First Round of the 2025 Elections

On February 9, Ecuadorian citizens went to the polls to vote in general elections. As polls predicted, the two leading candidates — conservative incumbent Daniel Noboa and progressive Luisa González — received the most votes and will advance to a runoff on April 13.

Noboa and González secured 44.17 and 43.97 percent of the vote, respectively, a margin so narrow (just 19,756 votes) that some outlets have described it as a statistical tie. Leonidas Iza, the candidate for the Indigenous Pachakutik party and the leader of CONAIE — Ecuador’s largest and most influential Indigenous organization — finished third with 5.25 percent of the vote, followed by Andrea González in fourth with 2.69. The remaining 12 candidates each failed to secure 1 percent of the vote.

When comparing the results of this election with those of the first round in 2023 — when Noboa and Luisa González also ran — this year’s outcome represents an overall improvement for both candidates in terms of vote share. That year, González finished first in the first round with 33.61 percent of the vote, while Noboa placed second with 23.47 percent. When comparing the electoral map between the first rounds of both elections, though, Noboa came out on top, winning eight more provinces than in 2023, partly at the expense of Luisa González.

Due to the narrow results, some analysts have suggested that this first round of voting resembled a runoff more than a typical first round — a shift from recent years, where first rounds have generally featured stronger competition from candidates outside the top two — and likened it to a kind of third round of the 2023 elections, wherein Noboa achieved 51.83 percent and González 48.17 in the runoff. This perspective is further supported by the electoral map, which shows near-identical patterns between the 2023 second round and the 2025 first round, with the exception of González capturing one highland province and one southern coastal province from Noboa this year.

Despite the near tie, the two camps reacted to the results differently. For Noboa, the outcome was a disappointment. Before the vote, most polls (and financial markets) had predicted a more decisive victory for him, and a flawed exit poll, widely circulated on election day, had even projected a first-round win for Noboa with 50.1 percent of the vote. In the lead-up to the election, Noboa and his campaign had also actively promoted the narrative that he would secure an outright victory in the first round.

When the results told a different story, Noboa fell silent and did not attend any of his campaign’s election night events. It wasn’t until the following morning that he broke his silence, tweeting a letter thanking his supporters, claiming victory, and asserting that his party had secured the largest presence in the National Assembly — though, after further counting, his party ended up as the second-largest. He also gave a televised interview in which he alleged widespread irregularities, claiming that his vote figures did not align with those reported by the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), and accusing criminal gangs of threatening citizens to vote for González. That same day, EU and OAS observers refuted Noboa’s claims, stating that there were no widespread irregularities or fraud in the elections.

For González, this election marks the best performance for her Citizen’s Revolution (RC) party in over a decade. She successfully consolidated and expanded the core base of correísmo — the political movement she represents, which had been largely stagnant at around 32–33 percent since 2021 — and managed to capture much of the anti-Noboa vote from those dissatisfied with his policies, his failing militarized security response, and violations of electoral rules and the constitution (more details below). González’s performance signals a growing shift in voter preferences to a return to the progressive policies of the Correa administration (2007-2017), easing concerns within correísmo that citizens, particularly younger ones, were starting to forget the gains made during Correa’s presidency.

Adding to correísmo’s sense of triumph is the fact that González achieved these results despite Noboa’s electoral advantages. For instance, by refusing to step down during the electoral period as the Ecuadorian constitution mandates, Noboa was able to remain president and use government-funded activities to campaign. In November, he also engaged in a state-funded charm offensive, issuing decrees with economic relief measures and launching a vaguely defined program offering around 80,000 young people $400 per month for three months.

The EU EOM’s preliminary report also criticized the Ecuadorian media’s lack of impartiality, stating:

media coverage and political advertising during the campaign period demonstrated an imbalance in favour of Daniel Noboa, both in quantity and tone. State-owned media played a significant role in this disparity, but private outlets also contributed to it. Government advertisements were closely aligned with Daniel Noboa’s campaign messages. … The EU EOM observed instances of online institutional advertising that contributed to a blurred distinction between Daniel Noboa’s role as president and as a candidate throughout the electoral campaign.

