The Presidential Debate and Elections

Ahead of Ecuador’s February 9 presidential elections, the National Electoral Council (CNE) organized a presidential debate on January 19. The 16 candidates were divided into 2 groups of 8, participating at separate times during the nearly four-hour event. This arrangement meant that the two leading candidates, incumbent Daniel Noboa and progressive Luisa González, did not have the opportunity to interact with each other.

Overall, no single candidate stood out during the debate — likely a result of the rigid and widely criticized format, which allotted each candidate about eight minutes of speaking time. The candidates offered vague proposals, with much discussion centered on privatization of the energy sector and other areas of the state, using artificial intelligence to improve government efficiency, and taking a firm stance on security issues.

President Noboa primarily focused on highlighting his administration’s actions and supposed achievements, providing little detail about his future plans beyond a promise of continuity. He emerged relatively unscathed from attacks, the strongest of which came from candidate Francesco Tabacchi, who challenged Noboa to name the four children who had recently been forcibly disappeared by the military. Noboa refused, claiming he was not being asked a question. Analysts agree that the debate had no real winners or losers, and that, for the most part, the lower-polling candidates failed to position themselves as strong alternatives to Noboa or González.

A January 15 Comunicaliza poll conducted before the debate placed Noboa first with 36.1 percent of the total vote, followed by Luisa González with 33.0 percent. In two subsequent polls conducted January 24 and 27, Noboa maintained his lead with 36.9 percent and 38.1 percent of the total vote, respectively, while González remained in second with 32.4 percent and 32.0 percent. However, observers have recently scrutinized Comunicaliza’s polling in past elections, casting doubt on the firm’s accuracy.

Negocios y Estrategias’ January 15 pre-debate poll placed González first with 40 percent of the total vote, and Noboa second with 34. Their January 21 post-debate poll showed barely any movement from these figures, except a slight increase in support for Leonidas Iza, the Pachakutik Indigenous party’s candidate, and Andrea González, a conservative who had been part of slain presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio’s ticket in the 2023 elections.

The elections this year will be monitored by a variety of actors, including the Organization of American States and the European Union, who have each sent electoral observation missions (EOMs). The EU EOM has stated that it is closely monitoring President Noboa’s breach of electoral laws, including his refusal to take a mandatory leave of absence, as well as the removal of the vice president (detailed below), to assess whether these actions influence the election’s outcome. The OAS, which oversaw the 2023 presidential elections, noted in its 2023 report that the country was highly polarized, with widespread voter fatigue due to frequent elections. According to recent polls and news outlets, polarization remains high.

Warnings of Violence in the Elections

In the last few years, elections in Ecuador have been marked by instability and violence; most notably, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated ahead of the 2023 elections, after leaving a campaign event. Violence and threats of violence have marked this election as well. On January 31, Ecuadorian police arrested 12 armed men in possession of military and police uniforms in Manabí, where President Noboa was set to campaign. While Noboa has suggested that the suspects were plotting to attack or assassinate him, journalists from La Posta, citing police sources, report that authorities believe the target was actually a female candidate. Of the two women in the race — Andrea González and Luisa González — only Luisa González was campaigning near the area at the time of the arrests, the journalists reported. The police have denied the journalist’s claim.

There have also been threats to the life of former vice president Jorge Glas, who is currently jailed in the infamous maximum security La Roca prison. Both former president Rafael Correa and Glas, who served as vice president under Correa, have been convicted on corruption charges based on dubious evidence in proceedings marred by lack of due process. Glas has been imprisoned since April, after Ecuadorian security forces seized him in an armed breach of the Mexican embassy, in violation of international law, following Mexico’s decision to grant him asylum. Since then, Glas’s supporters, as well as a UN special rapporteur, have alleged that he is being subjected to torture and other violations of his human rights.

Glas has allegedly faced threats in prison. On January 5, he was temporarily evacuated from La Roca due to what his lawyer claimed was an assassination attempt. The government, however, disputes this, saying the evacuation was due to a riot within the facility. Days later, on January 8, an inmate was murdered in La Roca, further raising concerns that Glas’s safety could not be guaranteed. Glas’s legal team and some observers also allege that Noboa’s campaign, using troll accounts, is spreading a false rumor that the progressive Revolución Ciudadana (RC) movement, which Luisa González represents, is plotting to assassinate Glas in prison just before the elections to blame his death on Noboa. This rumor was echoed by one of Noboa’s ministers during an interview on January 2. Glas’s legal team claimed that the government is using these rumors to justify a potential assassination of Glas, but the Noboa administration denies this.

