The Americas Blog

El Blog de las Americas

The Americas Blog seeks to present a more accurate perspective on economic and political developments in the Western Hemisphere than is often presented in the United States. It will provide information that is often ignored, buried, and sometimes misreported in the major U.S. media.

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A new op-ed in the Guardian by Ricardo Hausmann portrays a dystopian fictional Venezuela, one in which the Venezuelan government has run the economy into the ground despite abundant oil wealth, but yet its charismatic president continues to be re-elected through some sort of sinister trickery. Sound familiar? It should: it’s the same tired story repeated in the U.S. and U.K. media almost every day, but in this case Hausmann was apparently given free rein to present his own set of “facts.” It isn’t surprising that Hausmann would write something so divorced from reality; he went to elaborate lengths to invent a conspiracy theory about supposed fraud in Venezuela’s 2004 recall referendum by relying on fake exit polls. An independent panel of statisticians selected by the Carter Center determined that Hausmann and his colleague Roberto Rigobón had in fact found no evidence of fraud. [PDF] But let’s get back to Hausmann’s latest Guardian piece, starting with the economy. Hausmann writes, "Since 1999, the year [Chávez] took over the presidency, Venezuela has had the lowest average GDP growth rate and the highest inflation of any Latin American country except Haiti." The source for this “lowest average GDP growth rate” to which Hausmann links is a highly opinionated BBC article which in turn quotes a colleague of Hausmann’s from the Center for International Development at Harvard University who has a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics. Had Hausmann consulted official government data, or growth numbers for the region from the IMF, he would have found a very different set of facts.
A new op-ed in the Guardian by Ricardo Hausmann portrays a dystopian fictional Venezuela, one in which the Venezuelan government has run the economy into the ground despite abundant oil wealth, but yet its charismatic president continues to be re-elected through some sort of sinister trickery. Sound familiar? It should: it’s the same tired story repeated in the U.S. and U.K. media almost every day, but in this case Hausmann was apparently given free rein to present his own set of “facts.” It isn’t surprising that Hausmann would write something so divorced from reality; he went to elaborate lengths to invent a conspiracy theory about supposed fraud in Venezuela’s 2004 recall referendum by relying on fake exit polls. An independent panel of statisticians selected by the Carter Center determined that Hausmann and his colleague Roberto Rigobón had in fact found no evidence of fraud. [PDF] But let’s get back to Hausmann’s latest Guardian piece, starting with the economy. Hausmann writes, "Since 1999, the year [Chávez] took over the presidency, Venezuela has had the lowest average GDP growth rate and the highest inflation of any Latin American country except Haiti." The source for this “lowest average GDP growth rate” to which Hausmann links is a highly opinionated BBC article which in turn quotes a colleague of Hausmann’s from the Center for International Development at Harvard University who has a Bachelor of Arts degree in economics. Had Hausmann consulted official government data, or growth numbers for the region from the IMF, he would have found a very different set of facts.
A few days ago two more land rights activists were murdered in the Bajo Aguán, a region of Honduras where dozens of campesinos have been killed over the last three years. On February 16, Jacobo Cartagena, member of the Unified Campesino Movement of the Ag
A few days ago two more land rights activists were murdered in the Bajo Aguán, a region of Honduras where dozens of campesinos have been killed over the last three years. On February 16, Jacobo Cartagena, member of the Unified Campesino Movement of the Ag
