Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti Relief & Reconstruction Watch

Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch is a blog that tracks multinational aid efforts in Haiti with an eye towards ensuring they are oriented towards the needs of the Haitian people, and that aid is not used to undermine Haitians' right to self-determination.

This past weekend, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah said that by 2015 the goal is to have 30 percent of aid funds going to local groups. This is in line with the goals put forth in the USAID Forward reform agenda, which aims to reach this target agency-wide by 2015. Shah also made a surprising announcement regarding local procurement in Haiti, as reported in the Miami Herald:

Before the January 2010 earthquake, Shah said less than 9 percent of USAID money was going to Haitian organizations. “We’re over the pre-earthquake level now,’’ said Shah during an interview with The Miami Herald. He wasn’t more specific.

As we have noted numerous times before, according to the available data, it appears that far less than 10 percent of USAID funds have gone directly to local organizations. A review of data on USAID contracts for work in Haiti from the Federal Procurement Database System reveals that just 1.3 percent of USAID funds have gone directly to Haitian companies, as can be seen in Table I.

Table I: USAID Contracts by Recipient Location
alt

Additionally, more than $500 million has been distributed as grants for Haiti related work. An analysis of available data from USASpending.gov shows only 0.2 percent of this amount going to Haitian organizations, as can be seen in Table II.

Table II: USAID Grants by Recipient Location
alt

Separate data released by USAID does show a slightly higher percent of funds going directly to Haitian organizations, but still far below even the 9 percent figure cited by Shah. In March, following a request made by HRRW, USAID released a list of “local partners” they work with in Haiti and how much funding they have received. The total was just over $9.4 million, still less than one percent of the nearly $1 billion spent by USAID since the earthquake.

It is possible Shah was referring to money going to Haitian organizations at the subcontractor level, yet the USAID Forward agenda envisions 30 percent going directly to local organizations, so this wouldn’t make sense. Unfortunately, as the Miami Herald noted, Shah “wasn’t more specific.”  A request for more information from USAID has thus far not been answered, but if more information becomes available, you can be sure it will be posted here.

 

 

This past weekend, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah said that by 2015 the goal is to have 30 percent of aid funds going to local groups. This is in line with the goals put forth in the USAID Forward reform agenda, which aims to reach this target agency-wide by 2015. Shah also made a surprising announcement regarding local procurement in Haiti, as reported in the Miami Herald:

Before the January 2010 earthquake, Shah said less than 9 percent of USAID money was going to Haitian organizations. “We’re over the pre-earthquake level now,’’ said Shah during an interview with The Miami Herald. He wasn’t more specific.

As we have noted numerous times before, according to the available data, it appears that far less than 10 percent of USAID funds have gone directly to local organizations. A review of data on USAID contracts for work in Haiti from the Federal Procurement Database System reveals that just 1.3 percent of USAID funds have gone directly to Haitian companies, as can be seen in Table I.

Table I: USAID Contracts by Recipient Location
alt

Additionally, more than $500 million has been distributed as grants for Haiti related work. An analysis of available data from USASpending.gov shows only 0.2 percent of this amount going to Haitian organizations, as can be seen in Table II.

Table II: USAID Grants by Recipient Location
alt

Separate data released by USAID does show a slightly higher percent of funds going directly to Haitian organizations, but still far below even the 9 percent figure cited by Shah. In March, following a request made by HRRW, USAID released a list of “local partners” they work with in Haiti and how much funding they have received. The total was just over $9.4 million, still less than one percent of the nearly $1 billion spent by USAID since the earthquake.

It is possible Shah was referring to money going to Haitian organizations at the subcontractor level, yet the USAID Forward agenda envisions 30 percent going directly to local organizations, so this wouldn’t make sense. Unfortunately, as the Miami Herald noted, Shah “wasn’t more specific.”  A request for more information from USAID has thus far not been answered, but if more information becomes available, you can be sure it will be posted here.

 

 

In an interview following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe told Reuters that cholera is “really under control.”  Well, that certainly depends on your definition of under control. Since tropical storm Isaac swept across Haiti last month, some 83 Haitians have reportedly died from cholera and this is almost certainly an understatement, as the surveillance system has become increasingly unreliable. Over the same time, more than 8,200 Haitians have been sickened. Since April of this year, when the rainy season began, 514 have died and over 63,000 have been sickened by cholera.

As for the government’s response, according to the United Nations, “national capacity to respond to potential outbreaks, especially during the rainy season, remains very weak.” From May to June this year, just as the rainy season was beginning, three cholera treatment centers and 13 cholera treatment units were closed down, leaving just 17 and 61 left open, respectively. This is down from 38 and 205 last August. Additionally, as CCO Haiti pointed out last month, “many public health workers in the Cholera Treatment Center (CTCs) have not received salaries for several months and there are reports of strikes by front line medical staff to redress this situation. This is a serious issue negatively affecting the effectiveness of the cholera response and it needs to be urgently addressed.”

Of course, this is not entirely the government’s fault. Most of the cholera response bypassed the government entirely and now, as NGOs pull out of the field, the government has been left to pick up the slack without adequate resources. Nevertheless, to the hundreds of Haitians falling ill every day with cholera, Prime Minister Lamothe’s assertion must ring especially hollow.

Update 9/27: The post has been updated to reflect newly posted data on cholera deaths and cases.

In an interview following his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe told Reuters that cholera is “really under control.”  Well, that certainly depends on your definition of under control. Since tropical storm Isaac swept across Haiti last month, some 83 Haitians have reportedly died from cholera and this is almost certainly an understatement, as the surveillance system has become increasingly unreliable. Over the same time, more than 8,200 Haitians have been sickened. Since April of this year, when the rainy season began, 514 have died and over 63,000 have been sickened by cholera.

As for the government’s response, according to the United Nations, “national capacity to respond to potential outbreaks, especially during the rainy season, remains very weak.” From May to June this year, just as the rainy season was beginning, three cholera treatment centers and 13 cholera treatment units were closed down, leaving just 17 and 61 left open, respectively. This is down from 38 and 205 last August. Additionally, as CCO Haiti pointed out last month, “many public health workers in the Cholera Treatment Center (CTCs) have not received salaries for several months and there are reports of strikes by front line medical staff to redress this situation. This is a serious issue negatively affecting the effectiveness of the cholera response and it needs to be urgently addressed.”

Of course, this is not entirely the government’s fault. Most of the cholera response bypassed the government entirely and now, as NGOs pull out of the field, the government has been left to pick up the slack without adequate resources. Nevertheless, to the hundreds of Haitians falling ill every day with cholera, Prime Minister Lamothe’s assertion must ring especially hollow.

Update 9/27: The post has been updated to reflect newly posted data on cholera deaths and cases.

In his mandated report on MINUSTAH, the United Nations Secretary General for the first time outlines the creation of a timetable for withdrawal of MINUSTAH personnel from Haiti. UNSG Ban Ki-moon writes:

The plan foresees a narrowing of the Mission’s activities to a core set of mandated tasks that are achievable within a reasonable time frame (envisioned to be a period of between four and five years for planning purposes) aimed at consolidating stabilization gains to a point beyond which the presence of a large peacekeeping operation will no longer be required. The Mission will work with the Government, civil society, the United Nations country team and international partners to agree on a transition compact that will set out a limited number of stabilization benchmarks that will serve as key indicators of progress in the stabilization process.

Calling for a concrete timetable for progressive withdrawal of the foreign contingents is a small, but important first step.   Last year’s authorization of MINUSTAH [PDF] lacked any details on withdrawal and instead mandated that, “future adjustments to its force configuration should be based on the overall security situation on the ground.” Ban Ki-moon is now recommending creating a “transition compact” with the Haitian government that would have specific benchmarks on the road to withdrawal. The main benchmark for reducing the number of MINUSTAH personnel would be sufficient strengthening of the Haitian National Police, while other “benchmarks will evaluate the maturity of key rule of law oversight and accountability mechanisms.”

These benchmarks have yet to be drawn up, however, and so the plan could be overly optimistic in terms of its drawdown timetable. Growth and reform of the police has been a key benchmark for MINUSTAH’s mission completion all along, yet eight years after MINUSTAH began, “the country’s still limited police force cannot guarantee the security needed to protect citizens, enforce the law and underpin political stability,” according to the International Crisis Group. (It is notable that the UNSG’s four-five year timeline is compatible with the five-year extension called for by the International Crisis Group, which it recommends in order to, as it puts it, ensure “a third peaceful handover of democratic power …at the end of the Martelly presidency,” and “the completion of the second five-year police development plan.”)

Another key benchmark for MINUSTAH is the Haitian government’s ability to organize “transparent, fair and credible elections.” Unfortunately, if past history is any guide, MINUSTAH’s involvement in elections has far from guaranteed “fair and credible elections”. On the contrary, MINUSTAH officials praised Haiti’s 2010 elections – which were marred by the exclusion of several political parties, including the most popular, Fanmi Lavalas; deadly violence; polling place disruptions; and numerous logistical problems – as “going well” and “peaceful.”Even worse, MINUSTAH’s direct involvement in overturning the 2010 presidential election results, without any statistical evidence, only added to the lack of credible elections.

The creation of a timetable for withdrawal comes after pressure both from within Haiti and from troop-contributing countries to end MINUSTAH’s nearly decade long occupation. Last summer, a group of prominent activists and intellectuals from all of the Latin American countries contributing troops to MINUSTAH asked their governments to support a rapid withdrawal of all foreign troops from Haiti.  In June, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which supplies over a quarter of MINUSTAH personnel, debated the future of MINUSTAH. The nations agreed to form a working group “for the purposes of elaborating a scheme on the strategy, form, conditions, stages, and timeline of a Plan of Reduction of Contingents of the Military Component of the Mission.” Meanwhile, Haitian legislators have become increasingly outspoken against MINUSTAH, perhaps reflecting the fact that surveys have shown a vast majority of Haitians support the rapid withdrawal of MINUSTAH troops.

Less Troops, More Focus on Police

As part of the consolidation of MINUSTAH personnel, the UNSG recommends that the “military component will gradually hand over responsibility for security to formed police units and, ultimately, to the national police.” To begin with, MINUSTAH military personnel concentrate their presence in five “security hubs”, while police units would take over in the departments that the military moved out of.

In the report, Ban Ki-moon recommends continuing the gradual drawdown of MINUSTAH personnel, which began last year. Last year, the Security Council authorized a reduction in the number of troops, reversing the large increase seen in the aftermath of the earthquake. This year, Ban Ki-moon suggests going further, reducing troops by 1,070 from 7,340 to 6,270 and by reducing police by 640 from 3,241 to 2,601. The total reduction is equal to about 16 percent of the total force and brings MINUSTAH to its lowest authorized size since 2005.

Still No Accountability for Abuses and Cholera

The steps recommended by Ban Ki-moon are positive, albeit small, yet there is still no movement from MINUSTAH to address the numerous alleged abuses that have been committed under their watch.  As we have written about extensively, there have been a number of cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by MINUSTAH personnel. But notably absent from the Secretary General’s report was any mention of these cases, despite the fact that since 2010 there have been 10 internal UN investigations into sexual exploitation, abuse, or other serious crimes committed by MINUSTAH personnel.