The Vice President Remains Removed

Verónica Abad’s battle to reclaim her position as vice president (see full analysis in Round-Ups No. 18 and 17) continues to play out in the courts through a series of legal proceedings. Since his inauguration, President Noboa has sought to remove Abad, aiming to prevent her from assuming the presidency in the event he takes a leave of absence for election campaigning, as the constitution and electoral rules require. In November, Abad was suspended following an administrative inquiry by the Ministry of Labor and was replaced by Noboa, via decree, with one of his allies.

On December 23, Quito judge Nubia Vera ruled that the Noboa administration’s suspension and replacement of Abad was unconstitutional, as the vice president can only be removed by the National Assembly. Additionally, Vera argued that Abad’s suspension violated foreign service laws and mandated that she be reinstated. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed this decision on January 17 with a ruling that the ministry’s internal rules underpinning the administrative inquiry process were also unconstitutional and that administrative authorities cannot suspend the vice president.

Following Judge Vera’s December 23 ruling, Noboa issued a decree ordering Abad to travel to Turkey to serve as an embassy official. When Abad initially refused to comply, citing Judge Vera’s ruling, the president issued another decree, arguing that her refusal constituted a temporary absence due to “force majeure.” As a result, the decree ordered Abad to be replaced until January 22 or until she reported to the Ecuadorian embassy in Turkey. On January 23, Noboa extended Abad’s replacement through Decree 512, stating that his ally, Cynthia Gellibert, would continue serving as acting vice president until Abad traveled to Turkey. Abad, however, claims she has been prevented from doing so because she has not been allowed to regain access to her office or to coordinate the transfer. The government, meanwhile, insists she is able to travel, noting that an airplane ticket was emailed to her.

Constitutional Court Deals Blow to Noboa’s Decrees

The issue of Abad’s removal is tied to the constitutional requirement that incumbents seeking reelection must take a leave of absence for the duration of the month-long official campaign period, which began on January 5. Noboa, relying on flawed arguments based on a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling on the separate issue of term limits, is fiercely resisting this mandate to avoid transferring the presidency to Abad — with whom he has a bad relationship — and to retain power for as long as possible.

Instead, Noboa has largely remained in office during the campaign, only temporarily stepping down through a series of decrees and delegating the presidency to Gellibert during those brief intervals. Noboa’s refusal to stand down, however, conflicts with electoral laws prohibiting the use of state resources in campaigning. This has left him in a contradictory position — refusing to fully comply with these laws while simultaneously acknowledging their existence, as seen in the justification for his first leave of absence and legal arguments in court.

Below is a review of Noboa’s decrees:

• Via Decree 500, Noboa temporarily stepped down and delegated the presidency to Gellibert from January 9 to 12. This move came after the CNE reminded him that he could not use state resources in campaigning, following a speech he delivered to supporters from the balcony of the presidential palace on January 5, once the official campaign period had already begun. On January 12, he revoked the decree and returned to the presidency hours before it was set to expire, after learning that the Constitutional Court was reviewing it.
• Decree 505 granted Noboa a second leave of absence from January 16 to 19. His primary motivation was to participate in the January 19 presidential debate, a legal requirement that he could not fulfill as president without violating campaign laws.
• Decree 513 gave Noboa another leave of absence from January 24 to 27 to carry out more campaign-related activities.
• Decree 519 granted Noboa a fourth leave of absence and Gellibert another stint in the presidency from January 31 to February 3.

Legal experts argue that these decrees are illegal for multiple reasons, not least because they delegate the presidency to an official who was unconstitutionally appointed as acting vice president. Part of Noboa’s justification is that the ambiguity of electoral rules around campaigning constitutes a “force majeure,” requiring him to step aside temporarily to campaign without violating the law. One legal expert, however, argues that the laws are clear and only appear ambiguous to Noboa due to his erroneous interpretation. Furthermore, the expert notes that neither the campaign nor the situation qualifies as force majeure, as this legal concept applies only to unforeseen and insurmountable events, such as natural disasters, whereas the campaign period has clearly defined dates. Another observer noted that Decree 505 introduces two distinct concepts of the vice presidency: the “elected vice president” (Abad) and the individual currently “carrying out the duties of the vice presidency” (Gellibert).

It is also important to note that, under normal legal procedures, the president must request a leave of absence from the National Assembly for the full duration of the month-long campaign period. This means that Noboa’s short leaves of absence have been taken irregularly, without parliamentary approval. In his decrees, Noboa contends that the Assembly’s potential denial of his request would infringe on his right to be elected, despite the Assembly urging him to take a formal leave of absence and members of his own party denouncing that the body was trying to “force” him to take leave.