On Friday, February 15, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had concluded its most recent Article IV consultation with Honduras. The Fund’s recommendations varied little from those it has offered many other countries in recent years: cut public spending, reduce deficits, reform pensions and depress wages. The IMF regularly conducts Article IV consultations with almost all of its member countries—with Argentina, which since 2006 has refused to take part in the process, being one notable exception. The official reviews are a way for the Fund to present its analysis of each country’s economic prospects and to advocate for a set of reforms. While it is difficult to precisely assess the influence of the consultations, it has been noted that in many cases the recommended policies have been adopted against popular public opinion. And in countries that end up borrowing from the fund, these policies are often preconditions for receiving future IMF loans. The Fund’s recommendations on Honduras diverged little from the policies it is pushing in many other countries. Below is a selection from the IMF’s brief (347-word, to be exact) Executive Board Assessment of its most recent consultation with Honduras: Directors . . . underscored the need to tighten macroeconomic policies and press ahead with structural reforms . . .. [They] welcomed the planned reduction of the budget deficit in 2013, and urged early adoption of the measures needed to ensure this outcome and avoid further central bank borrowing or accumulation of domestic payments arrears. They called for sustained medium-term fiscal consolidation . . . [and] supported plans to restrain the public sector wage bill . . . and emphasized the importance of reducing energy subsidies . . .. Directors concurred that monetary policy should be tightened . . . [and] regarded plans to reform state-owned enterprises as critical to strengthen the fiscal position and support growth, and encouraged timely implementation . . . and welcomed the ongoing reform of public pension funds. It is difficult to overlook how much this assessment resembles the Fund’s recommendations to European countries struggling to emerge from the global recession. CEPR co-director Mark Weisbrot and Senior Research Associate Helene Jorgensen recently released a paper analyzing 67 Article IV consultations for European member countries between 2008 and 2012, in which the authors found that the lending body was pushing a “one-size-fits-all” approach that often included pro-cyclical policy recommendations. In the paper Weisbrot and Jorgensen summarized their findings, in part, as follows: This content analysis finds a consistent pattern of policy recommendations, which indicates (1) a macroeconomic policy that focuses on reducing spending and shrinking the size of government, in many cases regardless of whether this is appropriate or necessary, or may even exacerbate an economic downturn; and (2) a focus on other policy issues that would tend to reduce social protections for broad sectors of the population (including public pensions, health care, and employment protections), reduce labor’s share of national income, and possibly increase poverty, social exclusion, and economic and social inequality as a result.
On Friday, February 15, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had concluded its most recent Article IV consultation with Honduras. The Fund’s recommendations varied little from those it has offered many other countries in recent years: cut public spending, reduce deficits, reform pensions and depress wages. The IMF regularly conducts Article IV consultations with almost all of its member countries—with Argentina, which since 2006 has refused to take part in the process, being one notable exception. The official reviews are a way for the Fund to present its analysis of each country’s economic prospects and to advocate for a set of reforms. While it is difficult to precisely assess the influence of the consultations, it has been noted that in many cases the recommended policies have been adopted against popular public opinion. And in countries that end up borrowing from the fund, these policies are often preconditions for receiving future IMF loans. The Fund’s recommendations on Honduras diverged little from the policies it is pushing in many other countries. Below is a selection from the IMF’s brief (347-word, to be exact) Executive Board Assessment of its most recent consultation with Honduras: Directors . . . underscored the need to tighten macroeconomic policies and press ahead with structural reforms . . .. [They] welcomed the planned reduction of the budget deficit in 2013, and urged early adoption of the measures needed to ensure this outcome and avoid further central bank borrowing or accumulation of domestic payments arrears. They called for sustained medium-term fiscal consolidation . . . [and] supported plans to restrain the public sector wage bill . . . and emphasized the importance of reducing energy subsidies . . .. Directors concurred that monetary policy should be tightened . . . [and] regarded plans to reform state-owned enterprises as critical to strengthen the fiscal position and support growth, and encouraged timely implementation . . . and welcomed the ongoing reform