Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) will adopt a new methodology for measuring GDP this summer. The methodology will treat research and development and the creation of artistic works as forms of capital that depreciate through time rather than one-time expenditures. This will lead to an increase in measured GDP of close to 3.0 percent according to BEA's analysis. There are three points worth making on this change. First, for you conspiracy buffs, this one has been in the works for close to two decades. The government didn't just come up with it to make President Obama look better. Go back to digging up the Real Story about the plunge in gold prices. The second point is that the methodology for this will inevitably be very troubling. If Pfizer has a patent for a great new cancer drug we will now pick this up as an increase in the investment component of GDP. Suppose Merck develops a drug that does the exact same thing, except that it gets around Pfizer's patent. According to the new methodology this would further increase GDP. Of course, this is a battle over rents, not actually an increase in total output. That is a problem. Expenditures for rent-seeking don't make us richer in aggregate. In fact, this is already a problem now, it's just likely to be more of a problem in the future. Consider the situation where a software developer makes their great new software available for free. Our friends over at BEA won't show any gain to GDP even though our living standards will certainly be improved by much more than if they had patented the software and charged for it.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) will adopt a new methodology for measuring GDP this summer. The methodology will treat research and development and the creation of artistic works as forms of capital that depreciate through time rather than one-time expenditures. This will lead to an increase in measured GDP of close to 3.0 percent according to BEA's analysis. There are three points worth making on this change. First, for you conspiracy buffs, this one has been in the works for close to two decades. The government didn't just come up with it to make President Obama look better. Go back to digging up the Real Story about the plunge in gold prices. The second point is that the methodology for this will inevitably be very troubling. If Pfizer has a patent for a great new cancer drug we will now pick this up as an increase in the investment component of GDP. Suppose Merck develops a drug that does the exact same thing, except that it gets around Pfizer's patent. According to the new methodology this would further increase GDP. Of course, this is a battle over rents, not actually an increase in total output. That is a problem. Expenditures for rent-seeking don't make us richer in aggregate. In fact, this is already a problem now, it's just likely to be more of a problem in the future. Consider the situation where a software developer makes their great new software available for free. Our friends over at BEA won't show any gain to GDP even though our living standards will certainly be improved by much more than if they had patented the software and charged for it.
That is quite literally what he told us in his column. His second paragraph tells readers: "Among economists, there is no consensus on policies. Is “austerity” (government spending cuts and tax increases) self-defeating or the unavoidable response to high budget deficits and debt? Can central banks such as the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank engineer recovery by holding short-term interest rates near zero and by buying massive amounts of bonds (so-called “quantitative easing”)? Or will these policies foster financial speculation, instability and inflation? The public is confused, because economists are divided." See, we don't know what to do, so we just can't do anything. All those suckers who are unemployed or seeing stagnant wages, well we just don't know. And the fact that those on the top are getting rich with 60-year high shares of national income, well what can we do about that? It's just too confusing. While Samuelson may be very confused by economics, those who understood their intro econ have little difficulty explaining the current situation. The housing bubble was driving the economy prior to its collapse. The collapse eliminated more than $600 billion in demand from residential construction and more than $500 billion in demand from consumption. There was also demand lost from a collapse of a smaller bubble in non-residential construction and from state and local government cutbacks forced by a loss of tax revenue. This is not complicated and it was predicted.
That is quite literally what he told us in his column. His second paragraph tells readers: "Among economists, there is no consensus on policies. Is “austerity” (government spending cuts and tax increases) self-defeating or the unavoidable response to high budget deficits and debt? Can central banks such as the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank engineer recovery by holding short-term interest rates near zero and by buying massive amounts of bonds (so-called “quantitative easing”)? Or will these policies foster financial speculation, instability and inflation? The public is confused, because economists are divided." See, we don't know what to do, so we just can't do anything. All those suckers who are unemployed or seeing stagnant wages, well we just don't know. And the fact that those on the top are getting rich with 60-year high shares of national income, well what can we do about that? It's just too confusing. While Samuelson may be very confused by economics, those who understood their intro econ have little difficulty explaining the current situation. The housing bubble was driving the economy prior to its collapse. The collapse eliminated more than $600 billion in demand from residential construction and more than $500 billion in demand from consumption. There was also demand lost from a collapse of a smaller bubble in non-residential construction and from state and local government cutbacks forced by a loss of tax revenue. This is not complicated and it was predicted.

The NYT told readers about efforts to require city governments to disclose their pension liabilities in order to be able to continue to issue tax-exempt bonds. While better disclosure of pension liabilities may be desirable, there are important methodological issues that the piece neglects to mention.

