Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch is a blog that tracks multinational aid efforts in Haiti with an eye towards ensuring they are oriented towards the needs of the Haitian people, and that aid is not used to undermine Haitians' right to self-determination.
• Economic PolicyGovernmentEl GobiernoHaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeOrganization of American StatesOrganización de los Estados AmericanosUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
After a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti’s southern peninsula on August 14, many are looking back at the devastating 2010 quake and examining lessons learned. For more than 10 years, our Haiti blog has tracked aid flows to Haiti as well as the long-term political fallout from the quake. The following is a partial review of that work.
After a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti’s southern peninsula on August 14, many are looking back at the devastating 2010 quake and examining lessons learned. For more than 10 years, our Haiti blog has tracked aid flows to Haiti as well as the long-term political fallout from the quake. The following is a partial review of that work.
• ColombiaColombiaHaitiHaitiUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
Dimitri Herard, the head of the General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN, by its French acronym), is the subject of a US law enforcement investigation related to arms trafficking in Haiti, according to multiple sources both inside Haiti and the United States. Earlier this week, the president of Haiti was assassinated in what Haitian government officials have claimed was an elite commando raid of the president’s private residence. As head of the palace guard, Herard is one of the individuals most responsible for the safety of the president. The USGPN is responsible for securing both the palace and the president’s private residence.
On Thursday, July 8, the chief government prosecutor in Port-au-Prince requested that Herard present himself for questioning in relation to the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. A source close to the deceased president, requesting anonymity out of fear for their life, claimed that Moïse was personally aware of the US investigation into Herard, and that Moïse had told them that “the US is taking care of it.”
Herard, in 2012, was one of a small group of Haitians sent to Ecuador under then-president Michel Martelly to train at the Eloy Alfaro Military Academy. He eventually entered the president’s palace guard and became head of the USGPN in February 2017 after the inauguration of Moïse. Despite Herard’s high-level presence within the USGPN, he also operates a private security company. The practice, while a clear conflict of interest, has become increasingly common among police officers in recent years.
In April 2020, Carl Frederic Martin, a Haitian-American and former US Navy officer, together with the sister of Dimitri Herard, created Tradex Haiti S.A., a security company. Another company, this one Florida-based and owned by Martin, received a $73,000 State Department contract in November 2019 to provide “riot gear kit[s]” for a specialized unit of the Haitian National Police (PNH).
In late August 2020, I reported on Martin’s State Department contract, the new security company he had formed with a relative of Herard, and their attempts to create a weapons manufacturing company called HOFSA. The activities of Martin and Herard came directly after the arrest of businessman Aby Larco, accused of being a significant source of arms trafficking in Haiti. Larco and Martin had formed a security company together years earlier, though they eventually ended the partnership. Seven days after Larco’s arrest, Martin and a relative of Herard filed the paperwork to incorporate their new arms manufacturing company, though its business license was eventually revoked.
Three days after the publication of the late August report, a “news” website was created that quickly published a fake news article alleging I had been paid by members of the Haitian elite to destabilize the country. “Coming back to Haiti to further destabilize a democratically elected government will prove to be harder for time to come,” the unsigned article warned. The website’s “About Us” page is a direct copy and paste from the website of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, replacing the organization’s name with “Haiti News Hub.”
In the more than a year and a half since Larco’s arrest, however, the flow of black market weapons into Haiti has only increased, fueling rising insecurity and violence. Kidnappings reached a peak of nearly four a day early in 2021, and, according to security experts, have provided armed groups with significant resources to purchase new weapons and ammunition. Individual ransom payments have reached hundreds of thousands of dollars.
In late June, former police officer and leader of the G9 Family and Allies, Jimmy Cherizier, held a press conference with dozens of armed men displaying high-powered weapons. Police officers and government officials often complain that they lack the resources or firepower to properly counter armed civilian groups. At the same time, many of those groups draw upon support from current and former police officers as well as politicians and private sector actors.
US law enforcement has been increasingly interested in the network bringing illegal weapons into Haiti and its relation to kidnappings. In March 2021, two individuals, Peterson Benjamin and Lissner Mathieu, were arrested in Haiti and brought to the United States. Benjamin was quickly indicted on charges related to his alleged involvement in a criminal enterprise responsible for the kidnapping of a US citizen in Haiti. Mathieu was apparently arrested in connection with a decade-old drug trafficking case. When he was arrested, Mathieu had in his possession a badge from the National Palace. The government denied that he had ever been employed in the palace.
It is unclear if the investigation into Herard is related to this earlier case, or precisely how far along the investigation is. However, multiple sources confirmed that US law enforcement officials recently traveled to Haiti and gathered information related to Herard and his alleged involvement in weapons trafficking. According to a well-placed source in Haitian law enforcement, at least some of the arms are coming from Turkey and then entering Haiti through the Dominican Republic. Moïse traveled to Turkey to participate in a business forum in June.
