October 29, 2024
Presidential Elections and Allegations of US Interference
The National Electoral Council’s (CNE) deadline for registering candidacies for the February 2025 general elections ended on October 2. A total of 16 presidential tickets have registered, tying the historic record set during the 2021 elections (for an overview of the main candidates, see Ecuador News Round-Up No. 15). The CNE must now verify that all candidates meet the requirements to run and address any potential objections to the tickets — a process it has already begun by dismissing objections against security-oriented candidate Jan Topić, who was accused of having active contracts with local governments. The tickets will be granted final approval by December 30, when the CNE concludes the process.
Under Ecuadorian law, public officials seeking reelection must take a mandatory leave of absence during the official campaign period, which for this election runs from January 5 to February 6. Those running for a different position must resign from their current post before registering their candidacy. These requirements caused a stir in the National Assembly after the body’s president, Henry Kronfle of the traditionalist Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) party, resigned on October 2 to run as his party’s presidential candidate, and Viviana Veloz of the progressive Revolución Ciudadana (RC) party — the Assembly’s first vice president and Kronfle’s successor — assumed the presidency the same day. Veloz will hold the position until a new National Assembly is sworn in, except during the official campaign period, as she is seeking reelection. But a battle emerged between the PSC and the conservative, anti-RC party, Construye, for the Assembly’s first vice presidency, which must be decided by the National Assembly plenary. After legislators failed to elect a candidate in an initial vote on October 8, the PSC, with support from the RC, ultimately succeeded in having their candidate, Otto Vera, elected by the plenary as first vice president on October 29.
Like other elected officials, Noboa must take a leave of absence in January to run for reelection. This has caused him problems, as he is keen to avoid transferring the presidency to Vice President Verónica Abad, with whom he has a strained relationship. Noboa has maneuvered, both explicitly and behind the scenes, to create reasons to dismiss or discipline Abad, or to pressure her to resign (see Ecuador News Round-Up No. 15 for more). Noboa’s struggle against Abad is mainly unfolding at the Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE), an electoral authority separate from the CNE, where several complaints seeking Abad’s removal have been filed by Noboa’s ministers, members of his government, and other officials. One accuses her of campaigning in the 2022 local elections before the legally designated period; hearings on this complaint began on October 24. Abad, who was sent to Israel as an “ambassador for peace” shortly after being sworn in, also has a hearing on November 7 at the Ministry of Labor regarding an administrative process against her initiated at the request of the foreign ministry, which seeks to have her disciplined for allegedly delaying her transfer to Turkey.
Meanwhile, President Noboa faces declining approval ratings due to the ongoing security and energy crisis, as detailed below. In response, critics say, he has sought to divert attention and deepen polarization ahead of the elections by presenting two controversial constitutional amendments. The first involves lifting the constitutional ban on foreign military bases on Ecuadorian soil implemented under former president Rafael Correa. The other seeks to eliminate constitutional requirements designed to create a level-playing field between political parties, including government financial contributions to parties that meet minimum thresholds and funding for promotional content in certain forms of media for all parties participating in an election. One expert interviewed by Ecuavisa said, “In societies such as ours, [this amendment will] encourage the oligarchization of politics and, under current conditions, widen the possibilities for the institutionalization of narco-politics.”
On October 9, the United States imposed a travel ban on former president Correa and former vice president Jorge Glas — and their wives and adult children, who have not been involved in politics — for “significant corruption,” prohibiting them from entering the US and sparking accusations of election interference. Since the end of the Correa administration in 2017, both Correa and Glas have been convicted on corruption charges based on flimsy evidence and in proceedings marred by lack of due process. Correa currently resides in Belgium, where he was granted political asylum in 2022. The visa restrictions against Glas seem especially odd, as he has been held in a maximum security prison since Ecuadorian security forces seized him after storming the Mexican embassy, in violation of international law, following Mexico’s decision to grant Glas asylum. One designee, Correa’s youngest child, was only 14 years old when Correa left office.
