The Americas Blog seeks to present a more accurate perspective on economic and political developments in the Western Hemisphere than is often presented in the United States. It will provide information that is often ignored, buried, and sometimes misreported in the major U.S. media.
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The full Department of Justice Inspector General (DOJ/IG) report from the ‘Fast and Furious’ disaster was released on the 19th of September. Coming on the heels of the Caravan for Peace with Justice and Dignity, which ended its month-long campaign around the United States last a week earlier, it is timely to think about several present-day realities: the paralysis afflicting policy makers around the topic of gun control, the Obama administration’s doubling down on Drug War policies, and the ongoing violence that affects people in Mexico, the U.S. and many communities in Central and South America.
Our government plays a crucial role in facilitating gun violence in Mexico (as well as throughout the region and in the U.S. itself), both by refusing to push for sensible gun control laws and by failing to enforce the laws already in place. Between the calendar years 2007 and 2011, almost 70% of the 99,000 firearms that were recovered in Mexico and submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) were U.S.-sourced. U.S.-sourced here means that the firearms were manufactured in the U.S. or they were legally imported into the U.S. under the auspices of a federal firearms licensee (FFL).
These numbers are likely to be very low estimates, as they only count guns successfully confiscated and turned over to the ATF for tracking, and they indicate that the U.S. is a huge part of the problem. Rather than engaging in a serious review of current drug policy, the Obama Administration has focused on defending itself against allegations surrounding the “Fast and Furious” scandal, contributing to the paralysis that we have been seeing with policy makers around the issue of gun control, and even today this Administration continues to express enthusiasm for the War on Drugs in its current form.
When it comes to sensible gun control laws, it is clear that new laws are needed. Here is another excerpt from the DOJ/IG report:
It is legal for a non-prohibited individual in Arizona to purchase an unlimited number of firearms from an FFL at any time. It is also legal for a non-prohibited person to pay for firearms in cash and to then transfer, sell, or barter those firearms to a non-prohibited third party. (pp. 139-140)
It seems to me that ‘unlimited number of firearms’ is precisely what the movement towards sensible gun laws is trying to fight against—and if you have any doubt, consider that the 5 individuals in the Fast and Furious case purchased over 100 guns each, and the one with the most purchases bought 723 weapons!
The full Department of Justice Inspector General (DOJ/IG) report from the ‘Fast and Furious’ disaster was released on the 19th of September. Coming on the heels of the Caravan for Peace with Justice and Dignity, which ended its month-long campaign around the United States last a week earlier, it is timely to think about several present-day realities: the paralysis afflicting policy makers around the topic of gun control, the Obama administration’s doubling down on Drug War policies, and the ongoing violence that affects people in Mexico, the U.S. and many communities in Central and South America.
Our government plays a crucial role in facilitating gun violence in Mexico (as well as throughout the region and in the U.S. itself), both by refusing to push for sensible gun control laws and by failing to enforce the laws already in place. Between the calendar years 2007 and 2011, almost 70% of the 99,000 firearms that were recovered in Mexico and submitted to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) were U.S.-sourced. U.S.-sourced here means that the firearms were manufactured in the U.S. or they were legally imported into the U.S. under the auspices of a federal firearms licensee (FFL).
These numbers are likely to be very low estimates, as they only count guns successfully confiscated and turned over to the ATF for tracking, and they indicate that the U.S. is a huge part of the problem. Rather than engaging in a serious review of current drug policy, the Obama Administration has focused on defending itself against allegations surrounding the “Fast and Furious” scandal, contributing to the paralysis that we have been seeing with policy makers around the issue of gun control, and even today this Administration continues to express enthusiasm for the War on Drugs in its current form.
When it comes to sensible gun control laws, it is clear that new laws are needed. Here is another excerpt from the DOJ/IG report:
It is legal for a non-prohibited individual in Arizona to purchase an unlimited number of firearms from an FFL at any time. It is also legal for a non-prohibited person to pay for firearms in cash and to then transfer, sell, or barter those firearms to a non-prohibited third party. (pp. 139-140)
It seems to me that ‘unlimited number of firearms’ is precisely what the movement towards sensible gun laws is trying to fight against—and if you have any doubt, consider that the 5 individuals in the Fast and Furious case purchased over 100 guns each, and the one with the most purchases bought 723 weapons!
