Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

Economists generally like to see supply and demand determine prices. When there is a shortage of an item then the price is supposed to rise. At higher prices the supply increases and the demand falls, this eliminates the shortage.

For some reason this simple logic was altogether absent from a Washington Post article that was headlined “Germany struggles with skilled labor shortage, shrinking population.” Remarkably the piece never once mentions increasing wages. Instead it talks about efforts to bring in foreign workers.

It seems like Germany might be suffering from the same problem that is often the subject of news stories in the United States: managers who don’t know how to raise wages. The media have frequently reported on businesses who complain that they cannot find qualified workers.

Since there are very few occupations where real wages have  been rising in the last five years, it seems that few people who run businesses understand how labor markets work. This suggests that there could be large gains to the economy if the government (both here and in Germany) offered remedial economic courses to business managers explaining the basics of labor markets. Then they would understand that if they want more workers they should offer higher wages. This would eliminate labor shortages and then we would no longer have to read silly pieces like this one in the Post.  

Economists generally like to see supply and demand determine prices. When there is a shortage of an item then the price is supposed to rise. At higher prices the supply increases and the demand falls, this eliminates the shortage.

For some reason this simple logic was altogether absent from a Washington Post article that was headlined “Germany struggles with skilled labor shortage, shrinking population.” Remarkably the piece never once mentions increasing wages. Instead it talks about efforts to bring in foreign workers.

It seems like Germany might be suffering from the same problem that is often the subject of news stories in the United States: managers who don’t know how to raise wages. The media have frequently reported on businesses who complain that they cannot find qualified workers.

Since there are very few occupations where real wages have  been rising in the last five years, it seems that few people who run businesses understand how labor markets work. This suggests that there could be large gains to the economy if the government (both here and in Germany) offered remedial economic courses to business managers explaining the basics of labor markets. Then they would understand that if they want more workers they should offer higher wages. This would eliminate labor shortages and then we would no longer have to read silly pieces like this one in the Post.  

A couple of weeks ago the NYT had a piece offering a dire prognosis about the prospects for the Danish welfare state. I pointed out that this assessment did not fit the data, with Denmark doing considerably better than the United States on most standard economic measures. Nancy Folbre also wrote about Denmark’s welfare state in her Economix piece in the NYT last week. Today, the paper has a useful “Room for Debate” segment on the Danish welfare state. It would be great if this sort of exchange came about after every misleading article.

A couple of weeks ago the NYT had a piece offering a dire prognosis about the prospects for the Danish welfare state. I pointed out that this assessment did not fit the data, with Denmark doing considerably better than the United States on most standard economic measures. Nancy Folbre also wrote about Denmark’s welfare state in her Economix piece in the NYT last week. Today, the paper has a useful “Room for Debate” segment on the Danish welfare state. It would be great if this sort of exchange came about after every misleading article.

