Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

A couple of weeks ago the Washington Post (a.k.a. “Fox on 15th Street”) gained notoriety for running a major news article based on a study funding by military contractors that warned of large job losses from cuts in military spending. Of course folks who know economics realize that in a downturn cuts in any type of government spending will lead to job loss. In fact, cuts in most forms of government spending will lead to larger job losses than cuts in military spending. In other words, there was no real news in this study, except that the numbers were likely exaggerated.

In keeping with this spirit, the Post published a news article today that warned that allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for the richest 2 percent would be “placing an enormous strain on the already sluggish economic recovery” according to another business financed study. This assertion badly misrepresented the study’s findings.

The projections from the study are long-run effects. They are not effects that would be felt in an “already sluggish economic recovery,” unless the assumption is that the recovery will be sluggish for 5-10 years in the future. The reporter and/or editor should have noticed the difference between the long-run impact and the immediate effect. The projections discussed in the article are long-run projections, not effects that would be felt in the next year or two.

The other major failing of this piece is that it never accurately described what the study analyzed. It calculated the impact of a tax increase that is used for higher government consumption spending. It does not measure the impact of a tax increase that is used either for deficit reduction or investment in infrastructure and education. The model used in this analysis would likely to show that either of these two uses of higher tax revenue would lead to increases in output, jobs, and wages, not decreases.

A couple of weeks ago the Washington Post (a.k.a. “Fox on 15th Street”) gained notoriety for running a major news article based on a study funding by military contractors that warned of large job losses from cuts in military spending. Of course folks who know economics realize that in a downturn cuts in any type of government spending will lead to job loss. In fact, cuts in most forms of government spending will lead to larger job losses than cuts in military spending. In other words, there was no real news in this study, except that the numbers were likely exaggerated.

In keeping with this spirit, the Post published a news article today that warned that allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire for the richest 2 percent would be “placing an enormous strain on the already sluggish economic recovery” according to another business financed study. This assertion badly misrepresented the study’s findings.

The projections from the study are long-run effects. They are not effects that would be felt in an “already sluggish economic recovery,” unless the assumption is that the recovery will be sluggish for 5-10 years in the future. The reporter and/or editor should have noticed the difference between the long-run impact and the immediate effect. The projections discussed in the article are long-run projections, not effects that would be felt in the next year or two.

The other major failing of this piece is that it never accurately described what the study analyzed. It calculated the impact of a tax increase that is used for higher government consumption spending. It does not measure the impact of a tax increase that is used either for deficit reduction or investment in infrastructure and education. The model used in this analysis would likely to show that either of these two uses of higher tax revenue would lead to increases in output, jobs, and wages, not decreases.

Yes, that is what Brooks told readers. His column today mourns the fact that Romney and Bain are being blasted for being capitalists. He then tells readers:

“Romney is going to have to define a vision of modern capitalism. …. Let’s face it, he’s not a heroic entrepreneur. He’s an efficiency expert.”

Brooks is certainly right that Romney is not a heroic entrepreneur, but it doesn’t follow that he is necessarily an efficiency expert either. The private equity folks like to tell stories of how they find poorly managed companies, clean them up, and then sell them for a big profit. 

Undoubtedly there are cases where this is true, but these are likely the minority of companies that are taken over by private equity (PE) firms. Finding companies that can be quickly turned around by better management is not easy. After all, if it were easy to find better management, someone would have done it already (economist humor).

What PE is very good at is taking advantage of tax dodges. It’s likely that your stodgy family-run business has not kept up-to-date with the state of the art tax avoidance schemes. However PE companies do, and there can be big bucks in applying these modern tax avoidance schemes to old-fashioned businesses.

To see this, let’s take a simple example. Suppose an old widget company was operating with a ratio of debt to book value of 20 percent. Let’s assume that its book value is $1,000 million and its debt $200 million, leaving shareholders’ equity of $800 million.