A US agency involved in the investigation did not respond to a request for comment by the time of publication. Herard also did not respond.
In June, the same website that published the fake news article threatening me published another article touting Herard as a “rising star” within the PNH who was increasingly at loggerheads with the chief of police, Leon Charles. On June 28, the website published another article about the proliferation of high-powered weapons in the hands of gangs in Haiti, pointing the finger at Aby Larco, who has been in prison for nearly two years, and Sebastian Barjon, another former partner of Martin, Larco, and Herard. The article claimed that both Larco and Barjon were the target of US and Haitian investigations. The article does not mention either Herard or Martin.
While there is no evidence the investigation into Herard is related to this week’s assassination of the president, given his role in presidential security, the existence of the investigation is sure to raise more questions. The government prosecutor in Port-au-Prince, Bedford Claude, has invited Herard, as well as Civil Laguel, security coordinator for the president, and the leaders of two other police units, for questioning in relation to the assassination case. After spending a day in Moïse’s residence, Claude told Le Nouvelliste, “I did not see any police victim except the president and his wife. If you are responsible for the security of the president, where were you? What did you do to avoid this fate for the president?”
He said that he had requested a list of all security officers present at the president’s residence the night of the assassination, but that he has yet to receive a response. On July 8, Haiti’s police chief, Leon Charles, told the press that the mercenary team that allegedly killed Moïse was composed of 28 people, including 26 Colombians and two Haitian-Americans. Thus far, police have arrested 17 and killed three, while eight allegedly remain at large. The Colombian minister of defense confirmed that at least some of those arrested had served in the country’s armed forces.
Speaking on local radio this morning, former Senator Steven Benoit cast doubt on the official narrative that this team of Colombians was responsible for assassination of Moïse, alleging that they in fact had been in Haiti under a contract with the government. “The President of the Republic, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated by his security agents,” Benoit claimed, without providing details. Also today, White House press secretary Jenn Psaki announced that, responding to a request for security and investigative assistance from the Haitian government, the US would be sending senior FBI and DHS officials to Haiti as soon as possible.
Dimitri Herard, the head of the General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN, by its French acronym), is the subject of a US law enforcement investigation related to arms trafficking in Haiti, according to multiple sources both inside Haiti and the United States. Earlier this week, the president of Haiti was assassinated in what Haitian government officials have claimed was an elite commando raid of the president’s private residence. As head of the palace guard, Herard is one of the individuals most responsible for the safety of the president. The USGPN is responsible for securing both the palace and the president’s private residence.
On Thursday, July 8, the chief government prosecutor in Port-au-Prince requested that Herard present himself for questioning in relation to the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. A source close to the deceased president, requesting anonymity out of fear for their life, claimed that Moïse was personally aware of the US investigation into Herard, and that Moïse had told them that “the US is taking care of it.”
Herard, in 2012, was one of a small group of Haitians sent to Ecuador under then-president Michel Martelly to train at the Eloy Alfaro Military Academy. He eventually entered the president’s palace guard and became head of the USGPN in February 2017 after the inauguration of Moïse. Despite Herard’s high-level presence within the USGPN, he also operates a private security company. The practice, while a clear conflict of interest, has become increasingly common among police officers in recent years.
In April 2020, Carl Frederic Martin, a Haitian-American and former US Navy officer, together with the sister of Dimitri Herard, created Tradex Haiti S.A., a security company. Another company, this one Florida-based and owned by Martin, received a $73,000 State Department contract in November 2019 to provide “riot gear kit[s]” for a specialized unit of the Haitian National Police (PNH).
In late August 2020, I reported on Martin’s State Department contract, the new security company he had formed with a relative of Herard, and their attempts to create a weapons manufacturing company called HOFSA. The activities of Martin and Herard came directly after the arrest of businessman Aby Larco, accused of being a significant source of arms trafficking in Haiti. Larco and Martin had formed a security company together years earlier, though they eventually ended the partnership. Seven days after Larco’s arrest, Martin and a relative of Herard filed the paperwork to incorporate their new arms manufacturing company, though its business license was eventually revoked.
Three days after the publication of the late August report, a “news” website was created that quickly published a fake news article alleging I had been paid by members of the Haitian elite to destabilize the country. “Coming back to Haiti to further destabilize a democratically elected government will prove to be harder for time to come,” the unsigned article warned. The website’s “About Us” page is a direct copy and paste from the website of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, replacing the organization’s name with “Haiti News Hub.”
In the more than a year and a half since Larco’s arrest, however, the flow of black market weapons into Haiti has only increased, fueling rising insecurity and violence. Kidnappings reached a peak of nearly four a day early in 2021, and, according to security experts, have provided armed groups with significant resources to purchase new weapons and ammunition. Individual ransom payments have reached hundreds of thousands of dollars.
