Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Niall Ferguson, who was last seen predicting soaring interest rates and hyperinflation as a result of the Obama stimulus and Fed’s QE policy is now calling for generational warfare as the best route to rescue the country’s young. In a piece for the Daily Beast, Ferguson complains about the lack of social mobility in the United States, noting that it now trails many other wealthy countries in the percentage of low income children who move up into higher income quintiles.

Ferguson goes through some of the usual conservative stuff about bad families from Charles Murray, but then he settles on the real problem, Social Security and Medicare. He tells readers that 10 percent of the federal budget goes to children compared to 41 percent for the non-children part of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. He then points out that even adding in state spending, which accounts for most education spending, the government spends twice as much on seniors as it does on kids. He then says to readers:

“Ask yourself: how can social mobility possibly increase in a society that cares twice as much for Grandma as junior?”

There are two big problems with Ferguson’s logic. First, most of the payments for Grandma that he describes are part of programs with designated revenue streams. Social Security is essentially a publicly run pension system. We make people pay for their benefits. The same is true with Medicare. (In the case of Medicare people do typically get back more than they pay in but this is because we pay doctors, drug companies, and other providers so much. If our providers received the same sort of compensation as providers in other countries, Medicare taxes would be pretty much adequate to cover benefits.)

Ferguson’s outrage over seniors getting the benefit for which they have paid would be like being outraged over farmers getting payments for flood damage when they collect a federally run flood insurance program. In Ferguson’s world this would translate to caring more about farmers who are flood victims than kids, but to most other people it looks like paying back money that is owed.

The other major flaw in Ferguson’s logic is the implication that our ability to support our kids is limited by the money we spend on seniors. Countries that spend more on their seniors also tend to spend more on their kids. it seems that the question is more of national priorities for ensuring that people get treated decently at both ends of life.

This is consistent with data that show a negative relationship between the share of the economy that goes to the financial sector and spending on kids. It also turns out that a larger share of output going to the richest one percent is associated with lower payments to kids. So if Ferguson wants to see more money going to kids he should probably be looking to target the financial sector and one percent, not the Social Security and Medicare benefits of retirees.

 

Niall Ferguson, who was last seen predicting soaring interest rates and hyperinflation as a result of the Obama stimulus and Fed’s QE policy is now calling for generational warfare as the best route to rescue the country’s young. In a piece for the Daily Beast, Ferguson complains about the lack of social mobility in the United States, noting that it now trails many other wealthy countries in the percentage of low income children who move up into higher income quintiles.

Ferguson goes through some of the usual conservative stuff about bad families from Charles Murray, but then he settles on the real problem, Social Security and Medicare. He tells readers that 10 percent of the federal budget goes to children compared to 41 percent for the non-children part of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. He then points out that even adding in state spending, which accounts for most education spending, the government spends twice as much on seniors as it does on kids. He then says to readers:

“Ask yourself: how can social mobility possibly increase in a society that cares twice as much for Grandma as junior?”

There are two big problems with Ferguson’s logic. First, most of the payments for Grandma that he describes are part of programs with designated revenue streams. Social Security is essentially a publicly run pension system. We make people pay for their benefits. The same is true with Medicare. (In the case of Medicare people do typically get back more than they pay in but this is because we pay doctors, drug companies, and other providers so much. If our providers received the same sort of compensation as providers in other countries, Medicare taxes would be pretty much adequate to cover benefits.)

Ferguson’s outrage over seniors getting the benefit for which they have paid would be like being outraged over farmers getting payments for flood damage when they collect a federally run flood insurance program. In Ferguson’s world this would translate to caring more about farmers who are flood victims than kids, but to most other people it looks like paying back money that is owed.

The other major flaw in Ferguson’s logic is the implication that our ability to support our kids is limited by the money we spend on seniors. Countries that spend more on their seniors also tend to spend more on their kids. it seems that the question is more of national priorities for ensuring that people get treated decently at both ends of life.

This is consistent with data that show a negative relationship between the share of the economy that goes to the financial sector and spending on kids. It also turns out that a larger share of output going to the richest one percent is associated with lower payments to kids. So if Ferguson wants to see more money going to kids he should probably be looking to target the financial sector and one percent, not the Social Security and Medicare benefits of retirees.

 

The Wall Street Journal seems to have completely missed the story of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. It begins an article telling readers:

“After a slow start early in the economic recovery, consumer spending has begun to pick up. The question is whether Americans are ready to open their wallets more widely.”

