Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

It is widely known that for Washington Post columnists writing on economics, ignorance is an asset. Megan McArdle helps make the case in a piece on Chicago’s pensions that tells readers in its headline: “Chicago kept saying it would pay for pensions later. Well, it’s later.” The gist of the piece is that Chicago has seriously underfunded public pensions. This is true. Where McArdle combats reality is in implying that this sort of underfunding is typical for public pensions and also that the same logic applies to the federal budget. McArdle absolves the current mayor, Lori Lightfoot, of blame (she just took office four months ago), as well as her immediate predecessor, Rahm Emanuel, who served two full terms. Instead she tells us: “Rather, it’s the fault of generations of politicians before them who promised an ever-richer array of benefits to government workers. Particularly, they liked to raise the retirement benefits. … “Oh, ho, ho, ho. Pay for the pensions? No, we have to stop; some politician might be reading this, and they could really hurt themselves laughing too hard. The whole point of giving workers pension benefits instead of cash was that you didn’t have to pay for them; you could promise the benefits now and gather up the votes that the grateful workers tossed at your feet, all without costing current taxpayers a single dime.” There are two big problems with McArdle’s story here. First the story of grossly underfunded pensions is not generally true. Most are reasonably well funded because politicians were not hurting themselves laughing, but rather were responsibly setting aside money for the liabilities facing state and local governments. (This briefing paper from Brookings gives a good assessment of the financial state of public pensions.) The real story is that Chicago, along with some other state and local governments with seriously underfunded pensions, are outliers. But even in the case of Chicago, McArdle did not get the story right. Its shortfall was not the work of “generations of politicians.” Rather it was the result of a specific event – the stock bubble of the late 1990s.
It is widely known that for Washington Post columnists writing on economics, ignorance is an asset. Megan McArdle helps make the case in a piece on Chicago’s pensions that tells readers in its headline: “Chicago kept saying it would pay for pensions later. Well, it’s later.” The gist of the piece is that Chicago has seriously underfunded public pensions. This is true. Where McArdle combats reality is in implying that this sort of underfunding is typical for public pensions and also that the same logic applies to the federal budget. McArdle absolves the current mayor, Lori Lightfoot, of blame (she just took office four months ago), as well as her immediate predecessor, Rahm Emanuel, who served two full terms. Instead she tells us: “Rather, it’s the fault of generations of politicians before them who promised an ever-richer array of benefits to government workers. Particularly, they liked to raise the retirement benefits. … “Oh, ho, ho, ho. Pay for the pensions? No, we have to stop; some politician might be reading this, and they could really hurt themselves laughing too hard. The whole point of giving workers pension benefits instead of cash was that you didn’t have to pay for them; you could promise the benefits now and gather up the votes that the grateful workers tossed at your feet, all without costing current taxpayers a single dime.” There are two big problems with McArdle’s story here. First the story of grossly underfunded pensions is not generally true. Most are reasonably well funded because politicians were not hurting themselves laughing, but rather were responsibly setting aside money for the liabilities facing state and local governments. (This briefing paper from Brookings gives a good assessment of the financial state of public pensions.) The real story is that Chicago, along with some other state and local governments with seriously underfunded pensions, are outliers. But even in the case of Chicago, McArdle did not get the story right. Its shortfall was not the work of “generations of politicians.” Rather it was the result of a specific event – the stock bubble of the late 1990s.

“The idea of guaranteed income is gaining traction, from the presidential debate stage to Silicon Valley, where tech titans such as Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk have promoted it as a way to fend off a gloomy future in which automation and climate change eliminate millions of jobs.”

This came up as a throwaway line in an article about a trial program for a guaranteed basic income. The problem is that the type of job losses being described here are 180 percent opposite from each other.

Job loss from automation is ostensibly from too much productivity — we don’t need workers. (There is zero evidence for this story, but no one ever said that Mark Zuckerberg or Elon Musk had a clue about the economy.) Job loss attributed to addressing climate change is the result of too little productivity. The story (most get this wrong) is that there is plenty of work for people to do, such as retrofitting buildings and installing solar panels, but that with less energy use, the economy is less productive, and therefore these jobs pay less and workers don’t want to do them.