In late June, former police officer and leader of the G9 Family and Allies, Jimmy Cherizier, held a press conference with dozens of armed men displaying high-powered weapons. Police officers and government officials often complain that they lack the resources or firepower to properly counter armed civilian groups. At the same time, many of those groups draw upon support from current and former police officers as well as politicians and private sector actors.
US law enforcement has been increasingly interested in the network bringing illegal weapons into Haiti and its relation to kidnappings. In March 2021, two individuals, Peterson Benjamin and Lissner Mathieu, were arrested in Haiti and brought to the United States. Benjamin was quickly indicted on charges related to his alleged involvement in a criminal enterprise responsible for the kidnapping of a US citizen in Haiti. Mathieu was apparently arrested in connection with a decade-old drug trafficking case. When he was arrested, Mathieu had in his possession a badge from the National Palace. The government denied that he had ever been employed in the palace.
It is unclear if the investigation into Herard is related to this earlier case, or precisely how far along the investigation is. However, multiple sources confirmed that US law enforcement officials recently traveled to Haiti and gathered information related to Herard and his alleged involvement in weapons trafficking. According to a well-placed source in Haitian law enforcement, at least some of the arms are coming from Turkey and then entering Haiti through the Dominican Republic. Moïse traveled to Turkey to participate in a business forum in June.
A US agency involved in the investigation did not respond to a request for comment by the time of publication. Herard also did not respond.
In June, the same website that published the fake news article threatening me published another article touting Herard as a “rising star” within the PNH who was increasingly at loggerheads with the chief of police, Leon Charles. On June 28, the website published another article about the proliferation of high-powered weapons in the hands of gangs in Haiti, pointing the finger at Aby Larco, who has been in prison for nearly two years, and Sebastian Barjon, another former partner of Martin, Larco, and Herard. The article claimed that both Larco and Barjon were the target of US and Haitian investigations. The article does not mention either Herard or Martin.
While there is no evidence the investigation into Herard is related to this week’s assassination of the president, given his role in presidential security, the existence of the investigation is sure to raise more questions. The government prosecutor in Port-au-Prince, Bedford Claude, has invited Herard, as well as Civil Laguel, security coordinator for the president, and the leaders of two other police units, for questioning in relation to the assassination case. After spending a day in Moïse’s residence, Claude told Le Nouvelliste, “I did not see any police victim except the president and his wife. If you are responsible for the security of the president, where were you? What did you do to avoid this fate for the president?”
He said that he had requested a list of all security officers present at the president’s residence the night of the assassination, but that he has yet to receive a response. On July 8, Haiti’s police chief, Leon Charles, told the press that the mercenary team that allegedly killed Moïse was composed of 28 people, including 26 Colombians and two Haitian-Americans. Thus far, police have arrested 17 and killed three, while eight allegedly remain at large. The Colombian minister of defense confirmed that at least some of those arrested had served in the country’s armed forces.
Speaking on local radio this morning, former Senator Steven Benoit cast doubt on the official narrative that this team of Colombians was responsible for assassination of Moïse, alleging that they in fact had been in Haiti under a contract with the government. “The President of the Republic, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated by his security agents,” Benoit claimed, without providing details. Also today, White House press secretary Jenn Psaki announced that, responding to a request for security and investigative assistance from the Haitian government, the US would be sending senior FBI and DHS officials to Haiti as soon as possible.
• HaitiHaitiUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
“Nouvo Konstitisyon : Noup Vote”
Nan moman bilbòd sa yo plakade nan tout Pòtoprens ak tout rès peyi a, gouvènman an lanse yon dènye bourad nan planifikasyon referandòm ki te gen pou dat 27 Jen 2021. Gouvènman an òganize “deba” televize, li enprime bilten, l ap fè presyon sou òganizasyon entènasyonal, epi tou l ap travay sou fondasyon sa li panse ki se yon efò nesesè pou li mete gouvènans Ayiti a sou chimen siksè.
Pwoblèm lan ? Se yon ti gwoup moun sèlman k ap fè kanpay. Gen yon dal òganizasyon sosyete sivil, òganizasyson kominotè, ak pati politik ki konteste efò sa a ; yo di referandòm lan se yon pwojè ilegal ki gen pou sèl objektif mete plis pouvwa nan men Jovenel Moïse. An verite, nan dènye semèn sa yo, yon bann aktè politik lanse yon apèl bay popilasyon an pou yo revòlte kont referandòm lan epi itilize tout taktik yo kapab pou yo anpeche vòt la fèt. [Pou yon diskisyon pi detaye sou spesifisite refòm konstitisyonèl la, epi pou konprann poukisa tèlman gen moun ki opoze li, Haitian Studies Association te òganize yon chita pale avèk lidè epi ekspè Ayisyen sou sijè a.]