It is just mind-boggling to see this in the country’s leading business newspaper. Umm, no actually wallets have been pretty wide open for a long time. The way that economists determine the width of the opening is by looking at the saving rate. In the good old days before the stock and housing bubbles, savings out of disposable income averaged more than 8.0 percent.

The savings rate began to fall in the late 1980s in the response to the beginnings of the stock bubble. It fell further in the late 1990s as the bubble peaked. The savings rate bottomed out at just over 2.0 percent in 2000. It rose again after the bubble burst but then fell back to 2.0 percent as a result of the wealth created by the housing bubble. (Actually the saving rate fell to near zero by some measures.)

Predictably, the saving rate rose again following the collapse of the housing bubble and the loss of $8 trillion in housing wealth. However it has remained unusually low, at less than 4.0 percent in recent quarters. This means that consumers are actually spending quite freely. It is not clear what data the piece is referring to when it complains that consumers have been reluctant to spend. Clearly the opposite is true.

The Wall Street Journal seems to have completely missed the story of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse. It begins an article telling readers:

“After a slow start early in the economic recovery, consumer spending has begun to pick up. The question is whether Americans are ready to open their wallets more widely.”

It is just mind-boggling to see this in the country’s leading business newspaper. Umm, no actually wallets have been pretty wide open for a long time. The way that economists determine the width of the opening is by looking at the saving rate. In the good old days before the stock and housing bubbles, savings out of disposable income averaged more than 8.0 percent.

The savings rate began to fall in the late 1980s in the response to the beginnings of the stock bubble. It fell further in the late 1990s as the bubble peaked. The savings rate bottomed out at just over 2.0 percent in 2000. It rose again after the bubble burst but then fell back to 2.0 percent as a result of the wealth created by the housing bubble. (Actually the saving rate fell to near zero by some measures.)

Predictably, the saving rate rose again following the collapse of the housing bubble and the loss of $8 trillion in housing wealth. However it has remained unusually low, at less than 4.0 percent in recent quarters. This means that consumers are actually spending quite freely. It is not clear what data the piece is referring to when it complains that consumers have been reluctant to spend. Clearly the opposite is true.

The NYT headlined an article on the release of the newest Case-Shiller housing price data, “housing market shrugging off rise in mortgage interest rates.” This may or may not be true, but the new Case-Shiller data will not provide us much information on this question.

The data released today was for the three month period ending in April. This means that the typical home in the sample was sold in March. It is also important to remember that the index picks up closings. Since it typically takes roughly two months between contracting and closing, the Case-Shiller data released today is telling us about house sales that were contracted back in January. That is not going to give us much information about how the housing market is responding to a rise in mortgage rates that has mostly occurred over the last two months.

The piece also tells readers:

“If mortgage rates rise to 4 percent by the end of the year, as the Mortgage Bankers Association forecasts, they will still be much lower than the rates most Americans have experienced over the last few decades. In May, the average interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage stood at 3.5 percent.”

This statement is bizarre because interest rates have already crossed 4.0 percent. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that the average contracted rate two weeks ago was 4.17 percent. It is almost certain to be higher now since Treasury rates have risen substantially in the last two weeks.

The NYT headlined an article on the release of the newest Case-Shiller housing price data, “housing market shrugging off rise in mortgage interest rates.” This may or may not be true, but the new Case-Shiller data will not provide us much information on this question.

The data released today was for the three month period ending in April. This means that the typical home in the sample was sold in March. It is also important to remember that the index picks up closings. Since it typically takes roughly two months between contracting and closing, the Case-Shiller data released today is telling us about house sales that were contracted back in January. That is not going to give us much information about how the housing market is responding to a rise in mortgage rates that has mostly occurred over the last two months.

The piece also tells readers:

“If mortgage rates rise to 4 percent by the end of the year, as the Mortgage Bankers Association forecasts, they will still be much lower than the rates most Americans have experienced over the last few decades. In May, the average interest rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage stood at 3.5 percent.”

This statement is bizarre because interest rates have already crossed 4.0 percent. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that the average contracted rate two weeks ago was 4.17 percent. It is almost certain to be higher now since Treasury rates have risen substantially in the last two weeks.