The 20 page report also fails to make any mention of the UN’s role in introducing cholera to Haiti, despite a growing consensus among the scientific community that has linked the UN base in Mirebalais to the introduction of the pathogen. As of September 6, a total of 7,558 deaths and over 590,000 cases have been reported, though this is likely an underestimate. A shift in UN resources from troops, police, armored vehicles and other military and security aspects of the Mission, to cholera mitigation and prevention, could go a long way toward controlling and eventually eliminating the epidemic. As the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has noted – and as the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti and others have campaigned for – it is estimated that MINUSTAH’s budget for one year is all that would be needed to modernize Haiti’s water and sanitation system. As the UNSG report itself notes, the need is urgent: “The integration of efforts to combat cholera into the national health system is experiencing significant challenges, in part caused by delays in the decentralization of response efforts and structural weaknesses within the health system.”

Next Step: A UN Security Council Resolution on the Renewal of MINUSTAH’s Mandate

The main purpose of the UN Secretary General’s report is to guide the internal discussion around the UN Security Council’s decision to renew the one-year mandate of MINUSTAH.  The decision is made official via a U.N. Security Council Resolution which will normally be voted on shortly before the expiration of MINUSTAH’s mandate on October 15.  It will be interesting to see whether the resolution, which generally includes a long list of concerns and recommendations, will incorporate the UNSG ‘s recommendations and, for the first time, establish a firm timeline for withdrawal along with specific benchmarks linked to the reduction of troop levels.  If benchmarks are elaborated, will they take into account calls for greater accountability and transparency around MINUSTAH actions?  And will the resolution flag critical issues omitted from the Secretary General report, such as measures to address the cholera situation and human rights abuses perpetrated by MINUSTAH personnel?  Stay tuned…

In his mandated report on MINUSTAH, the United Nations Secretary General for the first time outlines the creation of a timetable for withdrawal of MINUSTAH personnel from Haiti. UNSG Ban Ki-moon writes:

The plan foresees a narrowing of the Mission’s activities to a core set of mandated tasks that are achievable within a reasonable time frame (envisioned to be a period of between four and five years for planning purposes) aimed at consolidating stabilization gains to a point beyond which the presence of a large peacekeeping operation will no longer be required. The Mission will work with the Government, civil society, the United Nations country team and international partners to agree on a transition compact that will set out a limited number of stabilization benchmarks that will serve as key indicators of progress in the stabilization process.

Calling for a concrete timetable for progressive withdrawal of the foreign contingents is a small, but important first step.   Last year’s authorization of MINUSTAH [PDF] lacked any details on withdrawal and instead mandated that, “future adjustments to its force configuration should be based on the overall security situation on the ground.” Ban Ki-moon is now recommending creating a “transition compact” with the Haitian government that would have specific benchmarks on the road to withdrawal. The main benchmark for reducing the number of MINUSTAH personnel would be sufficient strengthening of the Haitian National Police, while other “benchmarks will evaluate the maturity of key rule of law oversight and accountability mechanisms.”

These benchmarks have yet to be drawn up, however, and so the plan could be overly optimistic in terms of its drawdown timetable. Growth and reform of the police has been a key benchmark for MINUSTAH’s mission completion all along, yet eight years after MINUSTAH began, “the country’s still limited police force cannot guarantee the security needed to protect citizens, enforce the law and underpin political stability,” according to the International Crisis Group. (It is notable that the UNSG’s four-five year timeline is compatible with the five-year extension called for by the International Crisis Group, which it recommends in order to, as it puts it, ensure “a third peaceful handover of democratic power …at the end of the Martelly presidency,” and “the completion of the second five-year police development plan.”)

Another key benchmark for MINUSTAH is the Haitian government’s ability to organize “transparent, fair and credible elections.” Unfortunately, if past history is any guide, MINUSTAH’s involvement in elections has far from guaranteed “fair and credible elections”. On the contrary, MINUSTAH officials praised Haiti’s 2010 elections – which were marred by the exclusion of several political parties, including the most popular, Fanmi Lavalas; deadly violence; polling place disruptions; and numerous logistical problems – as “going well” and “peaceful.”Even worse, MINUSTAH’s direct involvement in overturning the 2010 presidential election results, without any statistical evidence, only added to the lack of credible elections.

The creation of a timetable for withdrawal comes after pressure both from within Haiti and from troop-contributing countries to end MINUSTAH’s nearly decade long occupation. Last summer, a group of prominent activists and intellectuals from all of the Latin American countries contributing troops to MINUSTAH asked their governments to support a rapid withdrawal of all foreign troops from Haiti.  In June, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which supplies over a quarter of MINUSTAH personnel, debated the future of MINUSTAH. The nations agreed to form a working group “for the purposes of elaborating a scheme on the strategy, form, conditions, stages, and timeline of a Plan of Reduction of Contingents of the Military Component of the Mission.” Meanwhile, Haitian legislators have become increasingly outspoken against MINUSTAH, perhaps reflecting the fact that surveys have shown a vast majority of Haitians support the rapid withdrawal of MINUSTAH troops.

Less Troops, More Focus on Police

As part of the consolidation of MINUSTAH personnel, the UNSG recommends that the “military component will gradually hand over responsibility for security to formed police units and, ultimately, to the national police.” To begin with, MINUSTAH military personnel concentrate their presence in five “security hubs”, while police units would take over in the departments that the military moved out of.

In the report, Ban Ki-moon recommends continuing the gradual drawdown of MINUSTAH personnel, which began last year. Last year, the Security Council authorized a reduction in the number of troops, reversing the large increase seen in the aftermath of the earthquake. This year, Ban Ki-moon suggests going further, reducing troops by 1,070 from 7,340 to 6,270 and by reducing police by 640 from 3,241 to 2,601. The total reduction is equal to about 16 percent of the total force and brings MINUSTAH to its lowest authorized size since 2005.

Still No Accountability for Abuses and Cholera

The steps recommended by Ban Ki-moon are positive, albeit small, yet there is still no movement from MINUSTAH to address the numerous alleged abuses that have been committed under their watch.  As we have written about extensively, there have been a number of cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by MINUSTAH personnel. But notably absent from the Secretary General’s report was any mention of these cases, despite the fact that since 2010 there have been 10 internal UN investigations into sexual exploitation, abuse, or other serious crimes committed by MINUSTAH personnel.

The 20 page report also fails to make any mention of the UN’s role in introducing cholera to Haiti, despite a growing consensus among the scientific community that has linked the UN base in Mirebalais to the introduction of the pathogen. As of September 6, a total of 7,558 deaths and over 590,000 cases have been reported, though this is likely an underestimate. A shift in UN resources from troops, police, armored vehicles and other military and security aspects of the Mission, to cholera mitigation and prevention, could go a long way toward controlling and eventually eliminating the epidemic. As the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has noted – and as the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti and others have campaigned for – it is estimated that MINUSTAH’s budget for one year is all that would be needed to modernize Haiti’s water and sanitation system. As the UNSG report itself notes, the need is urgent: “The integration of efforts to combat cholera into the national health system is experiencing significant challenges, in part caused by delays in the decentralization of response efforts and structural weaknesses within the health system.”

Next Step: A UN Security Council Resolution on the Renewal of MINUSTAH’s Mandate

The main purpose of the UN Secretary General’s report is to guide the internal discussion around the UN Security Council’s decision to renew the one-year mandate of MINUSTAH.  The decision is made official via a U.N. Security Council Resolution which will normally be voted on shortly before the expiration of MINUSTAH’s mandate on October 15.  It will be interesting to see whether the resolution, which generally includes a long list of concerns and recommendations, will incorporate the UNSG ‘s recommendations and, for the first time, establish a firm timeline for withdrawal along with specific benchmarks linked to the reduction of troop levels.  If benchmarks are elaborated, will they take into account calls for greater accountability and transparency around MINUSTAH actions?  And will the resolution flag critical issues omitted from the Secretary General report, such as measures to address the cholera situation and human rights abuses perpetrated by MINUSTAH personnel?  Stay tuned…

Last week, four Uruguayan peacekeepers who were repatriated from Haiti nearly one year ago after video evidence emerged showing the assault of an 18-year old Haitian man, apparently inside the Uruguayan’s Port Salut base, were finally charged. The prosecutor, however, is charging the four soldiers with “coercion” as opposed to sexual abuse.

As AFP reported last week:

“The evidence on record does not support findings of sexual assault. The indictment concerns only the crime of coercion,” said the prosecutor in the case, Enrique Rodriguez.

The Latin American nation’s penal code states that coercion — a crime punishable by three months to three years in prison — involves the use of physical or psychological restraint to force someone to take or abstain from an action against their will.

“In this case, force was used to oblige another person to tolerate an action against their will,” Rodriguez said, noting that the judge has not yet ruled in the case.      

The Uruguayan press, reporting on the charges notes that the judge, even if he finds the accused soldiers guilty, could still forgo giving prison sentences.

The case stands as just the latest example of the problems of holding the UN Peacekeeping mission in Haiti accountable for abuses, from the introduction of cholera to the sexual abuse of Haitians. Under the UN’s Status of Forces Agreement, those accused of abuse are repatriated quickly, where they face judges of their home country as opposed to local Haitian courts where they could face significantly longer and tougher sentences. In March, three Pakistani police were found guilty of rape, yet were sentenced to just one year in prison by a Pakistani military tribunal. Despite evidence implicating MINUSTAH personnel in a cover-up of the abuse, the case in local courts has stalled. In another example of injustice, over 100 Sri Lankan troops were returned to Sri Lanka in 2007 after evidence emerged of their involvement in sexual exploitation and prostitution with Haitian children and women. There is no sign that the troops have faced any form of punishment since.

In responding to the allegations of continued abuse by MINUSTAH personnel, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Haiti, Mariano Fernández Amunátegui stated:

I will not evade the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, against which the United Nations are committed to enforce its zero tolerance policy. They are outrageous and totally unacceptable, and they are severely punished. Impunity does not prevail.

Yet the diminished sentences and charges relating to MINUSTAH troops continues to undermine the UN’s claim that it enforces a “zero tolerance” policy or that those found guilty are “severely punished.”

AFP notes that after the news of the charges broke in Uruguay, it “prompted protests outside the Uruguayan base at Port-Salut to demand the withdrawal of the UN forces.” Over the last few years, there have been increased calls both from within Haiti as well as troop contributing countries for the withdrawal of MINUSTAH. One body that is becoming more critical of MINUSTAH’s presence is the Haitian legislature. The recently released report from the UN Secretary General on MINUSTAH notes that:

Parliamentarians shared frank and mostly critical views on MINUSTAH. They called for the mission to compensate cholera victims and to swiftly punish those within MINUSTAH responsible for incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse of Haitians.

MINUSTAH’s current mandate ends in October, yet the extension for at least another year is almost assured. In the previous renewal, the Security Council “expressed its intention to renew the mission’s mandate beyond 2012.”