Se pa sèlman Ayiti k ap debat posibilite pou gen referandòm konstitisyonèl nan zòn lan. Ane pase nan peyi Chili, pi fò pèp la te vote an favè kreyasyon yon nouvo dokiman, epi mwa sa a, yo te vote pou yo mete nouvo reprezantan an plas ki pou kòmanse ekri nouvo tèks la. Yo atann yo aske travay konvansyon konstitisyonèl la pran plizyè mwa, apre sa vòt sou nouvo tèks la ta sipoze fèt an 2022, nan mitan ane a. Gen plizyè regilasyon ki mandate patisipasyon gwoup ki tradisyonèlman majinalize tankou fanm ak popilasyon Endijèn la nan peyi Chili.
An konparezon, dokiman Ayiti a se yon ti komisyon ki ekri l, e moun ki ladan l se moun Prezidan Moïse chwazi li menm. Jou kap 27 Jen, lè komisyon an mande Ayisyen pou yo ale nan biwo vòt, Ayisyen ap oblije vote sou tout kontni tèks la avèk yon senp “wi” oubyen “non,” malgre yo pa wè vèsyon final la. Se jis an Janvye ane sa a ke komisyon an pibliye yon premye vèsyon ki gen chanjman y ap pwopoze yo ; met sou sa, yo pibliye l an Franse sèlman, ki se yon lang majorite pèp ayisyen an pa pale. Yo pibliye yon vèsyon yo revize nan fen mwa Me, yon mwa avan vòt la fèt, e y ap planifye pibliye yon dènye vesyon nan mwa Jen an.
Semèn sa a, apre li rankontre M. Moïse, Anbasadris Amerikèn nan Nasyon Zini, Linda Thomas-Greenfield kanpe dèyè pozisyon ofisyèl kominote entènasyonal la ki di : jiska prezan, preparasyon pou referandòm lan pa “ase transparan oswa enklizif.” Pozisyon piblik Etazini se ke preferans li se pou gouvènman Ayisyen an ta fè plis efò pou òganize eleksyon lejislatif epi prezidansyèl nan fen ane sa a, anvan yo rivesou kontwovèsi konstitisyon an. Nan 17 dènye mwa sa yo, Ayiti fonksyone san palman, kifè tout pwosesis referandòm lan ap fèt ak Prezidan Moïse k ap dirije pa dekrè epi san siveyans lejislatif.
Gen anpil moun ki deja di pou yo, Jovenel Moïse pa ta sipoze nan Palè Nasyonal ankò, ale wè pou l ap òganize yon referandòm epi kreye yon nouvo konstitisyon. Ekspè nan chan legal la, òganizasyon dwa moun, antite relijye avèk yon dal gwoup òganizasyon sosyete sivil kenbe pozisyon yo : manda Jovenel Moïse fini 7 Fevriye 2021. Yo di refòm li yo illegal, epi met sou li, yo di pa gen mwayen pou eleksyon ki lib epi kredib òganize anba sipèvizyon li. Mwa pase, 69 manb kongrè Ameriken an te ekri Sekretè Deta Anthony Blinken pou yo eksprime akò yo.
An Avril, yon reprezantan Depatman Leta, Ned Price, di laprès konsa : “Nou di sa plizyè fwa : refòm konstitisyonèl lan se yon chwa pou pèp Ayisyen an fè.” Li ajoute, “Nou di gouvènman Ayisyen an : gouvènmen Ameriken an pa p bay sipò finansye pou òganizasyon yon referandòm konstitisyonèl.” Men, menm lè Etazini pa ta bay sipò dirèkteman, sa pa vle di ke politik li pa p, nan sans pa l, valide referandòm lan.
Sipò Silansye Kominote Entènasyonal La
Kominote entènasyonal la kontinye fè silans sou kesyon referandòm lan. Kore Gwoup, ki genyen kòm manb, Etazini, Kanada, Brezil, Lafrans, Inyon Ewopeyèn, Nasyon Zini, ak OEA te pibliye yon nòt an Avril tou kote yo te deklare pwosesis la pa t ase transparan ni enklizif. Malgre sa, aktè entènasyonal yo pa janm mande pou gouvènman Ayisyen an anile oswa ranvwaye referandòm lan. Met sou sa, ni Nasyon Zini, ni OEA ap sipote referandòm lan, malgre nòt piblik yo.
De òganizasyon miltilateral sa yo bay asistans teknik bay komisyon k ap ekri nouvo tèks la depi fòmasyon li ane pase. OEA te menm ede ak revizyon tèks la pou li eseye retire aspè ki te pi pwoblematik yo nan vèsyon original la. Sou bò pa l, Nasyon Zini pwokire materyèl de vòt enpòtan pou konsèy elektoral la k ap fè referandòm lan tou ; yo genyen yon akò tou pou yo apiye yo nan lojistik òganizasyon vòt la. Met sou li, Nasyon Zini ap ede PNH ak strateji sekirite elektoral la.
Asistans teknik sa a pa anyen devan ensistans kominote entènasyonal la pou eleksyon fèt ane sa a. Li enposib pou eleksyon yo separe de referandòm lan, e sipò òganizasyon entènasyonal sa yo pou eleksyon yo ap sèvi sipò pou referandòm lan tou.