For simplicity, assume the combination of before tax profit and interest is 10 percent or $100 million. The company will  then pay 6 percent interest ($12 million) on its debt. This leaves before tax profit of $88 million. if it pays a 35 percent tax rate, then its after tax profit is $57.2 million, as shown below.

private-equity-fig-1-07-2012

 

Now suppose some clever PE types come in. One of the first things they will likely do is borrow a substantial amount, let’s say $600 million. They will use this money to repay much of the $800 million purchase price of company. The interest burden on the higher $800 million in debt ($600 million in new debt plus the old $200 million) is $48 million, leaving $52 million in before tax profits. Assuming that the company still pays 35 percent of its profits in taxes, its after-tax profit as a PE-owned company is $33.8 million.

While this means that our PE folks are taking home less from the widget company than the old-fashioned family owners, it is important to remember that they have gotten most of their money out of the operation. They only have $200 million invested, as compared to the $800 million invested by the previous owner, as illustrated below.

private-equity-fig-2-07-2012

This means in principle that the Romney-Bain folks can find three other widget companies. If they do the same deal with each, they will manage to pocket over $135 million compared to the $57.2 million earned with the same amount of capital by the prior family owner.

Note that this increase in profitability assumes nothing about efficiency. In this story the Romney-Bain gang did nothing to improve the operation of the factory. They just found ways to reduce its tax liability.

This is clearly an overly-simplistic story, but it does illustrate how PE companies can make large profits without doing anything to increase efficiency. This is one of the ways in which PE companies make money. To get the full list, read the work of my colleague Eileen Appelbaum.

But the important point is that PE companies can make lots of money for themselves in ways that do not involve increasing efficiency. In other words, contrary to what Brooks told readers, there is no reason to assume that just because Romney got rich in PE that he is an efficiency expert.

Yes, that is what Brooks told readers. His column today mourns the fact that Romney and Bain are being blasted for being capitalists. He then tells readers:

“Romney is going to have to define a vision of modern capitalism. …. Let’s face it, he’s not a heroic entrepreneur. He’s an efficiency expert.”

Brooks is certainly right that Romney is not a heroic entrepreneur, but it doesn’t follow that he is necessarily an efficiency expert either. The private equity folks like to tell stories of how they find poorly managed companies, clean them up, and then sell them for a big profit. 

Undoubtedly there are cases where this is true, but these are likely the minority of companies that are taken over by private equity (PE) firms. Finding companies that can be quickly turned around by better management is not easy. After all, if it were easy to find better management, someone would have done it already (economist humor).

What PE is very good at is taking advantage of tax dodges. It’s likely that your stodgy family-run business has not kept up-to-date with the state of the art tax avoidance schemes. However PE companies do, and there can be big bucks in applying these modern tax avoidance schemes to old-fashioned businesses.

To see this, let’s take a simple example. Suppose an old widget company was operating with a ratio of debt to book value of 20 percent. Let’s assume that its book value is $1,000 million and its debt $200 million, leaving shareholders’ equity of $800 million.

For simplicity, assume the combination of before tax profit and interest is 10 percent or $100 million. The company will  then pay 6 percent interest ($12 million) on its debt. This leaves before tax profit of $88 million. if it pays a 35 percent tax rate, then its after tax profit is $57.2 million, as shown below.

private-equity-fig-1-07-2012

 

Now suppose some clever PE types come in. One of the first things they will likely do is borrow a substantial amount, let’s say $600 million. They will use this money to repay much of the $800 million purchase price of company. The interest burden on the higher $800 million in debt ($600 million in new debt plus the old $200 million) is $48 million, leaving $52 million in before tax profits. Assuming that the company still pays 35 percent of its profits in taxes, its after-tax profit as a PE-owned company is $33.8 million.

While this means that our PE folks are taking home less from the widget company than the old-fashioned family owners, it is important to remember that they have gotten most of their money out of the operation. They only have $200 million invested, as compared to the $800 million invested by the previous owner, as illustrated below.

private-equity-fig-2-07-2012

This means in principle that the Romney-Bain folks can find three other widget companies. If they do the same deal with each, they will manage to pocket over $135 million compared to the $57.2 million earned with the same amount of capital by the prior family owner.

