Colombians will head to the polls on Sunday, May 31 for the first round of the country’s 2026 presidential elections to determine who will take over from progressive President Gustavo Petro after his single constitutionally permitted term in office. Sunday’s race pits Senator Iván Cepeda — viewed as Petro’s ideological successor — against two right-wing candidates — celebrity lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella and Senator Paloma Valencia — in what is widely seen as a referendum on the first left-wing presidency in Colombia’s history. Recent polls suggest that while Cepeda remains the frontrunner, he will likely fall short of securing the outright majority needed to avoid a runoff. Cepeda is nevertheless expected to advance comfortably to the June 21 second round, where he would face either De la Espriella or Valencia.

The following backgrounder outlines what you need to know about this pivotal vote: who’s running, the candidates’ positions on key issues, and concerns and challenges regarding the election itself. CEPR will be on the ground participating as official election observers, and will be sharing live updates on our Latin America news tracker. 

In this brief:
The Candidates
The Key Issues
The Risks

The Candidates

Three candidates are expected to gain significant portions of the vote in the first round of the elections: Iván Cepeda, Abelardo de la Espriella, and Paloma Valencia. In addition, there are two candidates — Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López, centrist former mayors of Medellín and Bogotá, respectively — who are expected to garner about 2 percent of the vote each. 

Iván Cepeda

Iván Cepeda is a prominent human rights advocate, former philosophy professor, and current senator with Gustavo Petro’s left-wing Pacto Histórico coalition. Cepeda is generally leading the polls for the first round of the elections, campaigning on a continuation of President Petro’s agenda. His platform centers around increased social spending, state intervention to combat poverty and inequality, rural land reform and the extension of land redistribution measures, and a commitment to Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy, which prioritizes negotiations with Colombia’s remaining nonstate armed groups over military escalation. Cepeda is, like Petro, publicly critical of the United States’ perceived violations of Latin American sovereignty.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda, a senator for the left-wing Patriotic Union who was shot and killed in the streets of Bogotá in 1994 by Colombian army sergeants in an assassination backed by elements of the Colombian state. Iván Cepeda has been a leading proponent for victims of state-backed paramilitary violence, particularly the systematic killing of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Patriotic Union, and has denounced and investigated related human rights abuses. He is particularly known for his role in collecting testimonies from former paramilitary members attesting to former President Álvaro Uribe’s ties to these groups. Cepeda was sued by Uribe for allegedly manipulating witnesses but was cleared of wrongdoing by the country’s Supreme Court, while Uribe was himself later charged and convicted of bribing witnesses and attempting to mislead justice in the same case (his conviction was overturned but the legal battle continues). 

Cepeda’s running mate is Aida Quilcué, an Indigenous leader and fellow Pacto Histórico senator, likely chosen in part to represent rural, Indigenous, feminist, and mass movement elements of the Pacto Histórico’s coalition.

Cepeda is widely expected to place first on Sunday, and aspires to an outright victory in the first round, though it seems unlikely that he will garner enough support to pull this off. 

Abelardo de la Espriella

Abelardo de la Espriella is a right-wing lawyer, media personality, and businessman running on a tough-on-crime and pro-market platform. De la Espriella refers to himself as “The Tiger” and is self-styled as an outsider, anti-establishment candidate. On the security front, De la Espriella espouses a hard-line, militarized “tough-on-crime” rhetoric, and has proposed the construction of 10 mega-prisons, drawing comparisons (which he appears to welcome) to El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, who tripled El Salvador’s prison population. He is critical of the 2016 peace accords for their alleged leniency toward former guerrillas, and advocates for military action against, rather than negotiations with, remaining armed groups. On the economic front, De la Espriella has expressed admiration for the policies of Argentina’s libertarian President Javier Milei; he claims to support pro-business reforms, reduced regulation, small government, and “market-based” approaches to growth. On foreign policy, De la Espriella advocates for stronger ties with the United States and Israel in particular.

De la Espriella rose to prominence as a media-savvy lawyer in high-profile and often politically contentious cases, including major criminal and corruption-related litigation involving public figures. He was legal counsel for politicians with alleged ties to right-wing paramilitary groups (the parapolítica scandal), for a banker convicted of defrauding thousands of Colombians in a notorious Ponzi scheme (D.M.G. Grupo Holding), and Colombian-born Venezuelan businessman Alex Saab — an alleged frontman for Nicolás Maduro who is currently in US custody facing money-laundering and corruption charges. De la Espriella has also represented former President Álvaro Uribe in defamation and reputation-related lawsuits. He is the founder and leader of a right-wing movement called “Defenders of the Homeland,” though this is not an official party. 