On February 3, the Constitutional Court ruled Decrees 500 and 505 unconstitutional, stating that the Constitution does not permit Noboa to delegate the presidency by decree. The court specifically cited Article 1 of both decrees, which explicitly states that the presidency is “entrusted” to Gellibert during Noboa’s absence. Decrees 513 and 519, which were issued too late for the court to examine, contain the same provision in Articles 1 and 2, respectively. The ruling also implicitly affirmed that the presidency cannot be transferred to anyone other than the constitutional vice president, effectively disqualifying Gellibert. Although the ruling was officially notified to the parties involved and made public on February 3, the Court had reached a decision 11 days before, on January 23. This delay sparked criticism from legal experts, as it enabled Noboa to delegate the presidency twice.

The government ignored the Constitutional Court’s decision and announced it would continue delegating the presidency to Gellibert. The argument made by the administration is that the ruling did not impose any sanctions or reparations, nor did it directly address the question of Abad’s replacement or Noboa’s “force majeure” justification. The government also concluded that the only issue raised by the Court was the procedural manner in which Gellibert was delegated the presidency, not the act itself. A minister also claimed that Noboa could continue his campaign, as the court did not explicitly require him to take a leave of absence.

Abad’s defense team disagrees, saying that the ruling prohibits Noboa from delegating the presidency to anyone other than Abad. A constitutional expert added that, as a consequence of the ruling, Noboa must request a leave of absence from the National Assembly. The expert also highlighted that Noboa had committed electoral infractions, which must be penalized by the TCE, and that the National Assembly had sufficient grounds to initiate impeachment proceedings against him. Additionally, another constitutional expert noted that the Court reiterated in its ruling — as it has in previous decisions — that force majeure refers to an unforeseeable and insurmountable event and that it cannot simply be established by decree.

Primicias reported on January 23:

for the first time since the change of the [2008] constitution, an incumbent president does not take a leave of absence for the duration of the entire campaign. And, despite the prohibition established in the Code of Democracy, Noboa has participated in 19 governmental events, financed with public resources. … By maintaining this dual role without clear limits, the actions of the Executive — especially those directly ordered by the president — have a significant impact on the electoral landscape.

Although the campaign period ended on February 6, this issue may resurface if the election proceeds to a second round on April 13, as there will be a new campaign period for the two frontrunners.

Prosecutor General Diana Salazar Allegedly Threatens Institutional Independence

On January 24, the Prosecutor General’s Office, led by Prosecutor General Diana Salazar, raided the offices of the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS), the popularly elected body responsible for selecting various oversight authorities, including the constitutional court, prosecutor general, comptroller general, ombudsman, electoral authorities, members of the judicial oversight body, and certain judges, among others.

The raid was linked to the Council’s ongoing selection process for the banking superintendent, who oversees Ecuador’s public and private financial institutions. On January 22, the Council voted to push back the term of Roberto Romero — who had been selected and approved as superintendent on December 4 from a shortlist submitted by President Noboa — and to reinstate Raúl González, the previous superintendent dismissed in 2022 by a court order. The Council revisited its decision for two key reasons. First, a new majority had emerged in the CPCCS following the National Assembly’s impeachment of one of its members on December 27. Second, a December 5 ruling by the Constitutional Court nullified González’s earlier dismissal, stating that his removal had been unjust and concluding that there was no legal impediment to his serving as superintendent. While the Court specified that its ruling should not “affect any legal situation that had been consolidated” in the selection process, the Council’s new majority understood this to mean that González could be reinstated, arguing that Romero’s appointment had not been consolidated since it had not yet been ratified by the National Assembly, whereas González’s selection had been.

The government came out against the Council’s actions and Romero filed a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, alleging that the Council was not adhering to the Constitutional Court’s decision. Based on this complaint, the Prosecutor General’s Office raided the Council’s offices on January 24, investigating alleged “usurpation of duties.” On that day, the Constitutional Court clarified that the Council’s interpretation contradicted its decision and initiated a follow-up process to assess the ruling’s implementation. In response, the Council convened an emergency meeting on January 27 to undo the decision and continue with Romero’s selection process. Romero was ratified and sworn in by the National Assembly that same day.

The Prosecutor General’s raid came days after Diana Salazar reappeared in the public spotlight after taking a step back due to what she claimed was a high-risk pregnancy. Salazar, who has received awards from the US State Department and the US foreign policy establishment, has been accused of persecuting the progressive RC movement, to which presidential candidate Luisa González belongs. She has faced allegations of intervening in the 2021 elections against RC candidate Andrés Arauz and in the 2023 elections by enabling the spread of false rumors linking the RC to the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio. An August investigation by Drop Site News and The Intercept Brasil, along with leaked messages from Villavicencio’s phone, detail other evidence of Salazar’s politicized actions and improper relations with the US government.

The recent raid on the Council has sparked criticism for violating the principle of separation of powers. Unlike many other countries, which typically have three branches of government, the Ecuadorian state is structured around five. The CPCCS is part of the fourth branch, responsible for ensuring transparency and social control. Critics argue that the Council’s contentious decisions and internal disputes should be resolved through legal processes in the courts, rather than through interventions by the Prosecutor General’s Office. By January 31, moreover, the Electoral Dispute Tribunal removed the four members of this new majority from office over an unrelated case involving campaign violations.