Note that this increase in profitability assumes nothing about efficiency. In this story the Romney-Bain gang did nothing to improve the operation of the factory. They just found ways to reduce its tax liability.

This is clearly an overly-simplistic story, but it does illustrate how PE companies can make large profits without doing anything to increase efficiency. This is one of the ways in which PE companies make money. To get the full list, read the work of my colleague Eileen Appelbaum.

But the important point is that PE companies can make lots of money for themselves in ways that do not involve increasing efficiency. In other words, contrary to what Brooks told readers, there is no reason to assume that just because Romney got rich in PE that he is an efficiency expert.

Bill Keller used his NYT column today to outline a series of myths about President Obama’s health care plan. At one point he tells readers:

“I’m a pretty devout capitalist, and I see that in some cases individual responsibility helps contain wasteful spending on health care. If you have to share the cost of that extra M.R.I. or elective surgery, you’ll think hard about whether you really need it.”

The irony here is that under the current system it is government intervention that makes “the cost of that extra M.R.I.” expensive. The direct cost of an M.R.I., the electricity, the time of technicians to run the machine and the time of a doctor to read the results are relatively low. The machine itself however is expensive, because of government granted patent monopolies.

If M.R.I.s were sold in a free market, where anyone could copy the technology and sell an M.R.I. device for whatever the market would bear, then the cost of M.R.I. tests would not be a major issue.

Bill Keller used his NYT column today to outline a series of myths about President Obama’s health care plan. At one point he tells readers:

“I’m a pretty devout capitalist, and I see that in some cases individual responsibility helps contain wasteful spending on health care. If you have to share the cost of that extra M.R.I. or elective surgery, you’ll think hard about whether you really need it.”

The irony here is that under the current system it is government intervention that makes “the cost of that extra M.R.I.” expensive. The direct cost of an M.R.I., the electricity, the time of technicians to run the machine and the time of a doctor to read the results are relatively low. The machine itself however is expensive, because of government granted patent monopolies.

If M.R.I.s were sold in a free market, where anyone could copy the technology and sell an M.R.I. device for whatever the market would bear, then the cost of M.R.I. tests would not be a major issue.

That what readers of his column calling President Obama a “distributionalist” and Governor Romney an “expansionist” must have concluded. Samuelson tells readers:

“By ‘distributionalist,’ I mean that Obama sees government as an instrument to promote economic and social justice by redistributing the bounty of a wealthy society. Economic growth is not ignored but tends to be taken for granted or treated as a less important priority. How else, for example, to explain Obama’s decision to push the Affordable Care Act (the ACA or ‘Obamacare’) — a huge new social program — in the midst of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression?”

There are a couple of obvious answers to Samuelson’s “how else” question. First, President Obama made a stimulus package the first priority of his administration. His big mistake was that he listened to what the mainstream of the economics profession was saying at the time, and therefore believed that this would not be “the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression.”

For those unable to remember back to 2009, many Republicans argued that the economy did not need any boost at all. This would include many of the people who Samuelson would no doubt call “expansionist.”

The other obvious answer to Samuelson’s question is that the key provisions in the ACA do not kick in until 2014, when most projections in 2009 showed the economy to have largely recovered from the downturn. This means that, insofar as the bill has negative impacts on the economy (it’s certainly not obvious why it would) the expectation at the time is that these would not be felt until the economy had pretty much recovered from the downturn. It is also worth noting that the ACA includes cost control provisions (Samuelson probably was unable to find a copy of the bill) that would, if effective, limit the extent to which health care costs pose a drain on the economy in the long-term.

Samuelson’s main reason for calling Romney an expansionist is that he wants to give more tax breaks to rich people. There is no evidence that this will lead to more rapid economic growth, although it will undoubtedly make rich people richer.

Romney also wants to get rid of regulations that limit the ability of too big to fail banks from getting even more profit from their implicit government subsidies. While this will also put more money in the pockets of the very wealthy, it has no obvious connection to economic growth. In fact, by diverting resources from productive sectors of the economy to the financial sector, Romney’s path would likely slow growth.

