November 26, 2024
Violence Surrounds Upcoming Elections and Electoral Court Disqualifies Candidates
The political climate in Ecuador is heating up as the February 9 general elections draw near. Much like last year’s election when candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated, several of the 16 presidential candidates and their associates are facing violent attacks and threats due to the country’s ongoing security crisis. In October and November alone, Jan Topić of the SUMA Party and Pedro Granja of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE) both reported receiving death threats, with Granja saying that armed men broke into his brother’s house to deliver the threat. Democratic Center candidate Jimmy Jairala’s car was shot at while his son and friends were inside, and the driver was wounded. Joselito Argüello, a PSE legislative candidate, was shot and wounded after leaving a meeting.
At the same time, Ecuador’s Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE) — which some observers claim has recently shown a pro-Noboa bias — has issued controversial rulings disqualifying the candidacies of Jan Topić and all legislative candidates from the conservative Construye party, the Indigenous Pachakutik party, and two smaller parties.
Topić, a businessman who has served as president of Telconet, his father’s telecommunications company, and who has headed up radar and video surveillance companies, had his candidacy challenged by Pachakutik and the Patriotic Society Party (PSP) before the National Electoral Council (CNE) — the country’s electoral authority — over conflicts of interest. The parties argued that Topić should be disqualified because he has represented a company with at least one active government contract. The CNE rejected the objection, finding no evidence of such claims. The parties then appealed to the TCE, which recognized that Topić held no active government contracts as a physical person, but noted that he still represents contracting companies and had fudged divestment from these entities by transferring his shares to his brother. The TCE disqualified Topić on November 10 and gave SUMA 10 days to name a replacement candidate. The party chose Wilson Enrique Gómez, a risk management consultant with public and private sector experience.
Several analysts, presidential candidates, and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro — with whom Topić had met just weeks prior — have called Topić’s disqualification antidemocratic. Even though the decision was final, Topić filed a complaint against the judge who authored it, alleging procedural fraud. He also challenged the decision on constitutional grounds before the Constitutional Court, asking it to repeal the TCE ruling, but it is unlikely to result in changes to the decision. Topić also alleged that Noboa influenced the final decision since Topić, a conservative, security-oriented candidate, is likely to draw support from voters who might otherwise back Noboa.
On November 19, a day after SUMA registered its replacement candidate, Ecuador’s telecommunications regulator revoked Telconet’s permit to operate a submarine Internet cable connecting the country to the United States, citing alleged irregularities in the permit concession and audit reports from 2018. Telconet, owned by the Topić family and one of Ecuador’s main Internet service providers, issued a statement warning that the decision could jeopardize Internet access across the country. The company refuted the claims, noting, among other things, that it was accused of retroactively failing to comply with permitting regulations introduced in 2016, even though its permit was granted in 2015. Telconet also alleged that the move was politically motivated, a sentiment echoed by Topić’s father. Several legislators from the left and the right condemned the regulator’s actions, agreeing that “this is yet another act of persecution by the executive against its political adversaries,” according to Radio Pichincha.
Pachakutik, Construye, and two other parties, meanwhile, were disqualified in late October from fielding legislative candidates; a decision upheld by the TCE. While the reasons for each party’s disqualification vary slightly, they primarily stem from infractions related to candidate replacements and errors in, or failures to, submit certain paperwork. The parties and some presidential candidates criticized the TCE’s decision for being too rigid in its adherence to formalities and for not permitting the parties to correct the mistakes. Construye and Pachakutik currently hold National Assembly seats and are fielding presidential candidates.
The President Unconstitutionally Replaces the Vice President
Noboa’s year-long campaign to oust Vice President Verónica Abad by virtually any means possible has paid off. Culminating in a series of actions widely considered unconstitutional, on November 9 Abad was suspended for five months and the president appointed an ally as acting vice president two days later.
Noboa and Abad have had strained relations since before their inauguration. On his first day in office, Noboa sent Abad to Israel as “ambassador for peace” — most likely to keep her out of domestic politics and to pressure her to resign. Given this animosity, Noboa has been keen to prevent Abad from assuming the interim presidency when he takes a constitutionally mandated leave of absence to campaign for reelection between January and February next year. Abad has certainly faced significant challenges, including her son’s arrest on influence-peddling charges, being publicly insulted and branded an enemy by Noboa’s ministers, denial of vacation days, orders barring her from speaking publicly, and a barrage of frivolous complaints filed against her before the TCE.