The piece notes that Moody’s, the bond-rating agency, is now adjusting pension liabilities reported by city governments in making assessments of their financial situation. The methodology used by Moody’s to make its adjustment ignores the expected return from market assets. Moody’s methodology would have implied that pension funds were hugely over-funded at the peak of the stock bubble in 2000, even though any reasonable assessment of pension liabilities would have predicted very low returns on assets at that point.

If municipalities were to adjust pension contributions to sustain funding targets using the Moody’s methodology it would lead to highly erratic funding patterns. In most cases, governments would have to make large contributions for a number of years and then would have to contribute little or nothing as market returns exceeded the return assumptions used by Moody’s. This would be comparable to having city governments accumulate large bank deposits so that they could pay for their schools or fire departments from the annual interest.

Usually public finance economists advocate funding mechanisms that imply an even flow through time so that no particular cohort of taxpayers is excessively benefited or penalized. The Moody’s methodology, which is also being pushed as part of the bill being debated in Congress, goes in the opposite direction. This fact should have been noted in the piece.

The NYT told readers about efforts to require city governments to disclose their pension liabilities in order to be able to continue to issue tax-exempt bonds. While better disclosure of pension liabilities may be desirable, there are important methodological issues that the piece neglects to mention.

The piece notes that Moody’s, the bond-rating agency, is now adjusting pension liabilities reported by city governments in making assessments of their financial situation. The methodology used by Moody’s to make its adjustment ignores the expected return from market assets. Moody’s methodology would have implied that pension funds were hugely over-funded at the peak of the stock bubble in 2000, even though any reasonable assessment of pension liabilities would have predicted very low returns on assets at that point.

If municipalities were to adjust pension contributions to sustain funding targets using the Moody’s methodology it would lead to highly erratic funding patterns. In most cases, governments would have to make large contributions for a number of years and then would have to contribute little or nothing as market returns exceeded the return assumptions used by Moody’s. This would be comparable to having city governments accumulate large bank deposits so that they could pay for their schools or fire departments from the annual interest.

Usually public finance economists advocate funding mechanisms that imply an even flow through time so that no particular cohort of taxpayers is excessively benefited or penalized. The Moody’s methodology, which is also being pushed as part of the bill being debated in Congress, goes in the opposite direction. This fact should have been noted in the piece.

Ilyana Kuziemko and Stefanie Stantcheva seem determined to win the contest for greatest out to lunch op-ed column of all time. They note the huge rise in inequality in wealth and income over the last three decades. They tell readers that the public is aware of this increase. However they say that the public doesn’t trust the government to do anything to address inequality:

“Whether or not the rise in inequality has itself lowered Americans’ faith in government, the low opinion in which Americans hold their government may well limit their willingness to connect concern with inequality to government action.”

Sorry folks, but the public is way ahead of our researchers here. The public recognizes that inequality did not just happen, as the our oped authors seem to believe. Inequality was the result of deliberate government policies. For example, we have high unemployment now because of government policies that are reducing demand in the economy. Manufacturing workers lost jobs and have lower wages because of trade policy designed to put them in competition with low-paid workers in the developing world while protecting our doctors and lawyers.

Maybe if social scientists who did surveys understood a bit more economics, they would ask better questions.

Ilyana Kuziemko and Stefanie Stantcheva seem determined to win the contest for greatest out to lunch op-ed column of all time. They note the huge rise in inequality in wealth and income over the last three decades. They tell readers that the public is aware of this increase. However they say that the public doesn’t trust the government to do anything to address inequality:

“Whether or not the rise in inequality has itself lowered Americans’ faith in government, the low opinion in which Americans hold their government may well limit their willingness to connect concern with inequality to government action.”

Sorry folks, but the public is way ahead of our researchers here. The public recognizes that inequality did not just happen, as the our oped authors seem to believe. Inequality was the result of deliberate government policies. For example, we have high unemployment now because of government policies that are reducing demand in the economy. Manufacturing workers lost jobs and have lower wages because of trade policy designed to put them in competition with low-paid workers in the developing world while protecting our doctors and lawyers.

Maybe if social scientists who did surveys understood a bit more economics, they would ask better questions.