This is all very tangential to the article, but a serious paper should get these points right if it is going to print them.   

“The idea of guaranteed income is gaining traction, from the presidential debate stage to Silicon Valley, where tech titans such as Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk have promoted it as a way to fend off a gloomy future in which automation and climate change eliminate millions of jobs.”

This came up as a throwaway line in an article about a trial program for a guaranteed basic income. The problem is that the type of job losses being described here are 180 percent opposite from each other.

Job loss from automation is ostensibly from too much productivity — we don’t need workers. (There is zero evidence for this story, but no one ever said that Mark Zuckerberg or Elon Musk had a clue about the economy.) Job loss attributed to addressing climate change is the result of too little productivity. The story (most get this wrong) is that there is plenty of work for people to do, such as retrofitting buildings and installing solar panels, but that with less energy use, the economy is less productive, and therefore these jobs pay less and workers don’t want to do them.

This is all very tangential to the article, but a serious paper should get these points right if it is going to print them.   

No Recession for 2020

These days the business press is full of predictions of recessions. This could get people worried, except that the track record of economists in predicting recessions is basically awful. As much fun as a bunch of scary warnings from economists is, it is best to look at the data. At the most basic level it is important to recognize that some sectors are very cyclical, meaning they grow rapidly in upturns and fall sharply in recessions, and others tend not to fluctuate very much over the course of a business cycle. The cyclical group is led by housing construction, durable goods consumption (cars and big household appliances), non-residential construction, equipment investment, and inventories. These components of demand tend to plunge in a recession. On the other hand, we have several components of demand that are mostly unresponsive to the business cycle. Spending on consumer services (largely medical spending and rent) varies little over the course of the business cycle. Spending on consumer services fell just 0.3 percent in 2009 and actually rose through all prior post-war recessions. The story is similar for investment in intellectual products like software and pharmaceutical research. This component of GDP fell by just 0.5 percent in 2009. While this category of spending did fall slightly in the recession following the late 1990s tech boom, the decline from 2000 to 2001 (the sharpest annual falloff) was just 0.8 percent. This point about the varying cyclicality of different sectors matters for recession predictions, because the highly cyclical components have shrunk sharply as a share of the economy in the last four decades, as the less cyclical components have grown.  This is seen most clearly with residential construction, the most cyclical component of GDP. Residential construction peaked at 6.7 percent of GDP during the housing boom before the Great Recession, it was just 3.7 percent of GDP in the most recent quarter. It was 5.7 percent of GDP before the 1980-82 recessions and 4.8 percent of GDP before Fed interest rate hikes began slowing construction in advance of the 1990 recession.
These days the business press is full of predictions of recessions. This could get people worried, except that the track record of economists in predicting recessions is basically awful. As much fun as a bunch of scary warnings from economists is, it is best to look at the data. At the most basic level it is important to recognize that some sectors are very cyclical, meaning they grow rapidly in upturns and fall sharply in recessions, and others tend not to fluctuate very much over the course of a business cycle. The cyclical group is led by housing construction, durable goods consumption (cars and big household appliances), non-residential construction, equipment investment, and inventories. These components of demand tend to plunge in a recession. On the other hand, we have several components of demand that are mostly unresponsive to the business cycle. Spending on consumer services (largely medical spending and rent) varies little over the course of the business cycle. Spending on consumer services fell just 0.3 percent in 2009 and actually rose through all prior post-war recessions. The story is similar for investment in intellectual products like software and pharmaceutical research. This component of GDP fell by just 0.5 percent in 2009. While this category of spending did fall slightly in the recession following the late 1990s tech boom, the decline from 2000 to 2001 (the sharpest annual falloff) was just 0.8 percent. This point about the varying cyclicality of different sectors matters for recession predictions, because the highly cyclical components have shrunk sharply as a share of the economy in the last four decades, as the less cyclical components have grown.  This is seen most clearly with residential construction, the most cyclical component of GDP. Residential construction peaked at 6.7 percent of GDP during the housing boom before the Great Recession, it was just 3.7 percent of GDP in the most recent quarter. It was 5.7 percent of GDP before the 1980-82 recessions and 4.8 percent of GDP before Fed interest rate hikes began slowing construction in advance of the 1990 recession.