 

Last week, four Uruguayan peacekeepers who were repatriated from Haiti nearly one year ago after video evidence emerged showing the assault of an 18-year old Haitian man, apparently inside the Uruguayan’s Port Salut base, were finally charged. The prosecutor, however, is charging the four soldiers with “coercion” as opposed to sexual abuse.

As AFP reported last week:

“The evidence on record does not support findings of sexual assault. The indictment concerns only the crime of coercion,” said the prosecutor in the case, Enrique Rodriguez.

The Latin American nation’s penal code states that coercion — a crime punishable by three months to three years in prison — involves the use of physical or psychological restraint to force someone to take or abstain from an action against their will.

“In this case, force was used to oblige another person to tolerate an action against their will,” Rodriguez said, noting that the judge has not yet ruled in the case.      

The Uruguayan press, reporting on the charges notes that the judge, even if he finds the accused soldiers guilty, could still forgo giving prison sentences.

The case stands as just the latest example of the problems of holding the UN Peacekeeping mission in Haiti accountable for abuses, from the introduction of cholera to the sexual abuse of Haitians. Under the UN’s Status of Forces Agreement, those accused of abuse are repatriated quickly, where they face judges of their home country as opposed to local Haitian courts where they could face significantly longer and tougher sentences. In March, three Pakistani police were found guilty of rape, yet were sentenced to just one year in prison by a Pakistani military tribunal. Despite evidence implicating MINUSTAH personnel in a cover-up of the abuse, the case in local courts has stalled. In another example of injustice, over 100 Sri Lankan troops were returned to Sri Lanka in 2007 after evidence emerged of their involvement in sexual exploitation and prostitution with Haitian children and women. There is no sign that the troops have faced any form of punishment since.

In responding to the allegations of continued abuse by MINUSTAH personnel, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Haiti, Mariano Fernández Amunátegui stated:

I will not evade the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, against which the United Nations are committed to enforce its zero tolerance policy. They are outrageous and totally unacceptable, and they are severely punished. Impunity does not prevail.

Yet the diminished sentences and charges relating to MINUSTAH troops continues to undermine the UN’s claim that it enforces a “zero tolerance” policy or that those found guilty are “severely punished.”

AFP notes that after the news of the charges broke in Uruguay, it “prompted protests outside the Uruguayan base at Port-Salut to demand the withdrawal of the UN forces.” Over the last few years, there have been increased calls both from within Haiti as well as troop contributing countries for the withdrawal of MINUSTAH. One body that is becoming more critical of MINUSTAH’s presence is the Haitian legislature. The recently released report from the UN Secretary General on MINUSTAH notes that:

Parliamentarians shared frank and mostly critical views on MINUSTAH. They called for the mission to compensate cholera victims and to swiftly punish those within MINUSTAH responsible for incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse of Haitians.

MINUSTAH’s current mandate ends in October, yet the extension for at least another year is almost assured. In the previous renewal, the Security Council “expressed its intention to renew the mission’s mandate beyond 2012.”

 

The latest news from the Associated Press suggests Tropical Storm Isaac may not reach hurricane strength before hitting Haiti:

Tropical Storm Isaac strengthened slightly as it spun toward the Dominican Republic and vulnerable Haiti on Friday, threatening to bring punishing rains but unlikely to gain enough steam to strike as a hurricane.

Forecasters now expect the storm to stay below hurricane force until it’s in the Gulf of Mexico, staying to the west of Tampa, Florida, where the Republican National Convention starts on Monday, though there is still an outside chance it could hit there.

In Haiti, the government and international aid groups announced plans to evacuate several thousand people from one of the settlement camps that sprang up in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

Isaac was expected to dump eight to 12 inches (20 to 30 centimeters) of rain on the island of Hispaniola that is shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

“That kind of rain is going to cause some life-threatening flash floods and mudslides,” said Dennis Feltgen, a spokesman for the Hurricane Center in Miami.

AP’s Trenton Daniel goes on to describe the Haitian government’s emergency measures and the reactions that some Haitians had to them:

In flood-prone Haiti, where the storm’s eye is likely to blow ashore late Friday, Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe urged people to avoid crossing rivers, to tape their windows, and to stay calm, saying “panic creates more problems.”

Lamothe and other Haitian officials said the government had set aside about $50,000 in emergency funds and had buses and 32 boats on standby for evacuations.

But among many Haitians, the notion of disaster preparedness in a country where most people get by on about $2 a day was met with a shrug.

“We don’t have houses that can bear a hurricane,” said Jeanette Lauredan, who lives in a tent camp in the crowded Delmas district of Port-au-Prince.

About 400,000 people remain in settlement camps comprised of shacks and tarps in the wake of Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake.

While much less loss of life and destruction may result with Isaac hitting Haiti as a tropical storm, rather than a hurricane, the toll is still likely to be devastating – in part because cholera infections are likely to spike, as we noted yesterday. It is in large part the lack of adequate shelter that has been provided to Haiti’s displaced earthquake survivors that this new cholera upsurge may result. Partners in Health’s Cate Oswald writes from Haiti that:

“We’re ensuring that each hospital has enough cholera treatment materials on hand and that we have identified alternative locations within our hospitals for any cholera treatment areas still under tents — in case of heavy rains and wind — and in the case that we start to see a surge in the number of cholera cases. We have staff on hand at all facilities, as always, ready to respond to any additional needs. The Red Cross is working hard with the Haitian government to get people still living in tent camps to emergency shelters.”

Oxfam Country Director Andrew Pugh said in a press release today, “Nothing short of a miracle can keep people safe from this kind of storm when their only shelter is a tent. Haiti’s disaster preparedness and response capacities have improved since the earthquake, but much remains to be done to help the poorest people cope with hurricane-strength threats.”

But this has been the case for the past two-and-a-half years. Helping people cope, and prepare for “hurricane-strength threats” is what the international community, NGO’s, and the Haitian government should have been doing ever since the earthquake. Yet the international community and many NGO’s have scaled back efforts to fight cholera during the dry seasons both years since the outbreak began. And Haiti is threatened by hurricanes every year, during a hurricane season that lasts from June – November, and it often gets hit hard. Hurricane Jeanne in 2004 killed some 3,000 people in Haiti. Three years later, as Haiti struggled to obtain debt cancellation from its biggest lenders, the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and other institutions, we noted that the country was still trying to recover from Jeanne’s impact. The case we made then for Haiti’s urgent need for funds – from debt cancellation – to cope with the regular deluge from tropical storms and hurricanes, are even more relevant for why Haiti needs international support today:

Funds made available through debt cancellation would also give Haiti the opportunity to address urgent humanitarian needs in the wake of recent natural disasters. Over 57 people died as a result of Tropical Storm Noel [in 2007], and the storm caused floods and landslides. Some of the poorest urban areas, including Cité-Soleil in Port-au-Prince, were among the worst hit.

Prior to Noel, Haiti had already been hit by Hurricane Dean in August, and then wracked by weeks of flooding, with over 700 homes destroyed and more than 4,000 seriously damaged, “leaving around 4,000 families in distress and 3,000 persons living in temporary shelters,” according to the International Organization for Migration.

A New York Times editorial today laments this failure to adequately help Haiti prepare for the inevitable, almost yearly “unnatural disaster”:

Government officials and aid groups on Thursday had little to offer the most vulnerable Haitians as time ran out, besides asking people to remain calm as they braced for the storm’s impact. The 390,000 people whose homes are plastic sheets and sticks, or battered tents, or quake-damaged houses long ago condemned as too dangerous to occupy and impossible to repair, could not have been comforted. The slogan “Build back better” — so often repeated as the principle guiding the immense international aid and reconstruction effort — must seem like a cruel joke.

The editorial laments the still insufficient international response to Haiti’s many ongoing and still urgent needs:

The United Nations humanitarian agency reported recently that a $231 million program by the United Nations and international donors to meet shelter, sanitation, food and other emergency needs in 2012 had raised $47 million by July 24, so the budget was cut to $128 million. At the end of July, it still needed $81 million to get to the end of the year. While progress has been made, the lack of basic, permanent housing remains the greatest failure in postquake Haiti. Now, as another potential disaster looms, many of the displaced may be victims again.

The latest news from the Associated Press suggests Tropical Storm Isaac may not reach hurricane strength before hitting Haiti:

Tropical Storm Isaac strengthened slightly as it spun toward the Dominican Republic and vulnerable Haiti on Friday, threatening to bring punishing rains but unlikely to gain enough steam to strike as a hurricane.

Forecasters now expect the storm to stay below hurricane force until it’s in the Gulf of Mexico, staying to the west of Tampa, Florida, where the Republican National Convention starts on Monday, though there is still an outside chance it could hit there.

In Haiti, the government and international aid groups announced plans to evacuate several thousand people from one of the settlement camps that sprang up in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

Isaac was expected to dump eight to 12 inches (20 to 30 centimeters) of rain on the island of Hispaniola that is shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

“That kind of rain is going to cause some life-threatening flash floods and mudslides,” said Dennis Feltgen, a spokesman for the Hurricane Center in Miami.

AP’s Trenton Daniel goes on to describe the Haitian government’s emergency measures and the reactions that some Haitians had to them:

In flood-prone Haiti, where the storm’s eye is likely to blow ashore late Friday, Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe urged people to avoid crossing rivers, to tape their windows, and to stay calm, saying “panic creates more problems.”

Lamothe and other Haitian officials said the government had set aside about $50,000 in emergency funds and had buses and 32 boats on standby for evacuations.

But among many Haitians, the notion of disaster preparedness in a country where most people get by on about $2 a day was met with a shrug.

“We don’t have houses that can bear a hurricane,” said Jeanette Lauredan, who lives in a tent camp in the crowded Delmas district of Port-au-Prince.

About 400,000 people remain in settlement camps comprised of shacks and tarps in the wake of Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake.

While much less loss of life and destruction may result with Isaac hitting Haiti as a tropical storm, rather than a hurricane, the toll is still likely to be devastating – in part because cholera infections are likely to spike, as we noted yesterday. It is in large part the lack of adequate shelter that has been provided to Haiti’s displaced earthquake survivors that this new cholera upsurge may result. Partners in Health’s Cate Oswald writes from Haiti that:

“We’re ensuring that each hospital has enough cholera treatment materials on hand and that we have identified alternative locations within our hospitals for any cholera treatment areas still under tents — in case of heavy rains and wind — and in the case that we start to see a surge in the number of cholera cases. We have staff on hand at all facilities, as always, ready to respond to any additional needs. The Red Cross is working hard with the Haitian government to get people still living in tent camps to emergency shelters.”

Oxfam Country Director Andrew Pugh said in a press release today, “Nothing short of a miracle can keep people safe from this kind of storm when their only shelter is a tent. Haiti’s disaster preparedness and response capacities have improved since the earthquake, but much remains to be done to help the poorest people cope with hurricane-strength threats.”

