Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

As its readers know, the Washington Post really really wants to see big cuts in Medicare and Social Security and is happy to use its news pages to advance this agenda. In a budget piece today, it told readers:

“In a flurry of meetings and phone calls over the past few days, Obama has courted more than half a dozen Republicans in the Senate, telling them that he is ready to overhaul expensive health and retirement programs if they agree to raise taxes to tame the national debt” [emphasis added].

If the Post was not trying to push its Big Deal agenda, it would have told readers that Obama is willing to cut health care retirement programs. The issue here is reducing government payments, not changing the color of the forms used. It also would not use the adjective “expensive.” While the country does pay a lot of money for Medicare and Medicaid, because it pays doctors and other providers much more than they get elsewhere, Social Security is actually relatively cheap compared to other countries’ public pension programs.

Also, an objective newspaper would not have inserted the word “tame” since the data do not support the case that the debt is somehow out of control. The ratio of debt to GDP has been rising only because the collapse of the housing bubble led to a severe downturn. Had it not been for this downturn, the ratio would have fallen through most of the decade. The ratio of interest to GDP is near a post-war low.

The piece also asserts that:

“there was more skepticism of Obama’s motives”

among many Republicans. Of course the Post does not know whether Republicans really were skeptical of President Obama’s motives, they just know that Republicans claimed to be skeptical. It is not good reporting to accept assertions from politicians at face value, since they are not always truthful. 

As its readers know, the Washington Post really really wants to see big cuts in Medicare and Social Security and is happy to use its news pages to advance this agenda. In a budget piece today, it told readers:

“In a flurry of meetings and phone calls over the past few days, Obama has courted more than half a dozen Republicans in the Senate, telling them that he is ready to overhaul expensive health and retirement programs if they agree to raise taxes to tame the national debt” [emphasis added].

If the Post was not trying to push its Big Deal agenda, it would have told readers that Obama is willing to cut health care retirement programs. The issue here is reducing government payments, not changing the color of the forms used. It also would not use the adjective “expensive.” While the country does pay a lot of money for Medicare and Medicaid, because it pays doctors and other providers much more than they get elsewhere, Social Security is actually relatively cheap compared to other countries’ public pension programs.

Also, an objective newspaper would not have inserted the word “tame” since the data do not support the case that the debt is somehow out of control. The ratio of debt to GDP has been rising only because the collapse of the housing bubble led to a severe downturn. Had it not been for this downturn, the ratio would have fallen through most of the decade. The ratio of interest to GDP is near a post-war low.

The piece also asserts that:

“there was more skepticism of Obama’s motives”

among many Republicans. Of course the Post does not know whether Republicans really were skeptical of President Obama’s motives, they just know that Republicans claimed to be skeptical. It is not good reporting to accept assertions from politicians at face value, since they are not always truthful. 

I see that Brad has a post saying that the economy was adjusting nicely to the bursting of the housing bubble until the financial crisis set in. He notes that housing construction fell by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2008. This was replaced by an increase in gross exports of 2.0 pp of GDP and increase in equipment investment of 0.5 pp. Everything was moving along nicely until the financial crisis in 2008.

I see things a bit differently. First, gross exports don’t create jobs, net exports do. When we move an auto assembly plant from Ohio to Mexico, we are not creating additional jobs with the car parts exported to Mexico. That’s intro textbook stuff. If we look at the net export picture, the gain is only about 1 pp of GDP. Furthermore, it is hard to see the improvement in the trade picture having gone very much further without a further decline in the dollar. (That was a possibility, but far from a certainty — it depends on policy decisions elsewhere.)

The rest of the gap was made up by a surge in non-residential construction (can you say bubble?), which rose by more than 33 percent as a share of GDP, or more than 1 pp of GDP. This boom led to considerable overbuilding in retail, office space and most other categories of non-residential construction. Assuming the burst of spending in non-residential construction was another bubble, then the portion of the demand gap filled through this channel was destined to be temporary. It was inevitable that this bubble would also burst and we would need something else to make up the hole in demand.