of public pension funds. It is difficult to overlook how much this assessment resembles the Fund’s recommendations to European countries struggling to emerge from the global recession. CEPR co-director Mark Weisbrot and Senior Research Associate Helene Jorgensen recently released a paper analyzing 67 Article IV consultations for European member countries between 2008 and 2012, in which the authors found that the lending body was pushing a “one-size-fits-all” approach that often included pro-cyclical policy recommendations. In the paper Weisbrot and Jorgensen summarized their findings, in part, as follows: This content analysis finds a consistent pattern of policy recommendations, which indicates (1) a macroeconomic policy that focuses on reducing spending and shrinking the size of government, in many cases regardless of whether this is appropriate or necessary, or may even exacerbate an economic downturn; and (2) a focus on other policy issues that would tend to reduce social protections for broad sectors of the population (including public pensions, health care, and employment protections), reduce labor’s share of national income, and possibly increase poverty, social exclusion, and economic and social inequality as a result.
The Miami Herald editorial board commented on the recent reelection of Ecuador’s Rafael Correa earlier this week, noting that “opposition candidate Alvaro Noboa, whom Mr. Correa defeated 57 percent to 43 percent, has indicated that he might challenge the
The Miami Herald editorial board commented on the recent reelection of Ecuador’s Rafael Correa earlier this week, noting that “opposition candidate Alvaro Noboa, whom Mr. Correa defeated 57 percent to 43 percent, has indicated that he might challenge the
In early February, New York University professor Greg Grandin came across a map on the Washington Post’s web page highlighting in red the 54 countries from around the world that participated in one way or another in the U.S.’s extraordinary rendition prog
In early February, New York University professor Greg Grandin came across a map on the Washington Post’s web page highlighting in red the 54 countries from around the world that participated in one way or another in the U.S.’s extraordinary rendition prog
International media reporting ahead of Ecuador’s elections today has sounded familiar themes, understating the achievements of the Rafael Correa government and attributing Ecuador’s recent economic and social progress to “luck” or happenstance, and high oil prices. Correa is depicted as an enemy of press freedom, despite the fact that Ecuadorean media is uncensored and the majority of it opposes the government; and despite his granting of political asylum to Julian Assange. He is also depicted as a member of Latin America’s “bad left” who has ambitions of regional leadership should “bad left” leader Hugo Chávez succumb to illness or otherwise be unable to continue in office. A common theme in press accounts is that the Correa administration’s social programs are “funded by the country's oil proceeds.” While some reporting has gone deeper and noted that “Correa has taken on big business and media groups, imposing new contracts on oil companies and renegotiating the country's debt while touting his poverty reduction efforts,” others have not. “High prices for oil exports resulted in higher revenues which the government invested in social programs and public infrastructure,” the Christian Science Monitor reported in a Friday article. The New York Times’  William Neuman presented a contradictory picture of the economic importance of Ecuador’s petroleum sector, writing that “Ecuador is the smallest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, yet oil sales account for about half of the country’s income from exports and about a third of all tax revenues, according to the United States Energy Information Administration,” just before stating in the next paragraph that “Mr. Correa has taken advantage of high oil prices to put money into social programs, earning him immense popularity, especially among the country’s poor.” Petroleum exports have been important to Ecuador’s economy for a long time; this did not suddenly come about with Correa. While Correa was favored by high oil prices during most of his six years in office, the collapse of oil prices in 2008 was a major blow to the economy.  