But this has been the case for the past two-and-a-half years. Helping people cope, and prepare for “hurricane-strength threats” is what the international community, NGO’s, and the Haitian government should have been doing ever since the earthquake. Yet the international community and many NGO’s have scaled back efforts to fight cholera during the dry seasons both years since the outbreak began. And Haiti is threatened by hurricanes every year, during a hurricane season that lasts from June – November, and it often gets hit hard. Hurricane Jeanne in 2004 killed some 3,000 people in Haiti. Three years later, as Haiti struggled to obtain debt cancellation from its biggest lenders, the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and other institutions, we noted that the country was still trying to recover from Jeanne’s impact. The case we made then for Haiti’s urgent need for funds – from debt cancellation – to cope with the regular deluge from tropical storms and hurricanes, are even more relevant for why Haiti needs international support today:

Funds made available through debt cancellation would also give Haiti the opportunity to address urgent humanitarian needs in the wake of recent natural disasters. Over 57 people died as a result of Tropical Storm Noel [in 2007], and the storm caused floods and landslides. Some of the poorest urban areas, including Cité-Soleil in Port-au-Prince, were among the worst hit.

Prior to Noel, Haiti had already been hit by Hurricane Dean in August, and then wracked by weeks of flooding, with over 700 homes destroyed and more than 4,000 seriously damaged, “leaving around 4,000 families in distress and 3,000 persons living in temporary shelters,” according to the International Organization for Migration.

A New York Times editorial today laments this failure to adequately help Haiti prepare for the inevitable, almost yearly “unnatural disaster”:

Government officials and aid groups on Thursday had little to offer the most vulnerable Haitians as time ran out, besides asking people to remain calm as they braced for the storm’s impact. The 390,000 people whose homes are plastic sheets and sticks, or battered tents, or quake-damaged houses long ago condemned as too dangerous to occupy and impossible to repair, could not have been comforted. The slogan “Build back better” — so often repeated as the principle guiding the immense international aid and reconstruction effort — must seem like a cruel joke.

The editorial laments the still insufficient international response to Haiti’s many ongoing and still urgent needs:

The United Nations humanitarian agency reported recently that a $231 million program by the United Nations and international donors to meet shelter, sanitation, food and other emergency needs in 2012 had raised $47 million by July 24, so the budget was cut to $128 million. At the end of July, it still needed $81 million to get to the end of the year. While progress has been made, the lack of basic, permanent housing remains the greatest failure in postquake Haiti. Now, as another potential disaster looms, many of the displaced may be victims again.

There has been much discussion in the media over the past day regarding whether Tropical Storm Isaac might rain on the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida, and possibly cause delays or a cancellation. Receiving less attention is that 400,000 some people in Haiti are still living in tents, under tarps and various forms of makeshift housing – people who became internally displaced persons (IDP’s) after the 2010 earthquake, and they are also in the storm’s projected path.

Aside from the more obvious threats that flooding and strong winds could mean for IDP camps and other vulnerable communities, Isaac could also bring a spike in cholera infections. As we have pointed out before, along with countless news articles, medical reports, and NGO press releases, Haiti’s cholera infections surge with rainy weather, and tropical storms and hurricanes pose an especially ominous threat. The lack of adequate sanitation and safe drinking water in IDP camps means that drinking water sources are likely to be contaminated by waste water when flooding occurs – along with the tents, tarps, and much bedding and other possessions. And it is not just the IDPs who face increased dangers with heavy rain. As the cholera response has been scaled back, access to cholera treatment centers in rural Haiti has decreased. While flooding and mudslides pose extreme danger on their own, they can also prevent those in need from traveling to secure the care that is needed.

We wrote two weeks ago that the Haitian health ministry reported a slower rate of infection this summer, which it attributed to unusually dry weather, but that they predicted an increase in the coming months as the hurricane season begins. The Pan American Health Organization estimates that Haiti could see up to 170,000 new cases this year, which would mean an average of about 20,000 cases per month over the next five months – 5,000 more cases per month than in the previous three months. We further noted that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was reporting a “very weak” “capacity to respond to potential outbreaks,” such as could occur with a drenching tropical storm.

The United Nations, meanwhile, whose troops caused the epidemic in October 2010, has yet to take responsibility by taking steps to contain and control cholera.

The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti issued a press release today urging United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonovi?, who was set to travel to Haiti this week, “to examine the human rights implications of the cholera epidemic brought to Haiti by UN troops,” noting that

Cholera has killed more than 7,500 Haitians and infected over 580,000 since it was introduced by UN peacekeepers in October 2010. Despite overwhelming evidence that the UN caused the epidemic, the world body continues to deny responsibility and has not adequately responded to stop cholera’s killing.

“We applaud Assistant Secretary-General Šimonoviæ’s emphasis on rule of law as a necessary for the enjoyment of human rights in Haiti,” said Mario Joseph, Haiti’s leading human rights lawyer, who represents cholera victims in their claims at the UN. “To be a credible advocate for rule of law, however, the UN must demonstrate by example and be accountable for the cholera epidemic it caused.”

IJDH’s Brian Concannon adds

“The UN cholera is a massive violation of the internationally-recognized right to water for millions of Haitians, and of the right to life for thousands. …We hope that Assistant Secretary-General Šimonoviæ sees that the UN has a historic opportunity to advance the enforceability of water and sanitation rights globally, and save thousands of lives, by acting consistently with its professed ideals.”

But Šimonovi?, who was supposed “to discuss deep-rooted human rights challenges” with Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, the President of the Senate, Dieuseul Simon Desras, and others, canceled the trip due to Isaac, noting that “tropical storm Isaac is expected to grow into a hurricane by the time it hits Hispaniola on Friday 24.” Haiti’s 400,000 IDP’s, meanwhile, do not have the luxury of simply canceling their pending appointment with Isaac.

There has been much discussion in the media over the past day regarding whether Tropical Storm Isaac might rain on the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida, and possibly cause delays or a cancellation. Receiving less attention is that 400,000 some people in Haiti are still living in tents, under tarps and various forms of makeshift housing – people who became internally displaced persons (IDP’s) after the 2010 earthquake, and they are also in the storm’s projected path.

Aside from the more obvious threats that flooding and strong winds could mean for IDP camps and other vulnerable communities, Isaac could also bring a spike in cholera infections. As we have pointed out before, along with countless news articles, medical reports, and NGO press releases, Haiti’s cholera infections surge with rainy weather, and tropical storms and hurricanes pose an especially ominous threat. The lack of adequate sanitation and safe drinking water in IDP camps means that drinking water sources are likely to be contaminated by waste water when flooding occurs – along with the tents, tarps, and much bedding and other possessions. And it is not just the IDPs who face increased dangers with heavy rain. As the cholera response has been scaled back, access to cholera treatment centers in rural Haiti has decreased. While flooding and mudslides pose extreme danger on their own, they can also prevent those in need from traveling to secure the care that is needed.

We wrote two weeks ago that the Haitian health ministry reported a slower rate of infection this summer, which it attributed to unusually dry weather, but that they predicted an increase in the coming months as the hurricane season begins. The Pan American Health Organization estimates that Haiti could see up to 170,000 new cases this year, which would mean an average of about 20,000 cases per month over the next five months – 5,000 more cases per month than in the previous three months. We further noted that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was reporting a “very weak” “capacity to respond to potential outbreaks,” such as could occur with a drenching tropical storm.

The United Nations, meanwhile, whose troops caused the epidemic in October 2010, has yet to take responsibility by taking steps to contain and control cholera.

The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti issued a press release today urging United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonovi?, who was set to travel to Haiti this week, “to examine the human rights implications of the cholera epidemic brought to Haiti by UN troops,” noting that

Cholera has killed more than 7,500 Haitians and infected over 580,000 since it was introduced by UN peacekeepers in October 2010. Despite overwhelming evidence that the UN caused the epidemic, the world body continues to deny responsibility and has not adequately responded to stop cholera’s killing.

“We applaud Assistant Secretary-General Šimonoviæ’s emphasis on rule of law as a necessary for the enjoyment of human rights in Haiti,” said Mario Joseph, Haiti’s leading human rights lawyer, who represents cholera victims in their claims at the UN. “To be a credible advocate for rule of law, however, the UN must demonstrate by example and be accountable for the cholera epidemic it caused.”

IJDH’s Brian Concannon adds

“The UN cholera is a massive violation of the internationally-recognized right to water for millions of Haitians, and of the right to life for thousands. …We hope that Assistant Secretary-General Šimonoviæ sees that the UN has a historic opportunity to advance the enforceability of water and sanitation rights globally, and save thousands of lives, by acting consistently with its professed ideals.”

But Šimonovi?, who was supposed “to discuss deep-rooted human rights challenges” with Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, the President of the Senate, Dieuseul Simon Desras, and others, canceled the trip due to Isaac, noting that “tropical storm Isaac is expected to grow into a hurricane by the time it hits Hispaniola on Friday 24.” Haiti’s 400,000 IDP’s, meanwhile, do not have the luxury of simply canceling their pending appointment with Isaac.

Last week Deborah Sontag of the New York Times reported in depth on the lack of sustainable housing solutions in Haiti since the earthquake:

Two and a half years after the earthquake, despite billions of dollars in reconstruction aid, the most obvious, pressing need — safe, stable housing for all displaced people — remains unmet.

In what international officials term a protracted humanitarian crisis, hundreds of thousands remain in increasingly wretched tent camps. Tens of thousands inhabit dangerously damaged buildings. And countless others, evicted from camps and yards, have simply disappeared with their raggedy tarps and rusty sheet metal into the hills.”

Sontag notes that $500 million was spent on transitional shelters that were “not built to last”, meaning “All the money spent on T-shelters will be melted away,” as H. Kit Miyamoto, an engineer working in Haiti, told Sontag. Meanwhile, although some 200,000 houses were damaged or destroyed:

international aid has led to an estimated 15,000 repairs and 5,700 new, permanent homes so far. Most of the new houses are outside greater Port-au-Prince, where it was easier to obtain land, and some have yet to be occupied.

Though many are quick to tout the decrease in camp population as a sign the housing and displacement crisis is being met, it is clear the number of new housing solutions can only explain a fraction of the camp population reduction. The lack of adequate housing has led 33 international organizations to sponsor the Under Tents campaign. Working with Haitian grassroots groups, the campaign seeks to win housing rights for the hundreds of thousands of Haitians who remain displaced or living in unsustainable housing.

Of particular concern is the sustainability of the government and international community’s flagship IDP relocation program, called “16/6.” Under Tents writes:

The extent to which Martelly’s plan constitutes a “durable” solution remains to be seen. First, the plan relocated just 5% of the IDP population. Second, human rights advocates worry this “relocation” has not ensured basic human rights such as access to water and sanitation services. Third, the plan offers families a rental stipend for just one year. In the absence of work opportunities, families’ ability to pay rent one year from now is dubious. Advocates have also raised concerns that residents of the original six camps were not told about the plan or given input into how it would affect them.

The plan was also the subject of a report for the Toronto Star by Catherine Porter. Although the project originally aimed to clear out six camps and rehabilitate 16 neighborhoods for those camp residents to return to, as Porter explains, “The plan for new houses, though, is modest. In total, only 1,000 new houses will be built in eight neighbourhoods by the 16/6 program.”

Rather, most beneficiaries of the “16/6” plan will receive a rental subsidy and move into potentially dangerous housing in neighborhoods that have yet to see major reconstruction since the earthquake. Porter continues:

I spent two mornings walking around Fort National, investigating what a $500 rent subsidy would get.