Okay, this is cheap line day, but in fact this is true. Even in a best case scenario, where there are no more hazard issues, the bill for a reshaped government mortgage loan guarantee put forward by senators Bob Corker and Mark Warner would be a job killer in standard economic models, like those used by the Congressional Budget Office and others. The logic is simple. The guarantee would subsidize loans to housing thereby steering more capital to housing and away from other forms of investment. The result is lower productivity growth, which would mean lower real wages and fewer jobs. It would have been worth including the views of an economist who could have explained this scenario to the Washington Post’s readers.

It is also unlikely that the system will be able to escape the problem of moral hazard that has afflicted the current system. (Wall Street types are smart.) The real question that should be posed is whether this additional form of housing subsidy, on top of the mortgage interest deduction, is the best use of public money. Unfortunately the article never frames the issue this way.

 

Note: Warner’s first name has been corrected — thanks Barkley.

Okay, this is cheap line day, but in fact this is true. Even in a best case scenario, where there are no more hazard issues, the bill for a reshaped government mortgage loan guarantee put forward by senators Bob Corker and Mark Warner would be a job killer in standard economic models, like those used by the Congressional Budget Office and others. The logic is simple. The guarantee would subsidize loans to housing thereby steering more capital to housing and away from other forms of investment. The result is lower productivity growth, which would mean lower real wages and fewer jobs. It would have been worth including the views of an economist who could have explained this scenario to the Washington Post’s readers.

It is also unlikely that the system will be able to escape the problem of moral hazard that has afflicted the current system. (Wall Street types are smart.) The real question that should be posed is whether this additional form of housing subsidy, on top of the mortgage interest deduction, is the best use of public money. Unfortunately the article never frames the issue this way.

 

Note: Warner’s first name has been corrected — thanks Barkley.

Eduardo Porter’s column on the drop in college graduation rates in the United States relative to other wealthy countries ignored the large variance in the wages of male college grads. While there is little dispersion for the wages of women who graduate college, this is not the case for men.

There are a substantial number of male college graduates who can anticipate wages that are less then the top quartile of men without college degrees. The marginal college graduate is presumably more likely to be in this group of low earners. If they recognize the risk of not being a high earner many men may opt not to take the time and incur the expense of getting a college degree even if on average it would make them better off.

Eduardo Porter’s column on the drop in college graduation rates in the United States relative to other wealthy countries ignored the large variance in the wages of male college grads. While there is little dispersion for the wages of women who graduate college, this is not the case for men.

There are a substantial number of male college graduates who can anticipate wages that are less then the top quartile of men without college degrees. The marginal college graduate is presumably more likely to be in this group of low earners. If they recognize the risk of not being a high earner many men may opt not to take the time and incur the expense of getting a college degree even if on average it would make them better off.

Some applause please for Casey Mulligan. Mulligan has been a strong opponent of the Affordable Care Act and the expansion of Medicaid provided under the act. However he used his column today to dispel a misunderstanding of a study of the health impact of increased Medicaid enrollment in Oregon.

The study was written up in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine which noted that the study found no statistically significant impact of Medicaid enrollment on health care. However Mulligan makes the point that the study actually did find that the people enrolled in Medicaid had improved health by several important measures. While the improvements were not large enough to meet standard tests of statistical significance this does not mean that they were not important. As Mulligan notes, given the limited number of people in the study and the relatively short time-frame (2 years), it would have been highly unlikely that it could have found statistically significant gains in health outcomes.

Mulligan deserves credit for clarifying this point, especially when the implications seem to be directly at odds with his view of the policy. It would be great if debates on economic policy were always like this. 

 

Addendum:

I’m glad to see that I have people knowledgeable about statistics reading this blog. Since I guess I was too quick in my post and folks apparently did not read the Mulligan piece or the study, let me be a bit clearer. The study had very little power. There were not enough people in it. As a result you had relatively few people with any specific condition, which meant that it would be almost impossible to find statistically significant results.

To see this point, suppose we chose 100 people at random for a study to determine if drug X was effective in preventing heart attacks. We gave 50 people drug X and the other 50 got a placebo. After a year, 2 people in the placebo group got a heart attack but only one person in the treatment group. Okay, this is a nice result, but almost certainly not statistically significant. Since we had not selected people with heart conditions and heart attacks are relatively infrequent in the population as a whole, it would have been almost impossible to have a statistically significant finding.

That is the story of the Oregon study. It had some encouraging results. They were not statistically significant, but it would have been almost impossible given the design of the study to have statistically significant results. That was the point of Mulligan’s piece — and he is 100 percent right.

