Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

That’s the question we ask this week in honor of the commemoration of the George W. Bush Library. According to Politico the answer appears to be “yes.”

Politico tells us that the Democrats in Congress who argue that there is no urgency to deal with the debt and that instead the focus of policy should be boosting the economy and getting the unemployment rate down are now increasingly occupying the center stage in the Democratic Party:

“These Democrats and their intellectual allies once occupied the political fringes, pushed aside by more moderate members who supported both immediate spending cuts and long-term entitlement reforms along with higher taxes.

But aided by a pile of recent data suggesting the deficit is already shrinking significantly and current spending cuts are slowing the economy, more Democrats such as Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine and Maryland Rep. Chris Van Hollen are coming around to the point of view that fiscal austerity, in all its forms, is more the problem than the solution.”

The article then goes on to note the famous Reinhart & Rogoff spreadsheet error that was exposed by researchers at the University of Massachusetts, which destroyed the paper that provided the intellectual foundation for the debt crisis story. It’s still too early to reach any definitive judgment, but this can be one of those rare instances where new evidence actually changes policy. If so, it will be a big deal.
 

That’s the question we ask this week in honor of the commemoration of the George W. Bush Library. According to Politico the answer appears to be “yes.”

Politico tells us that the Democrats in Congress who argue that there is no urgency to deal with the debt and that instead the focus of policy should be boosting the economy and getting the unemployment rate down are now increasingly occupying the center stage in the Democratic Party:

“These Democrats and their intellectual allies once occupied the political fringes, pushed aside by more moderate members who supported both immediate spending cuts and long-term entitlement reforms along with higher taxes.

But aided by a pile of recent data suggesting the deficit is already shrinking significantly and current spending cuts are slowing the economy, more Democrats such as Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine and Maryland Rep. Chris Van Hollen are coming around to the point of view that fiscal austerity, in all its forms, is more the problem than the solution.”

The article then goes on to note the famous Reinhart & Rogoff spreadsheet error that was exposed by researchers at the University of Massachusetts, which destroyed the paper that provided the intellectual foundation for the debt crisis story. It’s still too early to reach any definitive judgment, but this can be one of those rare instances where new evidence actually changes policy. If so, it will be a big deal.
 

Interest Burdens and Debt

Since the NYT is doing Reinhart and Rogoff 24-7, I suppose BTP should follow suit. One point that some of us keep making that continually disappears into the ether (as opposed to eliciting a response from our Harvard duo or their accomplices) is that rather than being high, the interest burden of the debt is near post-war lows. It is currently less than 1.5 percent of GDP. In fact, it is less than 1.0 percent of GDP if we subtract the $80 billion that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the assets it is holding. This means that rather than being an extraordinary burden right now, the debt is actually a very low burden. Insofar as this point draws a response, it is generally that interest rates will rise in the future as the economy recovers. That may well be true, but we will have contracted large amounts of debt at very low interest rates. This means that even in a story where the Fed does raise interest rates as the economy recovers, the interest burden will just be rising back to levels we have seen before. In fact, in the Congressional Budget Office's projections we will not get back to the early 1990s interest burden of more than 3.0 percent of GDP until 2021. It is also worth remembering that this interest burden did not prevent the United States from having strong growth through the decade of the 1990s. Again, the interest burden can be lowered by more than half of a percentage point of GDP if the Fed continues to hold assets, refunding the interest to the Treasury. This would require an alternative mechanism for restricting the money supply, specifically raising reserve requirements. While there are reasons for not wanting to go this route, given the large potential savings to the government (@ $80-$100 billion a year), it is an option for budget savings that Congress certainly should be considering.
Since the NYT is doing Reinhart and Rogoff 24-7, I suppose BTP should follow suit. One point that some of us keep making that continually disappears into the ether (as opposed to eliciting a response from our Harvard duo or their accomplices) is that rather than being high, the interest burden of the debt is near post-war lows. It is currently less than 1.5 percent of GDP. In fact, it is less than 1.0 percent of GDP if we subtract the $80 billion that the Fed refunds to the Treasury from the assets it is holding. This means that rather than being an extraordinary burden right now, the debt is actually a very low burden. Insofar as this point draws a response, it is generally that interest rates will rise in the future as the economy recovers. That may well be true, but we will have contracted large amounts of debt at very low interest rates. This means that even in a story where the Fed does raise interest rates as the economy recovers, the interest burden will just be rising back to levels we have seen before. In fact, in the Congressional Budget Office's projections we will not get back to the early 1990s interest burden of more than 3.0 percent of GDP until 2021. It is also worth remembering that this interest burden did not prevent the United States from having strong growth through the decade of the 1990s. Again, the interest burden can be lowered by more than half of a percentage point of GDP if the Fed continues to hold assets, refunding the interest to the Treasury. This would require an alternative mechanism for restricting the money supply, specifically raising reserve requirements. While there are reasons for not wanting to go this route, given the large potential savings to the government (@ $80-$100 billion a year), it is an option for budget savings that Congress certainly should be considering.