Ultimately, it was not the TCE that ordered Abad’s suspension, but the executive branch, with an administrative decision from the Ministry of Labor. This stemmed from a September 12 request by the foreign ministry to open an administrative inquiry into Abad’s week-long delay in relocating to Turkey, where she — and no other Ecuadorian embassy official in Israel — had been transferred on September 1, supposedly due to hostilities in Israel. The conclusion of the administrative inquiry was to suspend Abad from her vice presidential duties for 150 days, without pay, for “unjustifiably abandoning her duties for three or more working days.” Two days later, even though the suspension was still pending appeal, Noboa named Sariha Moya, the secretary of development and planification, as acting vice president.
Abad’s suspension has been met with near-unanimous rejection from the political class. Constitutional law experts interviewed by nearly all major Ecuadorian (and international) news outlets have called both the suspension and Abad’s replacement a flagrant violation of the constitution. They argue that only the National Assembly has the authority to sanction or remove an elected official like the vice president, through an impeachment process, and that no existing laws justify her suspension. They also contend that Abad’s suspension violates a ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which states that a democratically elected official cannot be removed by an administrative body. Moreover, some experts have pointed out that the Ministry of Labor’s rules regarding administrative inquiries, which explicitly excluded elected officials, were amended to include these just one day before the inquiry into Abad began, raising concerns about retroactivity. Others note that the rule the ministry invoked only allows for a maximum suspension of 30 days. There is also the issue of Abad being suspended from her vice presidential duties for an alleged infraction committed in her role as ambassador to Israel.
Noboa’s appointment of an acting vice president is also constitutionally questionable, even assuming Abad’s suspension is legal, because he used a procedure meant for selecting a replacement during a vice president’s temporary absence. According to articles 146 and 150 of the constitution, a vice president’s absence is considered temporary if it lasts up to three months, and permanent if it exceeds that period. The president may unilaterally appoint a cabinet member to be acting vice president in cases of temporary absence. However, in the case of a permanent absence, the president must submit a shortlist of prospects to the National Assembly, which will then select the definitive replacement. Since Abad has been “suspended” for more than three months, her absence should be considered permanent, not temporary, and the National Assembly should have been involved in selecting her replacement. Noboa’s ministers have argued that Abad has not been removed, claiming that she remains vice president with full political rights, despite her suspension. This created more confusion, especially when the armed forces initially referred to Abad as the “former vice president” in a statement that was later corrected.
Abad’s suspension and replacement has faced widespread condemnation from the press, presidential candidates, former Latin American presidents, and even parts of the business sector. The National Assembly also strongly disapproved, passing a resolution that rejected and refused to recognize the decisions, deeming them illegal and unconstitutional. The Assembly further requested an interpretive ruling from the Constitutional Court, and four legislators moved to initiate impeachment proceedings against the minister of labor. For her part, Abad has pursued legal action on multiple fronts, including filing a protective legal action to reverse her suspension, and appealing to the Inter-American Court. We can expect a showdown toward the end of the year regarding who will replace Noboa during his leave of absence.
Noboa Faces Issues at Home and Abroad that May Affect His Presidential Bid
President Noboa’s standing in the polls ahead of the upcoming election has been steadily declining due to a prolonged energy crisis causing daily 12-hour blackouts and a security crisis that has made 2024 the second-deadliest year in Ecuadorian history. A mid-October Negocios y Estrategias poll showed that Noboa’s share of the valid vote1 had dropped from 42.05 percent in September to 34.48 percent in October. Meanwhile, a newly released Comunicaliza poll conducted between November 8 and 12 shows support for Noboa at 39.17 percent, down from 47.74 percent in August. On the other hand, Luisa González, the progressive candidate and Noboa’s main rival, has seen her support increase steadily from 33.5 percent of the valid vote in August to 38.03 percent in November, a technical tie with Noboa according to Comunicaliza. El Expreso reports that Noboa’s unpopularity “stems from the perception that the president has focused his administration on re-election rather than on solving Ecuador’s problems, according to political analysts,” who also mention that Abad’s suspension and Topić’s disqualification are part of this political strategy.