The other factor in the mix is the drop off in consumption. Savings rates had been driven to nearly zero by the wealth created by the housing bubble. It seems to me inevitable that consumption would fall in response to the disappearance of this wealth. The financial crisis gave us a Wily E. Coyote moment where everyone stopped spending at the same time, but I would argue that this just brought the decline in spending forward in time.

The savings rate remains much higher today than at the peak of the bubble, although still low by historic standards. (It’s currently around 4.0 percent, the pre-bubble average was over 8.0 percent.) We have two alternative hypotheses here. I gather Brad would say that people are spending at a lower rate because they are still freaked out by the financial crisis. I would argue that they are spending at a lower rate for the same reason that homeless people don’t spend, they don’t have the money.

Homeowners are down $8 trillion in housing equity as a result of the crash. I would expect that loss of wealth to have a substantial impact on their spending. I gather Brad does not.

[Correction: The earlier version said “net exports” in the first paragraph.]

I see that Brad has a post saying that the economy was adjusting nicely to the bursting of the housing bubble until the financial crisis set in. He notes that housing construction fell by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2008. This was replaced by an increase in gross exports of 2.0 pp of GDP and increase in equipment investment of 0.5 pp. Everything was moving along nicely until the financial crisis in 2008.

I see things a bit differently. First, gross exports don’t create jobs, net exports do. When we move an auto assembly plant from Ohio to Mexico, we are not creating additional jobs with the car parts exported to Mexico. That’s intro textbook stuff. If we look at the net export picture, the gain is only about 1 pp of GDP. Furthermore, it is hard to see the improvement in the trade picture having gone very much further without a further decline in the dollar. (That was a possibility, but far from a certainty — it depends on policy decisions elsewhere.)

The rest of the gap was made up by a surge in non-residential construction (can you say bubble?), which rose by more than 33 percent as a share of GDP, or more than 1 pp of GDP. This boom led to considerable overbuilding in retail, office space and most other categories of non-residential construction. Assuming the burst of spending in non-residential construction was another bubble, then the portion of the demand gap filled through this channel was destined to be temporary. It was inevitable that this bubble would also burst and we would need something else to make up the hole in demand.

The other factor in the mix is the drop off in consumption. Savings rates had been driven to nearly zero by the wealth created by the housing bubble. It seems to me inevitable that consumption would fall in response to the disappearance of this wealth. The financial crisis gave us a Wily E. Coyote moment where everyone stopped spending at the same time, but I would argue that this just brought the decline in spending forward in time.

The savings rate remains much higher today than at the peak of the bubble, although still low by historic standards. (It’s currently around 4.0 percent, the pre-bubble average was over 8.0 percent.) We have two alternative hypotheses here. I gather Brad would say that people are spending at a lower rate because they are still freaked out by the financial crisis. I would argue that they are spending at a lower rate for the same reason that homeless people don’t spend, they don’t have the money.

Homeowners are down $8 trillion in housing equity as a result of the crash. I would expect that loss of wealth to have a substantial impact on their spending. I gather Brad does not.

[Correction: The earlier version said “net exports” in the first paragraph.]