The problem with economics is not that it's too complicated; the problem is that it's too damn simple. This problem is amply demonstrated by all the heroic efforts made by economists to explain the weakness of the current recovery. We've had economists tell us that the problem is that we are now a service sector economy rather than a manufacturing economy. The story is that inventory fluctuations explain much of the cycle. Since we don't inventory services, we will have a slower bounceback in terms of production and employment. (There is a simple problem, since we don't inventory services, the downturn should also be less severe in a service dominated economy. How does this story fit with the worst downturn since the Great Depression?) We've also been told that the problem is underwater homeowners who can't spend like the good old days because they are underwater in their mortgages. The problem with this one is that we only have around 10 million underwater homeowners, the vast majority of whom have relatively modest incomes. The emphasis is on "only" because, while 10 million is a lot of people to be underwater, it is not a lot of people to move the economy. The median income for homeowners is $70,000. (Median is probably appropriate here rather than average, since it is unlikely that many wealthy people are underwater.) Suppose that being above water would increase consumption by each of these homeowners by $5,000 a year. This is a huge jump in consumption for people with income of $70k. (Do we think these homeowners are saving an average of $5,000 a year now?) This would lead to an increase in annual consumption of $50 billion a year or less than 0.3 percent of GDP. This would be a nice boost to output, but it would not qualitatively change the nature of the recovery.
The problem with economics is not that it's too complicated; the problem is that it's too damn simple. This problem is amply demonstrated by all the heroic efforts made by economists to explain the weakness of the current recovery. We've had economists tell us that the problem is that we are now a service sector economy rather than a manufacturing economy. The story is that inventory fluctuations explain much of the cycle. Since we don't inventory services, we will have a slower bounceback in terms of production and employment. (There is a simple problem, since we don't inventory services, the downturn should also be less severe in a service dominated economy. How does this story fit with the worst downturn since the Great Depression?) We've also been told that the problem is underwater homeowners who can't spend like the good old days because they are underwater in their mortgages. The problem with this one is that we only have around 10 million underwater homeowners, the vast majority of whom have relatively modest incomes. The emphasis is on "only" because, while 10 million is a lot of people to be underwater, it is not a lot of people to move the economy. The median income for homeowners is $70,000. (Median is probably appropriate here rather than average, since it is unlikely that many wealthy people are underwater.) Suppose that being above water would increase consumption by each of these homeowners by $5,000 a year. This is a huge jump in consumption for people with income of $70k. (Do we think these homeowners are saving an average of $5,000 a year now?) This would lead to an increase in annual consumption of $50 billion a year or less than 0.3 percent of GDP. This would be a nice boost to output, but it would not qualitatively change the nature of the recovery.
Larry Summers weighed in on the famous Reinhart-Rogoff Excel spreadsheet error in a Washington Post column this morning. His first big lesson from the debate is: "Anyone close to the process of economic research will recognize that data errors like the ones they made are distressingly common." Summers immediately demonstrates the truth of this assertion as he tries to make a second point about inferring the future based on statistical regularities from the past. "Trillions of dollars have been lost and millions of people have become unemployed because the lesson learned from 60 years of experience between 1945 and 2005 was that 'American house prices in aggregate always go up.' This was no data problem or misanalysis. It was a data regularity until it wasn’t. The extrapolation from past experience to future outlook is always deeply problematic and needs to be done with great care." The problem with Summers story is that American house prices in aggregate did not always go up. In fact, for the century from 1896 to 1996 they just kept pace with the overall rate of inflation. Here's the story using government data from 1953. (Robert Shiller constructed a series going back to 1896 from a variety of data sources.) Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Housing Finance Authority, and Author's calculations.
Larry Summers weighed in on the famous Reinhart-Rogoff Excel spreadsheet error in a Washington Post column this morning. His first big lesson from the debate is: "Anyone close to the process of economic research will recognize that data errors like the ones they made are distressingly common." Summers immediately demonstrates the truth of this assertion as he tries to make a second point about inferring the future based on statistical regularities from the past. "Trillions of dollars have been lost and millions of people have become unemployed because the lesson learned from 60 years of experience between 1945 and 2005 was that 'American house prices in aggregate always go up.' This was no data problem or misanalysis. It was a data regularity until it wasn’t. The extrapolation from past experience to future outlook is always deeply problematic and needs to be done with great care." The problem with Summers story is that American house prices in aggregate did not always go up. In fact, for the century from 1896 to 1996 they just kept pace with the overall rate of inflation. Here's the story using government data from 1953. (Robert Shiller constructed a series going back to 1896 from a variety of data sources.) Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Housing Finance Authority, and Author's calculations.
Showing the sort of creativity that we have come to expect from economists, Tyler Cowen used his NYT column today to call for giving more money to the pharmaceutical industry as a way to deal with the risks of pandemics. Cowen moves from the true statement that research and development into prescription drugs and public health more generally has a substantial public good character, to the idea that we need to give pharmaceutical companies more money in order to get them to do the research. In discussing the issue of protecting the public against pandemics Cowen tells readers: "If anything, the American government — or, better yet, a consortium of governments — should pay more for pandemic remedies than what market-based auctions [of patent rights] would yield. That’s because, if a major pandemic does arise, other countries may not respect intellectual property rights as they scramble to copy a drug or vaccine for domestic distribution. To encourage innovations, policy makers need to bolster the expectation of rewards." For reasons that Cowen never bothers to mention, he excludes the possibility that patents may not be the best way to finance research. The patent system does provide an incentive to innovate but it also provides an enormous incentive to misrepresent research results and deceive the public and regulators about the quality and safety of drugs. We see this happening all the time, exactly as economic theory predicts. (Think of Vioxx.) The result is considerable damage to public health and an enormous economic waste as money is paid to pharmaceutical industry for drugs that are ineffective or possibly even harmful. Patents also give an incentive for