September 13, 2014
At its peak in 2006, the housing bubble had caused nationwide house prices to rise more than 70 percent above their trend level. This run-up occurred in spite of the fact that rents had not outpaced inflation and there was a record nationwide vacancy rate.
The dangers of the bubble also should have been clear. Residential construction peaked at almost 6.5 percent of GDP compared to long period average of close to 4.0 percent. The housing wealth effect had led to a consumption boom that pushed the saving rate to near zero.
Also, the flood of dubious loans was hardly a secret. The National Association of Realtors reported that nearly half of first-time homebuyers had put down zero or less on their homes in 2005. The spread of NINJA (no income, no job, and no assets) loans was a common joke in the industry.
These points are worth noting in reference to an article discussing the Fed’s efforts to increase its ability to detect dangerous asset bubbles. An asset that actually poses a major threat to the economy is not hard to find. It kind of stands out, sort of like an invasion by a foreign army. The failure of the Fed to recognize the housing bubble and the dangers it posed was due to an extraordinary level of incompetence, not the inherent difficulty of the mission.
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