The Federal Reserve Board disastrously missed and/or ignored two huge bubbles in the last decades: the stock bubble in the 1990s and the housing bubble in the 2000s. The collapse of both bubbles led to recessions from which it was difficult to recover. Neil Irwin inadvertently tells us today that the Fed is still utterly clueless when it comes to dealing with bubbles. The problem is that, at least according to Irwin's account, no one at the Fed seems to understand how bubbles hurt the economy. On the one hand, he presents the views of Fed governor Jeremy Stein, a bubble hawk, who he tells us: "argued in a Feb. 7 speech that there are already signs of overheating in the markets for certain kinds of securities, including junk bonds and real estate investment trusts that invest in mortgages. And if those or other potential bubbles get so large that if they popped the whole U.S. economy could be in danger." By contrast we have Fed chair Ben Bernanke and vice-chair Janet Yellen, the latter of whom he quotes as saying: "At this stage there are some signs that investors are reaching for yield, but I do not now see pervasive evidence of trends such as rapid credit growth, a marked buildup in leverage, or significant asset bubbles that would clearly threaten financial stability." Unfortunately, the concern about financial stability and discerning bubbles in a wide array of economic data completely misses the point. First, financial instability is not what caused our problems in either 2001 or in the current downturn. As much fun as it is to see the Fed chair, Treasury Secretary and other important people sweating over the collapse of huge financial institutions, this crisis was very much secondary to the country's economic problems. We know how to paper over a financial crisis, which the Fed eventually did (as did the European central bank), the hard part is replacing the demand that had been generated by a bubble once the bubble has burst. This directly leads to the second point. The bubbles that we have to worry about are not hard to find. Suppose there is a huge speculative bubble in soy beans that pushes their price to 20 times their normal level. This could be bad news for people that like soy beans and derivative products. It may also be disastrous for producers in the industry if they get caught on the wrong side of things. However, the collapse of this bubble will have minimal impact on the economy. If for some reason our bubble watchers at the Fed failed to notice the rise in soy bean prices, the problems caused by its eventual bursting will not sink the economy.
The Federal Reserve Board disastrously missed and/or ignored two huge bubbles in the last decades: the stock bubble in the 1990s and the housing bubble in the 2000s. The collapse of both bubbles led to recessions from which it was difficult to recover. Neil Irwin inadvertently tells us today that the Fed is still utterly clueless when it comes to dealing with bubbles. The problem is that, at least according to Irwin's account, no one at the Fed seems to understand how bubbles hurt the economy. On the one hand, he presents the views of Fed governor Jeremy Stein, a bubble hawk, who he tells us: "argued in a Feb. 7 speech that there are already signs of overheating in the markets for certain kinds of securities, including junk bonds and real estate investment trusts that invest in mortgages. And if those or other potential bubbles get so large that if they popped the whole U.S. economy could be in danger." By contrast we have Fed chair Ben Bernanke and vice-chair Janet Yellen, the latter of whom he quotes as saying: "At this stage there are some signs that investors are reaching for yield, but I do not now see pervasive evidence of trends such as rapid credit growth, a marked buildup in leverage, or significant asset bubbles that would clearly threaten financial stability." Unfortunately, the concern about financial stability and discerning bubbles in a wide array of economic data completely misses the point. First, financial instability is not what caused our problems in either 2001 or in the current downturn. As much fun as it is to see the Fed chair, Treasury Secretary and other important people sweating over the collapse of huge financial institutions, this crisis was very much secondary to the country's economic problems. We know how to paper over a financial crisis, which the Fed eventually did (as did the European central bank), the hard part is replacing the demand that had been generated by a bubble once the bubble has burst. This directly leads to the second point. The bubbles that we have to worry about are not hard to find. Suppose there is a huge speculative bubble in soy beans that pushes their price to 20 times their normal level. This could be bad news for people that like soy beans and derivative products. It may also be disastrous for producers in the industry if they get caught on the wrong side of things. However, the collapse of this bubble will have minimal impact on the economy. If for some reason our bubble watchers at the Fed failed to notice the rise in soy bean prices, the problems caused by its eventual bursting will not sink the economy.

It’s extremely unfair that shoe salespeople have to pay taxes on their income at the same rate as other workers. After all, they must work with shoe buyers, achieve an alignment of interest, and then get them to buy the shoes. Clearly this means that they should be taxed at the lower capital gains rate rather than the ordinary earnings rate that factory workers and school teachers pay.

Yes, this is nuts, but because very rich people run pension and hedge funds, the NYT feels the need to treat this stuff seriously. Therefore it gave Steve Judge, the chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council the opportunity to say that shoes salespeople shouldn’t have to be taxed at the same rate as everyone else. (Sorry, I meant rich equity and hedge fund managers.)

This one does not come close to passing the laugh test. The point here is very simple. When you get paid for work, whether you are school teacher, a shoe salesperson, or a hedge fund manager, this is earned income and should be taxed as such.

If hedge and private equity fund managers want to invest in their funds they are free to do so and can have their subsequent income taxed at the lower capital gains rate. This is really simple — even a hedge fund or private equity fund manager should be able to understand this. It is not a complicated issue no matter how much people may get paid to make it complicated.

 

Note: Typo corrected, thanks Tom.

