Elections and Debate

Ecuador’s April 13 runoff presidential election is fast approaching, with conservative incumbent Daniel Noboa and progressive candidate Luisa González tied at 44 percent in last month’s first round. Ahead of the runoff, the National Electoral Council (CNE) launched the official 18-day campaign period — the only time candidates are allowed to campaign — with a presidential debate on March 23.

Since Noboa and González were unable to interact during the first presidential debates because they had been placed in different groups, many anticipated this two-hour event would feature substantive policy debates capable of shifting voter opinions. Instead, it offered little discussion of policy and devolved into an exchange of attacks, with both candidates accusing each other of incompetence, corruption, and failed policies. No clear winner emerged from the debate, with analysts largely agreeing that the showdown will do little to sway undecideds and other sectors of the electorate the candidates are trying to capture.

Pollsters have largely remained silent since the first round, as none had accurately predicted the final result, with many being significantly off. Nevertheless, some have continued to release polls. Negocios y Estrategias’s pre-debate poll had González ahead with 51.09 percent of valid votes (excluding null and blank votes) to Noboa’s 48.91 percent. After the debate, she maintained her lead at 51.45 percent, while Noboa trailed at 48.55 percent. A March 30 poll by independent pollster Pedro Cango reported similar figures, with González at 51.9 percent and Noboa at 48.1 percent of the valid vote. Two additional polls were published on April 3. Comunicaliza reported a virtual tie, with Noboa at 41.5 percent and González at 41.1 percent of the total vote. Telcodata similarly showed González narrowly ahead with 50.2 percent, while Noboa stood at 49.8 percent of the valid vote.

On March 12, González secured an important endorsement from CONAIE, Ecuador’s largest and most influential Indigenous organization, and its political wing, Pachakutik. Leonidas Iza — CONAIE’s leader and Pachakutik’s first-round presidential candidate — won 5 percent of the vote. Since Ecuador’s Indigenous movement leans left, winning over these voters is a crucial goal for the González campaign. However, the Indigenous movement’s endorsement was tentative and conditional on González’s acceptance of key aspects of their agenda. It also wasn’t unanimous, as some smaller Indigenous organizations had broken rank with CONAIE to endorse Noboa since the first round. Pachaktuik and González’s Citizen’s Revolution Party (RC) signed a programmatic agreement on March 30 outlining 25 policy commitments that González would adhere to if elected president, sealing the endorsement.

For his part, Noboa rolled out economic relief packages — including loans, grants, and cash bonuses — hours before the campaign period began to shore up support. Many of these measures are primarily, though not exclusively, aimed at coastal areas, which have been impacted by flooding and other disasters caused by heavy rainfall. Notably, these are also regions where González performed the strongest in the first round. As part of this effort, Noboa extended for an additional two months a vague program he introduced before the first round, offering $400 to young people who engage in climate initiatives, among other things. He has also launched a similar program for coastal residents between the ages of 30 and 64 and announced $500 bonuses for members of the country’s military and police force.

Given Ecuador’s compulsory voting laws, Noboa asked the CNE to exempt citizens impacted by heavy rainfall from fines for failing to vote. This prompted criticism from the RC, which accused Noboa of discouraging people from voting. The CNE has not approved this change but has announced the possibility of changing voting precincts in case of emergencies.

Noboa also requested that the CNE ban the use of phones in polling places on election day, citing his claim of fraud following the first round — which international electoral observers dismissed — and his claim that gangs had threatened voters into supporting González, demanding photographic proof of their ballots. Despite concerns that this violated the constitution, principles of free speech, and electoral transparency, the CNE partially granted Noboa’s request, banning phones at the booth for voters and for electoral staff during vote counting while allowing their use by observers, party officials, and everyone else. A CNE member later stated that the decision was made under pressure from the Noboa administration, and the RC and other actors initiated legal challenges against it. In response to these challenges, the Constitutional Court ruled that while it is legal to ban the use of phones during booth voting, citizens are still allowed to bring and use them during the rest of their time at polling places. The EU’s electoral observation mission also questioned the policy.

Noboa’s unfounded allegations of fraud in the first round have raised concerns that he may refuse to accept the results of the second round if he loses. On April 1, he stated in a radio interview that he would recognize the results only if there were no indications of fraud, and implied that some fraud may be likely.

Evidence of Intervention in the 2023 Presidential Elections Mounts

On April 8, Verónica Sarauz, the widow of Fernando Villavicencio, the slain presidential candidate who ran in the 2023 elections, posted a video on X (formerly Twitter) in which she claimed that Prosecutor General Diana Salazar had pressured her to publicly accuse the RC party for the murder of her husband, just ahead of the 2023 runoff. “It was all fake, I was viciously deceived. Here’s the truth. When I was able to access the full testimony, I was left horrified. What I heard was a gross lie. A false positive built by the Prosecutor General’s Office to fabricate guilty people and cover for those truly responsible,” Sarauz said. She went on to allege that this was part of a coordinated effort by Salazar and Noboa.