A sign greeted me from the main road, tacked to the side of a tin shed: Une Chambre a Maisson a Affermer. Room for Rent. I called the number. A man named Nobert led me through a warren of narrow alleys to the bottom floor of a big concrete house. The room was like a prison cell: three metres by three metres, one window with no glass, a wire dangling from the ceiling with no light bulb.

Like most apartments in the slums, there was no stove or running water. Nobert took me back up the hill to the shared privy — a hole in the ground of a shed. For this, he was charging $375 (U.S.) for the year. “I’m renting eight other apartments already,” he said, “all of them to the IOM.”

As Sontag explains in the Times, a significant impediment to the creation of new housing has been the lack of a more comprehensive policy, and instead a focus on individual projects such as “16/6”:

In the absence of an overarching housing policy, Haiti’s shelter problem has been tackled unsystematically, in a way that has favored rural over urban victims and homeowners over renters because their needs were more easily met. Many families with the least resources have been neglected unless they happened to belong to a tent camp, neighborhood or vulnerable population targeted by a particular program.

“It’s the project syndrome — one neighborhood gets incredible resources, the next is in total limbo, or one camp gets rental subsidies, the next gets nothing,” said Maggie Stephenson, a senior technical adviser to U.N.-Habitat in Haiti. “We have to spread the remaining resources more equitably. Equity is essential, and so are durable solutions.”

One of these projects was the subject of a front page Washington Post article this past weekend, which praised a USAID-financed reconstruction project in the Ravine Pintade neighborhood (and echoed many of the same points as a press release on the USAID website three months ago). The $8.5 million project, “gives a hint of what is possible on a small scale,” writes David Brown of the Post. But it also suffered from the exact problem mentioned by Maggie Stephenson in the quote above:

However, there was only enough money to rebuild one side of the ravine. The north side was chosen because CHF and PCI had “strong existing community relationships” there, Khachadurian said. As it turned out, that asymmetry was the source of recurrent trouble during the 17 months of reconstruction.

Peter Van Buren wrote a scathing response to the Post article. Van Buren is the author of the book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. Van Buren spent a year leading State Department reconstruction teams in Iraq before writing his book, after which, according to his website the State Department “began termination proceedings against him, reassigning him to a make-work position and stripping him of his security clearance and diplomatic credentials.” Van Buren notes that the “default media plan at State is to follow anything negative in the press with a planted puff piece,” which he considers the article in the Post to be. He also posts a number of questions that he submitted to the Washington Post Ombudsman, among them:

Brown’s article, which ran on the front page of the Post and continued inside, quoted only two people connected with the project by name, the project manager paid by USAID and one engineer paid by USAID. Why were there no quotes from any of the Haitian residents of the new dwellings? Why were there no quotes from any local Haitain officials? Did the WaPo editors cut out such quotes? Did they not ask Brown to obtain such quotes? How did Brown fact-check the details given to him by the USAID-paid people? DID Brown fact check those details?

As I learned in Iraq, building things is relatively easy given massive amounts of money. The real magic is sustainability. Brown tells us “Groups of houses share 23 septic tanks and 100 bucket-flush toilets, which can be locked for privacy. Twenty solar-powered lights illuminate streets.” What plans and whose money are in place to repair and maintain that technology? Who/how will the septic tanks be drained or pumped out? What happens when the first solar light needs replacing? Will any of this be there working a year from now? If so, under what plan? The article calls the work in Haiti a “renaissance,” a pretty dramatic word that is empty, meaningless and damned temporary unless there is a sustainability plan in place.

 

Last week Deborah Sontag of the New York Times reported in depth on the lack of sustainable housing solutions in Haiti since the earthquake:

Two and a half years after the earthquake, despite billions of dollars in reconstruction aid, the most obvious, pressing need — safe, stable housing for all displaced people — remains unmet.

In what international officials term a protracted humanitarian crisis, hundreds of thousands remain in increasingly wretched tent camps. Tens of thousands inhabit dangerously damaged buildings. And countless others, evicted from camps and yards, have simply disappeared with their raggedy tarps and rusty sheet metal into the hills.”

Sontag notes that $500 million was spent on transitional shelters that were “not built to last”, meaning “All the money spent on T-shelters will be melted away,” as H. Kit Miyamoto, an engineer working in Haiti, told Sontag. Meanwhile, although some 200,000 houses were damaged or destroyed:

international aid has led to an estimated 15,000 repairs and 5,700 new, permanent homes so far. Most of the new houses are outside greater Port-au-Prince, where it was easier to obtain land, and some have yet to be occupied.

Though many are quick to tout the decrease in camp population as a sign the housing and displacement crisis is being met, it is clear the number of new housing solutions can only explain a fraction of the camp population reduction. The lack of adequate housing has led 33 international organizations to sponsor the Under Tents campaign. Working with Haitian grassroots groups, the campaign seeks to win housing rights for the hundreds of thousands of Haitians who remain displaced or living in unsustainable housing.

Of particular concern is the sustainability of the government and international community’s flagship IDP relocation program, called “16/6.” Under Tents writes:

The extent to which Martelly’s plan constitutes a “durable” solution remains to be seen. First, the plan relocated just 5% of the IDP population. Second, human rights advocates worry this “relocation” has not ensured basic human rights such as access to water and sanitation services. Third, the plan offers families a rental stipend for just one year. In the absence of work opportunities, families’ ability to pay rent one year from now is dubious. Advocates have also raised concerns that residents of the original six camps were not told about the plan or given input into how it would affect them.

The plan was also the subject of a report for the Toronto Star by Catherine Porter. Although the project originally aimed to clear out six camps and rehabilitate 16 neighborhoods for those camp residents to return to, as Porter explains, “The plan for new houses, though, is modest. In total, only 1,000 new houses will be built in eight neighbourhoods by the 16/6 program.”

Rather, most beneficiaries of the “16/6” plan will receive a rental subsidy and move into potentially dangerous housing in neighborhoods that have yet to see major reconstruction since the earthquake. Porter continues:

I spent two mornings walking around Fort National, investigating what a $500 rent subsidy would get.

A sign greeted me from the main road, tacked to the side of a tin shed: Une Chambre a Maisson a Affermer. Room for Rent. I called the number. A man named Nobert led me through a warren of narrow alleys to the bottom floor of a big concrete house. The room was like a prison cell: three metres by three metres, one window with no glass, a wire dangling from the ceiling with no light bulb.

Like most apartments in the slums, there was no stove or running water. Nobert took me back up the hill to the shared privy — a hole in the ground of a shed. For this, he was charging $375 (U.S.) for the year. “I’m renting eight other apartments already,” he said, “all of them to the IOM.”

As Sontag explains in the Times, a significant impediment to the creation of new housing has been the lack of a more comprehensive policy, and instead a focus on individual projects such as “16/6”:

In the absence of an overarching housing policy, Haiti’s shelter problem has been tackled unsystematically, in a way that has favored rural over urban victims and homeowners over renters because their needs were more easily met. Many families with the least resources have been neglected unless they happened to belong to a tent camp, neighborhood or vulnerable population targeted by a particular program.

“It’s the project syndrome — one neighborhood gets incredible resources, the next is in total limbo, or one camp gets rental subsidies, the next gets nothing,” said Maggie Stephenson, a senior technical adviser to U.N.-Habitat in Haiti. “We have to spread the remaining resources more equitably. Equity is essential, and so are durable solutions.”

One of these projects was the subject of a front page Washington Post article this past weekend, which praised a USAID-financed reconstruction project in the Ravine Pintade neighborhood (and echoed many of the same points as a press release on the USAID website three months ago). The $8.5 million project, “gives a hint of what is possible on a small scale,” writes David Brown of the Post. But it also suffered from the exact problem mentioned by Maggie Stephenson in the quote above:

However, there was only enough money to rebuild one side of the ravine. The north side was chosen because CHF and PCI had “strong existing community relationships” there, Khachadurian said. As it turned out, that asymmetry was the source of recurrent trouble during the 17 months of reconstruction.

Peter Van Buren wrote a scathing response to the Post article. Van Buren is the author of the book, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People. Van Buren spent a year leading State Department reconstruction teams in Iraq before writing his book, after which, according to his website the State Department “began termination proceedings against him, reassigning him to a make-work position and stripping him of his security clearance and diplomatic credentials.” Van Buren notes that the “default media plan at State is to follow anything negative in the press with a planted puff piece,” which he considers the article in the Post to be. He also posts a number of questions that he submitted to the Washington Post Ombudsman, among them:

Brown’s article, which ran on the front page of the Post and continued inside, quoted only two people connected with the project by name, the project manager paid by USAID and one engineer paid by USAID. Why were there no quotes from any of the Haitian residents of the new dwellings? Why were there no quotes from any local Haitain officials? Did the WaPo editors cut out such quotes? Did they not ask Brown to obtain such quotes? How did Brown fact-check the details given to him by the USAID-paid people? DID Brown fact check those details?

As I learned in Iraq, building things is relatively easy given massive amounts of money. The real magic is sustainability. Brown tells us “Groups of houses share 23 septic tanks and 100 bucket-flush toilets, which can be locked for privacy. Twenty solar-powered lights illuminate streets.” What plans and whose money are in place to repair and maintain that technology? Who/how will the septic tanks be drained or pumped out? What happens when the first solar light needs replacing? Will any of this be there working a year from now? If so, under what plan? The article calls the work in Haiti a “renaissance,” a pretty dramatic word that is empty, meaningless and damned temporary unless there is a sustainability plan in place.

 

The latest data from the MSPP (Ministry of Health) shows that the number of cholera cases and resulting deaths continues to rise. As of August 2, there have been a total of 583,871 cases and 7,497 deaths reported since October 2010 and this almost certainly is an underestimate. While the number of cases this summer has not spiked as high as it did last year, there have still been 377 deaths and nearly 45,000 cases reported in just the last three months.

The MSPP attributes the slower rate of infection this summer to unusually dry weather; however they predict an increase in the coming months as the hurricane season begins. The Pan American Health Organization estimates that Haiti could see up to 170,000 new cases this year, which would mean an average of about 20,000 cases per month over the next five months. Over the previous three months, the average number of cases has been over 15,000. Despite this, funding for the cholera response, as well as for the infrastructure needed to stem the spread of the disease, has been inadequate.  At the end of July, the Comite de Coordination des ONGs Internationales en Haiti (CCO Haiti), which is made up of many international NGOs operating in Haiti, released a statement on the situation:

The cholera outbreak that has already claimed thousands of lives all over the country remains a major threat to public health. Cholera prevention and response should be a key priority for the Haitian Government.

Furthermore, many public health workers in the Cholera Treatment Center (CTCs) have not received salaries for several months and there are reports of strikes by front line medical staff to redress this situation. This is a serious issue negatively affecting the effectiveness of the cholera response and it needs to be urgently addressed. In addition, there is evidence that the MSPP struggles to carry out its work efficiently due to poor logistics and inefficient fleet maintenance. This seriously hinders the material distribution within the CTCs, Cholera Treatment Units (CTUs) and Acute Diarrhea Treatment Centers (ADTCs), and affects the appropriate collection of cadavers. Necessary arrangement should be made to correct the situation. Overall, the MSPP must once again reinforce its leadership and coordination roles at both central and departmental levels.