The NYT has difficulty finding pundits who can write knowledgeably about economics. Thomas Friedman made this point in his Sunday column. At one point he quotes Gary Green, the president of Forsyth Technical Community College, in Winston-Salem, N.C.: "'We have a labor surplus in this country and a labor shortage at the same time,' Green explained to me. Workers in North Carolina, particularly in textiles and furniture, who lost jobs either to outsourcing or the recession in 2008, often 'do not have the skills required to get a new job today' in the biotech, health care and manufacturing centers that are opening in the state. "If before, he added, 'you just needed a high school shop class or a short postsecondary certificate to work in a factory, now you need an associate degree in machining,' a two-year program that requires higher math, I.T. and systems skills. In addition, some employers are now demanding that you not only have an associate degree but that nationally recognized skill certifications be incorporated into the curriculum to show that you have mastered the skills they want, like computer-integrated machining." Actually there are simple ways to identify labor shortages. First and foremost we should be seeing rapidly rising wages. If employers cannot get the workers they need then they raise the wages they offer to pull workers away from other employers. This is how markets work. (We should also see longer workweeks and increased vacancies.) In fact there is no major sector of the economy where wages are rising rapidly. This shows rather conclusively that workers do not have skill shortages although it may be the case that many managers are so ignorant of markets that they don't know that the way to attract better workers is to raise wages. Of course that would suggest the need to better train managers, not workers.
The NYT has difficulty finding pundits who can write knowledgeably about economics. Thomas Friedman made this point in his Sunday column. At one point he quotes Gary Green, the president of Forsyth Technical Community College, in Winston-Salem, N.C.: "'We have a labor surplus in this country and a labor shortage at the same time,' Green explained to me. Workers in North Carolina, particularly in textiles and furniture, who lost jobs either to outsourcing or the recession in 2008, often 'do not have the skills required to get a new job today' in the biotech, health care and manufacturing centers that are opening in the state. "If before, he added, 'you just needed a high school shop class or a short postsecondary certificate to work in a factory, now you need an associate degree in machining,' a two-year program that requires higher math, I.T. and systems skills. In addition, some employers are now demanding that you not only have an associate degree but that nationally recognized skill certifications be incorporated into the curriculum to show that you have mastered the skills they want, like computer-integrated machining." Actually there are simple ways to identify labor shortages. First and foremost we should be seeing rapidly rising wages. If employers cannot get the workers they need then they raise the wages they offer to pull workers away from other employers. This is how markets work. (We should also see longer workweeks and increased vacancies.) In fact there is no major sector of the economy where wages are rising rapidly. This shows rather conclusively that workers do not have skill shortages although it may be the case that many managers are so ignorant of markets that they don't know that the way to attract better workers is to raise wages. Of course that would suggest the need to better train managers, not workers.
The NYT appears to be following the pattern of journalism practiced by the Washington Post in openly editorializing in its news section. Today the news section features a diatribe against the Danish welfare state that is headlined, "Danes Rethink a Welfare State Ample to a Fault." There's not much ambiguity in that one. The piece then proceeds to present a state of statistics that are grossly misleading and excluding other data points that are highly relevant. The first paragraphs describe the generosity of the welfare state, then we get this ominous warning in the 5th paragraph: "But Denmark’s long-term outlook is troubling. The population is aging, and in many regions of the country people without jobs now outnumber those with them." Oooooh, scary! Yeah people are living longer in Denmark, that's something that's been happening for a couple of hundred years or so. Like every other wealthy country, people live longer in Denmark than in the United States. While they are projected to continue to see gains in life expectancy and further aging of the population, the increase is actually going to much slower than in the United States.
The NYT appears to be following the pattern of journalism practiced by the Washington Post in openly editorializing in its news section. Today the news section features a diatribe against the Danish welfare state that is headlined, "Danes Rethink a Welfare State Ample to a Fault." There's not much ambiguity in that one. The piece then proceeds to present a state of statistics that are grossly misleading and excluding other data points that are highly relevant. The first paragraphs describe the generosity of the welfare state, then we get this ominous warning in the 5th paragraph: "But Denmark’s long-term outlook is troubling. The population is aging, and in many regions of the country people without jobs now outnumber those with them." Oooooh, scary! Yeah people are living longer in Denmark, that's something that's been happening for a couple of hundred years or so. Like every other wealthy country, people live longer in Denmark than in the United States. While they are projected to continue to see gains in life expectancy and further aging of the population, the increase is actually going to much slower than in the United States.

In Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff’s (R&R) famous and now largely discredited “Growth in a Time of Debt,” New Zealand’s -7.6 percent growth (wrongly transcribed as -7.9 percent) in 1951 played an outsized role in their conclusion that high debt led to sharply lower growth. This number carried inordinate weight because R&R had mistakenly left out 4 high debt years for New Zealand in which it had seen healthy growth. Using their country-weighted methodology (each country counts the same, regardless of size or years with high debt) this mistake by itself subtracted 1.5 percentage points from the growth rate of countries in years of high debt.