On election night, González celebrated at her party’s headquarters, delivering a speech in which she claimed victory, criticized Noboa, and called for unity. She also sought to build bridges with other candidates, notably Leonidas Iza. Like Noboa, González denounced irregularities, though her focus was on Noboa’s refusal to step down during the campaign and his unconstitutional removal and replacement of the vice president.

The challenge for both candidates now is to sway as many voters as possible. They will aim to win over the significant portion of undecided voters, as well as those who supported Iza and Andrea González. As Andrea González is a right-wing candidate, the lion’s share of her votes should go to Noboa, especially since she has indirectly endorsed him. The bulk of Iza’s voters, on the other hand, will likely support Luisa González, as the Indigenous movement tends to lean left; however, internal disputes within the Indigenous movement and lingering tensions with the RC dating back to the Correa administration complicate this dynamic. Iza has stated that Pachakutik and CONAIE will collectively decide whom to endorse and how, although he has publicly ruled out supporting Noboa or calling for a protest vote as Pachakutik did in 2021. As a result, the Indigenous movement’s potential backing of Luisa González is likely to come with specific policy conditions.

Support from Pachakutik and the Indigenous movement is also key for the RC beyond the presidential election, particularly in the 151-seat National Assembly. There, the RC secured a plurality with 67 legislators, followed by Noboa’s ADN party with 66, Pachakutik with 9, and the traditionalist PSC with 5. The remaining four seats are split between minor parties. To achieve the 77-vote majority needed to select the legislature’s president and other leadership positions, pass laws, initiate oversight processes, and override a partial presidential veto, the RC will require the support of Pachakutik and a few others. The RC could also seek support from the PSC, though this may be more challenging. Meanwhile, Noboa’s ADN might rely heavily on the PSC’s backing, in addition to support from minor parties. However, the size of both the ADN and the RC means that each party holds the power to block impeachments.

Politics Ahead of the Second Round

Immediately after the elections, Noboa started making changes, issuing statements, and introducing proposals to strengthen his position ahead of the runoff. He began by shaking up his cabinet, replacing 11 ministers and senior officials, including the ministers of interior, economy, public health, and environment.

Next, Noboa publicly asserted that Ecuador would endure no more blackouts until 2026 and even stated that the country was exporting energy to Colombia. This claim was unexpected, as one of Noboa’s main challenges — and a key issue in the elections — has been managing a prolonged energy crisis that led to repeated blackouts of up to 14 hours a day, most recently in September, October, and November. In fact, his administration has been partly addressing the crisis by purchasing electricity from Colombia. As a result, Colombia’s Ministry of Energy and Mines refuted Noboa’s claim, stating that it had not imported any electricity from Ecuador. On the contrary, the ministry noted that Ecuador has been purchasing energy from Colombia since November.

Noboa has also announced that if elected, he would convene a constituent assembly to enact significant constitutional reforms, arguing, “Nowadays, a criminal has more rights than a person who behaves correctly.” He pledged that the assembly’s work would be completed in under two years and would focus on enhancing security for citizens — despite that voters have already approved several security-oriented constitutional amendments that Noboa proposed in an April referendum.

The government also issued a statement announcing that Noboa had instructed the foreign ministry to “coordinate efforts and establish cooperation agreements” with other nations in order to “incorporate the special forces of allied countries to support and strengthen the efforts of the armed forces and national police” in combating drug trafficking and criminal groups. The extent and scope of the cooperation the government is seeking remain unclear. The foreign minister has provided only vague details, saying that the government aims to enhance capacity building as well as tactical and technological cooperation. Meanwhile, the head of Noboa’s party in the National Assembly indicated in an interview that the intention is for foreign forces to participate in operations. Regardless of the form this cooperation takes, constitutional experts note that such international agreements may require approval from the Constitutional Court and possibly from the National Assembly.