De la Espriella’s running mate is economist and former finance minister José Manuel Restrepo, who served under President Iván Duque (2018–2022) of the right-wing Centro Democrático party founded by former president Uribe. Restrepo was likely selected in part to balance De la Espriella’s outsider image with a trusted technocratic insider.

De la Espriella is generally polling second, and is expected to make it to the run-off election where the latest polls predict a tight race.

Paloma Valencia

Paloma Valencia is a lawyer and senator for the right-wing Centro Democrático party. She is a close ally of former president Álvaro Uribe, and embraces his hard-line views on security policy. She is generally seen as the more establishment right-wing candidate, with strong support from the uribista base and political machinery. However, the close ties to Uribe also bring political baggage given his links to human rights abuses and far-right paramilitaries during the Colombian internal armed conflict, and may limit her appeal among those seeking a break from the dominant parties. Like De la Espriella, Valencia advocates for a militarized approach to security and law and order, and criticizes peace negotiations, including the 2016 accords. In fact, she accuses De la Espriella of having supported the signing of the peace agreement — an allegation that he denies. Economically, Valencia is a proponent of fiscal discipline, pro-business policies, and orthodox market-oriented reforms, and has called for expanded exploitation of fossil fuels. In many ways, Valencia and De la Espriella occupy similar policy positions, but are largely distinguished by their political style, relationship to existing party structures, and institutional positioning. 

Valencia is a member of a prominent, elite conservative political family, and is the granddaughter of former president Guillermo León Valencia. She is a lawyer and philosopher, and has been a senator since 2014.

Paloma Valencia’s vice presidential running mate is Juan Daniel Oviedo, a media-friendly economist and openly gay center-right politician, likely chosen — similarly to Restrepo — as a market-minded technocrat that might appeal to centrist voters. 

While Valencia’s popularity saw a brief surge in March of this year surrounding her party’s successes in parliamentary elections, provoking speculation that she might surpass De la Espriella, this proved to be relatively short-lived. Valencia is now expected to place third in the first round, which would bar her from participating in the run-off election.

The Key Issues

Social and economic policy is one of the central issues in the election, with candidates and pundits engaging in heated debates over the viability of the progressive reforms introduced during the Petro administration.

A recent CEPR report found significant improvements in several social indicators during Petro’s presidency, including reductions in monetary, extreme, and multidimensional poverty; alongside increases in real wages and declines in unemployment and informality. The report links these trends to increases in the minimum wage, expanded social programs, and greater public investment in historically neglected regions.

Iván Cepeda has campaigned on preserving and expanding much of this agenda, including land reform, stronger labor protections, expanded public investment, broader income support for older adults, and the continuation of Petro’s environmental agenda.

By contrast, right-wing candidates Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia have sharply criticized Petro’s economic agenda, arguing that it has expanded the role of the state in the economy and weakened the private sector and investor confidence. Both candidates oppose the government’s proposed health-care reform (which Cepeda has committed to pursuing if elected president), which seeks to reduce the role of private health insurance intermediaries known as EPS and strengthen the public health-care system. They have also backed legal and political efforts to oppose the government’s pension reform, which passed Congress but remains stalled in the courts. The reform would expand the public pension system and provide benefits for millions of elderly Colombians who were excluded from the formal pension system.

Peace negotiations and security policy have also been subjects of fierce discussion during the campaign. President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy combined negotiations with armed groups with efforts to implement the 2016 peace accords, particularly on rural development, land reform, and voluntary coca crop substitution. Petro also shifted antidrug policy toward interdiction and record cocaine seizures rather than forced eradication, arguing that enforcement should focus on trafficking networks rather than poor coca-growing farmers.

Cepeda, who participated in negotiations surrounding the 2016 peace agreement and who has also been involved in talks with the ELN, has defended continuing negotiations and deepening implementation of the accords. Cepeda argues that Colombia’s armed conflict is closely tied to rural inequality, state abandonment, and illicit economies, requiring both security measures and social investment.