As mentioned in the last Round-Up, Noboa has sought to divert attention and deepen polarization ahead of the elections by presenting two controversial constitutional amendments. One would lift the ban on foreign military bases on Ecuadorian soil, and the other would eliminate state funding for political parties. He has since proposed another constitutional amendment aimed at capitalizing on public frustration with the security situation: removing incarcerated individuals from the list of groups entitled to “priority and specialized care in public and private sectors,” which currently includes children, the elderly, people with disabilities, pregnant women, and other vulnerable groups who have historically been at risk of having their rights violated and who have faced barriers in accessing social services and participating in Ecuador’s development. The category is aimed at ensuring that vulnerable groups have the same fundamental rights as other citizens, and advocates and academics argue that inmates should remain in it given the current context of militarization of prisons, allegations of torture and abuse of power (outlined below), violence among inmates, and the failure of rehabilitation policies.
In November, as part of a new charm offensive ahead of the elections, Noboa submitted a bill to the National Assembly and issued decrees providing financial relief to individuals and businesses, including debt deferments and compensation for Internet bills due to the energy crisis; fiscal incentives for companies that avoid layoffs; pardons for certain tax debts; and a vaguely defined program to offer around 80,000 young people $400 per month, for three months, to participate in climate initiatives; among other things. These measures come as the IMF is expected to issue its second disbursement of funds to Ecuador in December under an agreement reached earlier this year.
All these moves have nevertheless failed to improve Noboa’s political situation. Protests against the president, which had been relatively rare, have erupted, with students and civil society organizations marching in Quito on October 31 to protest the energy crisis, blackouts, and overall security situation. And on November 15, the CONAIE, Ecuador’s largest and most influential Indigenous organization, led by Pachakutik presidential candidate Leonidas Iza, staged mass marches across various regions to protest the administration. Abad’s removal and opposition to mining were added to the list of energy and security grievances. The CONAIE announced that more protests would follow, while Ecuador’s largest unions, students, and social movements organized their own demonstrations on November 15 and 21.
Protesters gathered in Cuenca on November 14 and 15 where Noboa hosted this year’s Ibero-American Summit, which brings together leaders from Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula. This year saw the lowest turnout of leaders since the summit’s inception in 1991, with Noboa himself the only Latin American leader in attendance — marking the first time only one leader from the region’s 19 member states participated.
While some leaders, such as Colombia’s Gustavo Petro, claimed they were unable to attend due to domestic matters, others, like Chile’s Gabriel Boric, chose instead to attend the APEC summit in Peru, which coincided with the event in Cuenca. Several countries, like Mexico and Honduras, opted out mostly in response to Ecuador’s storming of the Mexican embassy in Quito last April. Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, one of the few confirmed Latin American leaders, canceled on the eve of the summit, citing an “unstable political and social environment” in Ecuador following Abad’s suspension. The presidents of Argentina and El Salvador, whom Noboa had insulted in an interview with The New Yorker in June, were also absent. El País reported: “The absence of important leaders was compounded by the dissatisfaction of those present with Daniel Noboa, who focused the summit too much on himself and his problems in Ecuador, disregarding the workings of a multilateral forum.” The failed summit highlighted Noboa’s isolation on the international stage, underscoring the impact of his numerous serious diplomatic mistakes during his short time in office.
Fernando Villavicencio’s Text Messages Are Leaked
On November 7, news outlet La Posta exposed the contents of Fernando Villavicencio’s cell phone in a series of live streams on YouTube. Villavicencio, an investigative journalist and legislator, who served from May 2021 to May 2023, was assassinated on August 9, 2023, while campaigning for the presidency. The circumstances surrounding his death and the subsequent investigation have raised numerous questions, with one key issue being the location and contents of his phone. Conflicting accounts from family members and friends about its whereabouts, combined with the prosecution’s failure to use its contents against those convicted of his murder, have added to the uncertainty. La Posta reports that Villavicencio’s family handed the device to Christian Zurita — his friend, fellow journalist, and successor as candidate — who then provided a copy of its contents to the FBI, which in turn forwarded it to Ecuador’s Prosecutor General’s Office, from whence it was leaked to La Posta and others.
The messages include several bombshell revelations involving journalists, political figures, and, notably, Prosecutor General Diana Salazar. In August, The Intercept Brasil and Drop Site News published an investigation based on a separate trove of leaked chats, which allegedly show Salazar sharing classified information with multiple people and using her office for political ends. The supposed messages on Villavicencio’s phone seem to confirm this pattern of behavior, with Salazar appearing to repeatedly share confidential and sensitive information about ongoing investigations with him. In one instance, Salazar allegedly provided Villavicencio with the transcript of a voice recording concerning an investigation and cautioned him against publishing it, warning that doing so would constitute a crime. She also gave advance notice of judicial rulings before they became public — information she should not have had access to as a prosecutor, considering judicial independence.