When the government grants drug companies patent monopolies that allow them to sell drugs at hundreds or even thousands of times the free market price it gives them an enormous incentive to do things like pay off doctors to prescribe drugs. Everyone who has ever taken an intro economics class understands that fact.

Unfortunately our leading economists do not seem aware of how protectionism in the prescription drug industry leads to corruption that can both raise costs and jeopardize the public’s health. That’s probably because they are too busy finding reasons why we can’t take steps to bring the economy back to full employment.

When the government grants drug companies patent monopolies that allow them to sell drugs at hundreds or even thousands of times the free market price it gives them an enormous incentive to do things like pay off doctors to prescribe drugs. Everyone who has ever taken an intro economics class understands that fact.

Unfortunately our leading economists do not seem aware of how protectionism in the prescription drug industry leads to corruption that can both raise costs and jeopardize the public’s health. That’s probably because they are too busy finding reasons why we can’t take steps to bring the economy back to full employment.

Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, used their second NYT column in a week, to complain about how they are being treated. Their complaint deserves tears from crocodiles everywhere. They try to present themselves as ivory tower economists who cannot possibly be blamed for the ways in which their work has been used to justify public policy, specifically as a rationale to cut government programs and raise taxes, measures that lead to unemployment in a downturn. This portrayal is disingenuous in the extreme. Reinhart and Rogoff surely are aware of how their work has been used. They have also encouraged this use in public writings and talks. While it is unfortunate that they have "received hate-filled, even threatening, e-mail messages," as one who works in the lower-paid corners of policy debates, let me say, welcome to the club. This column is careful to halfway walk back the main claim of their famous paper, telling us: "Our view has always been that causality [between high debt levels and slow growth] runs in both directions, and that there is no rule that applies across all times and places." It is good to hear the reference to causation from slow growth to high debt and that "no rule applies across all times and places." However it is worth noting that Reinhart and Rogoff never felt the need to use their access to the NYT's opinion pages to correct all the politicians who used their paper to argue the exact opposite: that their paper implied that countries with high debt levels could anticipate long periods of slow growth.
Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, used their second NYT column in a week, to complain about how they are being treated. Their complaint deserves tears from crocodiles everywhere. They try to present themselves as ivory tower economists who cannot possibly be blamed for the ways in which their work has been used to justify public policy, specifically as a rationale to cut government programs and raise taxes, measures that lead to unemployment in a downturn. This portrayal is disingenuous in the extreme. Reinhart and Rogoff surely are aware of how their work has been used. They have also encouraged this use in public writings and talks. While it is unfortunate that they have "received hate-filled, even threatening, e-mail messages," as one who works in the lower-paid corners of policy debates, let me say, welcome to the club. This column is careful to halfway walk back the main claim of their famous paper, telling us: "Our view has always been that causality [between high debt levels and slow growth] runs in both directions, and that there is no rule that applies across all times and places." It is good to hear the reference to causation from slow growth to high debt and that "no rule applies across all times and places." However it is worth noting that Reinhart and Rogoff never felt the need to use their access to the NYT's opinion pages to correct all the politicians who used their paper to argue the exact opposite: that their paper implied that countries with high debt levels could anticipate long periods of slow growth.

David Ignatius used his Washington Post column yesterday to give a glowing tribute to Mervyn King, the outgoing governor of the Bank Of England. The whole piece is a paean to King’s wisdom that concludes by telling readers that King is:

“the only person I’ve ever seen who could intellectually intimidate former Treasury secretary Larry Summers. King couldn’t fix the British economy, but he did understand it.”

While silencing Larry Summers is certainly commendable, the claim that King understands the economy is highly questionable. It was not just his job to fix the British economy, it was his job to prevent it from breaking in the first place.