Some applause please for Casey Mulligan. Mulligan has been a strong opponent of the Affordable Care Act and the expansion of Medicaid provided under the act. However he used his column today to dispel a misunderstanding of a study of the health impact of increased Medicaid enrollment in Oregon.

The study was written up in an article in the New England Journal of Medicine which noted that the study found no statistically significant impact of Medicaid enrollment on health care. However Mulligan makes the point that the study actually did find that the people enrolled in Medicaid had improved health by several important measures. While the improvements were not large enough to meet standard tests of statistical significance this does not mean that they were not important. As Mulligan notes, given the limited number of people in the study and the relatively short time-frame (2 years), it would have been highly unlikely that it could have found statistically significant gains in health outcomes.

Mulligan deserves credit for clarifying this point, especially when the implications seem to be directly at odds with his view of the policy. It would be great if debates on economic policy were always like this. 

 

Addendum:

I’m glad to see that I have people knowledgeable about statistics reading this blog. Since I guess I was too quick in my post and folks apparently did not read the Mulligan piece or the study, let me be a bit clearer. The study had very little power. There were not enough people in it. As a result you had relatively few people with any specific condition, which meant that it would be almost impossible to find statistically significant results.

To see this point, suppose we chose 100 people at random for a study to determine if drug X was effective in preventing heart attacks. We gave 50 people drug X and the other 50 got a placebo. After a year, 2 people in the placebo group got a heart attack but only one person in the treatment group. Okay, this is a nice result, but almost certainly not statistically significant. Since we had not selected people with heart conditions and heart attacks are relatively infrequent in the population as a whole, it would have been almost impossible to have a statistically significant finding.

That is the story of the Oregon study. It had some encouraging results. They were not statistically significant, but it would have been almost impossible given the design of the study to have statistically significant results. That was the point of Mulligan’s piece — and he is 100 percent right.