Nouvo konstitisyon an t ap drastikman chanje anviwònman politik peyi a. Premyèman, li t ap ranplase pòs Premye Minis la avèk yon Vis Prezidan, yon ranplasman ki t ap aboli Sena a nèt. Epi tou, si tèks ki pwopoze a apwouve, l ap bay gouvènman an manda pou li mete yon nouvo lwa elektoral. Kòman pou yon moun pale de òganizasyon eleksyon nan kèlke mwa, lè pèsonn pa menm konnen ki pòs k ap genyen nan eleksyon oubyen anba ki lwa eleksyon yo ap fèt ? Klèman, eleksyon yo depann de sa ki pral pase an Jen an.
Met sou li, ensistans entènasyonal la pou eleksyon yo fèt kreye yon pakèt vag kritik sou tout pwosesis vòt la. Konsèy elektoral ki genyen kounya, se Prezidan an ki mete li pa dekrè, e a lankont lalwa ; kou kasasyon an te refize sèmante nouvo manb yo. Se menm konsèy elektoral sa a ki pral fè ni referandòm lan ni eleksyon yo nan fen ane sa a. Si yon moun ap mande òganizasyon eleksyon, pa defo, l ap sipòote òganizasyon referandòm lan tou.
Sipò Etazini pou konsèy elektoral ilegal sa a ale pi lwen toujou ; a travè USAID, gouvènman Ameriken an deja depanse USD $12.6 milyon depi Moïse kòomanse prezidans li, nan non sipò pou “pwosesis elektoral e politik.” Majorite lajan sa a ale jwenn antite ki baze Etazini tankou Enstiti Demokratik Nasyonal, Enstiti Repiblik Entènasyonal, epi Fondasyon Entenasyonal pou Sistèm Elektoral. Òganizasyon sa yo enplemante pwòp pwogram yo, kidonk yo gendwa pa sanble tankou y ap sipòte referandòm lan oswa eleksyon yo “dirèkteman”.
Nan mwa Mas la, Sekretè Adjwen pa Enterim la nan Biwo Afè Emisfè Lwès la pou Depatman Leta Etazini, Julie Chung te tweet : “Etazini atravè @USAID_Haiti, ap ede pèp ayisyen an prepare pou eleksyon yo nan bay @CEP_Haiti, sipò teknik, ranfòse pati politik yo ak ONG yo, epi ogmante patisipasyon fanm yo nan politik ayisyèn nan.”
Se vre Etazini gendwa pa finanse referandòm lan, men pa gen manti nan sa : prensip ak politik kominote entènasyonal la ap travay di pou referandòm ilegal la fèt kout ke kout.
“Nouvo Konstitisyon : Noup Vote”
Nan moman bilbòd sa yo plakade nan tout Pòtoprens ak tout rès peyi a, gouvènman an lanse yon dènye bourad nan planifikasyon referandòm ki te gen pou dat 27 Jen 2021. Gouvènman an òganize “deba” televize, li enprime bilten, l ap fè presyon sou òganizasyon entènasyonal, epi tou l ap travay sou fondasyon sa li panse ki se yon efò nesesè pou li mete gouvènans Ayiti a sou chimen siksè.
Pwoblèm lan ? Se yon ti gwoup moun sèlman k ap fè kanpay. Gen yon dal òganizasyon sosyete sivil, òganizasyson kominotè, ak pati politik ki konteste efò sa a ; yo di referandòm lan se yon pwojè ilegal ki gen pou sèl objektif mete plis pouvwa nan men Jovenel Moïse. An verite, nan dènye semèn sa yo, yon bann aktè politik lanse yon apèl bay popilasyon an pou yo revòlte kont referandòm lan epi itilize tout taktik yo kapab pou yo anpeche vòt la fèt. [Pou yon diskisyon pi detaye sou spesifisite refòm konstitisyonèl la, epi pou konprann poukisa tèlman gen moun ki opoze li, Haitian Studies Association te òganize yon chita pale avèk lidè epi ekspè Ayisyen sou sijè a.]
Se pa sèlman Ayiti k ap debat posibilite pou gen referandòm konstitisyonèl nan zòn lan. Ane pase nan peyi Chili, pi fò pèp la te vote an favè kreyasyon yon nouvo dokiman, epi mwa sa a, yo te vote pou yo mete nouvo reprezantan an plas ki pou kòmanse ekri nouvo tèks la. Yo atann yo aske travay konvansyon konstitisyonèl la pran plizyè mwa, apre sa vòt sou nouvo tèks la ta sipoze fèt an 2022, nan mitan ane a. Gen plizyè regilasyon ki mandate patisipasyon gwoup ki tradisyonèlman majinalize tankou fanm ak popilasyon Endijèn la nan peyi Chili.
