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Executive Summary

Ecuador’s official month-long campaign period for the 2025 presidential elections, scheduled for February 9, is now underway. Polls suggest the race will likely come down to a contest between incumbent Daniel Noboa and progressive candidate Luisa González. Noboa has violated campaign laws and the constitution, refusing to temporarily transfer the presidency to Vice President Verónica Abad, whom he has removed twice without justification and in defiance of a judge’s orders. Despite effectively replacing Abad with an ally, Noboa largely ignored electoral rules mandating he take a temporary leave of absence during the campaign. His actions face several legal challenges and condemnation from experts, officials, civil society, and other candidates.

Meanwhile, Ecuador has been rocked by the disappearance of four Black children at the hands of the military. Their charred bodies were later found miles from where they were last seen. The military initially denied involvement and the minister of defense threatened a judge who had ruled it a case of forced disappearance by the state. Known as the “Malvinas Case,” the incident highlights growing human rights concerns over Noboa’s militarized response to rising violence. Additionally, Noboa has authorized the US military to station in the Galapagos Islands, while a report from the Center for Engagement in the Americas explores how violence is reshaping migration patterns in Ecuador.

Campaigning for the Elections Begins

On January 5, the legally designated month-long campaign period for Ecuadorian presidential and legislative candidates officially began. This is the only time during which candidates are permitted to hold rallies and events, appear on talk shows and radio programs, run advertisements, and, more generally, call on citizens to vote for them in the February 9 elections. A presidential debate is scheduled for January 19, during which candidates will address voters’ top concerns, including security, the energy crisis, the economy, and the rule of law. A total of 16 candidates are competing for the presidency.

Comunicaliza’s latest poll, conducted December 27 to 29, shows conservative candidate President Noboa leading with 44.9 percent of the valid vote, an increase from 39.1 percent in mid-November. Progressive candidate Luisa González is in second place with 40 percent of the valid vote, up from 38 percent. CEDATOS projects a wider margin for Noboa, giving him 48 percent of the valid vote compared to González’s 32.5 percent. In contrast, MR Analitica puts González in the lead with 41.14 percent of the valid vote, ahead of Noboa’s 32.32 percent.

Despite the discrepancies, all polls suggest the election will likely come down to a contest between Noboa and González, mirroring the 2023 elections. If either candidate wins 50 percent of the valid vote, or 40 percent with a 10-point lead over the next runner-up, they will secure an outright victory in the first round on February 9. Otherwise, a second round will take place between the top two candidates on April 13.

Noboa Unconstitutionally Refuses to Temporarily Leave Office

During the campaign period, incumbents must take a leave of absence if they are seeking reelection. Mandated by Ecuadorian law, this ensures that officials cannot use state resources, state-funded events, or official privileges to gain an unfair advantage in the campaign. According to the constitution, when incumbents are away campaigning, their duties are temporarily assumed by alternates. In the case of the president, this role falls to the vice president.

President Noboa, however, chose to disregard this rule and remain in office for the first days of the campaign — a decision he had hinted at months ago. Noboa has refused to temporarily transfer the presidency to Vice President Verónica Abad, whom he has unconstitutionally removed and replaced twice (see below). For added measure, Noboa argues that a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling concerning term limits exempts him from this requirement. (It is important to note that Ecuador’s constitution allows officials to be reelected only once, and that Noboa is completing the term of former president Guillermo Lasso who dissolved the legislature and ended his presidency in 2023 by invoking a “mutual death” clause in the constitution to avoid impeachment on corruption charges). Given the 2010 ruling, which states that finishing the term of a predecessor who was removed by the mutual death clause does not amount to reelection, Noboa contends he is not technically seeking reelection and therefore is not required to take a leave of absence. He and his party have held that he is allowed to remain in office as long as he doesn’t campaign.

Noboa’s refusal to take a leave of absence is both unprecedented and unconstitutional, according to legal experts, officials, and fellow candidates. Ecuavisa interviewed constitutional law experts who warned that the decision could create a “legal mess” for Noboa and his advisors, amounting to a serious electoral infraction punishable by the suspension of Noboa’s political rights, including his right to run for office.

A member of the National Electoral Council (CNE), Ecuador’s electoral authority, urged the body to address the issue, saying that Noboa’s interpretation of the Constitutional Court ruling is fundamentally flawed. She explains that it refers only to the computation of term limits, not the requirement to take a leave of absence, and that it does not, of course, take into account relevant laws passed since.

A group of more than 30 legal and political experts reiterated this position in a letter rejecting Noboa’s move. Moreover, a former electoral official said that Noboa can’t skirt the law by staying in office and not campaigning, as everything he does could be considered part of the campaign. On this point, an article in the newspaper Extra points out that it is irrelevant whether Noboa campaigns while he remains in office because the law states that as a candidate he must take a leave of absence by the time the campaign starts.