Observers and opposition politicians argue that this initiative is driven solely by electoral motives, particularly given the timing and Noboa’s request for the National Assembly’s political support through a resolution. However, the government claims it sought this approval to address potential concerns from foreign partners and to demonstrate that Noboa has backing. While not exactly what Noboa was looking for, legislators voted near-unanimously on February 25 to pass a resolution supporting the fight against criminal groups and urging the government to implement international security agreements that have already been signed.

This statement comes against the backdrop of an “internal armed conflict” that Noboa declared in January 2024 against criminal groups, suspending certain rights and deploying the military to the streets. These measures, which have faced widespread criticism from human rights organizations both domestically and internationally, have failed to alleviate the country’s security crisis. Indeed, 2024 became the second-deadliest year in Ecuador’s history (behind 2023), and January 2025 marked the deadliest January on record. In fact, the first 50 days of 2025 saw 1,300 homicides — a 40 percent increase when compared to the same period in 2023. These alarming developments could play a big role in the elections.

Noboa’s pursuit of foreign assistance is not new. In September, he proposed a constitutional amendment to overturn the constitutional ban on foreign military bases on Ecuadorian territory, which the National Assembly is currently studying. He also ratified a Status of Forces Agreement with the US in February allowing the US military to operate in Ecuador with diplomatic immunity, and took steps to implement it by authorizing US forces to station in the environmentally fragile Galápagos Islands. These actions have sparked criticism — most recently in the leading journal Science — with opponents arguing that they violate the constitution, compromise Ecuadorian sovereignty, threaten the islands’ delicate ecosystem, and could lead to the establishment of a US military base in practice. The US, under the Biden administration, stated it had no plans to establish a permanent military presence in Ecuador.

Vice President Abad’s Struggle Continues as Court Deals Blow to Her Case

Despite months of legal battle, Vice President Verónica Abad has still not been reinstated (see full analysis in Round-Ups No. 17, 18, and 19). To avoid taking a constitutionally mandated leave of absence during the campaign period, Noboa has sought to remove Abad — with whom he has a bad relationship — since his inauguration. In November, Abad was suspended following an administrative procedure by the Ministry of Labor, and Noboa replaced her, via decree, with one of his allies. After Judge Nubia Vera ruled this action illegal, stating that only the National Assembly can remove the vice president, Noboa reinstated Abad for a few days only to remove her again in late December via another decree. This time, Noboa cited her failure to report to a diplomatic posting in Turkey.

Noboa then violated constitutional and electoral laws requiring him to take a leave of absence for the full month-long campaign period by temporarily delegating the presidency to Cynthia Gellibert, an ally, through successive decrees. This never amounted to a full month; instead, Noboa stepped down intermittently whenever it suited him.

On February 3, just days before the February 9 election, the Constitutional Court declared these moves unconstitutional, ruling that the constitution does not permit Noboa to delegate the presidency by decree. This, however, did not stop Noboa, who took the ruling to mean he could still replace Abad — just not through a decree. On January 6, the last day of the official campaign period, Noboa did just that. Rather than directly informing the National Assembly of his temporary absence, Noboa sent a letter to Gellibert, whom he kept as acting vice president, informing her of his leave that day and requesting she notify the National Assembly of his absence — which, under normal procedures, must approve the president’s leave of absence for the entire campaign period.

Gellibert complied with Noboa’s request and sent the National Assembly a notice in which she referred to herself as acting vice president. In their response, the body warned Noboa’s ally that she might be committing the criminal offense of usurpation of duties, stating that it only recognized Abad as the legitimate vice president of Ecuador. The Assembly also noted that it had not received a formal request for a leave of absence from Noboa.