Donors must provide sustained and adequate funding to support a comprehensive and integrated approach to cholera prevention and care.

Although less severe than the cholera outbreak last year, the current situation on the ground is much worse than statistics portray. And yet, a shortage of funding has translated into fewer health partners and created serious gaps in coverage. From August, 2011 to May, 2012, the number of Cholera Treatment Centers (CTCs) has declined from 38 to 20, and the number of Cholera Treatment Units from 205 to 74.

In their latest humanitarian bulletin, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that, “national capacity to respond to potential outbreaks, especially during the rainy season, remains very weak. The country has only 468 beds for cholera admissions, with 233 of these already occupied. At the height of the epidemic in June 2011, 2500 beds were available.” Despite this, OCHA notes that “significant progress has been made especially in the surveillance and reporting of the epidemic as well as in the integration of cholera care in the national healthcare system.” 

Despite OCHA’s positive assessment of strengthening the national health care system, as CCO Haiti pointed out, MSPP is still facing serious issues in their response to cholera. One reason why the Haitian government has had a hard time leading the response is that the international community largely bypassed the government in their provision of funding for cholera. The government of Haiti received only $4.9 million in funds for the cholera response, while the Red Cross alone received $6.1 million. While CCO Haiti calls for increased funding from donors, it is imperative that this money not simply be channeled to international NGOs, but through the MSPP. As the UN Special Envoy has noted, “aid is most effective at strengthening public institutions when it is channelled through them.”

Infrastructure

While the short-term cholera response has reportedly diminished, the only long term solution to stemming cholera’s spread is through investment in water and sanitation infrastructure. This is a key demand of the 15,000 plus Haitians who filed a complaint with the United Nations seeking compensation. Three weeks ago 104 congressional Democrats made a similar demand of the United Nations in a letter to Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN.

Thus far, the UN has failed to accept responsibility and the 104 Members of Congress have yet to receive a reply from Ambassador Rice. In the meantime, little money has been dedicated to improving the water and sanitation infrastructure throughout Haiti. As CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot writes today for McClatchy:

But controlling and putting an end to the epidemic is the least that the U.N. can do for Haiti, having caused this disaster. We know that it can be done, too – as it has in many other countries – by building the necessary infrastructure so that Haitians can have access to clean drinking water. The cost has been estimated at $800 million – or the amount that the U.N. spends on keeping its soldiers there for a year.

Surveillance System

Tracking the evolution and spread of cholera is key to an efficient response. Health actors must know where to focus efforts and where to allocate resources. Nevertheless, there have been increasing complaints about the national surveillance system. There are often long delays in publishing information and often there are unexplained jumps in the number of cases and deaths. In May, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), one of the leading responders to the epidemic called the surveillance system “dysfunctional,” later adding that “the numbers are incomplete and unreliable.” In their statement, CCO Haiti adds:

Further efforts need to be made to improve the quality and reliability of data collection systems. Thorough evaluations are needed to identify and address the problems in the epidemiological surveillance system. According to MSPP, only 57.8 % of the 341 daily cholera reports were submitted by departments during the period from March 27 to April 26, 2012. This lack of accurate reporting seriously impacts the capacity to effectively respond.

This trend appears to be continuing as the recent daily reports published by the MSPP are consistently missing data from numerous departments. Without a clear picture of what the disease is actually doing, responding to it will continue to be hampered.

The latest data from the MSPP (Ministry of Health) shows that the number of cholera cases and resulting deaths continues to rise. As of August 2, there have been a total of 583,871 cases and 7,497 deaths reported since October 2010 and this almost certainly is an underestimate. While the number of cases this summer has not spiked as high as it did last year, there have still been 377 deaths and nearly 45,000 cases reported in just the last three months.

The MSPP attributes the slower rate of infection this summer to unusually dry weather; however they predict an increase in the coming months as the hurricane season begins. The Pan American Health Organization estimates that Haiti could see up to 170,000 new cases this year, which would mean an average of about 20,000 cases per month over the next five months. Over the previous three months, the average number of cases has been over 15,000. Despite this, funding for the cholera response, as well as for the infrastructure needed to stem the spread of the disease, has been inadequate.  At the end of July, the Comite de Coordination des ONGs Internationales en Haiti (CCO Haiti), which is made up of many international NGOs operating in Haiti, released a statement on the situation:

The cholera outbreak that has already claimed thousands of lives all over the country remains a major threat to public health. Cholera prevention and response should be a key priority for the Haitian Government.

Furthermore, many public health workers in the Cholera Treatment Center (CTCs) have not received salaries for several months and there are reports of strikes by front line medical staff to redress this situation. This is a serious issue negatively affecting the effectiveness of the cholera response and it needs to be urgently addressed. In addition, there is evidence that the MSPP struggles to carry out its work efficiently due to poor logistics and inefficient fleet maintenance. This seriously hinders the material distribution within the CTCs, Cholera Treatment Units (CTUs) and Acute Diarrhea Treatment Centers (ADTCs), and affects the appropriate collection of cadavers. Necessary arrangement should be made to correct the situation. Overall, the MSPP must once again reinforce its leadership and coordination roles at both central and departmental levels.

Donors must provide sustained and adequate funding to support a comprehensive and integrated approach to cholera prevention and care.

Although less severe than the cholera outbreak last year, the current situation on the ground is much worse than statistics portray. And yet, a shortage of funding has translated into fewer health partners and created serious gaps in coverage. From August, 2011 to May, 2012, the number of Cholera Treatment Centers (CTCs) has declined from 38 to 20, and the number of Cholera Treatment Units from 205 to 74.

In their latest humanitarian bulletin, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that, “national capacity to respond to potential outbreaks, especially during the rainy season, remains very weak. The country has only 468 beds for cholera admissions, with 233 of these already occupied. At the height of the epidemic in June 2011, 2500 beds were available.” Despite this, OCHA notes that “significant progress has been made especially in the surveillance and reporting of the epidemic as well as in the integration of cholera care in the national healthcare system.” 

Despite OCHA’s positive assessment of strengthening the national health care system, as CCO Haiti pointed out, MSPP is still facing serious issues in their response to cholera. One reason why the Haitian government has had a hard time leading the response is that the international community largely bypassed the government in their provision of funding for cholera. The government of Haiti received only $4.9 million in funds for the cholera response, while the Red Cross alone received $6.1 million. While CCO Haiti calls for increased funding from donors, it is imperative that this money not simply be channeled to international NGOs, but through the MSPP. As the UN Special Envoy has noted, “aid is most effective at strengthening public institutions when it is channelled through them.”

Infrastructure

While the short-term cholera response has reportedly diminished, the only long term solution to stemming cholera’s spread is through investment in water and sanitation infrastructure. This is a key demand of the 15,000 plus Haitians who filed a complaint with the United Nations seeking compensation. Three weeks ago 104 congressional Democrats made a similar demand of the United Nations in a letter to Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN.

Thus far, the UN has failed to accept responsibility and the 104 Members of Congress have yet to receive a reply from Ambassador Rice. In the meantime, little money has been dedicated to improving the water and sanitation infrastructure throughout Haiti. As CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot writes today for McClatchy:

But controlling and putting an end to the epidemic is the least that the U.N. can do for Haiti, having caused this disaster. We know that it can be done, too – as it has in many other countries – by building the necessary infrastructure so that Haitians can have access to clean drinking water. The cost has been estimated at $800 million – or the amount that the U.N. spends on keeping its soldiers there for a year.

Surveillance System

Tracking the evolution and spread of cholera is key to an efficient response. Health actors must know where to focus efforts and where to allocate resources. Nevertheless, there have been increasing complaints about the national surveillance system. There are often long delays in publishing information and often there are unexplained jumps in the number of cases and deaths. In May, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), one of the leading responders to the epidemic called the surveillance system “dysfunctional,” later adding that “the numbers are incomplete and unreliable.” In their statement, CCO Haiti adds:

Further efforts need to be made to improve the quality and reliability of data collection systems. Thorough evaluations are needed to identify and address the problems in the epidemiological surveillance system. According to MSPP, only 57.8 % of the 341 daily cholera reports were submitted by departments during the period from March 27 to April 26, 2012. This lack of accurate reporting seriously impacts the capacity to effectively respond.

This trend appears to be continuing as the recent daily reports published by the MSPP are consistently missing data from numerous departments. Without a clear picture of what the disease is actually doing, responding to it will continue to be hampered.

The killing of four adults, and – according to some reports – disappearance of four children in a violent forced eviction on July 23rd has gone all but unnoticed by the major English language media, but some details have emerged through Haitian and some independent English language press. Haïti Liberté has a detailed report in English of the incident at Parc La Visite in Seguin, Marigot, on the southern coast. Haïti Liberté and other outlets’ reports are based in large part on the work of Haitian journalist Claudy Belizaire of the Reference Institute for Journalism and Communication (RIJC), who also took graphic photos of the killing’s aftermath. 

Haïti Liberté reported that the four were killed when 36 “Haitian police [officers] …destroyed seven homes in an attempt to clear peasants from a remote mountain-top park where they have lived and farmed for the past 70 years,” noting that “The bloody confrontation …occurred exactly 25 years to the day after an infamous 1987 peasant massacre near the northwestern town of Jean-Rabel…”

The RIJC reported the four confirmed dead to be “Desire Enoz – 32 years; Nicolas David – 28 years, Robinson Volcin – 22 years and Desire Aleis – 18 years.”

Belizaire, as translated by Haïti Liberté, wrote that three days later, “since this serious incident, no state official has come to Seguin, where barricades have been erected by the people, in protest. The only item known about this negotiation was an envelope of 50,000 gourdes [about $ 1,250] promised to each family (50% before departure, 50% after).”

The $600 before, $600 after moving payments are reminiscent of Martelly’s much-criticized cash incentive plan to get people to relocate.  Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) attorney Mario Joseph describes the government’s strategy in a new letter [PDF] of complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR):

The only apparent strategy of the Haitian government with respect to victims of the earthquake of January 12, [2010], is to provide internally displaced persons (IDP) camps located in the rich neighborhoods of Petion Ville, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, with small sums of money to force them to leave. The Haitian government implemented this program, providing “financial assistance” amounting to 20,000 gourdes (U.S. $ 500) for residents of camps Places Saint-Pierre, Place Boyer, Canapé Vert, Mais Gate, Primature, Parc Pélé, and Champ Mars.

Residents affected by this program have been so harassed by officials to leave the camp that they feel they have no choice but to leave, turning the government’s initiatives into forced evictions in many cases.  According to residents, they will either be removed with force against their will without a penny or moved voluntarily with at least some money.

RIJC describes a possible motive for the eviction operation:

For groundwaters, this nature reserve is also a water reservoir for the departments of the West and South-east through the capital Port-au-Prince and Jacmel. According to experts, the water level drops significantly over time and the effects are visible in the watershed and in the two cities above-mentioned. Recommendations were made to the government to take measures to protect the reserve through the eviction of 140 families of this population.