Right-wing candidates Valencia and De la Espriella have pledged to abandon this approach. Pointing to the breakdown of negotiations with key armed groups such as the ELN and the continued frequent eruptions of deadly violence in conflict zones, both candidates favor a tougher military strategy. They argue that ceasefires and stalled negotiations weakened state authority in some regions and allowed armed groups to strengthen their territorial presence. Valencia and De la Espriella both support expanded forced coca eradication efforts and renewed aerial fumigation proposals. De la Espriella has called for a drone and AI-driven Plan Colombia 2.0, in reference to the US-backed multibillion dollar counternarcotics and counterinsurgency plan that was in place for roughly 15 years and is associated with massive human rights crimes and the forced displacement of millions.

Regional geopolitics are another key topic; particularly relations with the United States, with which Colombia has had the most far-reaching military and security cooperation of any country in South America. While this security relationship remains strong, President Petro sharply diverged from prior administrations with his refusal to systematically support US foreign policy goals and with his forceful defense of sovereignty (both in Colombia and in other Latin American countries, like Cuba) and human rights. Petro and President Trump have repeatedly clashed over Trump’s treatment and deportation of immigrants, the war in Gaza, and the US military’s boat strikes and extrajudicial killings in the Caribbean and Pacific, which led Petro to suspend all intelligence cooperation related to the strikes. 

While less strident in his criticism, Cepeda has largely embraced Petro’s positions regarding US foreign policy and has consistently opposed US military interventionism in the region and the US-backed “War on Drugs.” While he has referred to relations with the US, Colombia’s largest trading partner, as “fundamental,” he has, in his official foreign policy platform, advocated for a relationship of “cooperation, not subordination” and called for “strategic autonomy” and greater Latin American integration.

Challenges and Concerns

Political violence has long been a feature of Colombian elections, a problem compounded by the country’s decades-long internal conflict involving guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and state security forces. This election cycle is no exception, with all three major candidates reporting that they have received threats. In June of last year, senator and likely presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, of the Centro Democrático party, was shot during a campaign event and later died from his injuries.

Candidates, however, are not the only targets. This month, the organization Misión de Observación Electoral, Colombia’s leading election observation group, published a report stating that between January 1, 2025, and April 30, 2026, there were 565 acts of violence against political, social, and community leaders in the context of the elections, with political actors being targeted in over half of the cases. The organization has documented 3,134 violent incidents by armed groups nationwide during this election cycle, noting that — based on data from March’s legislative elections — such actions fuel a climate of fear and depress voter turnout. 

The presence of armed groups in Colombia has led to accusations from candidates and political figures that these groups are coercing citizens to vote for specific candidates. Notably, former President Álvaro Uribe has claimed that in some regions votes for Cepeda would be illegitimate because they would result from coercion by armed groups, citing reports from the country’s human rights institution, which the institution itself has denied. Cepeda has also warned about voter coercion by armed groups, but has stopped short of specifying which candidates such coercion might benefit. While there have been reports of such coercion, there is no strong evidence that one candidate benefits more than another as a result of pressure from these groups, which include left-wing insurgent organizations, right-wing paramilitaries, and nonideological criminal organizations.

A number of armed groups declared ceasefires covering the electoral period; however, clashes between armed groups have continued. 

Vote buying and clientelism remain long-standing concerns in Colombian elections, particularly in regions historically associated with entrenched political machines, poverty, and weak institutional oversight. Electoral observers have traditionally identified elevated risks in parts of the Caribbean coast and in some municipalities affected by armed conflict or illicit economies.

These concerns were underscored in March 2026, when authorities reported seizing more than COP $3.5 billion (nearly USD $1 million) in cash allegedly intended for vote buying ahead of the congressional elections and presidential primaries.

These practices often extend beyond direct cash payments on election day and can include transportation to polling stations, distribution of food or goods, short-term jobs, or mediation by local political brokers tied to regional political networks.

Foreign Interference, particularly from the US, has been notable in recent Latin American elections. In Argentina, with President Javier Milei facing major economic challenges and critical midterm elections in October of last year, the Trump administration extended a $20 billion currency swap to the Argentine central bank and later threatened to terminate US financial support if Milei’s party lost. In Honduras, just days before the November 30 general elections, Trump endorsed conservative candidate Nasry Asfura, publicly attacked the other two leading presidential candidates, and again threatened to cut economic support if his preferred candidate lost. He also pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández — a prominent figure in Asfura’s party who had been serving a 45-year prison sentence in the US on drug-trafficking charges. In both cases, the Trump administration’s preferred candidate or party ultimately secured electoral victories. 