Everywhere you look, there are people who are taking seriously the claim that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has a big media advantage over the opposition in the upcoming elections. The Committee to Protect Journalists, in their latest report [PDF] on Venezuela, states that “a vast state media presence echoes the government’s positions,” and refers to the government as having a “media empire.”
From the Wilson Center’s latest report [PDF], we read: “Media coverage is not even moderately balanced. . . . In television, the government’s predominance is overwhelming; it was estimated that by 2007 it controlled seven national television channels and 35 open community channels.”
These statements are false and misleading, but they are adopted uncritically in almost all mainstream media coverage. In fact, state TV had about 5.9 percent of the audience that watches television in Venezuela in 2009-2010. These data were gathered by AGB Panamericana de Venezuela Medición S.A., a local affiliate of Nielsen Media Research International, and are probably as reliable as Nielsen ratings in the United States. The data were collected through equipment boxes placed in each home, measuring minutes of each channel watched. A representative sample of 1000 households was constructed and data were gathered over ten years.
Thus, the above statements are similar to claiming that PBS TV, the public TV in the U.S., dominates broadcast TV in the United States. Most of the major newspapers (e.g., El Nacional, El Universal) are also strongly against the government. According to CONATEL data, only about 14 percent of radio is publicly owned; and since there is more strongly anti-government radio in Venezuela than TV, the opposition almost certainly has more advantage in radio than in other media.
Chávez, of course, regularly does cadenas – speeches which interrupt regular TV programming. But it is difficult to judge whether these speeches can balance the overwhelming media bias against the government.
There are also polling data indicating that the private, opposition media’s dominance in Venezuela has a significant influence on political beliefs. For example, an Associated Press-Ipsos poll conducted in November 2006, just before the last presidential election, showed that “57 percent of respondents were at least somewhat concerned that people could face reprisals for how they vote,” with only 42 percent “very confident their votes would be kept secret.” This was a theme repeatedly transmitted through opposition media. In fact, there is a secret ballot and it is no more possible for the government to know how someone voted in Venezuela than it is in the United States, Germany, or Sweden.
The misrepresentation of the media is part of the ongoing gross misrepresentation of Venezuela throughout media and foreign policy circles, which has reached the point where almost anything can be said about Venezuela and remain unchallenged, so long as it is negative.
Everywhere you look, there are people who are taking seriously the claim that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has a big media advantage over the opposition in the upcoming elections. The Committee to Protect Journalists, in their latest report [PDF] on Venezuela, states that “a vast state media presence echoes the government’s positions,” and refers to the government as having a “media empire.”
From the Wilson Center’s latest report [PDF], we read: “Media coverage is not even moderately balanced. . . . In television, the government’s predominance is overwhelming; it was estimated that by 2007 it controlled seven national television channels and 35 open community channels.”
These statements are false and misleading, but they are adopted uncritically in almost all mainstream media coverage. In fact, state TV had about 5.9 percent of the audience that watches television in Venezuela in 2009-2010. These data were gathered by AGB Panamericana de Venezuela Medición S.A., a local affiliate of Nielsen Media Research International, and are probably as reliable as Nielsen ratings in the United States. The data were collected through equipment boxes placed in each home, measuring minutes of each channel watched. A representative sample of 1000 households was constructed and data were gathered over ten years.
Thus, the above statements are similar to claiming that PBS TV, the public TV in the U.S., dominates broadcast TV in the United States. Most of the major newspapers (e.g., El Nacional, El Universal) are also strongly against the government. According to CONATEL data, only about 14 percent of radio is publicly owned; and since there is more strongly anti-government radio in Venezuela than TV, the opposition almost certainly has more advantage in radio than in other media.
Chávez, of course, regularly does cadenas – speeches which interrupt regular TV programming. But it is difficult to judge whether these speeches can balance the overwhelming media bias against the government.