And Haïti Liberté adds:

The Parc La Visite is one of Haiti’s three national parks and has one of Haiti’s last remaining pine forests, in a country that is 98% deforested. It has suffered from unauthorized logging and clearing over the last decades, which has affected the watersheds for the cities of Port-au-Prince and Jacmel.

The La Selle region, which includes La Visite, was recently added to UNESCO’s network of biosphere reserves. Additionally, a USAID financed program (WINNER) implemented by Chemonics is funding reforestation and other conservation measures in the park.

While there has been relatively little media coverage of the killings, the UN says it is looking into the incident, as translated by Haïti Liberté:

The United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is concerned by reports of the deaths of at least four Haitians and several injured, in circumstances not yet clear, during an operation of forced evictions conducted by police officers,” the note says. “A multidisciplinary team of the United Nations was deployed in the field to collect information to help establish the facts. MINUSTAH recalls that forced eviction without providing alternative adequate housing is contrary to international human rights, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The Associated Press also ran a brief article noting MINUSTAH’s investigation. (UPI and Xinhua did as well, but in Spanish.)

Of course, the Parc La Visite incident is just one of many recent incidents of forced eviction, and is perhaps notable – aside from the killings – in that the residents being evicted are not IDP’s. Forced evictions are among the human rights abuses that attorney Mario Joseph has condemned in his letter [PDF] to the IACHR:

President Martelly’s failure to hold elections, and his outrageous actions with the State University and the press, the forced evictions of victims displaced by the earthquake and the arrest of a Member of Parliament show that he does not stand for democracy, human rights or the rule of law.

The killing of four adults, and – according to some reports – disappearance of four children in a violent forced eviction on July 23rd has gone all but unnoticed by the major English language media, but some details have emerged through Haitian and some independent English language press. Haïti Liberté has a detailed report in English of the incident at Parc La Visite in Seguin, Marigot, on the southern coast. Haïti Liberté and other outlets’ reports are based in large part on the work of Haitian journalist Claudy Belizaire of the Reference Institute for Journalism and Communication (RIJC), who also took graphic photos of the killing’s aftermath. 

Haïti Liberté reported that the four were killed when 36 “Haitian police [officers] …destroyed seven homes in an attempt to clear peasants from a remote mountain-top park where they have lived and farmed for the past 70 years,” noting that “The bloody confrontation …occurred exactly 25 years to the day after an infamous 1987 peasant massacre near the northwestern town of Jean-Rabel…”

The RIJC reported the four confirmed dead to be “Desire Enoz – 32 years; Nicolas David – 28 years, Robinson Volcin – 22 years and Desire Aleis – 18 years.”

Belizaire, as translated by Haïti Liberté, wrote that three days later, “since this serious incident, no state official has come to Seguin, where barricades have been erected by the people, in protest. The only item known about this negotiation was an envelope of 50,000 gourdes [about $ 1,250] promised to each family (50% before departure, 50% after).”

The $600 before, $600 after moving payments are reminiscent of Martelly’s much-criticized cash incentive plan to get people to relocate.  Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) attorney Mario Joseph describes the government’s strategy in a new letter [PDF] of complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR):

The only apparent strategy of the Haitian government with respect to victims of the earthquake of January 12, [2010], is to provide internally displaced persons (IDP) camps located in the rich neighborhoods of Petion Ville, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, with small sums of money to force them to leave. The Haitian government implemented this program, providing “financial assistance” amounting to 20,000 gourdes (U.S. $ 500) for residents of camps Places Saint-Pierre, Place Boyer, Canapé Vert, Mais Gate, Primature, Parc Pélé, and Champ Mars.

Residents affected by this program have been so harassed by officials to leave the camp that they feel they have no choice but to leave, turning the government’s initiatives into forced evictions in many cases.  According to residents, they will either be removed with force against their will without a penny or moved voluntarily with at least some money.

RIJC describes a possible motive for the eviction operation:

For groundwaters, this nature reserve is also a water reservoir for the departments of the West and South-east through the capital Port-au-Prince and Jacmel. According to experts, the water level drops significantly over time and the effects are visible in the watershed and in the two cities above-mentioned. Recommendations were made to the government to take measures to protect the reserve through the eviction of 140 families of this population.

And Haïti Liberté adds:

The Parc La Visite is one of Haiti’s three national parks and has one of Haiti’s last remaining pine forests, in a country that is 98% deforested. It has suffered from unauthorized logging and clearing over the last decades, which has affected the watersheds for the cities of Port-au-Prince and Jacmel.

The La Selle region, which includes La Visite, was recently added to UNESCO’s network of biosphere reserves. Additionally, a USAID financed program (WINNER) implemented by Chemonics is funding reforestation and other conservation measures in the park.

While there has been relatively little media coverage of the killings, the UN says it is looking into the incident, as translated by Haïti Liberté:

The United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is concerned by reports of the deaths of at least four Haitians and several injured, in circumstances not yet clear, during an operation of forced evictions conducted by police officers,” the note says. “A multidisciplinary team of the United Nations was deployed in the field to collect information to help establish the facts. MINUSTAH recalls that forced eviction without providing alternative adequate housing is contrary to international human rights, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The Associated Press also ran a brief article noting MINUSTAH’s investigation. (UPI and Xinhua did as well, but in Spanish.)

Of course, the Parc La Visite incident is just one of many recent incidents of forced eviction, and is perhaps notable – aside from the killings – in that the residents being evicted are not IDP’s. Forced evictions are among the human rights abuses that attorney Mario Joseph has condemned in his letter [PDF] to the IACHR:

President Martelly’s failure to hold elections, and his outrageous actions with the State University and the press, the forced evictions of victims displaced by the earthquake and the arrest of a Member of Parliament show that he does not stand for democracy, human rights or the rule of law.

A review of publicly available reports and recently released documents obtained via an Associated Press (AP) Freedom of Information Act request reveal that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has spent over $200 million on Title II food aid in Haiti since the earthquake. Title II food aid, administered by USAID and implemented by NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (primarily the World Food Program – WFP), is “the main avenue for U.S. food assistance.” As can be seen in Figure 1, in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, USAID obligated over $200 million and distributed over 174,000 metric tons of food aid in Haiti. Although most of this came in the form of emergency food aid following the earthquake, food distributions have continued in 2011 as well.

Figure 1.

alt
Source: USAID, Author’s Calculations

The Numbers

According to a report prepared for USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, in fiscal year 2010, USAID Title II food aid totaled 153,000 metric tons (MT), of which over 115,000 came in the form of emergency food aid. In 2011, these totals decreased drastically to 21,430 MT, of which 5,950 MT was emergency aid. According to the report, emergency food aid was distributed through two avenues: Single-Year Assistance Programs and the World Food Program. Based on documents obtained by the AP, USAID obligated over $21 million to World Vision, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA) for program costs associated with these emergency distributions. Additionally, USAID, which covers the cost of commodities and shipping, valued these services at over $100 million.

Non-emergency food aid takes the form of food distribution, but also often incorporates agricultural productivity, natural resource management as well as other issues related to food security. The majority of non-emergency food aid, which totaled over 50,000 MT in FY 2010 and 2011, came through Multi-Year Assistance Programs implemented by the same partners as the above-mentioned emergency, single-year programs: ACDI/VOCA, World Vision and CRS. These three programs all began prior to the earthquake and are ongoing until at least September 2012. A recent audit conducted by the USAID Inspector General (IG) reveals that, since the programs began in 2008, these partners have spent $46 million dollars in program costs. According to the AP documents most of this came after the earthquake. Together, the three organizations distributed nearly $70 million in commodities.

The Inspector General, in its audit of these multi-year programs, noted that “assistance generally has improved conditions for targeted beneficiaries…However, we could not determine whether the effects will last well into the future.” Nevertheless, the IG found a number of problems in the management of these programs, including overlapping with other USAID projects; lack of data management; the use of duplicative, excessive and uncoordinated indicators; uneven and poorly tracked integration of key activities; and other problems.

Overall, the documents obtained by the Associated Press show that World Vision, ACDI/VOCA and CRS have received $57 million since the earthquake from USAID for program costs related to Title II food aid, as can be seen in Figure 2. As will be discussed in more detail later, while this data shows program costs, the provision of the actual commodities for distribution and the shipping of those commodities are paid for directly by USAID, and so do not show up in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

alt
Source: USAID, Associated Press


Monetization

One of the more controversial aspects of food aid is the practice of monetization, organizations selling food aid in local markets to fund their work. The Haiti Justice Alliance has discussed this in detail:

Aid experts agree that monetization harms “beneficiary” populations for a range of reasons. Even the US Government Accountability Office urged Congress to stop giving NGOs food aid for monetization.

Even the NGOs who monetize aid admit it’s a bad practice. The two biggest NGO recipients of post-earthquake Title II food aid were World Vision and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). World Vision is regularly criticized for its extreme lack of transparency (and here), so it’s difficult to determine their stance on monetization. CRS, however, has this disclaimer on the FAQ section of its website:

CRS recognizes that selling commodities, also referred to as monetization, is an inefficient method of obtaining funding.

Historically, World Vision, CRS and ACDI/VOCA have taken part in large scale monetization of food aid, though USAID, at least temporarily, halted this practice in 2011, perhaps heeding the advice of both the GAO and their implementing partners. Yet, as of January 2012, a total of $32 million in food aid had been monetized, according to the IG. Although no current monetization efforts are underway, in 2010 about half (19,000 MT) of the non-emergency food aid was monetized. There are some smaller scale monetization projects scheduled for 2012, most of which rely on third-party monetization which would entail selling the commodities in, say, the Dominican Republic to fund work in Haiti.

Barriers to Reform

As the IG notes, USAID food aid programs can be helpful, at least in the short-term, yet the sustainability of food aid is often questioned. Timothy Schwartz, who has written extensively on the topic, posted a chapter of his book “Travesty in Haiti” on his blog last year:

Food assistance to Haiti during the 1980s tripled reaching a yearly average of over $50 million in gratuitous U.S. surplus beans, corn, rice, and cracked wheat. Put in simpler terms, that was enough food to meet the calorific needs of over 15 percent of the Haitian population.

The large and persistent flows of food aid have done little to increase the self-sufficiency of Haitian agriculture and as Schwartz later describes, have in many cases undermined local production, something for which former President Bill Clinton publicly apologized for in 2010. Additionally, because of byzantine regulations, U.S. food aid is not often delivered in the most efficient and sustainable manner. The result is that a recently released food security index from the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Haiti in the bottom five out of 105 countries analyzed.