duplicative research. If a company has a major breakthrough drug that produces high profits then its competitors have a substantial incentive to try to duplicate this drug in a way that circumvents the patent. In a regime where patents provide a monopoly, the availability of potential substitutes will have the benefit of bringing the price down, however if the drug were already selling at its free market price, without a patent monopoly, no one would look to waste resources developing a second drug that essentially does the same thing as the first drug. Patent financed research also slows progress by encouraging secrecy. Science advances best when results are shared as widely as possible. Companies that are relying on patent financing will only make the bare minimum of their research available to the larger scientific community, providing the information needed to secure patents. They have enormous incentive to withhold any additional information that could provide benefits to competitors. Patent financing also distorts research toward finding patentable treatments for diseases. If a disease can be best controlled through diet, exercise, or controlling pollutants, patents will provide zero incentive to carry out research in the proper direction. Instead resources will be wasted on trying to develop a patentable drug.
Showing the sort of creativity that we have come to expect from economists, Tyler Cowen used his NYT column today to call for giving more money to the pharmaceutical industry as a way to deal with the risks of pandemics. Cowen moves from the true statement that research and development into prescription drugs and public health more generally has a substantial public good character, to the idea that we need to give pharmaceutical companies more money in order to get them to do the research. In discussing the issue of protecting the public against pandemics Cowen tells readers: "If anything, the American government — or, better yet, a consortium of governments — should pay more for pandemic remedies than what market-based auctions [of patent rights] would yield. That’s because, if a major pandemic does arise, other countries may not respect intellectual property rights as they scramble to copy a drug or vaccine for domestic distribution. To encourage innovations, policy makers need to bolster the expectation of rewards." For reasons that Cowen never bothers to mention, he excludes the possibility that patents may not be the best way to finance research. The patent system does provide an incentive to innovate but it also provides an enormous incentive to misrepresent research results and deceive the public and regulators about the quality and safety of drugs. We see this happening all the time, exactly as economic theory predicts. (Think of Vioxx.) The result is considerable damage to public health and an enormous economic waste as money is paid to pharmaceutical industry for drugs that are ineffective or possibly even harmful. Patents also give an incentive for duplicative research. If a company has a major breakthrough drug that produces high profits then its competitors have a substantial incentive to try to duplicate this drug in a way that circumvents the patent. In a regime where patents provide a monopoly, the availability of potential substitutes will have the benefit of bringing the price down, however if the drug were already selling at its free market price, without a patent monopoly, no one would look to waste resources developing a second drug that essentially does the same thing as the first drug. Patent financed research also slows progress by encouraging secrecy. Science advances best when results are shared as widely as possible. Companies that are relying on patent financing will only make the bare minimum of their research available to the larger scientific community, providing the information needed to secure patents. They have enormous incentive to withhold any additional information that could provide benefits to competitors. Patent financing also distorts research toward finding patentable treatments for diseases. If a disease can be best controlled through diet, exercise, or controlling pollutants, patents will provide zero incentive to carry out research in the proper direction. Instead resources will be wasted on trying to develop a patentable drug.
The April Jobs report was better than most economists (including me) had expected. Better news is always better than worse news, but it was one report amidst a lot of other less than stellar news. Furthermore, it just was not that good. Nonetheless the front page Post story hyped the good news in the report and told readers [in print edition only]: "The jobs report could also have significant implications for the Federal Reserve's $85-billion-a-month stimulus program. .. The program is tied to the outlook for the labor market, and some officials have begun suggesting that job growth could accelerate enough for the Fed to begin winding down the purchases this year." The Post, like most major media outlets have been shooting from excessive optimism to excessive pessimism about the economy consistently failing to keep their eyes on an underlying trendof weak growth. (Neil Irwin's blogpost yesterday gets the story almost exactly right.) Just last fall the Post and other news outlets were filled with pieces about how uncertainty over the "fiscal cliff" was already slowing growth and deterring investment. Somehow the people doing the investment did not get the message, as investment rose at a 13.2 percent annual rate in the quarter. In terms of current data, the Fed probably noticed that new orders for non-defense capital goods (excluding aircraft) were still almost 4.0 percent below their January level in March, even after a 0.9 percent increase from their February level. The March number is less than 0.2 percent above the year ago level. The Fed probably also noticed the construction data released by the Commerce Department last week which showed that total construction spending fell 1.7 percent in March driven by a 4.1 percent falloff in spending by the public sector.
The April Jobs report was better than most economists (including me) had expected. Better news is always better than worse news, but it was one report amidst a lot of other less than stellar news. Furthermore, it just was not that good. Nonetheless the front page Post story hyped the good news in the report and told readers [in print edition only]: "The jobs report could also have significant implications for the Federal Reserve's $85-billion-a-month stimulus program. .. The program is tied to the outlook for the labor market, and some officials have begun suggesting that job growth could accelerate enough for the Fed to begin winding down the purchases this year." The Post, like most major media outlets have been shooting from excessive optimism to excessive pessimism about the economy consistently failing to keep their eyes on an underlying trendof weak growth. (Neil Irwin's blogpost yesterday gets the story almost exactly right.) Just last fall the Post and other news outlets were filled with pieces about how uncertainty over the "fiscal cliff" was already slowing growth and deterring investment. Somehow the people doing the investment did not get the message, as investment rose at a 13.2 percent annual rate in the quarter. In terms of current data, the Fed probably noticed that new orders for non-defense capital goods (excluding aircraft) were still almost 4.0 percent below their January level in March, even after a 0.9 percent increase from their February level. The March number is less than 0.2 percent above the year ago level. The Fed probably also noticed the construction data released by the Commerce Department last week which showed that total construction spending fell 1.7 percent in March driven by a 4.1 percent falloff in spending by the public sector.