It’s probably too simple and obvious to be worth mentioning, but it seems none of the news coverage on the suits against opioid manufacturers says that the reason that companies like Purdue Pharma and Johnson & Johnson had so much incentive to push their drugs was that the government gave them patent monopolies that allowed them to sell their products for prices that were far above the free market level. While generic manufacturers also made money on opioids, the largest profits were made by the brand manufacturers, who also did the most pushing.

One of the unintended consequences of government-granted patent monopolies is that it gives companies an incentive to mislead physicians and the general public about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs. The costs from the resulting improper care can be enormous, as we showed in a short paper five years ago.

This should be a strong argument for alternatives to patent financed research, such as the $40 billion in direct public funding that now goes through the National Institutes of Health. Unfortunately, the idea of alternatives to patent-financed pharmaceutical research, which would allow all new drugs to sell at generic prices, saving close to $400 billion annually (1.8 percent of GDP), is too radical for U.S. politicians.

It’s probably too simple and obvious to be worth mentioning, but it seems none of the news coverage on the suits against opioid manufacturers says that the reason that companies like Purdue Pharma and Johnson & Johnson had so much incentive to push their drugs was that the government gave them patent monopolies that allowed them to sell their products for prices that were far above the free market level. While generic manufacturers also made money on opioids, the largest profits were made by the brand manufacturers, who also did the most pushing.

One of the unintended consequences of government-granted patent monopolies is that it gives companies an incentive to mislead physicians and the general public about the safety and effectiveness of their drugs. The costs from the resulting improper care can be enormous, as we showed in a short paper five years ago.

This should be a strong argument for alternatives to patent financed research, such as the $40 billion in direct public funding that now goes through the National Institutes of Health. Unfortunately, the idea of alternatives to patent-financed pharmaceutical research, which would allow all new drugs to sell at generic prices, saving close to $400 billion annually (1.8 percent of GDP), is too radical for U.S. politicians.

China Goes Generic!

The New York Times had a piece about a new law in China that reduced penalties for importing drugs that have not been approved by China’s regulatory agency. While it is not clear from the piece how far-reaching this change in the law will be in practice, the potential impact for both China and the world is enormous.

India has continued to be a massive supplier of generic drugs, both to its own people, but also to the rest of the world. Many drugs that are subject to patent protection in the United States are available at free market prices in India. The gap in prices is often more than 100 to 1. (India’s generics vary in quality, but their largest manufacturers are comparable in quality to U.S. manufacturers.)

The United States has been pushing for years to force India to narrow the scope of its generic industry, making its patent system closer to the U.S. system. While there is support for such a change in India, there is also massive opposition to a move that would hugely raise domestic drug prices and cripple one of its leading industries.

If China were to become a large-scale buyer of India’s generic drugs it would provide a large boost to the country’s industry and make it less likely it would give in to U.S. demands. This matters not only for the Chinese and Indian markets, but it raises the prospect where most of the world might be paying a few hundred dollars for drugs for which Pfizer and Merck are charging people in the United States and Europe hundreds of thousands of dollars.

That might not prove tenable in the long-run.

The New York Times had a piece about a new law in China that reduced penalties for importing drugs that have not been approved by China’s regulatory agency. While it is not clear from the piece how far-reaching this change in the law will be in practice, the potential impact for both China and the world is enormous.

India has continued to be a massive supplier of generic drugs, both to its own people, but also to the rest of the world. Many drugs that are subject to patent protection in the United States are available at free market prices in India. The gap in prices is often more than 100 to 1. (India’s generics vary in quality, but their largest manufacturers are comparable in quality to U.S. manufacturers.)