The evidence would suggest that Romney can best be characterized as a “distributionalist” in Samuelson’s terms, although his plan to is to redistribute upward.

That what readers of his column calling President Obama a “distributionalist” and Governor Romney an “expansionist” must have concluded. Samuelson tells readers:

“By ‘distributionalist,’ I mean that Obama sees government as an instrument to promote economic and social justice by redistributing the bounty of a wealthy society. Economic growth is not ignored but tends to be taken for granted or treated as a less important priority. How else, for example, to explain Obama’s decision to push the Affordable Care Act (the ACA or ‘Obamacare’) — a huge new social program — in the midst of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression?”

There are a couple of obvious answers to Samuelson’s “how else” question. First, President Obama made a stimulus package the first priority of his administration. His big mistake was that he listened to what the mainstream of the economics profession was saying at the time, and therefore believed that this would not be “the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression.”

For those unable to remember back to 2009, many Republicans argued that the economy did not need any boost at all. This would include many of the people who Samuelson would no doubt call “expansionist.”

The other obvious answer to Samuelson’s question is that the key provisions in the ACA do not kick in until 2014, when most projections in 2009 showed the economy to have largely recovered from the downturn. This means that, insofar as the bill has negative impacts on the economy (it’s certainly not obvious why it would) the expectation at the time is that these would not be felt until the economy had pretty much recovered from the downturn. It is also worth noting that the ACA includes cost control provisions (Samuelson probably was unable to find a copy of the bill) that would, if effective, limit the extent to which health care costs pose a drain on the economy in the long-term.

Samuelson’s main reason for calling Romney an expansionist is that he wants to give more tax breaks to rich people. There is no evidence that this will lead to more rapid economic growth, although it will undoubtedly make rich people richer.

Romney also wants to get rid of regulations that limit the ability of too big to fail banks from getting even more profit from their implicit government subsidies. While this will also put more money in the pockets of the very wealthy, it has no obvious connection to economic growth. In fact, by diverting resources from productive sectors of the economy to the financial sector, Romney’s path would likely slow growth.

The evidence would suggest that Romney can best be characterized as a “distributionalist” in Samuelson’s terms, although his plan to is to redistribute upward.

Okay, it’s not quite insider trading, but the NYT has an excellent article on how some hedge funds apparently get advance access to analysts’ reports on companies’ prospects.

Okay, it’s not quite insider trading, but the NYT has an excellent article on how some hedge funds apparently get advance access to analysts’ reports on companies’ prospects.

Wow, you just have to sit back in awe at something like this. Imagine the lead sports story the day after the Superbowl. It talks about who had a good day, the big plays, the big mistakes, and it never once mentions the score of the game. That is pretty much what the Post managed to do in a front page business section piece on the future of manufacturing in the United States.

If the Post noted the value of the dollar, which is the prime determinant of the relative cost of good produced in other countries and good produced in the United States, then it could have worked through some simple logic. The United States as a country will continue to consume manufactured goods. It is likely that thirty or forty years in the future we will still have cars, computer-like objects, houses made of manufactured materials, etc.

If we don’t manufacture these items here then we will have to import them. If we will import them, we will either have to export something else to pay for these imports or the rest of the world will have to give us manufactured goods for free. Something like the latter is happening now as China and other developing countries are buying up dollar denominated assets to keep up the value of the dollar against their currencies.

Essentially they are paying us to buy their stuff by making their products cheaper than they would otherwise be. This seems to be a useful development strategy at the moment, both because it helps to harness demand for their products and also because it allows them to accumulate massive amounts of dollar reserves which they believe are essential in an incompetently managed international financial system.

However, it is unlikely that situation will exist forever. China and other developing countries can pay their own people to buy their stuff, so it is not essential for them to indefinitely maintain huge export markets in the United States. Also, at some point they will presumably have enough reserves to get them through an inconceivable financial crisis.

This then raises the issue of how we will pay for the goods we import. While the popular line is “services,” this is mostly said by people who have not looked at the data. We would need an incredible a five-fold expansion of our surplus in services to even cover our current deficit. It would need to grow by a factor of ten if we lost all manufacturing in the U.S.