In August 2024, Drop Site News and The Intercept Brasil reported that, right before the 2023 presidential elections, Salazar, in contact with the US embassy in Quito, helped shape a public narrative implicating the RC in Villavicencio’s assassination. Villavicencio was murdered after leaving a campaign event just days before the 2023 first round of voting, in which Daniel Noboa and Luisa González emerged as the frontrunners.

Following Villavicencio’s death, Christian Zurita, his replacement, and Verónica Sarauz, his widow, initiated unfounded rumors that the RC was responsible, citing leaked testimony from an alleged “protected witness.” Leaked messages reviewed by journalists revealed that Salazar harbored an anti-RC bias during the elections and that she chose not to label these claims as false, despite having debunked other rumors relating to the killing in the lead-up to the vote. The allegations negatively impacted González in the elections. Sarauz’s statement seems to corroborate the journalists’ findings.

Noboa Breaks Electoral Laws as Court Suspends Vice President’s Political Rights

Ecuadorian election law requires that incumbents seeking reelection take a temporary leave of absence for the entire campaign period, which ends on April 10. Candidates are also prohibited from using state funds or resources for campaigning. Noboa has attempted to circumvent these laws with various legal arguments that experts have widely criticized. During the first round of elections, which featured a month-long campaign period, Noboa only stepped down for a few days, campaigning whenever it suited him. This led to legal challenges, and the Constitutional Court ruled that his method of temporarily delegating the presidency to an ally by decree — rather than to Vice President Verónica Abad — was unconstitutional (see full analysis in Round-Up No. 19)

For the second round, Noboa initially took a similar approach. He arrived at the presidential debate on the first day of the campaign period without clarifying whether he had stepped down, while one of his ministers publicly insisted that he was not required to do so. Days later, it was revealed that he had sent a letter to the CNE stating that he would campaign on March 26 without stepping down, claiming he would not use state resources. Once again, numerous constitutional lawyers argued that his actions were unconstitutional, and the National Assembly issued statements urging Noboa to request a leave of absence and highlighting that the CNE does not have the authority to allow Noboa to campaign without stepping down.

Noboa’s refusal to take leave stems from his unwillingness to transfer the presidency to Vice President Verónica Abad — with whom he has a bad relationship — during his absence. For over a year, he has sought to remove Abad or pressure her to resign, leading to legal battles between both sides (see full analysis in Round-Ups No. 17, 18, 19, and 20). During this time, the Ministry of Labor suspended Abad through an administrative procedure, prompting Noboa to replace her with an ally. Even after a local court and the Constitutional Court ruled this unconstitutional, Noboa found another pretext to remove and replace Abad by decree.

On February 27, the Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE) dealt a significant blow to Abad. In a case filed against her by Foreign Minister Gabriela Sommerfeld, the court ruled that Abad had committed gender-based political violence and suspended her political rights for two years, barring her from holding public office. Sommerfeld’s case was initiated, paradoxically, as a countersuit to a case Abad had filed in August — which the court had dismissed — alleging that Noboa, Sommerfeld, and other officials were committing gender-based political violence against her by trying to push her out of her role and publicly calling her an “enemy” who should resign for “acting against Ecuador,” among other things. This ruling — along with the dismissal of Abad’s case; the TCE’s inaction and silence on her removal and replacement; and its disqualification in November of presidential candidate Jan Topic, who would have been a key rival to Noboa — has fueled accusations from politicians, lawyers, and experts that the TCE has been co-opted by Noboa and operates in his political favor.

In March, the TCE ruled again in Noboa’s favor, rejecting Abad’s appeal of this decision and immediately suspending her political rights. This ruling places her in legal limbo, as only the National Assembly can formally remove the vice president. However, in practice, the decision has been interpreted by Noboa to have the same effect — since she is unable to hold public office, she cannot perform her duties as vice president. As a result, the ruling could be considered an attempt to create a force majeure impediment, leading first to a temporary absence and, after three months, a permanent absence. In either case, the idea behind this irregular approach entails the vice president’s “legalized” forceful replacement: for a temporary absence, Noboa can nominate a cabinet member as a stand-in, while a permanent vacancy allows him to submit a shortlist of candidates for the National Assembly to choose from.