The United States has been pushing for years to force India to narrow the scope of its generic industry, making its patent system closer to the U.S. system. While there is support for such a change in India, there is also massive opposition to a move that would hugely raise domestic drug prices and cripple one of its leading industries.

If China were to become a large-scale buyer of India’s generic drugs it would provide a large boost to the country’s industry and make it less likely it would give in to U.S. demands. This matters not only for the Chinese and Indian markets, but it raises the prospect where most of the world might be paying a few hundred dollars for drugs for which Pfizer and Merck are charging people in the United States and Europe hundreds of thousands of dollars.

That might not prove tenable in the long-run.

Robert Samuelson Doesn't Like Budget Deficits

He again used his weekly Washington Post column to tell us this. Somehow, our budget deficits are supposed to be a “high-stakes gamble,” although he really has no explanation as to how or why.

The standard economics story on why deficits are supposed to be bad is that they lead to high interest rates, thereby crowding out investment and slowing growth. Alternatively, if the Fed is lax and offsets the impact of the deficit by printing money, then the deficits lead to high inflation.

Fans of data know that neither is the case at present. Long-term interest rates are extraordinarily low, with the 10-year Treasury bond rate hovering near 1.6 percent. It was close to 5.0 percent when we were running budget surpluses under Clinton. Inflation is also low, coming in consistently below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target.

So file this one in the “Robert Samuelson doesn’t like budget deficits” box, right next to the “Dean Baker doesn’t like chocolate ice cream box.” Perhaps it is of some passing interest, but not the sort of thing serious people need to worry about.

He again used his weekly Washington Post column to tell us this. Somehow, our budget deficits are supposed to be a “high-stakes gamble,” although he really has no explanation as to how or why.

The standard economics story on why deficits are supposed to be bad is that they lead to high interest rates, thereby crowding out investment and slowing growth. Alternatively, if the Fed is lax and offsets the impact of the deficit by printing money, then the deficits lead to high inflation.

Fans of data know that neither is the case at present. Long-term interest rates are extraordinarily low, with the 10-year Treasury bond rate hovering near 1.6 percent. It was close to 5.0 percent when we were running budget surpluses under Clinton. Inflation is also low, coming in consistently below the Fed’s 2.0 percent target.

So file this one in the “Robert Samuelson doesn’t like budget deficits” box, right next to the “Dean Baker doesn’t like chocolate ice cream box.” Perhaps it is of some passing interest, but not the sort of thing serious people need to worry about.

Brazil has gotten a huge amount of bad press with the fires in the Amazon with the emphasis on the harm its development policies are doing to efforts to limit global warming. While the policies of Brazil’s right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro, are disastrous, there is an important part of the story that is being left out of most discussions.

The reason that we are worried about global warming is that rich countries, most importantly the United States, have been spewing huge amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere for well over a century while destroying the native forests on their lands. They also have paid to have forests in other countries destroyed in order to meet their resource needs.

This is the context in which the destruction of the Amazon is a worldwide problem of enormous proportions. (The Amazon is a treasure which should be preserved even if global warming was not a crisis, but that is a different matter.)

The blame Brazil story is one where a group of rich boys are sitting around in their mansion eating a huge plate of cookies. Meanwhile, they send the housekeeper from room to make the beds and clean up. After the housekeeper finishes, she sees the last cookie on the plate and begins to reach for it. The rich boys then all yell at her for being greedy for wanting to take the last cookie.

The rich countries’ lack of concern for the environment made it cheaper for them to develop. Now poorer countries, who are struggling to develop, are being told that they need to respect the environment for the good of the planet.

In fact, they do need to respect the environment, but we (the rich countries) have to pay them to do it. After all, it is a problem we created. That may not be a politically popular position here, but it is a politically serious one on a world basis and the only plausible way to limit global warming.

Brazil has gotten a huge amount of bad press with the fires in the Amazon with the emphasis on the harm its development policies are doing to efforts to limit global warming. While the policies of Brazil’s right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro, are disastrous, there is an important part of the story that is being left out of most discussions.