A NYT piece headlined, “college grads fare well in job market even through recession,” painted a misleading picture of the job market facing college grads in the downturn. First, the claim at the center of the piece, that college grads have gotten the bulk of the jobs in this recovery, is badly distorted by the pattern of retirements. The aging baby boomers who are leaving the labor force are much less likely to be college grads than the young people just entering, so even if there were no change in labor market conditions we would expect to see the share of college educated people increase among the employed. This effect is increased further as a result of the fact that less educated workers are likely to leave the work force at an earlier age because more of them work at physically demanding jobs. 

In terms of relative changes in unemployment rates, college grads have fared no better than anyone else. In fact, they have done slightly worse than the least educated workers, those without high school degrees.

Finally, the claim about the returns to a college degree are misleading, especially for men. While on average men with college degrees get far higher incomes than those with just a high school degree, there is a wide degree of dispersion as shown by my colleague John Schmitt and Heather Boushey.. As a result, a large percentage of college grads earn lower wages than many high school grads. For this reason, the marginal student who is considering attending college may have good reason to question whether it will pay off for him. It would have been useful if this piece had spent more time discussing the specifics of this issue. 

A NYT piece headlined, “college grads fare well in job market even through recession,” painted a misleading picture of the job market facing college grads in the downturn. First, the claim at the center of the piece, that college grads have gotten the bulk of the jobs in this recovery, is badly distorted by the pattern of retirements. The aging baby boomers who are leaving the labor force are much less likely to be college grads than the young people just entering, so even if there were no change in labor market conditions we would expect to see the share of college educated people increase among the employed. This effect is increased further as a result of the fact that less educated workers are likely to leave the work force at an earlier age because more of them work at physically demanding jobs. 

In terms of relative changes in unemployment rates, college grads have fared no better than anyone else. In fact, they have done slightly worse than the least educated workers, those without high school degrees.

Finally, the claim about the returns to a college degree are misleading, especially for men. While on average men with college degrees get far higher incomes than those with just a high school degree, there is a wide degree of dispersion as shown by my colleague John Schmitt and Heather Boushey.. As a result, a large percentage of college grads earn lower wages than many high school grads. For this reason, the marginal student who is considering attending college may have good reason to question whether it will pay off for him. It would have been useful if this piece had spent more time discussing the specifics of this issue. 

Robert Samuelson actually has a useful column today pointing out the imbalances that underlie the problems in the euro zone. The basic point is that the bubbles of the last decade led to a situation where prices in the crisis countries are hugely out of line with prices in the core countries, most importantly Germany. This means either substantial deflation in the crisis countries, considerably more rapid inflation in Germany and other core countries, or someone leaves the euro.

Samuelson rightly notes that none of these solutions seem likely right now for either economic or political reasons, or both. This means that the crisis is likely to persist for some time into the future.