There are also polling data indicating that the private, opposition media’s dominance in Venezuela has a significant influence on political beliefs. For example, an Associated Press-Ipsos poll conducted in November 2006, just before the last presidential election, showed that “57 percent of respondents were at least somewhat concerned that people could face reprisals for how they vote,” with only 42 percent “very confident their votes would be kept secret.” This was a theme repeatedly transmitted through opposition media. In fact, there is a secret ballot and it is no more possible for the government to know how someone voted in Venezuela than it is in the United States, Germany, or Sweden.
The misrepresentation of the media is part of the ongoing gross misrepresentation of Venezuela throughout media and foreign policy circles, which has reached the point where almost anything can be said about Venezuela and remain unchallenged, so long as it is negative.
While media reports and U.S.-based human rights organizations tend to focus on attacks on the press in countries that have elected left leaders, the closing of La Nación in Chile has generated next to nothing from those some organizations and media outlets.
It was announced this week that La Nación, the 70 percent state-owned news outlet, would be closed. The print edition had already been shut down in 2010 after conservative president Sebastian Piñera took office. The state newspaper’s union issued a statement calling the move, “the culmination of an attack on press freedom” waged by Piñera, while adding that “Once again, the common people, the citizens, were shut out of the distribution of power and resources, this time regarding an historic publication.”
While Piñera cited economic reasons for closing the print edition, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason as, according to La Mostrador, La Nación had some $2 million in profits in 2011.
With the closing of La Nación, Chile’s written media is now almost entirely concentrated in the hands of two groups, El Mercurio Group (publisher of El Mercurio) and Copesa (publisher of La Tercera). The two media outlets, which were outspoken proponents of the 1973 coup that brought the Pinochet dictatorship to power, have received $5 million in government subsidies a year, in an agreement that dates back to the Pinochet regime. As Chilean journalist Francisco Martorell told Reports Without Borders last year, “This system, which had resulted in the disappearance of the opposition press, killed it off again after the return to democracy, although it had just barely been revived. To cap it all, there are now fewer print media in Chile than there were at the end of the dictatorship!”
Well, now there is one fewer, but don’t expect to hear much about it from the self-styled defenders of free speech.
While media reports and U.S.-based human rights organizations tend to focus on attacks on the press in countries that have elected left leaders, the closing of La Nación in Chile has generated next to nothing from those some organizations and media outlets.
It was announced this week that La Nación, the 70 percent state-owned news outlet, would be closed. The print edition had already been shut down in 2010 after conservative president Sebastian Piñera took office. The state newspaper’s union issued a statement calling the move, “the culmination of an attack on press freedom” waged by Piñera, while adding that “Once again, the common people, the citizens, were shut out of the distribution of power and resources, this time regarding an historic publication.”
While Piñera cited economic reasons for closing the print edition, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason as, according to La Mostrador, La Nación had some $2 million in profits in 2011.
With the closing of La Nación, Chile’s written media is now almost entirely concentrated in the hands of two groups, El Mercurio Group (publisher of El Mercurio) and Copesa (publisher of La Tercera). The two media outlets, which were outspoken proponents of the 1973 coup that brought the Pinochet dictatorship to power, have received $5 million in government subsidies a year, in an agreement that dates back to the Pinochet regime. As Chilean journalist Francisco Martorell told Reports Without Borders last year, “This system, which had resulted in the disappearance of the opposition press, killed it off again after the return to democracy, although it had just barely been revived. To cap it all, there are now fewer print media in Chile than there were at the end of the dictatorship!”
Well, now there is one fewer, but don’t expect to hear much about it from the self-styled defenders of free speech.