Also, an important change during Correa’s first term has been the Ecuadorean government’s relationship with foreign oil companies. Correa notably has driven a much harder bargain than his predecessors, “imposing a windfall profits tax for concessions made to companies for the exploitation of domestic natural resources” that “raised over $500 million for the government in 2010,” as our latest paper notes. A raft of financial and regulatory reforms have also put a considerable amount of revenue in the government’s coffers, contributing to the increase  from 27 percent of GDP in 2006 to more than 40 percent in 2012. Stimulus spending – 5 percent of GDP in 2009 – boosted the economy and allowed Ecuador to get through the global recession with minimal damage, losing only about 1.3 percent of GDP during three quarters of recession, despite being one of the hardest hit countries in the hemisphere by external shocks. Non-petroleum sectors such as construction, commerce and services have also been important drivers of growth in recent years, including in 2011, when Ecuador had some of the highest real GDP growth in the region at 7.8 percent, second only to Argentina in South America.
International media reporting ahead of Ecuador’s elections today has sounded familiar themes, understating the achievements of the Rafael Correa government and attributing Ecuador’s recent economic and social progress to “luck” or happenstance, and high oil prices. Correa is depicted as an enemy of press freedom, despite the fact that Ecuadorean media is uncensored and the majority of it opposes the government; and despite his granting of political asylum to Julian Assange. He is also depicted as a member of Latin America’s “bad left” who has ambitions of regional leadership should “bad left” leader Hugo Chávez succumb to illness or otherwise be unable to continue in office. A common theme in press accounts is that the Correa administration’s social programs are “funded by the country's oil proceeds.” While some reporting has gone deeper and noted that “Correa has taken on big business and media groups, imposing new contracts on oil companies and renegotiating the country's debt while touting his poverty reduction efforts,” others have not. “High prices for oil exports resulted in higher revenues which the government invested in social programs and public infrastructure,” the Christian Science Monitor reported in a Friday article. The New York Times’  William Neuman presented a contradictory picture of the economic importance of Ecuador’s petroleum sector, writing that “Ecuador is the smallest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, yet oil sales account for about half of the country’s income from exports and about a third of all tax revenues, according to the United States Energy Information Administration,” just before stating in the next paragraph that “Mr. Correa has taken advantage of high oil prices to put money into social programs, earning him immense popularity, especially among the country’s poor.” Petroleum exports have been important to Ecuador’s economy for a long time; this did not suddenly come about with Correa. While Correa was favored by high oil prices during most of his six years in office, the collapse of oil prices in 2008 was a major blow to the economy.  Also, an important change during Correa’s first term has been the Ecuadorean government’s relationship with foreign oil companies. Correa notably has driven a much harder bargain than his predecessors, “imposing a windfall profits tax for concessions made to companies for the exploitation of domestic natural resources” that “raised over $500 million for the government in 2010,” as our latest paper notes. A raft of financial and regulatory reforms have also put a considerable amount of revenue in the government’s coffers, contributing to the increase  from 27 percent of GDP in 2006 to more than 40 percent in 2012. Stimulus spending – 5 percent of GDP in 2009 – boosted the economy and allowed Ecuador to get through the global recession with minimal damage, losing only about 1.3 percent of GDP during three quarters of recession, despite being one of the hardest hit countries in the hemisphere by external shocks. Non-petroleum sectors such as construction, commerce and services have also been important drivers of growth in recent years, including in 2011, when Ecuador had some of the highest real GDP growth in the region at 7.8 percent, second only to Argentina in South America.
On Sunday Ecuadorians will head to the polls to vote for a president and vice president, members of the National Assembly, mayors, and other elected officials. As we’ve done ahead of other elections in Latin America, CEPR has published a report offering s
On Sunday Ecuadorians will head to the polls to vote for a president and vice president, members of the National Assembly, mayors, and other elected officials. As we’ve done ahead of other elections in Latin America, CEPR has published a report offering s