Salazar also seemed to involve herself in politics, repeatedly telling Villavicencio that he should lead the National Assembly’s oversight committee once he was elected to the legislature — a role he would eventually take on. In addition, the prosecutor general shared a screenshot of a conversation with CNE head Diana Atamaint in which Salazar threatened to raid the electoral authority’s offices. This occurred during a dispute over the closely contested results for the second-place winner of the 2021 presidential election’s first round between conservative candidate Guillermo Lasso — whom La Posta alleges Salazar supported in the dispute — and centrist Indigenous candidate Yaku Pérez.
Salazar also allegedly pressured a lower-level prosecutor handling a money laundering complaint against Villavicencio and his brother. She repeatedly assured Villavicencio that she would speak with the prosecutor to “explore options” and forwarded her subordinate’s response, which stated that the case would be handled with “lots of cordiality.”
On November 5, as rumors of a possible leak of Villavicencio’s chats circulated on social media, the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a statement warning that any information concerning the phone was false. While La Posta did not provide forensic certification to verify the authenticity of the phone’s contents, they claim to have contacted more than 20 individuals mentioned in the messages who confirmed their legitimacy. Additionally, several journalists and politicians have publicly stated that their exchanges with Villavicencio are authentic.
Other revelations include that Villavicencio allegedly received monthly payments and instructions on how to operate in the National Assembly from a former high-ranking government official and businessman. The slain candidate is also accused, in messages with a top advisor to former president Lasso, of having recommended individuals connected to his sister, Aleczandra Villavicencio, for positions in the energy sector, some of whom were ultimately hired. Additionally, Villavicencio reportedly withheld information about corruption within the Lasso administration, and coordinated with journalists to publish stories that put Villavicencio in a good light. He also allegedly paid and directed “troll farms” to disseminate false information about his opponents, which included the circulation of a fake pornographic video involving National Assembly President Viviana Veloz.
The United Nations Expresses Concern over Human Rights in Ecuador, and Jorge Glas
On November 7, the United Nations Human Rights Committee released its findings on Ecuador as part of its latest review of the country. The report expressed concern over the government’s handling of the security situation, as the militarized response in both the streets and prisons has attracted widespread criticism for human rights violations. A statement noted:
The Committee was deeply alarmed by Ecuador’s frequent and seemingly normalised declarations of states of emergency at local and national levels since January 2024, including using ‘internal armed conflict’ as justification, despite relevant Constitutional Court rulings. The Committee underscored that states of emergency derogated fundamental rights… such as freedom of movement, freedom of association and assembly, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups, especially Indigenous communities, those living in poverty, and migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers.
The Committee also raised concerns about prison overcrowding, high rates of pretrial detention, violations of due process in the enforcement of counterterrorism laws, and the arbitrary use of these laws to justify widespread arrests. And the Committee was alarmed by the lack of comprehensive data on investigations of abuses; allegations of torture and systematic use of excessive force; corruption within the judiciary; judicial reforms since 2018; and the absence of safeguards to protect judges, prosecutors, and legal professionals from harm.
A week after the release of the Committee’s report, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Alice Jill Edwards — an Australian lawyer and scholar — issued a statement calling on the Ecuadorian government to “ensure that detained former vice-president Jorge David Glas Espinel is treated humanely and with dignity, warning that his situation may be life-threatening.” Glas served as vice president of Ecuador under Rafael Correa. Both Correa and Glas have been convicted on corruption charges based on flimsy or likely fabricated evidence in proceedings marred by lack of due process. Glas has been held in a maximum security prison since April, when Ecuadorian security forces seized him after storming the Mexican embassy, in violation of international law, following Mexico’s decision to grant him asylum.
Glas and his lawyers allege that he has been tortured in prison, and groups advocating for his release, including former Latin American presidents and human rights experts, warn that his life is at risk, either from mistreatment, poor health, or suicide. In her statement, endorsed by two other UN special rapporteurs, Edwards states, “I am disturbed by medical and other reports which suggest that Mr. Glas was subjected to torture.” She notes that Glas is held in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day in conditions that “would fall short of international standards,” and urged the government to provide the former vice president with adequate medical care. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which granted Glas precautionary measures in 2019 “in the belief that he faces a serious, urgent risk of suffering irreparable damage to his rights” during a previous stint in prison, visited Glas in late October and is yet to release a decision.