Many observers view the travel bans as an attempt by the US to influence the upcoming election in favor of Noboa, who has been a hardline, pro-US president. Given Correa’s ties to the RC, political opponents will likely use the US restrictions to discredit the party and its candidates and to further undermine Correa’s claims of innocence — despite Interpol having denied three Ecuadorian requests to issue a red notice for the former president. There is precedent for this: in the 2023 elections, the RC’s opponents blamed the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio on Correa, which negatively impacted RC candidate Luisa González in the vote.
Recent reporting by The Intercept Brasil and Drop Site News suggests the US embassy may have played a role in allowing this narrative to spread. Moreover, the US designations come four years after Correa was convicted, and at a time when Noboa needs distractions from the multiple crises facing his administration.
Correa has also suggested he may have been targeted because he recently met with Julian Assange on the margins of a parliamentary session on his case at the Council of Europe. Correa, whose administration granted Assange asylum in 2012 and gave him refuge at their embassy in London, seems to be the first major politician to have met with Assange since the WikiLeaks founder was released from prison.
The Continuing Energy Crisis
Ecuador is currently facing a series of nationwide blackouts amid a prolonged and unprecedented energy crisis. Since September 18, the government has implemented daily power outages, including for the industrial sector, lasting between 10 and 14 hours. Last-minute modifications of blackout schedules and reversals of promised outage reductions have sparked widespread public frustration. The latest example occurred when President Noboa announced on October 17 that daily blackouts would be gradually reduced from 10 hours to four hours by the week of November 6, only to reverse course on October 24, increasing the duration of blackouts to 14 hours. The latest blackout schedule mandates daily outages of 11 to 13 hours until November 3. In the midst of the prolonged blackouts and energy crisis, on October 9, Minister of Energy and Mines Antonio Gonçalves, the third to hold that position under the Noboa administration, resigned.
This marks the third cycle of blackouts in the past year for Ecuador, which generates 80 to 90 percent of its electricity from hydroelectric plants. In October 2023, the Lasso administration instituted rolling nationwide blackouts, citing droughts. Although President Noboa declared an end to these outages in February, they resumed in April. His government attributed the issue to maintenance problems and, without providing evidence, accused political opponents and officials within the Ministry of Energy and Mines, including the minister herself, of “sabotage,” which ultimately led to her dismissal. This time, Noboa has blamed a variety of factors, including his predecessors’ inaction, maintenance issues, climate change, and a drought that his government claims has resulted in the lowest water levels in 61 years. However, some experts contest this, arguing that while the drought is indeed severe, Ecuador has experienced at least 20 worse droughts since 1950. The minister of energy and mines also strayed from Noboa’s message and claimed there was a crisis of generation, transmission, and distribution.
While experts don’t discount the impact of drought, they also point to other factors. The president of the College of Electrical Engineers of Pichincha emphasized the increasing privatization of the energy sector since 2019 and a significant lack of investment and expansion of the energy grid, noting that Ecuador was exporting electricity as recently as 2018. He also stated that the Noboa government ignored expert warnings and recommendations. The National Assembly’s Oversight Committee report on the April blackouts warned in July that outages would return in September, but found no evidence of sabotage, and highlighted similar concerns, including insufficient investments by the Moreno and Lasso administrations, problems with energy generation, and failure to follow the government’s Electricity Master Plan — a roadmap for expanding the electricity grid. Other reports indicate that Noboa diverted funds from the national electricity operator to service public debts.
There are also additional factors to consider. Notably, Ecuador’s growing population and increasing energy demand have resulted in a deficit of 1,080 megawatts, with the current national electricity grid meeting about only 65 percent of domestic demand. As a result, Ecuador has had to purchase electricity from neighboring countries, primarily Colombia, which has suspended sales to Ecuador on several occasions to meet its own demand, including during the April blackouts and recent September and October power cuts. The last wave of outages in Ecuador goes back to 2009, before the Correa administration engaged in large-scale public investment in the electricity sector, greatly increasing per capita electricity generation during Correa’s 10 years in office.
The recurrence of a problem that seemingly belonged to the past has caused much discontent among citizens, the business community, and industrialists.