In his letter to Gellibert, Noboa highlighted what he described as legal gray areas and unresolved questions concerning the leave of absence requirement and — in order to justify his actions — claimed that these issues had never been clarified by the relevant authorities. However, constitutional lawyers contend that no such ambiguities exist and that Noboa’s apparent confusion stems solely from his flawed interpretation of the law, which he has distorted to remain in power.

With the exception of Judge Vera, Noboa’s assertion that state institutions failed to resolve alleged legal gray areas underscores these institutions’ complicity in his unconstitutional actions, as they have acted slowly — when they have chosen to act at all. While many analysts in Ecuador have already pointed this out, the elections provided an opportunity for international observers to raise similar concerns.

In relation to this, the OAS EOM preliminary report stated that “the campaign continued until the last day without clear guidance on whether the President should take a leave of absence or not. This situation generated significant uncertainty, tension, and distrust.” The EOM also recommended that “the relevant institutions … pronounce themselves in a timely and clear manner on the leaves of absence of elected officials.” The EU EOM added:

Recent criticisms against the [electoral authority] were partly related to alleged inaction in relation to President Noboa not requesting a leave of absence, contributing to accusations of bias. … During the last few weeks, President Noboa has alternated campaign activities with his presence at government events, some of which are prohibited during campaign periods, such as participating in the inauguration of public works or handing out houses to citizens in the context of public programmes. This has been compounded by a certain blurring between the government’s institutional propaganda and that of his party.

While they did not participate as electoral observers, two UN human rights experts — the special rapporteur on violence against women and girls and the independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order — also expressed concern over Noboa’s removal and replacement of Abad, saying in a statement, “Vice-President Abad’s case appears to be an alarming precedent that jeopardises the democratic character of elections in Ecuador … the measures reportedly taken against Vice-President Abad, including her arbitrary removal from office, the misuse of administrative sanctions and the judicial persecution of her family, would constitute serious violations of her political rights and of the rule of law.”

On February 27, the Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE) dealt a significant blow to Abad. In a case filed against her by Foreign Minister Gabriela Sommerfeld, the court ruled that Abad had committed gender-based political violence and suspended her political rights for two years, barring her from holding public office. Sommerfeld’s case was initiated, paradoxically, as a countersuit to a case Abad had filed in August — which the court had dismissed — alleging that Noboa, Sommerfeld, and other officials were committing gendered-based political violence against her by trying to push her out of her role and publicly calling her an “enemy” who should resign for “acting against Ecuador,” among other things. This ruling, along with the dismissal of Abad’s case, the TCE’s inaction and silence on her removal and replacement, and its disqualification of presidential candidate Jan Topic in November — who would have been a key rival to Noboa — has fueled accusations from politicians, lawyers, and experts that the TCE has been co-opted by Noboa and operates in his political favor.

Abad can appeal the ruling, and it will not be in force until the appeal has been processed. It is unlikely to be either upheld or overturned before the March 23 presidential debate and the start of the official campaign period for the second round on March 24. The consequences of the decision remain uncertain, with experts divided on its implications. Some lawyers argue that the TCE lacks the authority to suspend Abad’s political rights, and that, even if it were competent on this issue, such a ruling would not automatically remove her from the vice presidency because a TCE decision — unlike impeachment — is not explicitly outlined in the constitution as grounds for a vice president’s removal. Others contend that the TCE does have the authority, meaning that Abad would no longer serve as vice president if the ruling is upheld. Despite this uncertainty, the Noboa administration will likely use the decision to further justify and legitimize Abad’s removal and replacement.

Ecuador and Canada Finalize Negotiations for a “Free Trade” Agreement

On February 2, President Noboa announced on X that Canada and Ecuador had finalized negotiations for a “free trade” agreement (FTA), which had been in the works since April 2024. While both governments have promoted the deal as a means to boost bilateral trade, investment, and both countries’ economies overall, several civil society organizations — including CONAIE, Amnesty International Canada, MiningWatch Canada, and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) — have raised significant concerns.