At the end of January, I blogged about a Congressional letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Attorney General Eric Holder asking, among other things, for a U.S. investigation into the May 2012 killing of four Honduran indigenous villagers in Ahuas, Honduras during a counternarcotics operation that involved agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  The letter, signed by 58 House representatives, argues that a credible U.S. investigation of the incident is necessary given the “deeply flawed” nature of the investigation carried out by Honduras’ Public Prosecutor and that, according to media reports, Honduran police agents stated that “they took their orders from the D.E.A.”

On February 12, the Washington Times reported that despite “pleas from liberal lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the State and Justice departments have no intention of investigating purported human rights violations and misconduct by Drug Enforcement Administration agents in Honduras.”  Times’ correspondent Guy Taylor spoke to an anonymous State Department official who indicated that the Department was satisfied with the Honduran official investigation and stated that “there will be no separate investigation.”  Furthermore,

In a statement last month, DEA spokeswoman Dawn Dearden told The Times that the investigation conducted by Honduran authorities “concluded that DEA agents did not fire a single round” and that “the conduct of DEA personnel was consistent with current DEA protocols, policies and procedures.”

The anonymous State Department official reaffirmed this position stating, “as we have confirmed previously, DEA agents were involved in a supporting role, and did not fire their weapons.”

The basis for this determination, as the DEA spokeswoman made clear in her previous comments to the Times, is the report summarizing the conclusions of the Honduran Public Prosecutor’s office.  Though cited by the DEA and State Department, this report has not been made public.  However, there is abundant evidence that the investigation that generated the prosecutor’s report was indeed “deeply flawed.”  Last year’s in-depth report on the May killings, co-authored by CEPR and Rights Action, explained how key forensics tests were performed long after the incident occurred and how the autopsies of the victims took place a month after the incident and, according to numerous eye witnesses, were carried out in a stunningly unprofessional manner.  Key participants in the counternarcotics operation – including at least ten DEA agents and several State Department contractors – were never questioned, nor were their weapons submitted to ballistics tests.

Most importantly, the report’s apparent findings – at least as they have been represented by the State Department and the DEA – are directly contradicted by another report produced by the Honduran National Human Rights Ombudsman.  This report, which we also discussed in a previous post, is largely based on the testimonies of the Honduran police agents of the “Tactical Response Team” (TRT) that participated in the counternarcotics operation.  Whereas, according to State and DEA, the prosecutor’s report confirms that the DEA merely played a “supportive role” during this operation, the Ombudsman’s report concludes that the DEA essentially led the entire operation:

All members of the TRT have stated that they only receive orders from American superiors and that they don’t report anything, neither before nor afterwards, to their legal Honduran superiors, given that they ultimately don’t deal with orders or logistics of any sort.

Furthermore, though State and DEA adamantly claim that the DEA agents “did not fire their weapons,” the Ombudsman’s report suggests that the DEA was directly responsible for the discharge of one of the helicopter’s high caliber automatic mounted guns against the boat carrying those who were killed in the incident.  The report states that:

According to the account of various TRT (Honduran Tactical Response Team) members, as the Barra Patuca pipante was approaching the pipante transporting the drugs, which in that moment was adrift down river, a burst of fire could be heard, supposedly coming from the boat coming from Barra Patuca causing the member from the FAST Team of the DEA to communicate by radio with the foreign pilot on helicopter number four, who proceeded to give the order to the artilleryman from Honduras who was on the same helicopter to support his teammates by opening fire on the boat with the victims that was coming from Barra Patuca.

In other words, according to the testimony of Honduran police agents, the helicopter pilot – identified as non-Honduran – gave instructions to the helicopter gunner to open fire on the “boat with the victims” after being contacted by one of the DEA agents involved in the operation.  Given this second “official” version of events, which appears to directly contradict the conclusions of the Public Prosecutor’s report and suggests that the DEA may bear much responsibility for the lethal outcome of the May incident, it is difficult to see how U.S. officials can continue to maintain that there is no need for a separate, U.S. investigation. 

At the end of January, I blogged about a Congressional letter to Secretary of State John Kerry and Attorney General Eric Holder asking, among other things, for a U.S. investigation into the May 2012 killing of four Honduran indigenous villagers in Ahuas, Honduras during a counternarcotics operation that involved agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  The letter, signed by 58 House representatives, argues that a credible U.S. investigation of the incident is necessary given the “deeply flawed” nature of the investigation carried out by Honduras’ Public Prosecutor and that, according to media reports, Honduran police agents stated that “they took their orders from the D.E.A.”

On February 12, the Washington Times reported that despite “pleas from liberal lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the State and Justice departments have no intention of investigating purported human rights violations and misconduct by Drug Enforcement Administration agents in Honduras.”  Times’ correspondent Guy Taylor spoke to an anonymous State Department official who indicated that the Department was satisfied with the Honduran official investigation and stated that “there will be no separate investigation.”  Furthermore,

In a statement last month, DEA spokeswoman Dawn Dearden told The Times that the investigation conducted by Honduran authorities “concluded that DEA agents did not fire a single round” and that “the conduct of DEA personnel was consistent with current DEA protocols, policies and procedures.”

The anonymous State Department official reaffirmed this position stating, “as we have confirmed previously, DEA agents were involved in a supporting role, and did not fire their weapons.”