Furthermore, many trends in services point in the opposite direction. For example, we already have a large deficit with India in software services. This will certainly grow larger over time, and Indian software engineers will almost certainly drive us out of third countries as well.

We have a surplus on financial services, but this may slip if taxpayers got tired of subsidizing too big to fail Wall Street banks. One growing area of service exports is fees for royalties on patents and copyrights. This may grow if we have the economic and military power to impose more protectionist trade pacts (called “Free Trade Agreements” in Orwellian Washington newspeak), but that seems unlikely as countries like India are frequently insisting on paying free market prices for drugs.

The one rapidly growing area of surplus in services is tourism. Perhaps the future American workforce will be cleaning toilets and making beds for the rest of the world, since we will no longer be set up to manufacture goods.

Alternatively, the dollar might just fall so that the U.S. is again competitive in manufactured goods. That is the econ 101 story.

Wow, you just have to sit back in awe at something like this. Imagine the lead sports story the day after the Superbowl. It talks about who had a good day, the big plays, the big mistakes, and it never once mentions the score of the game. That is pretty much what the Post managed to do in a front page business section piece on the future of manufacturing in the United States.

If the Post noted the value of the dollar, which is the prime determinant of the relative cost of good produced in other countries and good produced in the United States, then it could have worked through some simple logic. The United States as a country will continue to consume manufactured goods. It is likely that thirty or forty years in the future we will still have cars, computer-like objects, houses made of manufactured materials, etc.

If we don’t manufacture these items here then we will have to import them. If we will import them, we will either have to export something else to pay for these imports or the rest of the world will have to give us manufactured goods for free. Something like the latter is happening now as China and other developing countries are buying up dollar denominated assets to keep up the value of the dollar against their currencies.

Essentially they are paying us to buy their stuff by making their products cheaper than they would otherwise be. This seems to be a useful development strategy at the moment, both because it helps to harness demand for their products and also because it allows them to accumulate massive amounts of dollar reserves which they believe are essential in an incompetently managed international financial system.

However, it is unlikely that situation will exist forever. China and other developing countries can pay their own people to buy their stuff, so it is not essential for them to indefinitely maintain huge export markets in the United States. Also, at some point they will presumably have enough reserves to get them through an inconceivable financial crisis.

This then raises the issue of how we will pay for the goods we import. While the popular line is “services,” this is mostly said by people who have not looked at the data. We would need an incredible a five-fold expansion of our surplus in services to even cover our current deficit. It would need to grow by a factor of ten if we lost all manufacturing in the U.S.

Furthermore, many trends in services point in the opposite direction. For example, we already have a large deficit with India in software services. This will certainly grow larger over time, and Indian software engineers will almost certainly drive us out of third countries as well.

We have a surplus on financial services, but this may slip if taxpayers got tired of subsidizing too big to fail Wall Street banks. One growing area of service exports is fees for royalties on patents and copyrights. This may grow if we have the economic and military power to impose more protectionist trade pacts (called “Free Trade Agreements” in Orwellian Washington newspeak), but that seems unlikely as countries like India are frequently insisting on paying free market prices for drugs.

The one rapidly growing area of surplus in services is tourism. Perhaps the future American workforce will be cleaning toilets and making beds for the rest of the world, since we will no longer be set up to manufacture goods.

Alternatively, the dollar might just fall so that the U.S. is again competitive in manufactured goods. That is the econ 101 story.

I really wanted to ignore David Brooks’ piece today, but he was saying excessively silly things in criticizing my friend, Chris Hayes. Specifically, he was responding to the main point of Chris’s new book, The Twilight of the Elites, that the elites have become corrupt and inbred.

Brooks tells us that Chris is wrong:

“I’d say today’s meritocratic elites achieve and preserve their status not mainly by being corrupt but mainly by being ambitious and disciplined.”

Is that so? Perhaps Brooks can tell us what Erskine Bowles did for the $335,000 that he earned as a director of Morgan Stanley in 2008. That year might ring a bell, since that was the year that Morgan Stanley was at the center of the financial crisis. It would have gone bankrupt had it not been for a rescue by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke.