Noboa invoked this argument in a decree on March 29, once again appointing his ally, Cynthia Gellibert, as acting vice president. He claimed that the TCE ruling constituted a force majeure impediment and temporary absence for Abad. However, Abad and some legal experts argue that the ruling does not prevent her from serving as vice president as that would imply retroactive enforcement. They maintain that the decision only affects any future public roles Abad might seek and point to the case of the mayor of Portoviejo, who remains in office despite having his political rights suspended in 2023. Others claim that the TCE’s decision is arbitrary, unconstitutional, and political in nature and that it sets a dangerous precedent.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls expressed concern over the ruling on March 26, stating that the TCE applied an overly broad and distorted interpretation of gendered political violence. She also noted that there was no real evidence proving Abad had committed gendered violence against Sommerfeld. Abad can appeal the case to the Constitutional Court, but this process may take months to resolve, during which time the TCE’s ruling will remain in effect.

On March 30, the CNE disclosed that Noboa had sent them a second letter, stating his intention to step down and campaign until April 10, the final day of the campaign period. This sparked widespread confusion among observers, as Noboa did not explicitly delegate presidential authority, leaving it unclear who would serve as acting president, though it is presumably Gellibert. Days earlier, the National Assembly had publicly reaffirmed that only it — not the CNE — has the authority to grant Noboa leave and that, following ordinary protocol, the president must formally request it from the Assembly.

Scandal After Scandal Rocks Noboa’s Campaign

A series of scandals have shaken Noboa’s campaign in recent weeks, the most prominent being the alleged revelation that Noboa Trading, a banana-exporting company owned by the Noboa family, has been sending banana shipments to Europe with cocaine hidden inside.

The journalist Andrés Durán — who first broke the story — and later the Colombian online media outlet Raya magazine have detailed how a contractor, hired by the corporation Noboa Trading to inspect its banana shipments for drugs at a port in Guayaquil, was arrested three times, in 2020, 2022, and 2024. Despite this, he repeatedly walked free, allegedly due to legal representation from Edgar José Lama Von Buchwald, then-lawmaker Daniel Noboa’s closest advisor — who now serves as health minister.

Durán further alleges that, despite the existence of arrest reports, the police lied in a report to a National Assembly member who, in May 2024, had inquired whether their archives contained any information on the arrested contractor. The Raya article states, “The Noboa group controls the entire banana cultivation and export supply chain, which raises questions about how much is beyond their supervision. The Noboa family owns the land where the fruit is grown, the containers, the company responsible for making the packaging for export, and even the cargo ships.”

Noboa denied owning the company on live TV during the presidential debate, stating that while his family members are involved in it, they have cooperated with investigations into cocaine shipments. Yet, an April 1 article in the Brazilian outlet Agência Publica reports that Noboa is indeed an owner of Noboa Trading, as he is co-owner of Lanfranco Holdings, a Panama-based company that holds a 51 percent stake in Noboa Trading. Noboa’s ties to Lanfranco Holdings — first exposed by Folha de São Paulo in 2023 — would typically disqualify him from public office under Ecuadorian law, which prohibits individuals with assets in tax havens like Panama from holding such positions.

Another major scandal involving Noboa’s family, dubbed the PetroNoboa scandal, alleges that a company founded by Noboa’s brother in December 2023 — after the election — irregularly purchased subsidized fuel from the state and resold it, including to businesses owned by the Noboa family. The National Assembly is investigating the matter.

A third scandal has to do with the Ministry of Defense’s $34 million purchase of bulletproof vests and helmets for the armed forces. Journalists from La Posta reported that the materials, bought from a Florida company, are of such poor quality that they are barely suitable for private security guards. The journalists also noted that the government was aware the company had failed to meet the terms of a previous contract yet proceeded with the purchase anyway. The minister of defense defended the move during a hearing at the National Assembly and told legislators that he could not reveal information about the vests.

In addition, a CEPR investigation highlights President Noboa’s personal conflicts of interest in negotiating a “free trade agreement” with Canada. The article outlines how Noboa’s family holds a stake in a Canadian mining company, whose value has nearly tripled since 2019 due to government actions. Because the deal — negotiated by Noboa — includes investor protections, his family could potentially use their involvement in the company to sue the Ecuadorian government in international tribunals, sidestepping local jurisdiction to protect their investments from perceived threats posed by future administrations, such as changes to environmental, labor, or tax policies.

Major Oil Spill Impacts Hundreds of Thousands

Beyond the scandals, an oil spill in Esmeraldas province has further complicated Noboa’s presidential bid. On March 13, a landslide reportedly caused a major oil pipeline to rupture, spilling 25,000 barrels of oil into a river and devastating a wildlife refuge. “The spill has limited access to drinking water for an estimated 500,000 people, triggering a health crisis with reports of respiratory issues, headaches and exposure to toxic gases,” the United Nations reported.

Local authorities declared an emergency, while the government largely blamed Petroecuador, the state-run oil company, ordering it to engage in cleanup efforts and to activate emergency funds to mitigate further damage and compensate families. However, in the wake of the spill, many have directly criticized the government for laying off hundreds of Petroecuador employees in recent months — including a wave of dismissals in February after workers opposed the privatization of a major oil field. It also appears that the government had been warned that mismanagement and arbitrary personnel changes at Petroecuador were jeopardizing the operability of oil infrastructure.