An konparezon, dokiman Ayiti a se yon ti komisyon ki ekri l, e moun ki ladan l se moun Prezidan Moïse chwazi li menm. Jou kap 27 Jen, lè komisyon an mande Ayisyen pou yo ale nan biwo vòt, Ayisyen ap oblije vote sou tout kontni tèks la avèk yon senp “wi” oubyen “non,” malgre yo pa wè vèsyon final la. Se jis an Janvye ane sa a ke komisyon an pibliye yon premye vèsyon ki gen chanjman y ap pwopoze yo ; met sou sa, yo pibliye l an Franse sèlman, ki se yon lang majorite pèp ayisyen an pa pale. Yo pibliye yon vèsyon yo revize nan fen mwa Me, yon mwa avan vòt la fèt, e y ap planifye pibliye yon dènye vesyon nan mwa Jen an.
Semèn sa a, apre li rankontre M. Moïse, Anbasadris Amerikèn nan Nasyon Zini, Linda Thomas-Greenfield kanpe dèyè pozisyon ofisyèl kominote entènasyonal la ki di : jiska prezan, preparasyon pou referandòm lan pa “ase transparan oswa enklizif.” Pozisyon piblik Etazini se ke preferans li se pou gouvènman Ayisyen an ta fè plis efò pou òganize eleksyon lejislatif epi prezidansyèl nan fen ane sa a, anvan yo rivesou kontwovèsi konstitisyon an. Nan 17 dènye mwa sa yo, Ayiti fonksyone san palman, kifè tout pwosesis referandòm lan ap fèt ak Prezidan Moïse k ap dirije pa dekrè epi san siveyans lejislatif.
Gen anpil moun ki deja di pou yo, Jovenel Moïse pa ta sipoze nan Palè Nasyonal ankò, ale wè pou l ap òganize yon referandòm epi kreye yon nouvo konstitisyon. Ekspè nan chan legal la, òganizasyon dwa moun, antite relijye avèk yon dal gwoup òganizasyon sosyete sivil kenbe pozisyon yo : manda Jovenel Moïse fini 7 Fevriye 2021. Yo di refòm li yo illegal, epi met sou li, yo di pa gen mwayen pou eleksyon ki lib epi kredib òganize anba sipèvizyon li. Mwa pase, 69 manb kongrè Ameriken an te ekri Sekretè Deta Anthony Blinken pou yo eksprime akò yo.
An Avril, yon reprezantan Depatman Leta, Ned Price, di laprès konsa : “Nou di sa plizyè fwa : refòm konstitisyonèl lan se yon chwa pou pèp Ayisyen an fè.” Li ajoute, “Nou di gouvènman Ayisyen an : gouvènmen Ameriken an pa p bay sipò finansye pou òganizasyon yon referandòm konstitisyonèl.” Men, menm lè Etazini pa ta bay sipò dirèkteman, sa pa vle di ke politik li pa p, nan sans pa l, valide referandòm lan.
Sipò Silansye Kominote Entènasyonal La
Kominote entènasyonal la kontinye fè silans sou kesyon referandòm lan. Kore Gwoup, ki genyen kòm manb, Etazini, Kanada, Brezil, Lafrans, Inyon Ewopeyèn, Nasyon Zini, ak OEA te pibliye yon nòt an Avril tou kote yo te deklare pwosesis la pa t ase transparan ni enklizif. Malgre sa, aktè entènasyonal yo pa janm mande pou gouvènman Ayisyen an anile oswa ranvwaye referandòm lan. Met sou sa, ni Nasyon Zini, ni OEA ap sipote referandòm lan, malgre nòt piblik yo.
De òganizasyon miltilateral sa yo bay asistans teknik bay komisyon k ap ekri nouvo tèks la depi fòmasyon li ane pase. OEA te menm ede ak revizyon tèks la pou li eseye retire aspè ki te pi pwoblematik yo nan vèsyon original la. Sou bò pa l, Nasyon Zini pwokire materyèl de vòt enpòtan pou konsèy elektoral la k ap fè referandòm lan tou ; yo genyen yon akò tou pou yo apiye yo nan lojistik òganizasyon vòt la. Met sou li, Nasyon Zini ap ede PNH ak strateji sekirite elektoral la.
Asistans teknik sa a pa anyen devan ensistans kominote entènasyonal la pou eleksyon fèt ane sa a. Li enposib pou eleksyon yo separe de referandòm lan, e sipò òganizasyon entènasyonal sa yo pou eleksyon yo ap sèvi sipò pou referandòm lan tou.
Nouvo konstitisyon an t ap drastikman chanje anviwònman politik peyi a. Premyèman, li t ap ranplase pòs Premye Minis la avèk yon Vis Prezidan, yon ranplasman ki t ap aboli Sena a nèt. Epi tou, si tèks ki pwopoze a apwouve, l ap bay gouvènman an manda pou li mete yon nouvo lwa elektoral. Kòman pou yon moun pale de òganizasyon eleksyon nan kèlke mwa, lè pèsonn pa menm konnen ki pòs k ap genyen nan eleksyon oubyen anba ki lwa eleksyon yo ap fèt ? Klèman, eleksyon yo depann de sa ki pral pase an Jen an.