Allegations have since surfaced that the raid was politically motivated. The new majority in the Council, for instance, had been linked to the RC, and was often referred to as the “liga azul” (blue league) due to the RC’s signature colors. The Prosecutor General’s Office even named its investigation “Caso Liga2” and designed a logo that incorporates visual elements resembling those of the RC. The Prosecutor General’s office also ensured negative optics for the accused by allowing a television crew to accompany and record the raid. The raid itself was premised on a complaint filed by Romero, and the Prosecutor General’s Office has not taken similar action against the presidency, despite the numerous complaints and legal challenges stemming from Noboa’s suspension and replacement of Abad.

Human Rights and Security

President Noboa’s militarized strategy to tackle insecurity, and his declaration of an “internal armed conflict” in January 2024, which he has enforced through repeated states of emergency, has drawn ongoing concern from human rights organizations for months. In January, the Americas Director for Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted: “Prosecutors are investigating more than 200 allegations of excessive use of force, 80 reports of torture, 8 of forced disappearances and 15 of extrajudicial executions by security forces since January [2024].” HRW’s yearly human rights report on Ecuador also states, “Ecuador’s militarization of its streets and prisons since January [2024] has led to serious human rights violations by security forces, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment.” It goes on to detail abuse in prisons, threats against judicial independence and freedom of expression (including from the government), and lack of due process in judicial proceedings.

Additionally, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which had previously remained relatively silent on human rights issues in Ecuador, issued press releases urging the state to address prison violence and condemning the military’s recent forced disappearance of four Afro-Ecuadorian children who were later found dead. The IACHR (and a UN special rapporteur) also expressed concern over threats made by the minister of defense against the judge who ruled the incident a case of forced disappearance at the hands of the state, and emphasized that “inter-American standards establish that maintaining internal public order and citizen security must primarily fall under the jurisdiction of civilian police forces. The Armed Forces are trained to ‘defeat the enemy’ and are not suited for the protection and control of civilians.”

Militarization, meanwhile, has failed to significantly reduce crime and violence in the country. Despite a slight decline at the beginning of the year, 2024 ended with the second-highest number of homicides in Ecuadorian history — behind 2023 — alongside a rise in extortions and kidnappings. Additionally, January 2025 was declared by media outlets to be the deadliest January in the country’s history even before the month’s end.

For this reason, some security experts, including university professor and researcher Luis Córdova, argue that Noboa’s military strategy has failed. Córdova points out that the government’s inability to strengthen the state and address other crises — such as unemployment, energy shortages, and deficiencies in education — has led it to rely heavily on coercive force, which has done little to resolve the broader issues or improve the overall security situation. Indeed, end-of-year figures show that poverty has reached its highest levels since the COVID-19 pandemic, while employment levels have generally worsened with an increase in inadequate and informal employment. Córdova also stresses the need for greater oversight of the military, as well as for more robust efforts to combat corruption and sever ties between state institutions and organized crime.

Calls to Close an Important Oil Block

On August 20, 2023, Ecuadorian citizens voted in a popular referendum to halt oil extraction in block 43-ITT, which is primarily located within the Yasuní National Park in the Amazon. The Constitutional Court had set a one-year deadline for the government to comply with the referendum’s outcome. Noboa, who initially favored stopping the block’s oil production, suggested postponing its closure for one year in January 2024, arguing that halting extraction would be too much of a hit on the economy. By August 2024, just 10 days before the deadline, Noboa submitted a proposal to the Constitutional Court in which he outlined a five-and-a-half-year timeline to gradually dismantle the block’s oil infrastructure and seal its 247 oil wells. Under the plan — which was criticized at the time — 10 wells would be sealed in 2024, followed by 48 wells annually starting in 2025. According to El Universo, Noboa’s 2024 target was met and oil extraction continues at a reduced rate in the remaining wells.

The court has yet to rule on Noboa’s proposal, but the start of the new year has reignited calls from various groups demanding compliance with the referendum. YASunidos — the group that spearheaded the 2023 referendum campaign — petitioned the IACHR, urging the body to investigate whether the government’s failure to fully shut down block 43-ITT constitutes a violation of human rights. The UN Special Rapporteur on toxics and human rights, meanwhile, submitted an amicus brief to the Constitutional Court “setting out international standards for compliance with judicial decisions that require States to ensure their effective and prompt execution,” according to a statement. The statement also notes, “The failure to comply with the will of the people and the ruling of Ecuador’s Constitutional Court jeopardises one of the world’s most biodiverse ecosystems, threatens the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and undermines the constitutional rule of law.”