However there is another part of the story that really deserves mentioning. What on earth were the folks at the European Central Bank (ECB) thinking in the years leading up to the crisis? The misalignment of prices in these countries did not arise overnight. There was considerably more rapid inflation in the current group of crisis countries in the last decade leading to enormous trade imbalances. Here’s the data from the IMF showing the deficits as a share of GDP.

Current Account Balance as a Percent of GDP

Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Greece -6.533 -5.785 -7.637 -11.388 -14.609 -14.922
Portugal -6.433 -8.327 -10.323 -10.685 -10.102 -12.638
Spain -3.508 -5.248 -7.353 -8.961 -9.995 -9.623

Source: International Monetary Fund.

These are incredible imbalances. In 2005, when the top people at the ECB went to the annual Fed meeting at Jackson Hole to celebrate the “Great Moderation” and debate whether Alan Greenspan was the greatest central banker of all time, the current account deficits in both Spain and Greece were already more than 7 percent of GDP. This would be a deficit of more than $1.1 trillion in the current U.S. economy. The deficit of 10.3 percent of GDP in Portugal would be almost $1.7 trillion in today’s economy. These deficits continued to expand, with Greece’s peaking at almost 15 percent of GDP ($2.4 trillion in the U.S. economy) in 2008.

How did the ECB think these imbalances made sense? There was some room for these countries to catch up relative to the core countries, but none of them was a China or India that could plausibly envision double-digit or near double-digit growth for decades. It’s hard to envision what story these people could have told themselves that did not have “disaster” in it. But, they did nothing and these economies collapsed.

The people in the crisis countries are now suffering enormously with no end in sight; and the boys and girls at the ECB? They still have their high paying jobs and plush pensions. See, the modern economy does offer good-paying jobs for people without skills.

Robert Samuelson actually has a useful column today pointing out the imbalances that underlie the problems in the euro zone. The basic point is that the bubbles of the last decade led to a situation where prices in the crisis countries are hugely out of line with prices in the core countries, most importantly Germany. This means either substantial deflation in the crisis countries, considerably more rapid inflation in Germany and other core countries, or someone leaves the euro.

Samuelson rightly notes that none of these solutions seem likely right now for either economic or political reasons, or both. This means that the crisis is likely to persist for some time into the future.

However there is another part of the story that really deserves mentioning. What on earth were the folks at the European Central Bank (ECB) thinking in the years leading up to the crisis? The misalignment of prices in these countries did not arise overnight. There was considerably more rapid inflation in the current group of crisis countries in the last decade leading to enormous trade imbalances. Here’s the data from the IMF showing the deficits as a share of GDP.

Current Account Balance as a Percent of GDP

Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Greece -6.533 -5.785 -7.637 -11.388 -14.609 -14.922
Portugal -6.433 -8.327 -10.323 -10.685 -10.102 -12.638
Spain -3.508 -5.248 -7.353 -8.961 -9.995 -9.623

Source: International Monetary Fund.

These are incredible imbalances. In 2005, when the top people at the ECB went to the annual Fed meeting at Jackson Hole to celebrate the “Great Moderation” and debate whether Alan Greenspan was the greatest central banker of all time, the current account deficits in both Spain and Greece were already more than 7 percent of GDP. This would be a deficit of more than $1.1 trillion in the current U.S. economy. The deficit of 10.3 percent of GDP in Portugal would be almost $1.7 trillion in today’s economy. These deficits continued to expand, with Greece’s peaking at almost 15 percent of GDP ($2.4 trillion in the U.S. economy) in 2008.

How did the ECB think these imbalances made sense? There was some room for these countries to catch up relative to the core countries, but none of them was a China or India that could plausibly envision double-digit or near double-digit growth for decades. It’s hard to envision what story these people could have told themselves that did not have “disaster” in it. But, they did nothing and these economies collapsed.

The people in the crisis countries are now suffering enormously with no end in sight; and the boys and girls at the ECB? They still have their high paying jobs and plush pensions. See, the modern economy does offer good-paying jobs for people without skills.

That’s what readers of a Post article discussing the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would conclude. The piece includes assertions from two experts, David Stevens, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association, and Julia Gordon, the director of housing finance and policy at the Center for American Progress, that 30-year fixed rate mortgages would disappear if the government did not guarantee these mortgages through the GSEs or some other mechanism.