The agreement’s overarching purpose is to encourage Canadian corporations, particularly in the mining sector, to expand extractive activities in Ecuador. Indeed, Noboa first mentioned plans to negotiate the agreement at a mining conference in Toronto in March last year, where he announced investment agreements with Canadian mining companies. Canada is Ecuador’s largest foreign investor, with mining making up the lion’s share of Canadian investments in the country.

Moreover, about half of the world’s mining companies are based in Canada, including many that originate from third countries. As such, the CONAIE noted that the agreement also favors “the private interests of the presidential family. The Nobis Group, linked to the Noboa family, is a shareholder of Adventus Mining, a [Canadian] company involved in mining projects that have generated conflicts in Indigenous territories due to a lack of consultation, dispossession and serious environmental impacts.”

Indigenous advocates argue that they were excluded from FTA negotiations even though the agreement will significantly affect Indigenous people. They point out that mining activities harm the environment and disproportionately affect Indigenous communities, with Canadian mining corporations in control of controversial projects.They argue that both the Ecuadorian government and mining corporations have often attempted to sidestep or minimize requirements for prior consultations with affected communities, a right granted to Indigenous peoples under Ecuador’s constitution.

Advocacy groups also worry about the inclusion of investor-state dispute mechanisms (ISDS) in the agreement. ISDS provisions grant foreign companies and individual investors the right to sue countries in secretive international forums for alleged violations of international investment agreements or trade agreements. These often result in ISDS cases being brought against governments acting in the best interest of their people, such as by strengthening or implementing laws and regulations around climate change, the environment, or tax evasion, among other supposed threats to “current or future” investor profits. For this reason, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution prohibits ISDS, a ban that voters reaffirmed in an April 2024 referendum, given the country’s negative experience with it.

Nevertheless, both the current government and previous administrations have taken steps to integrate Ecuador into ISDS mechanisms. Former President Lasso rejoined the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the World Bank’s ISDS system, while President Noboa — on top of proposing a return to ISDS in his April referendum — ratified an agreement with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, making Ecuador one of the body’s hosts. Noboa has also tried to position pro-ISDS individuals in key positions in Ecuadorian institutions, most recently by nominating Claudia Salgado to the Constitutional Court. A notoriously pro-ISDS candidate, Salgado previously served as Director of International Affairs and Arbitration for Ecuador’s State Attorney’s Office, where she advocated for corporate claims, including before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Canada-based companies, especially mining ones, are recurrent users of ISDS. A 2022 report from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives found that since 1998, companies in the mining and natural resources sector initiated 70 percent of Canadian ISDS cases outside of North America. “In Latin America in particular, Canadian-based corporations are responsible for more mining-related ISDS claims than investors from any other country,” the report notes. Another report from the Transnational Institute, published in 2024, states that three-fourths of the 29 ISDS cases against Ecuador were initiated by North American investors, with half of the cases relating to mining or hydrocarbon interests.

Canadian mining companies aren’t the only ones likely to sue the Ecuadorian state; oil companies could also pursue legal action. The Noboa administration is currently finalizing a controversial deal to privatize the Sacha oilfield, Ecuador’s largest and most productive. A Chinese-Canadian consortium was granted a concession over the field on February 28, meaning the state’s revenue from it will drop significantly. According to the proposed contract between the Ecuadorian government and the consortium, which still needs to be signed, one objective is to push forward the FTA with Canada.

After the “free trade” deal is signed, both countries must ratify it. It remains unclear when ratification will occur, given Ecuador’s elections, the new makeup of the National Assembly, and recent political changes in Canada. Nonetheless, Noboa has made the agreement a campaign talking point, saying in an interview that other countries require an Ecuadorian government they can trust, and claiming that Canadian authorities told him they would likely not sign the agreement if he loses the election.