It’s extremely unfair that shoe salespeople have to pay taxes on their income at the same rate as other workers. After all, they must work with shoe buyers, achieve an alignment of interest, and then get them to buy the shoes. Clearly this means that they should be taxed at the lower capital gains rate rather than the ordinary earnings rate that factory workers and school teachers pay.

Yes, this is nuts, but because very rich people run pension and hedge funds, the NYT feels the need to treat this stuff seriously. Therefore it gave Steve Judge, the chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council the opportunity to say that shoes salespeople shouldn’t have to be taxed at the same rate as everyone else. (Sorry, I meant rich equity and hedge fund managers.)

This one does not come close to passing the laugh test. The point here is very simple. When you get paid for work, whether you are school teacher, a shoe salesperson, or a hedge fund manager, this is earned income and should be taxed as such.

If hedge and private equity fund managers want to invest in their funds they are free to do so and can have their subsequent income taxed at the lower capital gains rate. This is really simple — even a hedge fund or private equity fund manager should be able to understand this. It is not a complicated issue no matter how much people may get paid to make it complicated.

 

Note: Typo corrected, thanks Tom.

That’s what readers of Marc Thiessen’s column on the sequester would conclude. Theissen repeatedly touts the report of the Bowles-Simpson commission. Of course there was no report issued by the commission because no report received the necessary majority. The Post’s fact checkers would have quickly caught Thiessen’s error and insist that he correct it, but such is the price of labor discord.

Thiessen’s piece is also striking for the lack of concern for the people will lose their jobs as a result of slower growth that is resulting from his preferred policy. Presumably he does not imagine himself or his friends to be among the people who will lose jobs because of the policies he advocates.

That’s what readers of Marc Thiessen’s column on the sequester would conclude. Theissen repeatedly touts the report of the Bowles-Simpson commission. Of course there was no report issued by the commission because no report received the necessary majority. The Post’s fact checkers would have quickly caught Thiessen’s error and insist that he correct it, but such is the price of labor discord.

Thiessen’s piece is also striking for the lack of concern for the people will lose their jobs as a result of slower growth that is resulting from his preferred policy. Presumably he does not imagine himself or his friends to be among the people who will lose jobs because of the policies he advocates.

The Washington Post began an article on a meeting of the euro zone finance ministers by telling readers:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts to end the debt crisis.”

At this point there is overwhelming evidence that the primary effect of the austerity being demanded by the finance ministers is to slow growth and increase unemployment. As a result of the negative impact on output, the budget cuts lead to little improvement in the financial situation of the affected countries.

Since the evidence shows that the ministers’ austerity agenda is not an effective way to deal with the debt crisis it is wrong of the Post to tell readers that this is the motive of the finance ministers. This assertion assumes that the finance ministers have no clue about the actual effect of the policies they advocate. While this may in fact be true, the Post certainly cannot claim to know that the euro zone’s finance ministers are completely clueless about economics.

It would have been more accurate to simply report what the ministers claim, for example writing:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts ‘to end the debt crisis.'”

This would made have made it clear to readers that the rationale claimed by the finance ministers bears no obvious relation to reality.

The Washington Post began an article on a meeting of the euro zone finance ministers by telling readers:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts to end the debt crisis.”

At this point there is overwhelming evidence that the primary effect of the austerity being demanded by the finance ministers is to slow growth and increase unemployment. As a result of the negative impact on output, the budget cuts lead to little improvement in the financial situation of the affected countries.

Since the evidence shows that the ministers’ austerity agenda is not an effective way to deal with the debt crisis it is wrong of the Post to tell readers that this is the motive of the finance ministers. This assertion assumes that the finance ministers have no clue about the actual effect of the policies they advocate. While this may in fact be true, the Post certainly cannot claim to know that the euro zone’s finance ministers are completely clueless about economics.

It would have been more accurate to simply report what the ministers claim, for example writing:

“European leaders demanded that euro members press on with budget cuts ‘to end the debt crisis.'”

This would made have made it clear to readers that the rationale claimed by the finance ministers bears no obvious relation to reality.

The NYT yet again referred to a report of the Bowles-Simpson Commission. There is no report from the Bowles-Simpson Commission because no report received the support of the necessary majority.