King was running the Bank of England as the housing bubble grew to ever more dangerous levels. It should have been clear to King that this asset bubble would burst at some point and that it would have severe consequences for the UK economy. However he took no measures to rein it in, apparently oblivious to the dangers. As a result, the UK is now experiencing a downturn that is more severe than the Great Depression. That fact probably deserves some mention in a balanced assessment of King’s record.

 [Typos corrected from an earlier version.]

David Ignatius used his Washington Post column yesterday to give a glowing tribute to Mervyn King, the outgoing governor of the Bank Of England. The whole piece is a paean to King’s wisdom that concludes by telling readers that King is:

“the only person I’ve ever seen who could intellectually intimidate former Treasury secretary Larry Summers. King couldn’t fix the British economy, but he did understand it.”

While silencing Larry Summers is certainly commendable, the claim that King understands the economy is highly questionable. It was not just his job to fix the British economy, it was his job to prevent it from breaking in the first place.

King was running the Bank of England as the housing bubble grew to ever more dangerous levels. It should have been clear to King that this asset bubble would burst at some point and that it would have severe consequences for the UK economy. However he took no measures to rein it in, apparently oblivious to the dangers. As a result, the UK is now experiencing a downturn that is more severe than the Great Depression. That fact probably deserves some mention in a balanced assessment of King’s record.

 [Typos corrected from an earlier version.]

There are often shades of grey in interpreting people's views, but the NYT seems to be giving us assessments of Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Janet Yellen's views that are 180 degrees apart. An article today on Dr. Yellen's prospects of being chosen to replace Ben Bernanke as chair tells readers: "In July 1996, the Federal Reserve broke the metronomic routine of its closed-door policy-making meetings to hold an unusual debate. The Fed’s powerful chairman, Alan Greenspan, saw a chance for the first time in decades to drive annual inflation all the way down to zero, achieving the price stability he had long regarded as the central bank’s primary mission. "But Janet L. Yellen, then a relatively new and little-known Fed governor, talked Mr. Greenspan to a standstill that day, arguing that a little inflation was a good thing." Okay, this is pretty clear, Yellen is on the side of promoting growth at the risk of somewhat higher inflation. This seems hard to reconcile with a piece the NYT wrote three years ago:
There are often shades of grey in interpreting people's views, but the NYT seems to be giving us assessments of Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Janet Yellen's views that are 180 degrees apart. An article today on Dr. Yellen's prospects of being chosen to replace Ben Bernanke as chair tells readers: "In July 1996, the Federal Reserve broke the metronomic routine of its closed-door policy-making meetings to hold an unusual debate. The Fed’s powerful chairman, Alan Greenspan, saw a chance for the first time in decades to drive annual inflation all the way down to zero, achieving the price stability he had long regarded as the central bank’s primary mission. "But Janet L. Yellen, then a relatively new and little-known Fed governor, talked Mr. Greenspan to a standstill that day, arguing that a little inflation was a good thing." Okay, this is pretty clear, Yellen is on the side of promoting growth at the risk of somewhat higher inflation. This seems hard to reconcile with a piece the NYT wrote three years ago:
I have a policy of not discussing items that directly refer to me in this blog, but I will make an exception today because the issues raised by Robert Samuelson are important. In his column Samuelson makes two key arguments. First, that the Reinhart-Rogoff conclusions about high debt leading to slow growth still stand even after the errors in the original paper were corrected, and second, that this work was never really the basis for austerity anyhow. Taking these in order, Samuelson constructs a chart showing the originally reported and corrected relationships between debt levels and GDP growth. Debt/GDP Annual economic growth, 1945-2009 ? Reinhart/Rogoff UMass economists 0-30% 4.1% 4.2% 30-60 2.8 3.1 60-90 2.8 3.2 90+ -0.1 2.2 He then tells readers: "After recalculating the Reinhart/Rogoff data, the UMass economists confirm that high debt implies lower economic growth." No, that is not right. The recalculated numbers show that high debt levels in the countries examined by Reinhart and Rogoff were associated with lower growth. However as the paper by Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin that exposed the error clearly explained, the growth falloff for countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent was not statistically significant. In fact, they found a much stronger negative relationship between debt and GDP growth at very low ratios of debt-to-GDP. This means that if someone was basing policy on the corrected Reinhart-Rogoff numbers they would be arguing for debt-to-GDP levels in the range of 15-20 percent. That is not what Reinhart and Rogoff or anyone what else in this debate is saying. 
I have a policy of not discussing items that directly refer to me in this blog, but I will make an exception today because the issues raised by Robert Samuelson are important. In his column Samuelson makes two key arguments. First, that the Reinhart-Rogoff conclusions about high debt leading to slow growth still stand even after the errors in the original paper were corrected, and second, that this work was never really the basis for austerity anyhow. Taking these in order, Samuelson constructs a chart showing the originally reported and corrected relationships between debt levels and GDP growth. Debt/GDP Annual economic growth, 1945-2009 ? Reinhart/Rogoff UMass economists 0-30% 4.1% 4.2% 30-60 2.8 3.1 60-90 2.8 3.2 90+ -0.1 2.2 He then tells readers: "After recalculating the Reinhart/Rogoff data, the UMass economists confirm that high debt implies lower economic growth." No, that is not right. The recalculated numbers show that high debt levels in the countries examined by Reinhart and Rogoff were associated with lower growth. However as the paper by Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin that exposed the error clearly explained, the growth falloff for countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent was not statistically significant. In fact, they found a much stronger negative relationship between debt and GDP growth at very low ratios of debt-to-GDP. This means that if someone was basing policy on the corrected Reinhart-Rogoff numbers they would be arguing for debt-to-GDP levels in the range of 15-20 percent. That is not what Reinhart and Rogoff or anyone what else in this debate is saying. 