Many candidates publicly condemned Noboa’s refusal to take a leave of absence, with some even submitting complaints against him before the CNE and the Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE). The National Assembly also passed a resolution reaffirming the leave of absence obligation for legislators. This was aimed at representatives from Noboa’s party, who had likewise said that they would not take a leave of absence.

In the lead-up to Noboa’s decision, however, several state institutions refused to address the matter. In May, when Noboa sought legal guidance from the General Counsel’s Office regarding the leave of absence rule, the institution abstained from providing an answer. Similarly, the CNE refused to take a position in December when one of its members requested the body reaffirm the rule. The CNE president merely stated that the rules were sufficiently clear and that any infractions would be addressed through legal action at the TCE. This sparked criticism, with observers accusing state institutions of remaining silent and allowing the constitution to be violated.

After Noboa delivered a speech from a presidential palace balcony to a crowd of supporters on January 5 — an act that some outlets claimed amounted to a campaign event — the CNE published a statement, indirectly reminding him that he is prohibited from using state resources for campaigning. The following day, Noboa issued Decree 500 announcing that he would take a leave of absence from January 9 to 12, during which Cynthia Gellibert, his new and illegally appointed acting vice president, would temporarily assume the presidency.

Noboa’s leave of absence was also declared irregularly — since it requires approval from the legislature rather than a unilateral decree — and it also falls short of the month-long leave required by law. On January 9, the CNE announced that it was investigating the January 5 event for alleged misuse of public resources.

The TV station Ecuavisa reported that Gellibert automatically assumed the presidency on January 9, though it is unclear whether she was required to sign any documents formalizing the transition. Noboa resumed his role as president on the morning of January 12 by issuing Decree 504, which repealed Decree 500. Notably, Decree 500 had specified that Noboa would return to office at 5 p.m. However, Noboa stated that he resumed his duties earlier for reasons of national security following the January 11 assassination of Eber Ponce, the mayor of the city of Arenillas on the border with Peru.

Observers argue that Noboa’s premature return was driven by the Constitutional Court’s January 10 announcement that it was reviewing Decree 500’s constitutionality. By repealing the decree, they suggest that Noboa aimed to halt the court’s review and avoid a formal ruling. However, they assert that the court could still issue a decision despite the decree’s repeal, as potential electoral infractions stemming from its issuance may still warrant review. Furthermore, the court has, on several occasions, ruled on policies or regulations that had already been revoked or modified at the time of its decisions.

Court Reverses Vice President Abad’s Removal; Noboa Replaces Her Again

On December 23, a Quito judge reversed Vice President Verónica Abad’s suspension and replacement. This ruling followed Noboa’s year-long campaign to remove Abad, aimed at preventing her from assuming the presidency should he take a leave of absence for election campaigning. As part of this effort, the Ministry of Labor had suspended Abad on November 9 for 150 days, citing her week-long delay in relocating to Turkey from Israel, where Noboa had appointed her “ambassador for peace” just after inauguration. Noboa then replaced Abad as vice president with Sariha Moya, an ally in his cabinet, by decree.

These actions were widely condemned as unconstitutional, as only the National Assembly has authority to remove the vice president, and Noboa violated other procedures regarding her replacement (see full analysis in Ecuador News Round-Up No.17). Eleven US Members of Congress wrote a letter to US Secretary of State Blinken expressing concern about this and other aspects of Noboa’s administration on December 19.

The December 23 ruling mandated that Abad be reinstated and required the Ministry of Labor to issue a public apology. Judge Nubia Vera cited the ministry’s own internal rules concerning administrative inquiries — the tool it had used to suspend Abad — which excludes foreign service officials, like Abad in her role as ambassador to Israel. The judge also cited a law regarding foreign service that allows diplomatic officials 30 days to relocate to a new posting. Regardless of the legality of Abad’s suspension, the judge argued that, under the law on public service, she could have been suspended for a maximum of 30 days. The judge also noted that, as an elected official, Abad is exempt from administrative inquiries under the same law. The minister of labor appealed the decision.

Shortly after the ruling, Judge Vera publicly denounced that she had been pressured to rule against Abad by the president of the Judiciary Council — the body responsible for overseeing the judiciary — and other officials from the same institution. She claimed they had threatened her with dismissal and had handed her a flash drive containing a pre-written ruling siding with the Ministry of Labor. On December 26, an inquiry into Judge Vera was initiated at the request of the Judiciary Council. The inquiry, which stems from a complaint filed against Vera in November, could lead to her removal. The judge requested provisional measures from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on January 12, claiming her life was at risk.