While agreements with the implementing partners discussed above cover the costs of internal distribution in Haiti, as well as management and input costs, the procurement of the commodities themselves as well as their shipment to Haiti are separate costs borne directly by USAID. As we have previously reported, according to public contractor databases, USAID spent at least $18 million between January 14, 2010 and February 26, 2011 on shipping emergency food aid. Additionally, the IG report notes that for the Multi-Year programs over $23 million was spent on ocean freight to deliver $67 million worth of commodities. Because of U.S. regulations, the vast majority of food aid must be shipped on U.S.-flagged carriers. The shipping industry has been cited by researchers as one of the barriers to reform of the U.S. food aid system. A 2010 report from Cornell University explains:

The sheer size and history of US food aid programs obviously create inertia that differentiates it from most donors. But in political economy terms, arguably the most distinctive feature of US food aid programs is the intimate involvement of ocean carriers, who benefit from little?known agricultural cargo preference (ACP) requirements absent in other donor countries. While food aid policy reforms have had to overcome resistance from agribusiness and some nongovernmental organization (NGO) interests in every donor nation, the “iron triangle” of interests formed by agribusiness, some NGOs and ocean carriers has been a uniquely effective lobby for the status quo in US food aid policy.

U.S. procurement regulations also prohibit the procurement of food aid locally, although some recent efforts have resulted in pilot local procurement programs on a small scale. Although these pilot programs have had positive results, they have come under scrutiny in the latest versions of the U.S. Farm Bill that are currently being discussed in the House and Senate. According to The Guardian:

The Senate version of the farm bill would extend the pilot. However, the House version doesn’t even mention it. Now the two chambers of Congress have to reconcile their differences, and with big farm bill fights over farm subsidies and domestic food stamps, it’s anyone’s guess what happens next.

Trade groups are clear in their opposition to local and regional purchasing. In letters to Congress earlier this year 31 agribusiness and shipping groups wrote: “US food aid programmes not only further our humanitarian and security goals by allowing Americans to share their bounty with the needy, but these programmes also provide stable jobs for hundreds of thousands of Americans.”

Previous research has shown the possible benefits of local procurement, and a recent study by the Local and Regional Procurement Learning Alliance points to other potential positive impacts. Surveys showed that “poorer individual recipients were significantly more likely to report maximal overall satisfaction with locally procured food aid than with transoceanic food aid.” Nevertheless, as The Guardian points out, agribusinesses continue to dominate the food aid game:

It is not surprising ADM, Cargill and Bunge dominate food aid, since they dominate global grain trade too. They are also powerful political players; in the first three months of 2012 alone, ADM and Cargill reported lobbying expenses of $360,000 and $340,000 respectively; Bunge reported spending $230,000 over the same period, lobbying Congress on a range of largely agricultural issues, including “support for US in-kind food aid programmes”.

Patrick Woodall, research director at Food and Water Watch, pointed out the inherent contradiction in current policy. The companies that benefit from the US food aid business are the very companies that encourage poor countries to cultivate non-food crops for export rather than food to feed their people. “In terms of global food security, it seems like a double-edged sword,” he said.

The U.S. government has clearly taken steps in the right direction by curbing the use of monetization and beginning pilot local procurement projects, yet even these modest reforms are under threat from the so-called “iron triangle”. The purpose of food aid is supposed to be to sustainably promote food security in developing countries, not to subsidize agribusinesses, the shipping industry or large NGOs. In order to successfully reform USAID’s food aid policies, they must confront these entrenched interests head on.

A review of publicly available reports and recently released documents obtained via an Associated Press (AP) Freedom of Information Act request reveal that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has spent over $200 million on Title II food aid in Haiti since the earthquake. Title II food aid, administered by USAID and implemented by NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (primarily the World Food Program – WFP), is “the main avenue for U.S. food assistance.” As can be seen in Figure 1, in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, USAID obligated over $200 million and distributed over 174,000 metric tons of food aid in Haiti. Although most of this came in the form of emergency food aid following the earthquake, food distributions have continued in 2011 as well.

Figure 1.

alt
Source: USAID, Author’s Calculations

The Numbers

According to a report prepared for USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, in fiscal year 2010, USAID Title II food aid totaled 153,000 metric tons (MT), of which over 115,000 came in the form of emergency food aid. In 2011, these totals decreased drastically to 21,430 MT, of which 5,950 MT was emergency aid. According to the report, emergency food aid was distributed through two avenues: Single-Year Assistance Programs and the World Food Program. Based on documents obtained by the AP, USAID obligated over $21 million to World Vision, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA) for program costs associated with these emergency distributions. Additionally, USAID, which covers the cost of commodities and shipping, valued these services at over $100 million.

Non-emergency food aid takes the form of food distribution, but also often incorporates agricultural productivity, natural resource management as well as other issues related to food security. The majority of non-emergency food aid, which totaled over 50,000 MT in FY 2010 and 2011, came through Multi-Year Assistance Programs implemented by the same partners as the above-mentioned emergency, single-year programs: ACDI/VOCA, World Vision and CRS. These three programs all began prior to the earthquake and are ongoing until at least September 2012. A recent audit conducted by the USAID Inspector General (IG) reveals that, since the programs began in 2008, these partners have spent $46 million dollars in program costs. According to the AP documents most of this came after the earthquake. Together, the three organizations distributed nearly $70 million in commodities.

The Inspector General, in its audit of these multi-year programs, noted that “assistance generally has improved conditions for targeted beneficiaries…However, we could not determine whether the effects will last well into the future.” Nevertheless, the IG found a number of problems in the management of these programs, including overlapping with other USAID projects; lack of data management; the use of duplicative, excessive and uncoordinated indicators; uneven and poorly tracked integration of key activities; and other problems.

Overall, the documents obtained by the Associated Press show that World Vision, ACDI/VOCA and CRS have received $57 million since the earthquake from USAID for program costs related to Title II food aid, as can be seen in Figure 2. As will be discussed in more detail later, while this data shows program costs, the provision of the actual commodities for distribution and the shipping of those commodities are paid for directly by USAID, and so do not show up in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

alt
Source: USAID, Associated Press


Monetization

One of the more controversial aspects of food aid is the practice of monetization, organizations selling food aid in local markets to fund their work. The Haiti Justice Alliance has discussed this in detail:

Aid experts agree that monetization harms “beneficiary” populations for a range of reasons. Even the US Government Accountability Office urged Congress to stop giving NGOs food aid for monetization.

Even the NGOs who monetize aid admit it’s a bad practice. The two biggest NGO recipients of post-earthquake Title II food aid were World Vision and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). World Vision is regularly criticized for its extreme lack of transparency (and here), so it’s difficult to determine their stance on monetization. CRS, however, has this disclaimer on the FAQ section of its website:

CRS recognizes that selling commodities, also referred to as monetization, is an inefficient method of obtaining funding.

Historically, World Vision, CRS and ACDI/VOCA have taken part in large scale monetization of food aid, though USAID, at least temporarily, halted this practice in 2011, perhaps heeding the advice of both the GAO and their implementing partners. Yet, as of January 2012, a total of $32 million in food aid had been monetized, according to the IG. Although no current monetization efforts are underway, in 2010 about half (19,000 MT) of the non-emergency food aid was monetized. There are some smaller scale monetization projects scheduled for 2012, most of which rely on third-party monetization which would entail selling the commodities in, say, the Dominican Republic to fund work in Haiti.

Barriers to Reform

As the IG notes, USAID food aid programs can be helpful, at least in the short-term, yet the sustainability of food aid is often questioned. Timothy Schwartz, who has written extensively on the topic, posted a chapter of his book “Travesty in Haiti” on his blog last year:

Food assistance to Haiti during the 1980s tripled reaching a yearly average of over $50 million in gratuitous U.S. surplus beans, corn, rice, and cracked wheat. Put in simpler terms, that was enough food to meet the calorific needs of over 15 percent of the Haitian population.

The large and persistent flows of food aid have done little to increase the self-sufficiency of Haitian agriculture and as Schwartz later describes, have in many cases undermined local production, something for which former President Bill Clinton publicly apologized for in 2010. Additionally, because of byzantine regulations, U.S. food aid is not often delivered in the most efficient and sustainable manner. The result is that a recently released food security index from the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Haiti in the bottom five out of 105 countries analyzed.

While agreements with the implementing partners discussed above cover the costs of internal distribution in Haiti, as well as management and input costs, the procurement of the commodities themselves as well as their shipment to Haiti are separate costs borne directly by USAID. As we have previously reported, according to public contractor databases, USAID spent at least $18 million between January 14, 2010 and February 26, 2011 on shipping emergency food aid. Additionally, the IG report notes that for the Multi-Year programs over $23 million was spent on ocean freight to deliver $67 million worth of commodities. Because of U.S. regulations, the vast majority of food aid must be shipped on U.S.-flagged carriers. The shipping industry has been cited by researchers as one of the barriers to reform of the U.S. food aid system. A 2010 report from Cornell University explains:

The sheer size and history of US food aid programs obviously create inertia that differentiates it from most donors. But in political economy terms, arguably the most distinctive feature of US food aid programs is the intimate involvement of ocean carriers, who benefit from little?known agricultural cargo preference (ACP) requirements absent in other donor countries. While food aid policy reforms have had to overcome resistance from agribusiness and some nongovernmental organization (NGO) interests in every donor nation, the “iron triangle” of interests formed by agribusiness, some NGOs and ocean carriers has been a uniquely effective lobby for the status quo in US food aid policy.

U.S. procurement regulations also prohibit the procurement of food aid locally, although some recent efforts have resulted in pilot local procurement programs on a small scale. Although these pilot programs have had positive results, they have come under scrutiny in the latest versions of the U.S. Farm Bill that are currently being discussed in the House and Senate. According to The Guardian:

The Senate version of the farm bill would extend the pilot. However, the House version doesn’t even mention it. Now the two chambers of Congress have to reconcile their differences, and with big farm bill fights over farm subsidies and domestic food stamps, it’s anyone’s guess what happens next.

Trade groups are clear in their opposition to local and regional purchasing. In letters to Congress earlier this year 31 agribusiness and shipping groups wrote: “US food aid programmes not only further our humanitarian and security goals by allowing Americans to share their bounty with the needy, but these programmes also provide stable jobs for hundreds of thousands of Americans.”

Previous research has shown the possible benefits of local procurement, and a recent study by the Local and Regional Procurement Learning Alliance points to other potential positive impacts. Surveys showed that “poorer individual recipients were significantly more likely to report maximal overall satisfaction with locally procured food aid than with transoceanic food aid.” Nevertheless, as The Guardian points out, agribusinesses continue to dominate the food aid game:

It is not surprising ADM, Cargill and Bunge dominate food aid, since they dominate global grain trade too. They are also powerful political players; in the first three months of 2012 alone, ADM and Cargill reported lobbying expenses of $360,000 and $340,000 respectively; Bunge reported spending $230,000 over the same period, lobbying Congress on a range of largely agricultural issues, including “support for US in-kind food aid programmes”.

Patrick Woodall, research director at Food and Water Watch, pointed out the inherent contradiction in current policy. The companies that benefit from the US food aid business are the very companies that encourage poor countries to cultivate non-food crops for export rather than food to feed their people. “In terms of global food security, it seems like a double-edged sword,” he said.

The U.S. government has clearly taken steps in the right direction by curbing the use of monetization and beginning pilot local procurement projects, yet even these modest reforms are under threat from the so-called “iron triangle”. The purpose of food aid is supposed to be to sustainably promote food security in developing countries, not to subsidize agribusinesses, the shipping industry or large NGOs. In order to successfully reform USAID’s food aid policies, they must confront these entrenched interests head on.

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