I have had plenty of occasions to criticize the editorial views of both the NYT and the Washington Post, but there are major differences between these two pillars of the national media. It would be hard to find a better statement of these differences than the Times and Post‘s view of the impact of the sequester on air travel.

One could also add that the sequester is throwing around 600,000 people out of work according to the Congressional Budget Office. These are people who have the necessary skills to fill jobs in the economy but who will not be working because people in Washington lack the skills to design policies to keep the economy near full employment.

I have had plenty of occasions to criticize the editorial views of both the NYT and the Washington Post, but there are major differences between these two pillars of the national media. It would be hard to find a better statement of these differences than the Times and Post‘s view of the impact of the sequester on air travel.

One could also add that the sequester is throwing around 600,000 people out of work according to the Congressional Budget Office. These are people who have the necessary skills to fill jobs in the economy but who will not be working because people in Washington lack the skills to design policies to keep the economy near full employment.

One of the big issues left to be resolved in the debate over housing finance is the size of the down payment that homebuyers must put down in order for a mortgage to be considered a “qualified” mortgage. If a mortgage fits this definition, securitizers would not be required to hold capital against the mortgage.

NYT’s Dealbook had a post discussing the topic which highlighted research by Roberto G. Quercia, director of the Center for Community Capital at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which purports to show that there is not much additional risk of default with lower down payments. In fact, the numbers presented in the piece imply that Quercia’s research implies that low down payment loans have far higher risks of default. This means that lenders would either have to charge considerably higher interest rates or be subsidized for making these loans.

The NYT piece reports that Quercia found that the default rate during the years of the housing crash on a set of loans that met certain quality standards was 5.8 percent. However the default rate on loans with down payments of 20 percent or more was just 3.9 percent.

The piece reports that this higher down payment group comprised less than half of the loans in the study. If we assume that the 20 percent down payment group comprised 40 percent of the loans then this means that the default rate for home buyers putting less than 20 percent down was over 7.0 percent, more than 80 percent higher than for the 20 percent down payment group.

Furthermore, the losses for the less than 20 percent down payment group would be considerably higher on each default since there is less of a down payment cushion. If the loss for a default on a 20 percent down payment averages 25 percent, and we assume that the average down payment for the less than 20 percent group is 10 percent, then the losses for this group would average 39 percent of the amount loaned. (A 20 percent down payment is 25 percent of mortgage loan. A 10 percent down payment is just 11 percent of the amount loaned.)

Multiplying the increased probability of default (1.8) by the higher loss per default (1.6), the cost of default for the less than 20 percent down payment mortgages would be over 180 percent higher for the more than 20 percent down payment group, according to Quercia’s research. That would not seem to be a good argument to apply the same lending standards for this low down payment group.

It is also worth noting that Quercia’s assessment, as presented in the NYT post, that the 20 percent down payment would have excluded more than half of the borrowers does not follow from the evidence presented. If homebuyers knew that they had to put down 20 percent to get a lower cost mortgage, then they would be more likely to have a 20 percent down payment than in a context where this was not a requirement, as was true for the period examined by Quercia.  