Met sou li, ensistans entènasyonal la pou eleksyon yo fèt kreye yon pakèt vag kritik sou tout pwosesis vòt la. Konsèy elektoral ki genyen kounya, se Prezidan an ki mete li pa dekrè, e a lankont lalwa ; kou kasasyon an te refize sèmante nouvo manb yo. Se menm konsèy elektoral sa a ki pral fè ni referandòm lan ni eleksyon yo nan fen ane sa a. Si yon moun ap mande òganizasyon eleksyon, pa defo, l ap sipòote òganizasyon referandòm lan tou.
Sipò Etazini pou konsèy elektoral ilegal sa a ale pi lwen toujou ; a travè USAID, gouvènman Ameriken an deja depanse USD $12.6 milyon depi Moïse kòomanse prezidans li, nan non sipò pou “pwosesis elektoral e politik.” Majorite lajan sa a ale jwenn antite ki baze Etazini tankou Enstiti Demokratik Nasyonal, Enstiti Repiblik Entènasyonal, epi Fondasyon Entenasyonal pou Sistèm Elektoral. Òganizasyon sa yo enplemante pwòp pwogram yo, kidonk yo gendwa pa sanble tankou y ap sipòte referandòm lan oswa eleksyon yo “dirèkteman”.
Nan mwa Mas la, Sekretè Adjwen pa Enterim la nan Biwo Afè Emisfè Lwès la pou Depatman Leta Etazini, Julie Chung te tweet : “Etazini atravè @USAID_Haiti, ap ede pèp ayisyen an prepare pou eleksyon yo nan bay @CEP_Haiti, sipò teknik, ranfòse pati politik yo ak ONG yo, epi ogmante patisipasyon fanm yo nan politik ayisyèn nan.”
Se vre Etazini gendwa pa finanse referandòm lan, men pa gen manti nan sa : prensip ak politik kominote entènasyonal la ap travay di pou referandòm ilegal la fèt kout ke kout.
• HaitiHaitiOrganization of American StatesOrganización de los Estados AmericanosUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
“New Constitution: We Will Vote.”
The billboards are plastered across Port-au-Prince and throughout the country, as the government launches an all-out push ahead of a referendum planned for next month. The government is holding televised “debates,” printing ballots, lobbying international organizations, and apparently laying the groundwork for what it claims is a necessary effort to put Haiti’s governance on a path to success.
The catch? The campaign is only happening on one side. The entire effort is contested by myriad civil society organizations, grassroots groups, and political parties, all of whom maintain that the referendum is an illegal power grab on the part of Haitian president Jovenel Moïse. In fact, over the last week, a number of prominent political actors have called on the population to revolt against the referendum and use whatever means possible to prevent the vote from taking place.
[For a more detailed discussion on the specifics of the constitutional reform, and why many in Haiti are so adamantly opposed to it, the Haitian Studies Association recently hosted a roundtable discussion with leading Haitian experts on the subject.]
Haiti is not the only country in the hemisphere currently debating constitutional reform. Last fall in Chile, voters overwhelmingly voted in favor of creating a new charter, and then earlier this month elected representatives responsible for drafting the new text. The constitutional convention’s work is expected to take many months, and the vote on the new text is not expected until sometime in mid-2022. There are regulations mandating the involvement of traditionally marginalized groups, including women and the nation’s Indigenous population.
By contrast, Haiti’s new charter was drafted by a small commission composed entirely of members handpicked by the president. On June 27, when Haitians are being asked to go to the polls, they will have to vote on the entirety of the new text with a simple “yes” or “no,” even though they have yet to see the final version. The commission did not issue a first draft of the proposed changes until January, and released it only in French, which the vast majority of Haitians do not speak. It released a revised version in late May, a month before the scheduled vote, and plans to issue one more version in June.
This week, after meeting with Moïse, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, reiterated the official position of the international community that, thus far, preparations for the referendum “have not been sufficiently transparent or inclusive.” The US’s public position is that its preference is for the Haitian government to first focus on holding legislative and presidential elections this fall before tackling the constitution controversy. For the last 17 months, Haiti has been without a functioning parliament, allowing the entire referendum process to unfold with President Moïse ruling by decree and without legislative oversight.
For many in Haiti, Moïse shouldn’t be in the National Palace anymore, let alone oversee the creation of a new constitution. Legal experts, human rights organizations, religious entities, and a broad-based network of civil society organizations contend that Moïse’s presidential mandate ended on February 7, 2021. They maintain that not only is his reform effort illegal, but that there is no chance for free, fair, or credible elections to be held under his watch at all. Last month, 69 members of the US Congress wrote to Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing their agreement.