Since my comments on Greg Mankiw's defense of the one percent prompted so much response, I thought I should add some clarification on the treatment of patents and copyrights. First off, my main point is that these are government policies designed to meet a public purpose (i.e. promoting innovation and creative work), not natural rights that are an end in themselves. In this sense altering them does not raise questions of rights as would restricting the freedom of speech or assembly. Those who like to point to the constitutional origin of these forms of property should note where patents and copyrights appear in the constitution. They are listed as a power of Congress along with other powers, like the power to tax. They do not appear in the Bill of Rights where rights of individuals are explicitly described. The constitution authorizes Congress to create monopolies for limited periods of time "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." In this sense, patents and copyrights are explicitly linked to a public purpose. If it were determined that patents and copyrights are not the most efficient means for promoting innovation and creative work, and therefore Congress decided to stop authorizing these monopolies, individuals would have no more constitutional basis for complaint than if Congress decided that it didn't need to raise taxes. Once we recognize that patents and copyrights are policies to promote innovation and creative work then the question is whether they are best policy and if so, are they best structured now for this purpose. Neither assumption is obvious and I would argue that the latter is almost certainly not true. In terms of whether these are the best policies, in my earlier post I was simply pointing out that alternative mechanisms already exist and support a great deal of work. I actually didn't advocate any specific policy, but I have written on alternatives to both. Here's a discussion of alternatives to patent supported drug research and here is a proposal modeled after the tax deduction for charitable contributions for supporting creative work. (By the way, the folks who were arguing for the merits of markets over central planning are in the wrong place. You were looking for Joe Stalin's blog, there is no proposal for central planning in my work.) 
Since my comments on Greg Mankiw's defense of the one percent prompted so much response, I thought I should add some clarification on the treatment of patents and copyrights. First off, my main point is that these are government policies designed to meet a public purpose (i.e. promoting innovation and creative work), not natural rights that are an end in themselves. In this sense altering them does not raise questions of rights as would restricting the freedom of speech or assembly. Those who like to point to the constitutional origin of these forms of property should note where patents and copyrights appear in the constitution. They are listed as a power of Congress along with other powers, like the power to tax. They do not appear in the Bill of Rights where rights of individuals are explicitly described. The constitution authorizes Congress to create monopolies for limited periods of time "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." In this sense, patents and copyrights are explicitly linked to a public purpose. If it were determined that patents and copyrights are not the most efficient means for promoting innovation and creative work, and therefore Congress decided to stop authorizing these monopolies, individuals would have no more constitutional basis for complaint than if Congress decided that it didn't need to raise taxes. Once we recognize that patents and copyrights are policies to promote innovation and creative work then the question is whether they are best policy and if so, are they best structured now for this purpose. Neither assumption is obvious and I would argue that the latter is almost certainly not true. In terms of whether these are the best policies, in my earlier post I was simply pointing out that alternative mechanisms already exist and support a great deal of work. I actually didn't advocate any specific policy, but I have written on alternatives to both. Here's a discussion of alternatives to patent supported drug research and here is a proposal modeled after the tax deduction for charitable contributions for supporting creative work. (By the way, the folks who were arguing for the merits of markets over central planning are in the wrong place. You were looking for Joe Stalin's blog, there is no proposal for central planning in my work.) 
Last week we had to teach Robert Samuelson about inflation. He noted that the wealth of households was back to its pre-recession level, but spending was not. This led him to think that the wealth effect no longer applied. However, when we adjusted the data for inflation and then brought in Mr. Arithmetic it turned out that people were spending more than would be predicted by the wealth effect, not less. This week it looks like we have to teach Mr. Samuelson about supply and demand. His column is a warning that "cheap money" (e.g. the quantitative easing and low interest rate policy pursued by the Fed) may do more harm than good. This comes in the context of the drop in world stock markets following Ben Bernanke's indication of a pullback from these policies. Never mind that the drop in world stock markets is exactly what would be predicted if cheap money actually was helping the economy (in that case, the pullback would be expected to lead to lower growth and likely lower profits, therefore we would expect to see lower stock prices), let's deal with the rest of his story. The basic problem in the column is an inability to distinguish clearly between supply and demand. This first comes up when he complains that in spite of cheap money: "the speed of the U.S. recovery (about 2 percent annually) is roughly half the average of all recoveries from 1960 to 2007. As for the global economy, it grew 2.5 percent in 2012, down from the 3.7 percent average from 2003 to 2007, says IHS Global Insight." This one is easily explained by lack of demand. Housing bubbles in the United States and elsewhere had been driving the economy prior to the downturn. Those bubbles have mostly burst, although Canada, Australia, and the UK have seen bubbles reemerge. The fact that the downturn was caused by a collapsed bubble instead of the Fed raising interest rates meant that the recovery would be much slower and more difficult than in prior recessions. There was no easy way to replace the consumption and construction demand created by these bubbles. Some of us were yelling this at the top of our lungs back at the start of the recession, but apparently Samuelson didn't hear us and is therefore surprised by the weakness of the recovery.
Last week we had to teach Robert Samuelson about inflation. He noted that the wealth of households was back to its pre-recession level, but spending was not. This led him to think that the wealth effect no longer applied. However, when we adjusted the data for inflation and then brought in Mr. Arithmetic it turned out that people were spending more than would be predicted by the wealth effect, not less. This week it looks like we have to teach Mr. Samuelson about supply and demand. His column is a warning that "cheap money" (e.g. the quantitative easing and low interest rate policy pursued by the Fed) may do more harm than good. This comes in the context of the drop in world stock markets following Ben Bernanke's indication of a pullback from these policies. Never mind that the drop in world stock markets is exactly what would be predicted if cheap money actually was helping the economy (in that case, the pullback would be expected to lead to lower growth and likely lower profits, therefore we would expect to see lower stock prices), let's deal with the rest of his story. The basic problem in the column is an inability to distinguish clearly between supply and demand. This first comes up when he complains that in spite of cheap money: "the speed of the U.S. recovery (about 2 percent annually) is roughly half the average of all recoveries from 1960 to 2007. As for the global economy, it grew 2.5 percent in 2012, down from the 3.7 percent average from 2003 to 2007, says IHS Global Insight." This one is easily explained by lack of demand. Housing bubbles in the United States and elsewhere had been driving the economy prior to the downturn. Those bubbles have mostly burst, although Canada, Australia, and the UK have seen bubbles reemerge. The fact that the downturn was caused by a collapsed bubble instead of the Fed raising interest rates meant that the recovery would be much slower and more difficult than in prior recessions. There was no easy way to replace the consumption and construction demand created by these bubbles. Some of us were yelling this at the top of our lungs back at the start of the recession, but apparently Samuelson didn't hear us and is therefore surprised by the weakness of the recovery.
Tyler Cowen has an interesting piece on the problems facing developing countries going forward. As he notes, these will be different in the future than they were in the past. However the piece is strange due to one of the items it mentions, the aging of the population, and one it leaves out, intellectual property claims. (Btw, Cowen references a column by Dani Rodrick as raising the issue of new problems confronting developing countries. Rodrick does not mention aging in his list of concerns.) On the former point, Cowen seems determined to apply the Peter Peterson financed obsession with cutting Social Security and Medicare to the whole world. He gives us the bad news: "It is less well known that fertility rates in much of the Middle East and North Africa are also falling rapidly. In Iran, for example, it is now estimated at 1.86 per woman, which over time would mean that families are not replenishing themselves. And shrinking and older populations, of course, limit future economic growth." Wow, back when I learned economics we cared about per capita income, not growth per se. Most people would think that Denmark is better off than Bangladesh, even though Bangladesh has a far higher GDP. Fewer people means fewer demands on resources of all types and less greenhouse gas emissions. I suppose Cowen is worried that the beaches will be less crowded and there will be smaller traffic jams. That prospect is not likely to be a major concern for most people in the developing world. Cowen also gives us the bad news about China: "Finally, many lower-income countries will be old before they are rich. China’s population, for example, is aging rapidly, given the government’s one-child policy and the decline in birthrates that accompanies rising income." Let's think about this one for a moment. China has seen unprecedented growth in per capita income over the last three decades. Per capita GDP has risen by a factor of 13. This swamps the growth in almost every other developing country. While aging can impose some burden on the working population, it will not prevent both workers and retirees from enjoying much higher living standards than they did in the recent past.
Tyler Cowen has an interesting piece on the problems facing developing countries going forward. As he notes, these will be different in the future than they were in the past. However the piece is strange due to one of the items it mentions, the aging of the population, and one it leaves out, intellectual property claims. (Btw, Cowen references a column by Dani Rodrick as raising the issue of new problems confronting developing countries. Rodrick does not mention aging in his list of concerns.) On the former point, Cowen seems determined to apply the Peter Peterson financed obsession with cutting Social Security and Medicare to the whole world. He gives us the bad news: "It is less well known that fertility rates in much of the Middle East and North Africa are also falling rapidly. In Iran, for example, it is now estimated at 1.86 per woman, which over time would mean that families are not replenishing themselves. And shrinking and older populations, of course, limit future economic growth." Wow, back when I learned economics we cared about per capita income, not growth per se. Most people would think that Denmark is better off than Bangladesh, even though Bangladesh has a far higher GDP. Fewer people means fewer demands on resources of all types and less greenhouse gas emissions. I suppose Cowen is worried that the beaches will be less crowded and there will be smaller traffic jams. That prospect is not likely to be a major concern for most people in the developing world. Cowen also gives us the bad news about China: "Finally, many lower-income countries will be old before they are rich. China’s population, for example, is aging rapidly, given the government’s one-child policy and the decline in birthrates that accompanies rising income." Let's think about this one for a moment. China has seen unprecedented growth in per capita income over the last three decades. Per capita GDP has risen by a factor of 13. This swamps the growth in almost every other developing country. While aging can impose some burden on the working population, it will not prevent both workers and retirees from enjoying much higher living standards than they did in the recent past.