One of the big issues left to be resolved in the debate over housing finance is the size of the down payment that homebuyers must put down in order for a mortgage to be considered a “qualified” mortgage. If a mortgage fits this definition, securitizers would not be required to hold capital against the mortgage.

NYT’s Dealbook had a post discussing the topic which highlighted research by Roberto G. Quercia, director of the Center for Community Capital at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which purports to show that there is not much additional risk of default with lower down payments. In fact, the numbers presented in the piece imply that Quercia’s research implies that low down payment loans have far higher risks of default. This means that lenders would either have to charge considerably higher interest rates or be subsidized for making these loans.

The NYT piece reports that Quercia found that the default rate during the years of the housing crash on a set of loans that met certain quality standards was 5.8 percent. However the default rate on loans with down payments of 20 percent or more was just 3.9 percent.

The piece reports that this higher down payment group comprised less than half of the loans in the study. If we assume that the 20 percent down payment group comprised 40 percent of the loans then this means that the default rate for home buyers putting less than 20 percent down was over 7.0 percent, more than 80 percent higher than for the 20 percent down payment group.

Furthermore, the losses for the less than 20 percent down payment group would be considerably higher on each default since there is less of a down payment cushion. If the loss for a default on a 20 percent down payment averages 25 percent, and we assume that the average down payment for the less than 20 percent group is 10 percent, then the losses for this group would average 39 percent of the amount loaned. (A 20 percent down payment is 25 percent of mortgage loan. A 10 percent down payment is just 11 percent of the amount loaned.)

Multiplying the increased probability of default (1.8) by the higher loss per default (1.6), the cost of default for the less than 20 percent down payment mortgages would be over 180 percent higher for the more than 20 percent down payment group, according to Quercia’s research. That would not seem to be a good argument to apply the same lending standards for this low down payment group.

It is also worth noting that Quercia’s assessment, as presented in the NYT post, that the 20 percent down payment would have excluded more than half of the borrowers does not follow from the evidence presented. If homebuyers knew that they had to put down 20 percent to get a lower cost mortgage, then they would be more likely to have a 20 percent down payment than in a context where this was not a requirement, as was true for the period examined by Quercia.  

The United States emits more than twice as much greenhouse gas per person as the average for West Europe. If countries like Germany, France, and Spain emitted as much per person as the United States, there would be no point worrying about greenhouse gas emissions because the planet would be fried. The world’s emissions levels over the last three decades would be so much larger that there would be no hope of reducing emissions enough to prevent catastrophic levels of global warming.

This fact (i.e. undeniably true statement) makes the Washington Post’s lecture to Europeans about the United States being “the world leader in fighting climate change” laughable. Apparently the Washington Post thinks the United States should get big points for improvement and somehow that Europe should emulate us even if we still are emitting far more greenhouse gas per person than Europe.

No one ever accused the Washington Post of having much grasp of logic and arithmetic. After all, they are doubling down in their support of austerity even after the Reinhart & Rogoff errors had been exposed. But this one seems to be below even the Post’s incredibly low standard. Come on, we know that the Post hates Europe because they don’t give all of their money to the rich, and ordinary workers can expect to get health care and a decent retirement, but this one is really off the deep end.

The United States emits more than twice as much greenhouse gas per person as the average for West Europe. If countries like Germany, France, and Spain emitted as much per person as the United States, there would be no point worrying about greenhouse gas emissions because the planet would be fried. The world’s emissions levels over the last three decades would be so much larger that there would be no hope of reducing emissions enough to prevent catastrophic levels of global warming.

This fact (i.e. undeniably true statement) makes the Washington Post’s lecture to Europeans about the United States being “the world leader in fighting climate change” laughable. Apparently the Washington Post thinks the United States should get big points for improvement and somehow that Europe should emulate us even if we still are emitting far more greenhouse gas per person than Europe.

No one ever accused the Washington Post of having much grasp of logic and arithmetic. After all, they are doubling down in their support of austerity even after the Reinhart & Rogoff errors had been exposed. But this one seems to be below even the Post’s incredibly low standard. Come on, we know that the Post hates Europe because they don’t give all of their money to the rich, and ordinary workers can expect to get health care and a decent retirement, but this one is really off the deep end.

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