The basis for this determination, as the DEA spokeswoman made clear in her previous comments to the Times, is the report summarizing the conclusions of the Honduran Public Prosecutor’s office.  Though cited by the DEA and State Department, this report has not been made public.  However, there is abundant evidence that the investigation that generated the prosecutor’s report was indeed “deeply flawed.”  Last year’s in-depth report on the May killings, co-authored by CEPR and Rights Action, explained how key forensics tests were performed long after the incident occurred and how the autopsies of the victims took place a month after the incident and, according to numerous eye witnesses, were carried out in a stunningly unprofessional manner.  Key participants in the counternarcotics operation – including at least ten DEA agents and several State Department contractors – were never questioned, nor were their weapons submitted to ballistics tests.

Most importantly, the report’s apparent findings – at least as they have been represented by the State Department and the DEA – are directly contradicted by another report produced by the Honduran National Human Rights Ombudsman.  This report, which we also discussed in a previous post, is largely based on the testimonies of the Honduran police agents of the “Tactical Response Team” (TRT) that participated in the counternarcotics operation.  Whereas, according to State and DEA, the prosecutor’s report confirms that the DEA merely played a “supportive role” during this operation, the Ombudsman’s report concludes that the DEA essentially led the entire operation:

All members of the TRT have stated that they only receive orders from American superiors and that they don’t report anything, neither before nor afterwards, to their legal Honduran superiors, given that they ultimately don’t deal with orders or logistics of any sort.

Furthermore, though State and DEA adamantly claim that the DEA agents “did not fire their weapons,” the Ombudsman’s report suggests that the DEA was directly responsible for the discharge of one of the helicopter’s high caliber automatic mounted guns against the boat carrying those who were killed in the incident.  The report states that:

According to the account of various TRT (Honduran Tactical Response Team) members, as the Barra Patuca pipante was approaching the pipante transporting the drugs, which in that moment was adrift down river, a burst of fire could be heard, supposedly coming from the boat coming from Barra Patuca causing the member from the FAST Team of the DEA to communicate by radio with the foreign pilot on helicopter number four, who proceeded to give the order to the artilleryman from Honduras who was on the same helicopter to support his teammates by opening fire on the boat with the victims that was coming from Barra Patuca.

In other words, according to the testimony of Honduran police agents, the helicopter pilot – identified as non-Honduran – gave instructions to the helicopter gunner to open fire on the “boat with the victims” after being contacted by one of the DEA agents involved in the operation.  Given this second “official” version of events, which appears to directly contradict the conclusions of the Public Prosecutor’s report and suggests that the DEA may bear much responsibility for the lethal outcome of the May incident, it is difficult to see how U.S. officials can continue to maintain that there is no need for a separate, U.S. investigation. 

En Español

Venezuela devalued its currency today, from 4.3 bolivares fuertes to 6.3 at the official exchange rate.   As with most economic news from Venezuela, it was not well reported.  A Reuters news article stated, as though it were a fact, that the move will “spur galloping inflation.”  But the biggest devaluation during the Chávez years, in January 2010, produced no increase in the core rate of inflation, and only a temporary increase in the headline rate; it then fell for more than two years, even as economic growth accelerated to more than 5 percent in 2012. Annual inflation was 19.5 percent in 2012.  At the time of the devaluation in January 2010, there were reports in the Washington Post predicting 60 percent inflation as a result of the devaluation.

Of course we would expect some temporary increase in inflation from a devaluation, as there was in 2010 – because the devaluation will increase the price of imports – but how much and how long it lasts depends on other government policies as well. 

The devaluation will increase the cost of capital flight, and by making imports more expensive, provide a boost to import-competing industries. For this reason, and because it reduces the black market premium and reduces capital flight, the move will overall be good for the economy.

 It is widely reported, as in the Reuters article, that the devaluation will help with government finances because each dollar in oil export earnings will now exchange for more domestic currency; in fact this is often stated as the reason for the devaluation. But government spending in domestic currency is not dependent on the exchange rate.   