The Noboa administration has attempted to address the crisis through various measures, including passing a law that offers tax incentives for companies generating their own power, employing “cloud seeding” to stimulate rainfall, reducing to zero the value-added tax on the purchase and import of energy generators, eliminating energy subsidies for mining corporations, and urging the private sector to produce its own electricity with private generators. Its most controversial move has been awarding a contract to a Turkish company with a questionable track record to deploy a power-generating barge in Guayaquil. Critics argue that the barge’s $144 million cost (plus an additional $45 million for fuel) is excessively high for a temporary solution that will produce a maximum of 100 megawatts. They claim the company is overcharging the government, point to irregularities in the contracting process, and raise concerns over the inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement clause. And, they assert that the barge is delivering less electricity than initially promised.
Fires in the Capital
Five fires broke out in Quito’s Guápulo neighborhood on September 24, spreading to homes and forested areas. Exacerbated by the dry season’s winds and high temperatures, smoke and ash from the eastern outskirts of the capital blanketed much of the wider city. Authorities responded swiftly, with President Noboa deploying the armed forces and Quito’s mayor mobilizing all firefighting units to combat the blaze. Roads were cut off and over 100 families evacuated. A state of emergency was declared in Quito to free up funds and activate high-level coordination mechanisms between the local and central government for an effective response. As authorities battled the initial five fires, six more broke out, prompting officials to suspect a coordinated attack, with the environment minister claiming the fires in Guápulo resulted from arson, and the mayor and government ministers referring to the incidents as terrorist “attacks.” Scheduled blackouts were suspended until 6 p.m. on September 26, and by September 27 all the fires had been extinguished, leaving over 140 hectares burned and more than a dozen homes affected.
During the fires, the minister of government called on citizens to help identify those responsible and offered a reward for information. The Prosecutor General’s Office launched an investigation into the fires’ cause. Ultimately, four people were arrested in connection with the fires, although little information about their alleged involvement has been released.
Insecurity Persists amid Human Rights Concerns
The Noboa government announced that Ecuador experienced 4,959 homicides between January and October 2024, an 18 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2023. While this may seem like significant progress, 2024 is already the second-deadliest year in Ecuadorian history, and the number is still much higher than for 2022 and earlier years. Other crimes such as extortions and robberies are also up overall.
High-profile murders also continue to occur, including the recent killing of the director of the Penitenciaría del Litoral, one of Ecuador’s most dangerous prisons. This incident prompted the director of the Ecuadorian Organized Crime Observatory to claim that the country is witnessing the early stages of an “insurgency, in which criminal organizations seek to destabilize the state to gain territorial control,” as happened in Mexico and Colombia. A civil society human rights report submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee states: “The possibility of Ecuador becoming a failed state, dominated by organised crime, poses the risk of a domino effect throughout the region.”
A recent CID-Gallup poll revealed that Ecuadorians are acutely aware of this violent reality and are the least likely in the world to feel safe walking alone at night in the area where they live.
On October 3, Noboa declared yet another partial 60-day state of emergency, this time in 20 municipalities, citing “grave internal commotion” and the “internal armed conflict,” the latter of which he officially declared in January in order to deploy the military against criminal gangs. This comes despite the Constitutional Court’s notice that Noboa cannot invoke “internal armed conflict” as a justification for the states of emergency, as he had repeatedly failed to adequately substantiate its existence. The state of emergency establishes a curfew from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. and suspends the rights to assembly and of the inviolability of the home. Notably, this marks the first time that Quito — where the government claims criminal groups are attempting to destabilize the state ahead of elections — is included in a partial state of emergency. The combination of a security and energy crisis has heightened citizens’ feelings of fear. This is Noboa’s sixth state of emergency since taking office.
As reported in previous Ecuador News Round-Ups, Noboa’s security measures have sparked widespread concerns about potential human rights violations. The 142nd session of the UN Human Rights Committee, taking place from October 14 to November 7, provides a platform for updated assessments, with various human rights organizations submitting reports on alleged violations.
Amnesty International’s report states: “The intervention of the armed forces has led to numerous reports of possible human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and other ill-treatment.” It highlights that in June, the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the organization that it had opened 226 investigations into possible “abuse of authority” on the part of security forces since January, alongside 12 investigations into possible extrajudicial killings — an increase from the 8 cases reported by Human Rights Watch in May. The report adds, “The disproportionate use of the criminal justice system to deal with drug-related offenses and stem the power of organized criminal groups has created a pernicious cycle of arbitrary detention and mass incarceration,” and suggests that this “may be disproportionately directed against persons from groups historically subject to discrimination, including persons of African descent, Indigenous origin and those from lower socioeconomic status ….” A separate report from an alliance of 14 human rights and environmental organizations says that there may have been 18,000 possible arbitrary detentions between January and April.