The reason that we are worried about global warming is that rich countries, most importantly the United States, have been spewing huge amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere for well over a century while destroying the native forests on their lands. They also have paid to have forests in other countries destroyed in order to meet their resource needs.

This is the context in which the destruction of the Amazon is a worldwide problem of enormous proportions. (The Amazon is a treasure which should be preserved even if global warming was not a crisis, but that is a different matter.)

The blame Brazil story is one where a group of rich boys are sitting around in their mansion eating a huge plate of cookies. Meanwhile, they send the housekeeper from room to make the beds and clean up. After the housekeeper finishes, she sees the last cookie on the plate and begins to reach for it. The rich boys then all yell at her for being greedy for wanting to take the last cookie.

The rich countries’ lack of concern for the environment made it cheaper for them to develop. Now poorer countries, who are struggling to develop, are being told that they need to respect the environment for the good of the planet.

In fact, they do need to respect the environment, but we (the rich countries) have to pay them to do it. After all, it is a problem we created. That may not be a politically popular position here, but it is a politically serious one on a world basis and the only plausible way to limit global warming.

The U.S. Economy Is NOT the World's Largest

I know that reality often has little place in our political debates, but is there any way we can the New York Times and other news outlets to stop saying that the U.S. economy is the world’s largest? It happens not to be true.

According to the I.M.F., using purchasing power parity measures, which most economists view as the best measure, China passed the United States in 2015 and is now more than 25 percent larger. Maybe reporters and editors get a kick out of saying that the U.S. is the world’s largest economy, but since it happens not to be true, it would be good if they stopped saying it.

I know that reality often has little place in our political debates, but is there any way we can the New York Times and other news outlets to stop saying that the U.S. economy is the world’s largest? It happens not to be true.

According to the I.M.F., using purchasing power parity measures, which most economists view as the best measure, China passed the United States in 2015 and is now more than 25 percent larger. Maybe reporters and editors get a kick out of saying that the U.S. is the world’s largest economy, but since it happens not to be true, it would be good if they stopped saying it.

I know that it is not always easy to write a headline for an article, but this one for a book excerpt should not have been a rush job. The piece, from a new book by Mike Isaac, describes the arrogance and stupidity by Uber and its founder, Travis Kalanick. The gist of the piece (haven’t seen the full book) is that Kalanick was an arrogant jerk who didn’t know what he was doing, but hero-worshipping brainless investors decided that he was a visionary.

Given the argument in the piece, it is absurd to make the claim in the headline that Uber was somehow “lost.” The point is that Uber was never there. Kalanick never had a profitable business model, he just convinced idiots with money to put a lot of it behind his hare-brained project.

Maybe in the future, The New York Times should suggest that headline writers read the piece for which they are writing a headline.

I know that it is not always easy to write a headline for an article, but this one for a book excerpt should not have been a rush job. The piece, from a new book by Mike Isaac, describes the arrogance and stupidity by Uber and its founder, Travis Kalanick. The gist of the piece (haven’t seen the full book) is that Kalanick was an arrogant jerk who didn’t know what he was doing, but hero-worshipping brainless investors decided that he was a visionary.

Given the argument in the piece, it is absurd to make the claim in the headline that Uber was somehow “lost.” The point is that Uber was never there. Kalanick never had a profitable business model, he just convinced idiots with money to put a lot of it behind his hare-brained project.

Maybe in the future, The New York Times should suggest that headline writers read the piece for which they are writing a headline.

