moral hazard that has afflicted the current system. (Wall Street types are smart.) The real question that should be posed is whether this additional form of housing subsidy, on top of the mortgage interest deduction, is the best use of public money. Unfortunately the article never frames the issue this way.

 

Note: Warner’s first name has been corrected — thanks Barkley.

Eduardo Porter’s column on the drop in college graduation rates in the United States relative to other wealthy countries ignored the large variance in the wages of male college grads. While there is little dispersion for the wages of women who graduate college, this is not the case for men.

There are a substantial number of male college graduates who can anticipate wages that are less then the top quartile of men without college degrees. The marginal college graduate is presumably more likely to be in this group of low earners. If they recognize the risk of not being a high earner many men may opt not to take the time and incur the expense of getting a college degree even if on average it would make them better off.

Eduardo Porter’s column on the drop in college graduation rates in the United States relative to other wealthy countries ignored the large variance in the wages of male college grads. While there is little dispersion for the wages of women who graduate college, this is not the case for men.

There are a substantial number of male college graduates who can anticipate wages that are less then the top quartile of men without college degrees. The marginal college graduate is presumably more likely to be in this group of low earners. If they recognize the risk of not being a high earner many men may opt not to take the time and incur the expense of getting a college degree even if on average it would make them better off.

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