While the Trump administration has remained relatively quiet regarding the electoral process in Colombia, its friction with President Petro — underscored by US sanctions against him — suggests a strong preference for a right-wing victory. While US government officials have not, to date, appeared to directly meddle in the Colombian election, certain Republican members of Congress have openly done so. This notably includes Colombian-born Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno, who has met with Abelardo de la Espriella and posed in pictures with the candidate while performing his signature military salute. Moreno, who will be present in Colombia as one of the US embassy’s 86 accredited electoral observers, has been a public critic of President Petro. He has called on electoral authorities to disqualify results from areas of the country where armed groups reportedly engage in voter coercion and intimidation and has said that “this is the election where the Colombian people are going to decide which way they are going to go. We’ve seen one way, and we just had to take a military action in Venezuela to fix that.” 

In addition, Representative Carlos Giménez of Florida has compared President Petro to Nicolás Maduro and said, “I hope that Colombians have realized that the left only brings misery and violence,” adding that “the left will continue to lead Colombia down the path of the socialist, anti-American regimes in the region.” Meanwhile, Florida Representative María Elvira Salazar has openly endorsed De la Espriella, who met with her and the Deputy Secretary of State in March. De la Espriella is a US citizen with ties to Salazar’s district in South Florida, and he and his wife have donated nearly $100,000 to the congresswoman since 2018. 

Finally, there are concerns about election interference from Colombia’s neighbor, Ecuador. Earlier this year, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa initiated a trade war with Colombia, seemingly without clear provocation, arguing that the Petro government wasn’t doing enough to cooperate on security matters. Tensions have escalated since, with Noboa accusing Colombian President Gustavo Petro of having criminal links, and Petro responding in kind. Noboa’s actions appear intended to undermine the campaign of Iván Cepeda, who has been performing strongly in the polls. Noboa has publicly suggested a preference for a right-wing opposition victory in Colombia, and following a phone call with candidate Paloma Valencia on May 4 he reduced tariffs on Colombian goods from 100 to 75 percent.

Concerns over Colombia’s electoral software have also become part of the debate around the 2026 presidential vote. In May, a group of former high-court magistrates, academics, and lawyers sent an open letter to the National Registrar requesting stronger guarantees of transparency, security, auditability, and traceability in the electoral process. The letter called for an international forensic audit of the systems used for the preliminary count; official scrutiny, transmission, consolidation, and publication of results; controlled technical access to critical components, including source code; and full traceability from polling-station forms to the official certification of results.

These concerns are rooted in previous electoral controversies, in particular the 2014 Senate elections. After the Movimiento Independiente de Renovación Absoluta (MIRA) party initially failed to win Senate seats, it challenged the results, alleging irregularities in the vote-counting process. In 2018, Colombia’s Council of State — the country’s highest administrative court and a key authority in electoral disputes — ruled in MIRA’s favor, finding serious irregularities in the official scrutiny, including concerns related to the scrutiny software.

In the same ruling, the Council of State urged electoral authorities to acquire vote-counting software “by and for the State,” meaning software owned and controlled by the Electoral Organization itself, with full traceability from the polling-station count to the official declaration of results. That recommendation has still not been fully implemented. Critics argue that this limits the state’s direct control and independent auditability of the system.

The National Registrar, Hernán Penagos, has rejected claims that the process lacks guarantees, arguing that there is no objective reason to cast generalized doubt on Colombia’s electoral system. He points to the role of polling-station officials, electoral witnesses, oversight bodies, and national and international observers, and says the preliminary count is technically robust and verifiable.

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While it appears unlikely that any candidate will gain the outright majority needed to win in the first round, Sunday’s vote remains a crucial test and an indicator of what may come in a potential second round on June 21. Whether or not the vote unfolds without any major incidents (see our breakdown of potential challenges above), will likely have a significant impact on public perception of the integrity of the election and on voter behavior in a potential run-off.  On the day of the elections, be sure to follow the latest updates from CEPR’s on-the-ground electoral observer, with CEPR’s live Latin America news tracker.