Bernanke used his emergency powers to allow Morgan Stanley to become a bank holding company in the middle of the crisis. This gave the bank the protection of the Fed and the FDIC, halting a bank run that would almost certainly have wiped out the bank. Did the stockholders of Morgan Stanley get $335,000 (more than ten times the median wage in 2008) of value out of Erskine Bowles for his work in 2008?

Of course Bowles is not the only member of the elite who does not seem to provide value for his money. Robert Rubin pocketed over $100 million in his role as a top exec at Citigroup even as that bank was spiraling toward bankruptcy, until it also was rescued by the nanny state.

Anyone who has ever been to Washington knows the town is chock full of 6-figure buffoons: people with no obvious skills who manage to get paychecks that are 5-10 times as high as those of people who work for a living. These people are ambitious and disciplined in that they know to avoid saying anything that will jeopardize their paychecks, but it is hard to see anything else that would justify their salaries.

I really wanted to ignore David Brooks’ piece today, but he was saying excessively silly things in criticizing my friend, Chris Hayes. Specifically, he was responding to the main point of Chris’s new book, The Twilight of the Elites, that the elites have become corrupt and inbred.

Brooks tells us that Chris is wrong:

“I’d say today’s meritocratic elites achieve and preserve their status not mainly by being corrupt but mainly by being ambitious and disciplined.”

Is that so? Perhaps Brooks can tell us what Erskine Bowles did for the $335,000 that he earned as a director of Morgan Stanley in 2008. That year might ring a bell, since that was the year that Morgan Stanley was at the center of the financial crisis. It would have gone bankrupt had it not been for a rescue by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke.

Bernanke used his emergency powers to allow Morgan Stanley to become a bank holding company in the middle of the crisis. This gave the bank the protection of the Fed and the FDIC, halting a bank run that would almost certainly have wiped out the bank. Did the stockholders of Morgan Stanley get $335,000 (more than ten times the median wage in 2008) of value out of Erskine Bowles for his work in 2008?

Of course Bowles is not the only member of the elite who does not seem to provide value for his money. Robert Rubin pocketed over $100 million in his role as a top exec at Citigroup even as that bank was spiraling toward bankruptcy, until it also was rescued by the nanny state.

Anyone who has ever been to Washington knows the town is chock full of 6-figure buffoons: people with no obvious skills who manage to get paychecks that are 5-10 times as high as those of people who work for a living. These people are ambitious and disciplined in that they know to avoid saying anything that will jeopardize their paychecks, but it is hard to see anything else that would justify their salaries.