Proposal to Overturn Ban on Foreign Military Bases
On September 16, Noboa posted a video on Twitter announcing his plan to propose a bill that would lift the constitutional ban on hosting foreign military bases on Ecuadorian soil. In the video — recorded at the former site of a US military air base in the coastal city of Manta — Noboa argued that international cooperation was essential to resolving the security crisis and that former president Rafael Correa’s decision not to renew the US’s lease on the Manta base in 2009 effectively handed the country over to narcotraffickers.
Article 5 of the Ecuadorian constitution, adopted by popular referendum in 2008, states, “Ecuador is a territory of peace. The establishment of foreign military bases, or foreign facilities for military purposes, shall not be permitted. The ceding of national military bases to foreign armed or security forces is prohibited.” Noboa’s proposal would modify this article to only state the first sentence — “Ecuador is a territory of peace.” Although he initially stated that the proposal would be submitted to the National Assembly, he first sent it to the Constitutional Court to clarify the procedure for the constitutional change. The Court green lit the proposal on October 15, and Noboa sent it to the National Assembly two days later. If it passes two rounds of debate with an absolute majority of 70 votes, it will be put to a popular referendum. It is uncertain whether the proposal will clear the legal hurdles in time for the February elections, or by the end of Noboa’s term in May. Noboa’s Acción Democrática Nacional party, Construye, and the PSC support the proposal, while the RC is opposed.
Critics argue that Noboa’s proposal represents another effort by his administration to enhance security cooperation with the United States at the expense of Ecuadorian sovereignty. In February, Noboa sparked debate by ratifying a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US, granting US military personnel immunity from local laws while deployed in Ecuador. However, Noboa is not the first president to seek closer ties with the US military; this has been a goal of every president since Rafael Correa ended his term in 2017. Talks concerning the SOFA were initiated under the administration of former president Guillermo Lasso, who signed the agreement, and in 2019 former president Lenín Moreno allowed the US to operate anti-narcotics airplanes from an airport in the Galapagos Islands, a move considered illegal by opposition sectors.
For its part, the US government has repeatedly signaled it “has no plans to request permission to establish a permanent U.S. military presence in Ecuador,” according to a US embassy press release — “permanent” being the key term in the statement.
Regardless of the United States’ current intentions, the possibility of establishing a US military base in Ecuador has raised concerns due in part to the human rights record associated with the former Manta airbase. Journalist reports suggest that US personnel committed at least 118 crimes in Ecuador during the base’s 10 years of operation, none of which led to prosecution. Human rights organizations also accuse the US of sinking or damaging Ecuadorian ships with no justification. One infamous case is that of the Jorve IV, a fishing boat that disappeared in 2002 with 18 people on board, widely believed to have been sunk by US forces.
Additionally, a report from the National Assembly indicates that the base failed to stimulate the local economy and instead contributed to a rise in the cost of living. Both the report and human rights groups questioned the base’s overall effectiveness. The US presence in Ecuador was primarily justified as part of the fight against drug trafficking, yet data shared by the US embassy shows that over its 10 years of operation (1999–2009) and 5,500 missions, the Manta base, in addition to US bases in Aruba and Curaçao, contributed to the seizure of 1,758 tons of drugs across 11 countries, with only 81 tons seized in Ecuador. In contrast, between 2005 and 2008 alone, Ecuadorian police seized 134 tons of drugs without US involvement. Moreover, experts note that the base failed to improve security for Ecuadorians. Renowned security scholar Fernando Carrión said in a recent interview that “when the Manta base was signed in 1999 … we had a homicide rate of 13.5 per 100,000 inhabitants. When the base leaves in 2010, the rate increases to 17.6. In other words, in that period the homicide rate rose, and then we have a significant drop when the base leaves. The rate dropped from 17.6 to 5.8 in 2017.”