Ireland has been repeatedly touted as a success story by advocates of austerity. However as Floyd Norris points out in a nice piece today, the widely touted turnaround is mostly a quirk in the data.

For tax purposes, several large UK companies have moved their headquarters from the UK to Ireland. This changes nothing in terms of Ireland’s actual GNP, in the sense of money flowing to people living in Ireland, but it does lead to an increase in reported GNP. The profits of these UK companies now show up in Ireland’s GNP rather than in the UK. When an adjustment is made for this switch Ireland’s GNP growth looks considerably weaker the last four years. Instead of turning positive in 2010 its current account just turned positive last year, and even then just by a small amount.

It seems like the austerity advocates will have to look elsewhere for their success story.

Ireland has been repeatedly touted as a success story by advocates of austerity. However as Floyd Norris points out in a nice piece today, the widely touted turnaround is mostly a quirk in the data.

For tax purposes, several large UK companies have moved their headquarters from the UK to Ireland. This changes nothing in terms of Ireland’s actual GNP, in the sense of money flowing to people living in Ireland, but it does lead to an increase in reported GNP. The profits of these UK companies now show up in Ireland’s GNP rather than in the UK. When an adjustment is made for this switch Ireland’s GNP growth looks considerably weaker the last four years. Instead of turning positive in 2010 its current account just turned positive last year, and even then just by a small amount.

It seems like the austerity advocates will have to look elsewhere for their success story.

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