All of the sources for this article indicate that they want to see cuts in Social Security and Medicare. This is a position that is opposed by the vast majority of people regardless of their political party or ideology. It would be useful if the NYT did not exclusively present the views of the minority who want to see cuts in these programs in its budget articles.

The NYT yet again referred to a report of the Bowles-Simpson Commission. There is no report from the Bowles-Simpson Commission because no report received the support of the necessary majority.

All of the sources for this article indicate that they want to see cuts in Social Security and Medicare. This is a position that is opposed by the vast majority of people regardless of their political party or ideology. It would be useful if the NYT did not exclusively present the views of the minority who want to see cuts in these programs in its budget articles.

I'm not kidding, it's right there in the Washington Post. And we thought Bob Woodward was creative. But Samuelson's economic history is even more striking than the linking of Kennedy to the sequester. He notes the fiscal stimulus that was sparked by the Kennedy tax cuts (and the Vietnam War and Johnson's Great Society programs) and the boom that resulted, and tells us that "it was a disaster." "High inflation was the first shock. An initial boom (by 1969, unemployment was 3.5 percent) spawned a wage-price spiral. With government seeming to guarantee 4 percent unemployment, workers and businesses had little reason to restrain wages and prices. In 1960, inflation was 1 percent; by 1980, it was 13 percent. The economy became less stable. From 1969 to 1982, there were four recessions, as the Federal Reserve alternated between trying to push unemployment down and prevent inflation from going up. Only in the early 1980s did the Fed, under Paul Volcker and with Ronald Reagan’s support, crush inflationary psychology." Before looking at Samuelson's horror story here, it is worth noting what happened in the boom, which can be treated as going through 1973, in spite of the recession in 1969. Growth over the 10 years from 1963 to 1973 averaged 4.4 percent, by far the most rapid stretch in the post-World War II era. The unemployment rate hovered near 4.0 percent for most of this period, as Samuelson complains. This led to large gains in real wages and sharp declines in poverty. The overall poverty rate fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 percent to 11.1 percent in 1973, an all-time low. For African Americans the poverty rate fell from 55.1 percent in 1959 (annual data is not available) to 31.4 percent in 1973. I suspect most folks wouldn't mind a few more disasters like this one.
I'm not kidding, it's right there in the Washington Post. And we thought Bob Woodward was creative. But Samuelson's economic history is even more striking than the linking of Kennedy to the sequester. He notes the fiscal stimulus that was sparked by the Kennedy tax cuts (and the Vietnam War and Johnson's Great Society programs) and the boom that resulted, and tells us that "it was a disaster." "High inflation was the first shock. An initial boom (by 1969, unemployment was 3.5 percent) spawned a wage-price spiral. With government seeming to guarantee 4 percent unemployment, workers and businesses had little reason to restrain wages and prices. In 1960, inflation was 1 percent; by 1980, it was 13 percent. The economy became less stable. From 1969 to 1982, there were four recessions, as the Federal Reserve alternated between trying to push unemployment down and prevent inflation from going up. Only in the early 1980s did the Fed, under Paul Volcker and with Ronald Reagan’s support, crush inflationary psychology." Before looking at Samuelson's horror story here, it is worth noting what happened in the boom, which can be treated as going through 1973, in spite of the recession in 1969. Growth over the 10 years from 1963 to 1973 averaged 4.4 percent, by far the most rapid stretch in the post-World War II era. The unemployment rate hovered near 4.0 percent for most of this period, as Samuelson complains. This led to large gains in real wages and sharp declines in poverty. The overall poverty rate fell from 19.5 percent in 1963 percent to 11.1 percent in 1973, an all-time low. For African Americans the poverty rate fell from 55.1 percent in 1959 (annual data is not available) to 31.4 percent in 1973. I suspect most folks wouldn't mind a few more disasters like this one.

It would have been helpful if the NYT had pointed out this fact in an article that included assertions from House Speaker John Boehner that spending is out of control.

“The president got his tax hikes on January the First. The issue here is spending. Spending is out of control.”