Social Spending in Venezuela (1990-2005)
|
|
Social Spending (including Soc Sec) | ||
| Millions of Bolivares | % of Public Spending | % of GDP | |
| 1990 | 172271.3 | 29.9 | 7.8 |
| 1991 | 286635.9 | 35.8 | 9.8 |
| 1992 | 402292.1 | 40.1 | 10.1 |
| 1993 | 440023.6 | 40.0 | 8.3 |
| 1994 | 652605.1 | 33.7 | 7.8 |
| 1995 | 1037334.7 | 36.9 | 7.8 |
| 1996 | 2080229 | 32.3 | 7.3 |
| 1997 | 4113750.5 | 38.6 | 9.8 |
| 1998 | 4111346.1 | 34.7 | 8.2 |
| 1999 | 5607402.7 | 38.5 | 9.4 |
| 2000 | 8782242.8 | 37.3 | 11.0 |
| 2001 | 10778508.8 | 38.4 | 12.1 |
| 2002 | 12107275.2 | 38.2 | 11.2 |
| 2003 | 16224911.7 | 39.0 | 12.1 |
| 2004 | 25068023.3 | 41.4 | 12.1 |
| 2005 | 38781871.5 | 44.9 | 13.2 |
Source: SISOV (http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
|
Social Spending (minus Soc Sec)
|
|||
| Millions of Bolivares | % of Public Spending | % of GDP | |
| 1990 | 157462.2 | 27.3 | 7.1 |
| 1991 | 261776.5 | 32.7 | 8.9 |
| 1992 | 366881.1 | 36.6 | 9.2 |
| 1993 | 399303.3 | 36.3 | 7.6 |
| 1994 | 568795.8 | 29.3 | 6.8 |
| 1995 | 903411.6 | 32.2 | 6.8 |
| 1996 | 1761219.1 | 27.3 | 6.2 |
| 1997 | 3467903.3 | 32.5 | 8.3 |
| 1998 | 3416919.5 | 28.8 | 6.8 |
| 1999 | 4429408.4 | 30.4 | 7.5 |
| 2000 | 7019333.9 | 29.8 | 8.8 |
| 2001 | 7716175 | 27.5 | 8.7 |
| 2002 | 9049090.9 | 28.6 | 8.4 |
| 2003 | 11674748.1 | 28.1 | 8.7 |
| 2004 | 18475914 | 30.5 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 29685076.6 | 34.4 | 10.1 |
Source: SISOV (http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
Social Spending in Venezuela (1990-2005)
|
|
Social Spending (including Soc Sec) | ||
| Millions of Bolivares | % of Public Spending | % of GDP | |
| 1990 | 172271.3 | 29.9 | 7.8 |
| 1991 | 286635.9 | 35.8 | 9.8 |
| 1992 | 402292.1 | 40.1 | 10.1 |
| 1993 | 440023.6 | 40.0 | 8.3 |
| 1994 | 652605.1 | 33.7 | 7.8 |
| 1995 | 1037334.7 | 36.9 | 7.8 |
| 1996 | 2080229 | 32.3 | 7.3 |
| 1997 | 4113750.5 | 38.6 | 9.8 |
| 1998 | 4111346.1 | 34.7 | 8.2 |
| 1999 | 5607402.7 | 38.5 | 9.4 |
| 2000 | 8782242.8 | 37.3 | 11.0 |
| 2001 | 10778508.8 | 38.4 | 12.1 |
| 2002 | 12107275.2 | 38.2 | 11.2 |
| 2003 | 16224911.7 | 39.0 | 12.1 |
| 2004 | 25068023.3 | 41.4 | 12.1 |
| 2005 | 38781871.5 | 44.9 | 13.2 |
Source: SISOV (http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
|
Social Spending (minus Soc Sec)
|
|||
| Millions of Bolivares | % of Public Spending | % of GDP | |
| 1990 | 157462.2 | 27.3 | 7.1 |
| 1991 | 261776.5 | 32.7 | 8.9 |
| 1992 | 366881.1 | 36.6 | 9.2 |
| 1993 | 399303.3 | 36.3 | 7.6 |
| 1994 | 568795.8 | 29.3 | 6.8 |
| 1995 | 903411.6 | 32.2 | 6.8 |
| 1996 | 1761219.1 | 27.3 | 6.2 |
| 1997 | 3467903.3 | 32.5 | 8.3 |
| 1998 | 3416919.5 | 28.8 | 6.8 |
| 1999 | 4429408.4 | 30.4 | 7.5 |
| 2000 | 7019333.9 | 29.8 | 8.8 |
| 2001 | 7716175 | 27.5 | 8.7 |
| 2002 | 9049090.9 | 28.6 | 8.4 |
| 2003 | 11674748.1 | 28.1 | 8.7 |
| 2004 | 18475914 | 30.5 | 8.9 |
| 2005 | 29685076.6 | 34.4 | 10.1 |
Source: SISOV (http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve/home/index.php)