Apart from blaming Petroecuador, the government has also attributed the oil spill to “sabotage.” This tactic is not new; in April 2024, Noboa blamed blackouts on sabotage within the Ministry of Energy, leading to the minister’s resignation. Petroecuador’s reports make no mention of sabotage, citing only the landslide as the cause. Some outlets have noted that if the spill were officially classified as sabotage, the government’s insurance policy would not cover the damages.

Noboa Intensifies Quest for US Military Assistance

Since taking office, President Noboa has been determined to bring US troops to Ecuador to address the country’s historic levels of insecurity. His ultimate goal is the establishment of a US military base, despite the fact that Ecuador’s constitution bans foreign bases on its soil. Nevertheless, he has continued to pursue that objective in various ways.

In September, he proposed a constitutional amendment to overturn the ban on foreign military bases, which the National Assembly is currently studying. He also ratified a Status of Forces Agreement with the US in February 2024, allowing the US military to operate in Ecuador with diplomatic immunity, and took steps to implement it by authorizing US forces to station in the environmentally fragile Galápagos Islands, prompting concern that this will mean the establishment of a de facto US military base. On February 19, Noboa issued a vague statement directing the foreign ministry to establish agreements with other countries to “incorporate” their “special forces” in Ecuador’s fight against organized crime.

Since then, Noboa’s efforts have significantly intensified. On March 11, he announced the hiring of Erik Prince — founder of Blackwater, the private military company notorious for its role in civilian massacres during the Iraq War — as an advisor. Prince has close ties to key figures in President Trump’s inner circle and is reportedly behind the deal enabling US migrant deportations to El Salvador. This raised fears that mercenaries from Prince’s network would soon be deploying to Ecuador, but Noboa dismissed this possibility, stating that he was seeking assistance from foreign militaries rather than private groups.

Jake Johnston, Director of International Research at CEPR, uncovered Foreign Agents Registration Act documents showing that the Ecuadorian embassy in Washington, DC, had hired a lobbying firm on March 10 for $165,000 to arrange a meeting between Noboa and Trump. Noboa traveled to Florida on March 28–29 and reportedly met with Trump at his Mar-a-Lago resort. Few details have been disclosed about the encounter, with Noboa stating that they discussed migration, the economy, Venezuela, and other topics. Noboa’s mother, a legislator-elect for her son’s party, later said that the meeting had been unofficial, fueling speculation that it was merely a fleeting encounter.

Ultimately, the impact of the brief encounter at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago restaurant on the elections remains unclear. While the Ecuadorian opposition has dismissed it as unserious, the government has praised it as a sign of closeness.

Ahead of the meeting, CNN reported that the Noboa administration had approved plans to build a US military base in the port city of Manta, where the US previously operated a base from 1999 to 2009. The article states, “Construction plans obtained exclusively by CNN show Ecuador’s Defense Ministry recently signed an agreement with Manta’s port authority to build a 150-meter pier and expand the existing port by more than 700 square meters. The projects are supported by the United States, documents appear to show, and a US representative was present at the signing of the agreement, the Ecuadorian official said.” Ecuadorian officials are also alleged to have informed Trump allies of the country’s interest in hosting a US military base. For its part, the US has approved a possible sale to Ecuador of $64 million worth of rifles; “technical manuals; training and support; and other related elements of logistics and program support,” according to a statement from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Despite Ecuador’s growing ties with the US, President Trump imposed a 10 percent tariff on all exports from the country (and the rest of the world) on April 2. The US is Ecuador’s largest trading partner, and for years, Ecuador has pushed for approval of the IDEA Act in Congress, which would grant it trade benefits with the US. It is also seeking a “free trade” agreement with Washington. President Noboa has downplayed the tariffs, claiming that Ecuador is better off than other countries facing higher rates. His administration has begun drawing up plans to facilitate US imports in an attempt to end the measures.

Noboa Promises Pardons for Security Forces

Ecuador’s security crisis is a key issue in the elections. The country has experienced record levels of violence in recent years, with 2023 being the deadliest year on record and 2024 the second deadliest. So far, 2025 homicide rates are on track to surpass those of 2023.

On March 8, gangs killed 22 people in an attack on a neighborhood in Guayaquil, shocking the country. In response, President Noboa announced preemptive pardons for military and police operating in the area, later expanding the measure to all security forces nationwide. Ecuador’s armed forces have been deployed to the streets since January 2024, when Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” against gangs, suspending certain rights and implementing a series of states of emergency. Since then, they have faced allegations of human rights violations, including prison torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances. Given this backdrop, the announcement of preemptive pardons has raised fears that it could embolden security forces to act more aggressively, potentially committing more violations.