In fact, spending as a share of potential GDP is near a 30-year low and is lower than at any point in the Reagan-Bush I administrations. The chart shows federal spending as a share of GDP and as a share of the GDP projected by the Congressional Budget Office in 2008 before it recognized the impact of the collapse of the housing bubble.

gov-spending-gdp-2013

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

It would have been helpful to remind readers of the actual path of government spending since many may not have not realized that Boehner was not being truthful.

It would have been helpful if the NYT had pointed out this fact in an article that included assertions from House Speaker John Boehner that spending is out of control.

“The president got his tax hikes on January the First. The issue here is spending. Spending is out of control.”

In fact, spending as a share of potential GDP is near a 30-year low and is lower than at any point in the Reagan-Bush I administrations. The chart shows federal spending as a share of GDP and as a share of the GDP projected by the Congressional Budget Office in 2008 before it recognized the impact of the collapse of the housing bubble.

gov-spending-gdp-2013

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

It would have been helpful to remind readers of the actual path of government spending since many may not have not realized that Boehner was not being truthful.

I realize that Pew is a very prestigious outfit, but Pew's garbage is still garbage. Its report on wealth by age group, or at least the interpretation that it and others have given this report, fits the bill. A couple of years ago, Pew did an analysis that gave breakdowns of wealth by age group. It found that the median household over the age of 65 had $170,500 in net worth. I was actually pleased that they came up with this number, since it meant that the projections that I had done more than two years earlier with my colleague David Rosnick were almost right on the nose. It's always gratifying to see other researchers independently corroborate your findings.  But what was remarkable about this report was that the Pew researchers took this number as evidence of the affluence of the elderly. The study points out that this was a 42 percent real increase from the 1984 level. By contrast, households under age 35 saw their median net worth fall by 68 percent to just $3,700. This disparity in wealth by age continues to be the take away from this report in the media. To realize the absurdity of this position, try thinking for a moment. The bulk of people who are now turning age 65 do not have a defined benefit pension. (They did in 1984.) This means that the only income they have is their Social Security check, which averages a bit over $1,200 a month. Right off the bat, $100 a month is subtracted to pay for their Medicare Part B premium. This means that our high living seniors have an income of $1,100 a month, plus their $170,500 in net worth. Is this rich? My guess is that 90 percent of the reporters who have covered this Pew study have no clue what net worth means. The $170,000 figure includes every asset that seniors own. That means everything in retirement accounts and other personal savings, the value of their car and the equity in their home. To put this in perspective, the median house price is roughly $180,000. That means that if our typical senior household sold off every other asset they held they would have roughly enough money to pay off their mortgage. Then they would be entirely dependent on their Social Security check to support themselves.
I realize that Pew is a very prestigious outfit, but Pew's garbage is still garbage. Its report on wealth by age group, or at least the interpretation that it and others have given this report, fits the bill. A couple of years ago, Pew did an analysis that gave breakdowns of wealth by age group. It found that the median household over the age of 65 had $170,500 in net worth. I was actually pleased that they came up with this number, since it meant that the projections that I had done more than two years earlier with my colleague David Rosnick were almost right on the nose. It's always gratifying to see other researchers independently corroborate your findings.  But what was remarkable about this report was that the Pew researchers took this number as evidence of the affluence of the elderly. The study points out that this was a 42 percent real increase from the 1984 level. By contrast, households under age 35 saw their median net worth fall by 68 percent to just $3,700. This disparity in wealth by age continues to be the take away from this report in the media. To realize the absurdity of this position, try thinking for a moment. The bulk of people who are now turning age 65 do not have a defined benefit pension. (They did in 1984.) This means that the only income they have is their Social Security check, which averages a bit over $1,200 a month. Right off the bat, $100 a month is subtracted to pay for their Medicare Part B premium. This means that our high living seniors have an income of $1,100 a month, plus their $170,500 in net worth. Is this rich? My guess is that 90 percent of the reporters who have covered this Pew study have no clue what net worth means. The $170,000 figure includes every asset that seniors own. That means everything in retirement accounts and other personal savings, the value of their car and the equity in their home. To put this in perspective, the median house price is roughly $180,000. That means that if our typical senior household sold off every other asset they held they would have roughly enough money to pay off their mortgage. Then they would be entirely dependent on their Social Security check to support themselves.

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