Birthday Boasts

Okay folks, today is my birthday so I’m going to be a bit self-indulgent here. Below is list of a number of important policy areas where I have been right at a time when the bulk of the economics profession was wrong. Yes, this is old-fashioned “I told you so” stuff. It can be seen as a bit arrogant and a bit obnoxious, but you have been warned. I also understand that being right against the economics profession is not a terribly high bar. But hey, that is the competition. 1) The NAIRU Ain’t 6.0 Percent or Anything Like It The conventional wisdom in the economics profession in the early and mid-90s was that if the unemployment rate fell much below 6.0 percent then inflation would accelerate out of control. This view was held not only by conservatives but also by more liberal voices within the mainstream like former Federal Reserve Board governors Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen. Even Paul Krugman got this one wrong, comparing the economists who questioned the NAIRU theory to the scientists who questioned the existence of a hole in the ozone layer ("Voodoo Revisited." The International Economy. November-December, 1995, pp 14-19). I argued the case against the NAIRU in Chapter 16 of Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy. The book was published in 1998, but the first draft was in early 1996 when those of us who questioned the 6.0 percent NAIRU could still bank on a heavy dose of ridicule. For those who need reminding, the unemployment rate fell below 5.0 percent in 1997 and eventually hit 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000. There was virtually no uptick in inflation through this period, until a rise in commodity prices in 2000 finally began sending the rate of inflation somewhat higher 2) The Consumer Price Index Does not Substantially Overstate Inflation Another big craze of the mid-90s was the claim that the consumer price index (CPI) substantially overstates the true rate of inflation. This sentiment peaked with the verdict of the Boskin Commission, consisting of five eminent economists who were appointed by the Senate Finance Committee to evaluate the accuracy of the CPI. In December of 1996 they came out with their report claiming that the CPI overstated the true rate of inflation by 1.1 percentage points. This was intended to be used as a rationale to reduce the size of the annual cost of living adjustment to Social Security. (Note that the cut is cumulative: after ten years it is roughly 11 percent, after 20 years it is roughly 22 percent.) It also would have changed the indexation of tax brackets in a way that would have led to higher tax rates for most people. Almost no economists were prepared to publicly challenge the Boskin Commission while many were happy to jump on the bandwagon.
Okay folks, today is my birthday so I’m going to be a bit self-indulgent here. Below is list of a number of important policy areas where I have been right at a time when the bulk of the economics profession was wrong. Yes, this is old-fashioned “I told you so” stuff. It can be seen as a bit arrogant and a bit obnoxious, but you have been warned. I also understand that being right against the economics profession is not a terribly high bar. But hey, that is the competition. 1) The NAIRU Ain’t 6.0 Percent or Anything Like It The conventional wisdom in the economics profession in the early and mid-90s was that if the unemployment rate fell much below 6.0 percent then inflation would accelerate out of control. This view was held not only by conservatives but also by more liberal voices within the mainstream like former Federal Reserve Board governors Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen. Even Paul Krugman got this one wrong, comparing the economists who questioned the NAIRU theory to the scientists who questioned the existence of a hole in the ozone layer ("Voodoo Revisited." The International Economy. November-December, 1995, pp 14-19). I argued the case against the NAIRU in Chapter 16 of Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy. The book was published in 1998, but the first draft was in early 1996 when those of us who questioned the 6.0 percent NAIRU could still bank on a heavy dose of ridicule. For those who need reminding, the unemployment rate fell below 5.0 percent in 1997 and eventually hit 4.0 percent as a year-round average in 2000. There was virtually no uptick in inflation through this period, until a rise in commodity prices in 2000 finally began sending the rate of inflation somewhat higher 2) The Consumer Price Index Does not Substantially Overstate Inflation Another big craze of the mid-90s was the claim that the consumer price index (CPI) substantially overstates the true rate of inflation. This sentiment peaked with the verdict of the Boskin Commission, consisting of five eminent economists who were appointed by the Senate Finance Committee to evaluate the accuracy of the CPI. In December of 1996 they came out with their report claiming that the CPI overstated the true rate of inflation by 1.1 percentage points. This was intended to be used as a rationale to reduce the size of the annual cost of living adjustment to Social Security. (Note that the cut is cumulative: after ten years it is roughly 11 percent, after 20 years it is roughly 22 percent.) It also would have changed the indexation of tax brackets in a way that would have led to higher tax rates for most people. Almost no economists were prepared to publicly challenge the Boskin Commission while many were happy to jump on the bandwagon.
The Washington Post editorial board is firmly non-committal on the question of whether the Fed should take more steps to boost the economy. On the pro side we have the fact that the economy is well-below full employment and growing slowly. Furthermore, the Post acknowledges that there is no threat of inflation. Given the Fed's twin mandates for full employment and price stability, it seems like we have a clear answer here. But no, that would be too easy. The Post tells us: "The Fed may also need to save ammunition to help deal with a financial collapse in Europe." That sounds profound and important. Let's see, the Fed must save ammunition in case something really bad happens in Europe. But wait, isn't the Fed's ammunition the reserves it can issue? And, isn't the only real limit on the amount of reserves it can issue the concern about inflation? In other words, if it throws too much money out there and we don't have the ability to produce the goods and services to meet the demand, then we would get inflation. However, the Europe disaster story is one where we are seeing a further hit to demand as Europe's economy implodes. How does it help in that situation that the Fed restrained itself in boosting the economy today? In fact, any boost to the U.S. economy will help, at least modestly, to boost European economies, thereby making an implosion less likely. Therefore concerns about an imploding Europe should provide yet another argument for more stimulus from the Fed. Finally the Post tells us: "Rather, slow growth may reflect structural factors, such as the huge household debt burden, which is declining but still equal to 83.6 percent of GDP. Then there’s the federal government’s out-of-whack tax and entitlement policies, and the uncertainty they generate. "By effectively transferring much private and government debt onto its own balance sheet, the Fed bought time for the U.S. economy to rebalance under relatively benign conditions. Companies and households have used the time so far to deleverage significantly. More monetary easing now might buy the economy even more time to heal. But soon it will be government’s turn to adjust; the Fed can prop up growth, not engineer a permanent escape from fiscal reality."
The Washington Post editorial board is firmly non-committal on the question of whether the Fed should take more steps to boost the economy. On the pro side we have the fact that the economy is well-below full employment and growing slowly. Furthermore, the Post acknowledges that there is no threat of inflation. Given the Fed's twin mandates for full employment and price stability, it seems like we have a clear answer here. But no, that would be too easy. The Post tells us: "The Fed may also need to save ammunition to help deal with a financial collapse in Europe." That sounds profound and important. Let's see, the Fed must save ammunition in case something really bad happens in Europe. But wait, isn't the Fed's ammunition the reserves it can issue? And, isn't the only real limit on the amount of reserves it can issue the concern about inflation? In other words, if it throws too much money out there and we don't have the ability to produce the goods and services to meet the demand, then we would get inflation. However, the Europe disaster story is one where we are seeing a further hit to demand as Europe's economy implodes. How does it help in that situation that the Fed restrained itself in boosting the economy today? In fact, any boost to the U.S. economy will help, at least modestly, to boost European economies, thereby making an implosion less likely. Therefore concerns about an imploding Europe should provide yet another argument for more stimulus from the Fed. Finally the Post tells us: "Rather, slow growth may reflect structural factors, such as the huge household debt burden, which is declining but still equal to 83.6 percent of GDP. Then there’s the federal government’s out-of-whack tax and entitlement policies, and the uncertainty they generate. "By effectively transferring much private and government debt onto its own balance sheet, the Fed bought time for the U.S. economy to rebalance under relatively benign conditions. Companies and households have used the time so far to deleverage significantly. More monetary easing now might buy the economy even more time to heal. But soon it will be government’s turn to adjust; the Fed can prop up growth, not engineer a permanent escape from fiscal reality."