En Español

Venezuela devalued its currency today, from 4.3 bolivares fuertes to 6.3 at the official exchange rate.   As with most economic news from Venezuela, it was not well reported.  A Reuters news article stated, as though it were a fact, that the move will “spur galloping inflation.”  But the biggest devaluation during the Chávez years, in January 2010, produced no increase in the core rate of inflation, and only a temporary increase in the headline rate; it then fell for more than two years, even as economic growth accelerated to more than 5 percent in 2012. Annual inflation was 19.5 percent in 2012.  At the time of the devaluation in January 2010, there were reports in the Washington Post predicting 60 percent inflation as a result of the devaluation.

Of course we would expect some temporary increase in inflation from a devaluation, as there was in 2010 – because the devaluation will increase the price of imports – but how much and how long it lasts depends on other government policies as well. 

The devaluation will increase the cost of capital flight, and by making imports more expensive, provide a boost to import-competing industries. For this reason, and because it reduces the black market premium and reduces capital flight, the move will overall be good for the economy.

 It is widely reported, as in the Reuters article, that the devaluation will help with government finances because each dollar in oil export earnings will now exchange for more domestic currency; in fact this is often stated as the reason for the devaluation. But government spending in domestic currency is not dependent on the exchange rate.   

A front-page article in the print edition of today’s Washington Post details how New Jersey Democratic Senator Robert Menendez twice approached federal health-care officials about Dr. Solomon Melgen’s outstanding $8.9 million debt to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, which the doctor claims was the result of being overbilled. Melgen, personally and through his ophthalmology company, has made major contributions to Menendez’s political campaigns. This is the latest news to follow reports that on Wednesday, January 30, the FBI raided Melgen’s offices, soon after which the senator’s office described the doctor as “a friend and political supporter of Senator Menendez for many years.” Two days later, following John Kerry’s resignation from his seat as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to become Secretary of State, Menendez took over the position, one of the most powerful and prestigious in Congress. Menendez, who is Cuban American, has taken a hard line against easing travel restrictions to Cuba and has been described as “fiercely pro-embargo.” The New Jersey Democrat has also worked closely with lawmakers across the aisle on policy towards Iran, including his co-authorship of sanctions legislation with Republican Senator Mark Kirk last year. Early reports of the FBI’s search focused on allegations that in 2010 Senator Menendez accepted free flights to the Dominican Republic from Dr. Solomon Melgen and had sex with prostitutes during these trips, a claim he has vehemently denied. It was also noted that Menendez is not married, and that prostitution is legal in the Caribbean nation. The Senate Ethics Committee is investigating the senator, who in January of this year wrote a $58,000 personal check to reimburse Melgen for two trips.
A front-page article in the print edition of today’s Washington Post details how New Jersey Democratic Senator Robert Menendez twice approached federal health-care officials about Dr. Solomon Melgen’s outstanding $8.9 million debt to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, which the doctor claims was the result of being overbilled. Melgen, personally and through his ophthalmology company, has made major contributions to Menendez’s political campaigns. This is the latest news to follow reports that on Wednesday, January 30, the FBI raided Melgen’s offices, soon after which the senator’s office described the doctor as “a friend and political supporter of Senator Menendez for many years.” Two days later, following John Kerry’s resignation from his seat as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to become Secretary of State, Menendez took over the position, one of the most powerful and prestigious in Congress. Menendez, who is Cuban American, has taken a hard line against easing travel restrictions to Cuba and has been described as “fiercely pro-embargo.” The New Jersey Democrat has also worked closely with lawmakers across the aisle on policy towards Iran, including his co-authorship of sanctions legislation with Republican Senator Mark Kirk last year. Early reports of the FBI’s search focused on allegations that in 2010 Senator Menendez accepted free flights to the Dominican Republic from Dr. Solomon Melgen and had sex with prostitutes during these trips, a claim he has vehemently denied. It was also noted that Menendez is not married, and that prostitution is legal in the Caribbean nation. The Senate Ethics Committee is investigating the senator, who in January of this year wrote a $58,000 personal check to reimburse Melgen for two trips.

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