Immediately after Judge Vera overturned Abad’s suspension, President Noboa issued a decree requiring the vice president to travel to Turkey by December 27 to serve as an embassy official. Abad refused to comply. Instead, she took vacation leave until January 3 and asserted that, based on the judge’s ruling, she had 30 days to complete the relocation. Noboa then decreed that Moya be reinstated as vice president until Abad reported to the Ecuadorian embassy in Turkey or until January 22, claiming that Abad’s failure to go to Turkey constituted a temporary absence due to “force majeure.” Noboa also noted that Abad had not sought authorization for her vacation and argued that the 30-day relocation period applied only to foreign service officials within the diplomatic track.

Experts disagree with Noboa, asserting that Abad was not required to seek approval for her vacation and that she does, in fact, have 30 days to relocate, as Judge Vera had ruled. A group of over 30 legal and political experts stated in a letter that Abad’s actions do not meet the constitutional definitions of “force majeure,” or temporary absence. They emphasized that such declarations must be ratified by the Constitutional Court and the National Assembly, rendering her replacement unlawful.

Abad then filed legal actions against the move with the Constitutional Court and with a court in Quito on January 2 and 9, respectively — as did the Popular Unity party, which filed a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office. She also called on the armed forces and police to support her in her effort to assume the presidency on January 5, but these two institutions rejected her plea and said they would abide by Noboa’s decrees.

On January 4, Noboa replaced Moya with another ally from his cabinet, Cynthia Gellibert, after Moya said she was unable to assume the role due to health reasons. The National Assembly, via a letter from its general secretariat, rejected Noboa’s official notification of Abad’s replacement on January 8, stating that his actions were unconstitutional, and that the assembly would only recognize Abad as vice president. Noboa responded by filing a complaint against the secretary with the Prosecutor General’s Office.

As noted above, Gellibert assumed the presidency from January 9 to 12, following Noboa’s issuance of Decree 500. On January 10, the Constitutional Court announced that it would review the decree. That same day, Judge Vera formally notified the presidency and other institutions that Abad must be reinstated in compliance with her ruling.

Military Accused of Forcibly Disappearing Four Children Later Found Dead

On December 8, four Afro-Ecuadorian children, aged 11 to 15, were stopped and detained by Ecuadorian soldiers in the impoverished Malvinas area of Guayaquil while returning home from a soccer game. For weeks, their families searched for them and urged the government to investigate their disappearance. Initially, the Ministry of Defense denied any involvement, but then security camera footage surfaced showing soldiers taking the children away. The Associated Press reported that even though police had the surveillance video, an investigation into the military’s role in the children’s disappearance was delayed for two weeks. The case only moved forward after the families went to the media, sparking a national outcry.

The Ministry of Defense stated that the boys were detained on December 8 due to suspicion of their involvement in a robbery, and that they were released later that night in Taura, an area unfamiliar to them several miles outside Guayaquil, near a military base. A witness whom the boys had approached after their release says that they were naked and had been beaten. Moments after one of the boys used the witness’s phone to call his father, four hooded men arrived on motorcycles and took the children away. The military claims the kidnappers were gang members.

On December 24, four incinerated bodies were found in the Taura area, and the Prosecutor General’s Office reported that DNA testing confirmed the remains were those of the missing boys. The same day, Judge Tanya Loor accepted a habeas corpus action filed by the families, with the support of human rights organizations. She ruled that the children had been forcibly disappeared by the state and mandated that the matter be investigated, that the Ministry of Defense issue an apology, and that the families be compensated.

There are several inconsistencies and irregularities in the military’s account of events. Prosecutors have noted that there is no evidence linking the boys to a robbery — no formal complaint, no report from an alleged victim, and no documentation from the armed forces themselves. Additionally, the military failed to inform, or hand the boys over to, a police unit specializing in juvenile affairs as required by standard procedure. There is also no official record of their detention, no order for their release, nor an exact location provided by the military as to where they were released. On December 31, the Prosecutor General’s Office filed charges of forced disappearance against the 16 soldiers involved and a judge ordered their pretrial detention for 90 days.

In compliance with the judge’s orders, the minister of defense apologized to the children’s families during a January 6 press conference. The apology was vague and short, however, and the minister spent most of the conference attacking and threatening Judge Loor for declaring a case of forced disappearance at the hands of the state. The minister stated that the government would “go all the way” to sanction the judge, and called for an investigation into “the use of the narrative of human rights as an instrument of political persecution.” In response to the minister’s press conference, the National Court of Justice and Ecuador’s Association of Judges published statements urging respect for judicial independence and condemning the threats made against Judge Loor. Human rights groups followed with similar statements.

The military and other government institutions have appealed Loor’s ruling, challenging the judge’s authority and arguing that the military was not involved in the children’s disappearance, claiming that it, and their deaths, had occurred after their release.