Economic theory predicts that when the price of a product substantially exceed its marginal cost that we should expect corruption. Economists usually use this prediction to complain about trade barriers that can the price of protected products by 15-20 percent above their free market price. Somehow they ignore the implication of this prediction when it comes to patent monopolies for prescription drugs that raise prices by many thousand percent above their free market.

This is the basis for the NYT series “Patent Monopolies Lead to Corruption” which documents instances where the market performs as predicted and drug companies or other actors rip off patients, insurers, or the government to maximize their profit from these monopolies. Today’s installment is about how doctors can charge ten times as much for pills dispensed in their office as would be charged by a pharmacy. As with all the other pieces in this series, there is no discussion of the importance of patent monopolies in this story or that we might have more efficient ways to finance development of new drugs.

Economic theory predicts that when the price of a product substantially exceed its marginal cost that we should expect corruption. Economists usually use this prediction to complain about trade barriers that can the price of protected products by 15-20 percent above their free market price. Somehow they ignore the implication of this prediction when it comes to patent monopolies for prescription drugs that raise prices by many thousand percent above their free market.

This is the basis for the NYT series “Patent Monopolies Lead to Corruption” which documents instances where the market performs as predicted and drug companies or other actors rip off patients, insurers, or the government to maximize their profit from these monopolies. Today’s installment is about how doctors can charge ten times as much for pills dispensed in their office as would be charged by a pharmacy. As with all the other pieces in this series, there is no discussion of the importance of patent monopolies in this story or that we might have more efficient ways to finance development of new drugs.

Want to search in the archives?

¿Quieres buscar en los archivos?

Click Here Haga clic aquí