To make the story better, today I received a tweet that informed me that the -7.6 percent growth New Zealand experienced in 1951 was not in any obvious way attributable to its high debt. In fact, the country suffered from a labor dispute that led to a strike/lockout of waterfront workers that lasted 5 months. Perhaps this dispute can be linked to New Zealand’s high debt at the time, but the connection is far from obvious. This is the sort of problem you get when using very small samples. 

In Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff’s (R&R) famous and now largely discredited “Growth in a Time of Debt,” New Zealand’s -7.6 percent growth (wrongly transcribed as -7.9 percent) in 1951 played an outsized role in their conclusion that high debt led to sharply lower growth. This number carried inordinate weight because R&R had mistakenly left out 4 high debt years for New Zealand in which it had seen healthy growth. Using their country-weighted methodology (each country counts the same, regardless of size or years with high debt) this mistake by itself subtracted 1.5 percentage points from the growth rate of countries in years of high debt.

To make the story better, today I received a tweet that informed me that the -7.6 percent growth New Zealand experienced in 1951 was not in any obvious way attributable to its high debt. In fact, the country suffered from a labor dispute that led to a strike/lockout of waterfront workers that lasted 5 months. Perhaps this dispute can be linked to New Zealand’s high debt at the time, but the connection is far from obvious. This is the sort of problem you get when using very small samples. 

There are some things that we can learn from economics, just as there are things we learn from astronomy. The vast majority of people in the United States believe that the earth goes around the sun because of what astronomers tell us. After all, we all see the opposite every day in the sky. For this reason, when a major newspaper tells us that when it comes to economics it is all just so confusing (except for what they insist you believe), it is doing a serious disservice. While some aspects of economics are difficult, many of the fundamentals, such as why we have a prolonged economic slump and millions of people are unemployed, are not. (Lack of demand in the economy, if you have to ask.) In this vein, the Post article, "It's an old numbers game. What if they're wrong?" seems almost like a deliberate effort to confuse readers into thinking there is nothing that can be done about the economy except to have the government reduce deficits. The second paragraph tells people: "How much debt can the nation manage? The United States was at about 102 percent in 2012, with the amount of debt held by the public closer to 75 percent. To some, that signals danger. Others say we could handle even more. In certain wonky circles, the debate over what ratio is sustainable is almost endless. And yet, serious people assess the president’s budget, indeed any budget, by how it decreases this ratio in years to come." This is almost completely wrong. For example, many economists would not even look to the ratio of debt to GDP as being an important variable since debt can be quickly reduced by selling assets. If a high debt level is some horrible burden on the economy, then the United States could just sell several trillions of dollars of assets and immediately lower its burden. People who understand balance sheets know this. Also, the price of debt fluctuates with interest rates. Debt issued at low interest rates can be repurchased at steep discounts when interest rates rise. This means that if debt-to-GDP ratios are what matters, we will have a great opportunity to quickly reduce this ratio when interest rates rise later in the decade as is widely predicted. This is a reason that serious people tend to focus on the interest burden, which is near a post-World War II low.
There are some things that we can learn from economics, just as there are things we learn from astronomy. The vast majority of people in the United States believe that the earth goes around the sun because of what astronomers tell us. After all, we all see the opposite every day in the sky. For this reason, when a major newspaper tells us that when it comes to economics it is all just so confusing (except for what they insist you believe), it is doing a serious disservice. While some aspects of economics are difficult, many of the fundamentals, such as why we have a prolonged economic slump and millions of people are unemployed, are not. (Lack of demand in the economy, if you have to ask.) In this vein, the Post article, "It's an old numbers game. What if they're wrong?" seems almost like a deliberate effort to confuse readers into thinking there is nothing that can be done about the economy except to have the government reduce deficits. The second paragraph tells people: "How much debt can the nation manage? The United States was at about 102 percent in 2012, with the amount of debt held by the public closer to 75 percent. To some, that signals danger. Others say we could handle even more. In certain wonky circles, the debate over what ratio is sustainable is almost endless. And yet, serious people assess the president’s budget, indeed any budget, by how it decreases this ratio in years to come." This is almost completely wrong. For example, many economists would not even look to the ratio of debt to GDP as being an important variable since debt can be quickly reduced by selling assets. If a high debt level is some horrible burden on the economy, then the United States could just sell several trillions of dollars of assets and immediately lower its burden. People who understand balance sheets know this. Also, the price of debt fluctuates with interest rates. Debt issued at low interest rates can be repurchased at steep discounts when interest rates rise. This means that if debt-to-GDP ratios are what matters, we will have a great opportunity to quickly reduce this ratio when interest rates rise later in the decade as is widely predicted. This is a reason that serious people tend to focus on the interest burden, which is near a post-World War II low.