This can easily be shown not to be true by the market in jumbo mortgages. These are mortgages that are too large in value to be insured by the GSEs. A large share of these mortgages are 30-year fixed rate mortgages. Also, while it is less common today, prior to the housing bubble banks did hold a substantial share of their mortgages, typically around 10-20 percent. Since the government was not guaranteeing these mortgages, the banks must have felt the guarantee was unnecessary to get them to issue 30-year fixed rate mortgages.

The issue with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is one of the interest rates that people will pay on mortgages, not whether they will exist or not. By having a government guarantee the government is providing a subsidy to homebuyers that comes at the expense of the rest of the economy. The government already provides a subsidy to homebuyers through the mortgage interest deduction, the question is whether it is desirable to provide a further subsidy through this government guarantee.

There is also a question of whether this is the most efficient way to provide the subsidy. The government guarantee can set up a complex system of financial intermediaries that may be difficult to regulate. It may be more efficient to provide any additional subsidy to homeownership through an enhanced tax deduction or credit that would not lead to a bloated financial sector.

These are the issues that should be at the center of the debate over the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Post should have been able to recognize the absurdity of claims about the end of 30-year fixed rate mortgages and have found an expert to clarify this point.

 

Note: Corrected acronym to “GSE.” Thanks to David Stevens.

That’s what readers of a Post article discussing the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would conclude. The piece includes assertions from two experts, David Stevens, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association, and Julia Gordon, the director of housing finance and policy at the Center for American Progress, that 30-year fixed rate mortgages would disappear if the government did not guarantee these mortgages through the GSEs or some other mechanism.

This can easily be shown not to be true by the market in jumbo mortgages. These are mortgages that are too large in value to be insured by the GSEs. A large share of these mortgages are 30-year fixed rate mortgages. Also, while it is less common today, prior to the housing bubble banks did hold a substantial share of their mortgages, typically around 10-20 percent. Since the government was not guaranteeing these mortgages, the banks must have felt the guarantee was unnecessary to get them to issue 30-year fixed rate mortgages.

The issue with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is one of the interest rates that people will pay on mortgages, not whether they will exist or not. By having a government guarantee the government is providing a subsidy to homebuyers that comes at the expense of the rest of the economy. The government already provides a subsidy to homebuyers through the mortgage interest deduction, the question is whether it is desirable to provide a further subsidy through this government guarantee.

There is also a question of whether this is the most efficient way to provide the subsidy. The government guarantee can set up a complex system of financial intermediaries that may be difficult to regulate. It may be more efficient to provide any additional subsidy to homeownership through an enhanced tax deduction or credit that would not lead to a bloated financial sector.

These are the issues that should be at the center of the debate over the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Post should have been able to recognize the absurdity of claims about the end of 30-year fixed rate mortgages and have found an expert to clarify this point.

 

Note: Corrected acronym to “GSE.” Thanks to David Stevens.

Brad Plummer has a useful post showing that with current policy in place we can keep CO2 emissions constant over the next three decades. The piece notes that this would be inadequate to prevent dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; for that we would need substantial reductions in emissions.

It is worth calling attention to one comment that may mislead readers. At one point the piece tells readers:

“Some of these measures [continuing current policy], such as re-upping the tax credits for clean energy, would require Congress. (And that wouldn’t be free; the recent one-year extension of the wind credit, for instance, will cost $1.2 billion per year for 10 years.)”

It’s unlikely that many readers have a clear sense of how much money $1.2 billion a year is relative to the budget. Spending is projected to average more than $4.7 trillion a year over the next decade. This means that the extension of the clean energy credits would cost less than 0.03 percent of projected spending. This likely would provide more information to readers than the dollar amount.

Brad Plummer has a useful post showing that with current policy in place we can keep CO2 emissions constant over the next three decades. The piece notes that this would be inadequate to prevent dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; for that we would need substantial reductions in emissions.

It is worth calling attention to one comment that may mislead readers. At one point the piece tells readers:

“Some of these measures [continuing current policy], such as re-upping the tax credits for clean energy, would require Congress. (And that wouldn’t be free; the recent one-year extension of the wind credit, for instance, will cost $1.2 billion per year for 10 years.)”

It’s unlikely that many readers have a clear sense of how much money $1.2 billion a year is relative to the budget. Spending is projected to average more than $4.7 trillion a year over the next decade. This means that the extension of the clean energy credits would cost less than 0.03 percent of projected spending. This likely would provide more information to readers than the dollar amount.

Want to search in the archives?

¿Quieres buscar en los archivos?

Click Here Haga clic aquí