Media Go Trumpian on Trade

The New York Times ran an article last week with a headline saying that the 2020 Democratic presidential contenders faced a major problem: "how to be tougher on trade than Trump." Serious readers might have struggled with the idea of getting “tough on trade.” After all, trade is a tool, like a shovel.  How is it possible to get tough on a shovel? While this headline may be especially egregious, it is characteristic of trade coverage which takes an almost entirely Trumpian view of the topic. Trump portrays the issue as one of some countries, most obviously China, benefitting at the expense of the United States. The media take a somewhat different tack on this country versus country story, but they nonetheless embrace the nonsense Trumpian logic. For Trump, at least in his rhetoric, the trade deficit is the central measure of winners and losers. In the case of China, its huge trade surplus with the United States ($420 billion or 2.1 percent of GDP in 2018) makes it Trumpian enemy #1. The trade deficit certainly is a problem for U.S. workers, but this doesn’t mean that China is winning at the expense of the United States, because of “stupid” trade negotiators, as Trump puts it. The U.S. trade deficit with China was not an accident. Both Republican and Democratic administrations signed trade deals that made it as easy as possible to manufacture goods in China and other countries, and then export them back to the United States. In many cases, this meant that large U.S. corporations, like General Electric and Boeing, outsourced parts of their operations to China to take advantage of low cost labor there. In other cases, retailers like Walmart set up low cost supply chains so that they could undercut their competitors in the U.S. market. General Electric, Boeing, Walmart and the rest did not lose from our trade deficit with China. In fact, the trade deficit was the result of their efforts to increase their profits. They have little reason to be unhappy with the trade deals negotiated over the last three decades. It is a different story for workers in the United States. As a result of the exploding trade deficit, we lost 3.4 million manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2007, 20 percent of the jobs in the sector. This is before the collapse of the housing bubble led to the Great Recession. We lost 40 percent of all unionized jobs in manufacturing. It is also important to point out – contrary to what you generally read in the paper – the loss of manufacturing jobs in this seven year period was not part of a longer downward trend. There had been only a modest decline in manufacturing employment over the prior three decades. The claim that we suddenly saw massive job loss in this sector due to automation, which just happened to coincide with the explosion of the trade deficit, is what economists refer to as “nonsense.”
The New York Times ran an article last week with a headline saying that the 2020 Democratic presidential contenders faced a major problem: "how to be tougher on trade than Trump." Serious readers might have struggled with the idea of getting “tough on trade.” After all, trade is a tool, like a shovel.  How is it possible to get tough on a shovel? While this headline may be especially egregious, it is characteristic of trade coverage which takes an almost entirely Trumpian view of the topic. Trump portrays the issue as one of some countries, most obviously China, benefitting at the expense of the United States. The media take a somewhat different tack on this country versus country story, but they nonetheless embrace the nonsense Trumpian logic. For Trump, at least in his rhetoric, the trade deficit is the central measure of winners and losers. In the case of China, its huge trade surplus with the United States ($420 billion or 2.1 percent of GDP in 2018) makes it Trumpian enemy #1. The trade deficit certainly is a problem for U.S. workers, but this doesn’t mean that China is winning at the expense of the United States, because of “stupid” trade negotiators, as Trump puts it. The U.S. trade deficit with China was not an accident. Both Republican and Democratic administrations signed trade deals that made it as easy as possible to manufacture goods in China and other countries, and then export them back to the United States. In many cases, this meant that large U.S. corporations, like General Electric and Boeing, outsourced parts of their operations to China to take advantage of low cost labor there. In other cases, retailers like Walmart set up low cost supply chains so that they could undercut their competitors in the U.S. market. General Electric, Boeing, Walmart and the rest did not lose from our trade deficit with China. In fact, the trade deficit was the result of their efforts to increase their profits. They have little reason to be unhappy with the trade deals negotiated over the last three decades. It is a different story for workers in the United States. As a result of the exploding trade deficit, we lost 3.4 million manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2007, 20 percent of the jobs in the sector. This is before the collapse of the housing bubble led to the Great Recession. We lost 40 percent of all unionized jobs in manufacturing. It is also important to point out – contrary to what you generally read in the paper – the loss of manufacturing jobs in this seven year period was not part of a longer downward trend. There had been only a modest decline in manufacturing employment over the prior three decades. The claim that we suddenly saw massive job loss in this sector due to automation, which just happened to coincide with the explosion of the trade deficit, is what economists refer to as “nonsense.”

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