The NYT had a useful piece on the increase in the number of people working at part-time jobs who would like full-time employment. This is an important measure of under-employment in the downturn that is missed when people just look at the unemployment rate. Since part-time workers often lack benefits like health care insurance, this can be an especially important issue.

However the piece concludes by equating part-time work with flexibility for employers. This is not true. There is no direct relationship between part-time work and flexible hours. A worker who has a regular shift from 1:00-5:00, Monday to Friday, provides no more flexibility to an employer than a worker who works from 9:00-5:00 the same days.

The flexibility comes from the fact that part-time workers are likely to have less bargaining power than full-time workers and therefore may have to accept changes in work hours on short notice. But this is a different issue than being employed part-time.

The NYT had a useful piece on the increase in the number of people working at part-time jobs who would like full-time employment. This is an important measure of under-employment in the downturn that is missed when people just look at the unemployment rate. Since part-time workers often lack benefits like health care insurance, this can be an especially important issue.

However the piece concludes by equating part-time work with flexibility for employers. This is not true. There is no direct relationship between part-time work and flexible hours. A worker who has a regular shift from 1:00-5:00, Monday to Friday, provides no more flexibility to an employer than a worker who works from 9:00-5:00 the same days.

The flexibility comes from the fact that part-time workers are likely to have less bargaining power than full-time workers and therefore may have to accept changes in work hours on short notice. But this is a different issue than being employed part-time.

The NYT had a piece on the precipitous fall in the price of Apple’s stock since last September. It explained the decline in part by the fact that an unusually large portion of its stockholders are individual investors. These investors were overly enthusiastic about the stock last year and now, according to the piece, excessively pessimistic. It tells readers;

“At its current price, investors are betting that Apple will grow more slowly than the average American company. And they are ignoring the enormous pile of cash that Apple has built up, which it could hand out to shareholders tomorrow if it wanted.”

These two sentences actually are in direct contradiction. Apple has accumulated an extraordinary amount of cash precisely because it does not see good investment opportunities. That is good reason to believe that its profits will grow less rapidly in the future than other companies. Rather than ignoring this cash, investors are likely focused very much on the fact that Apple does not seem able to find good places to use its money.

There is one other point that is worth making about the stock price. It is plausible to tell a story in which Apple’s stock price would be driven to extraordinary levels by ill-informed individual investors. (Although large investors could counter this run-up by shorting Apple stock.) It is less plausible that the price would be driven to irrationally low levels.

Institutional investors do own large amounts of Apple stock and in fact they have considerably less money in Apple today than they did eight months ago. If they viewed Apple stock as being seriously under-valued at its current price then they would rush in to take advantage of a bargain. The fact that this does not appear to be happening suggests that it is not just individual investors who view Apple’s stock price as being too high. The big institutional investors must share this view.

The NYT had a piece on the precipitous fall in the price of Apple’s stock since last September. It explained the decline in part by the fact that an unusually large portion of its stockholders are individual investors. These investors were overly enthusiastic about the stock last year and now, according to the piece, excessively pessimistic. It tells readers;

“At its current price, investors are betting that Apple will grow more slowly than the average American company. And they are ignoring the enormous pile of cash that Apple has built up, which it could hand out to shareholders tomorrow if it wanted.”

These two sentences actually are in direct contradiction. Apple has accumulated an extraordinary amount of cash precisely because it does not see good investment opportunities. That is good reason to believe that its profits will grow less rapidly in the future than other companies. Rather than ignoring this cash, investors are likely focused very much on the fact that Apple does not seem able to find good places to use its money.

There is one other point that is worth making about the stock price. It is plausible to tell a story in which Apple’s stock price would be driven to extraordinary levels by ill-informed individual investors. (Although large investors could counter this run-up by shorting Apple stock.) It is less plausible that the price would be driven to irrationally low levels.

Institutional investors do own large amounts of Apple stock and in fact they have considerably less money in Apple today than they did eight months ago. If they viewed Apple stock as being seriously under-valued at its current price then they would rush in to take advantage of a bargain. The fact that this does not appear to be happening suggests that it is not just individual investors who view Apple’s stock price as being too high. The big institutional investors must share this view.

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