The “Malvinas Case,” as it is now called in Ecuador, garnered international headlines and condemnation from human rights groups. While the boys were still missing, the UN Human Rights Office’s (OHCHR) Committee on Enforced Disappearances requested that the government adopt immediate measures to locate and protect the children. UNICEF also released a statement expressing concern, and upon confirmation of the boys’ killing, OHCHR called on the Ecuadorian government to investigate the case and guarantee justice.

The case highlights growing human rights concerns organizations have raised since President Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” against gangs a year ago. Under this approach, Noboa deployed the military to the streets, ordered them to take control of prisons, and issued a series of decrees establishing states of emergency, despite legal challenges. Human rights organizations have denounced widespread arbitrary detentions, prison torture, and abuse, as well as cases of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. And legislators in the National Assembly are investigating allegations that Noboa bought and deployed Pegasus phone spyware against politicians, journalists, and activists.

The Malvinas Case has also prompted calls for the United States to reassess its growing military relationship with Ecuador (described below) and ensure that this security cooperation complies with the Leahy Law, which prohibits “U.S. assistance to foreign security force units when there is credible information that the unit has committed a ‘gross violation of human rights.’”

Noboa Allows the US Military to Station and Operate out of the Galapagos Islands

On December 10, the Ecuadorian government issued an order permitting the US military to station ships, personnel, armaments, equipment, and submarines on the Galápagos Islands. The archipelago, located off Ecuador’s coast, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1978 due to its unique ecosystems and biodiversity, which experts regard as fragile. From there, the US military will be able to launch operations with Ecuador’s armed forces to combat drug trafficking, irregular migration, illegal fishing, and other illicit activities around the archipelago’s waters. The order authorizes the construction of additional infrastructure or facilities at existing ports and airports, if deemed necessary for its implementation, and US personnel will be exempt from paying taxes or fees on the islands.

This order, which has raised concerns from human rights and environmental organizations, appears to mark the beginning implementation of two agreements ratified between the United States and Ecuador in February last year. The first, known as a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), defines conditions for the “temporary” presence of US military personnel in Ecuador. It grants US military personnel the equivalent of diplomatic immunity and allows US military vehicles, aircraft, ships, and personnel to enter and travel freely within Ecuadorian territory, among other provisions.

The other agreement stipulates joint maritime operations to combat illegal activities (see Ecuador News Round-Up No. 11 for further analysis). Since 2019, however, the US has conducted anti-narcotics flights from airports in the Galápagos Islands, a move authorized by former president Lenín Moreno that some sectors in the opposition say is illegal.

Article 5 of the Ecuadorian constitution prohibits foreign military bases on Ecuadorian soil — a restriction that President Noboa aims to overturn through a proposed referendum. Critics nevertheless contend that the Galápagos order will result in the establishment of a US military base in practice, even if it is not officially designated as such. Their concerns stem from several factors, including the provision allowing new infrastructure to be constructed and the absence of a specific time limit in either the order or the SOFA regarding the presence of US military personnel and equipment on the islands, or in Ecuador more broadly. For its part, the US government has said it “has no plans to request permission to establish a permanent U.S. military presence in Ecuador,” according to a US embassy press release from September — “permanent” being the key term in the statement.

A coalition of 30 organizations has criticized the lack of consultation with local communities, potential environmental damage to the fragile Galápagos ecosystem, and Ecuador’s previous experience with a US military base in Manta from 1999 to 2009. That base was associated with unprosecuted crimes allegedly committed by US soldiers, the US military allegedly sinking and damaging boats without justification, rising living costs, and inefficiency in combating drug trafficking.

New Report Shines Light on Migration in Ecuador

A December 17 report published by Francisca Vigaud-Walsh of the Center for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas highlights migration patterns in Ecuador and how violence is reshaping them. The report discusses various aspects of migration, including challenges faced by migrants in Ecuador, various crises driving emigration, and the responses of the US and Ecuadorian governments. It also provides several recommendations for addressing these issues. On the issue of out-migration, the report states, “The most recent phase of emigration began in 2016, following a devastating earthquake, and has since intensified due to economic, security, and climate-related challenges. According to data from Ecuador’s Ministry of the Interior, the scale of emigration has grown markedly since 2021. …With conditions in Ecuador showing little signs of improvement, surveys indicate that emigration remains an objective for many Ecuadorians.” Indeed, recent figures show that 94,767 Ecuadorians out-migrated in 2024, making it the second-highest year for out-migration in eight years.

The report also emphasizes proposed reforms to the Organic Law on Human Mobility, introduced by National Assembly legislator Esther Cuesta in November. Vigaud-Walsh writes that the reform “proposes transformative updates to Ecuador’s migration framework, strengthening protections for refugees and migrants, ensuring rights to education and health.” It also “enhances reintegration programs for returning Ecuadorians by improving access to education, employment, and social inclusion,” among other measures. The bill has garnered broad support from key sectors of Ecuador’s civil society and organizations abroad, who played a role in shaping it.