“We have repeatedly stated that constitutional reform is for the Haitian people to decide,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price told the press in late April. “We’ve emphasized to the Haitian government that the US government will not provide financial support for a constitutional referendum.” But, while the US isn’t providing direct support, that does not mean its policy is not de facto enabling the referendum.
The International Community’s Silent Support
The international community has remained largely silent on the question of the referendum. The Core Group, which consists of the US, Canada, Brazil, France, the EU, the UN, and the OAS, among others, issued a statement in April noting that the process was not sufficiently transparent or inclusive. Nevertheless, international actors have refrained from explicitly calling for its cancellation or even its delay. Further, both the UN and the OAS are actively providing support for the referendum, despite their public statements of concern.
These two multilateral organizations have provided technical assistance to the commission tasked with drafting the new text since it was formed last fall. The OAS even helped with revisions to the text in an attempt to remove some of the more controversial aspects in the original. The UN, meanwhile, has helped to procure sensitive voting materials for the electoral council overseeing the referendum and has an agreement in place to provide logistics for holding the vote. The UN is also helping to advise the national police on an electoral security strategy.
But, more important than this technical assistance is the international community’s insistence on the holding of elections this fall. It is simply impossible to separate elections from the referendum, and donor support for the former is making the latter more likely by the day.
For starters, the new constitution would drastically alter the political landscape; for example, replacing the post of prime minister with a vice president, and abolishing the Senate altogether. Additionally, the draft text, if approved, mandates the government to institute a new electoral law. How can one speak of organizing elections in a few months when nobody even knows what posts will actually be contested, or under what laws? Clearly, the elections depend to a great degree on what happens in June.
Further, the international push for elections papers over valid criticisms of the broader voting process. The current electoral council was appointed by decree by the president, contrary to the law; the supreme court refused to swear in the new members. This is the electoral council that is set to oversee both the referendum and the elections later this year. By supporting their management of elections, one inherently supports their management of the referendum.
The US support for the illegal electoral council goes even further. Through USAID, the US government has spent $12.6 million since Moïse was elected in support of “elections and political processes.” Most of that money goes to US-based entities like the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republic Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The organizations implement their own programs, and so do not necessarily equate to “direct” support to the referendum or to elections.
But, in late March, acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Julie Chung tweeted: “The U.S., via @USAID_Haiti, is helping the Haitian people prepare for elections by providing technical support to the @cep_haiti, strengthening political parties and NGOs, and increasing the participation of women in Haitian politics.”
The US may not be directly funding the referendum, but make no mistake, the policies of the international community are going a long way toward ensuring the controversial referendum takes place as scheduled.
“New Constitution: We Will Vote.”
The billboards are plastered across Port-au-Prince and throughout the country, as the government launches an all-out push ahead of a referendum planned for next month. The government is holding televised “debates,” printing ballots, lobbying international organizations, and apparently laying the groundwork for what it claims is a necessary effort to put Haiti’s governance on a path to success.
The catch? The campaign is only happening on one side. The entire effort is contested by myriad civil society organizations, grassroots groups, and political parties, all of whom maintain that the referendum is an illegal power grab on the part of Haitian president Jovenel Moïse. In fact, over the last week, a number of prominent political actors have called on the population to revolt against the referendum and use whatever means possible to prevent the vote from taking place.
[For a more detailed discussion on the specifics of the constitutional reform, and why many in Haiti are so adamantly opposed to it, the Haitian Studies Association recently hosted a roundtable discussion with leading Haitian experts on the subject.]
Haiti is not the only country in the hemisphere currently debating constitutional reform. Last fall in Chile, voters overwhelmingly voted in favor of creating a new charter, and then earlier this month elected representatives responsible for drafting the new text. The constitutional convention’s work is expected to take many months, and the vote on the new text is not expected until sometime in mid-2022. There are regulations mandating the involvement of traditionally marginalized groups, including women and the nation’s Indigenous population.
By contrast, Haiti’s new charter was drafted by a small commission composed entirely of members handpicked by the president. On June 27, when Haitians are being asked to go to the polls, they will have to vote on the entirety of the new text with a simple “yes” or “no,” even though they have yet to see the final version. The commission did not issue a first draft of the proposed changes until January, and released it only in French, which the vast majority of Haitians do not speak. It released a revised version in late May, a month before the scheduled vote, and plans to issue one more version in June.
This week, after meeting with Moïse, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, reiterated the official position of the international community that, thus far, preparations for the referendum “have not been sufficiently transparent or inclusive.” The US’s public position is that its preference is for the Haitian government to first focus on holding legislative and presidential elections this fall before tackling the constitution controversy. For the last 17 months, Haiti has been without a functioning parliament, allowing the entire referendum process to unfold with President Moïse ruling by decree and without legislative oversight.
For many in Haiti, Moïse shouldn’t be in the National Palace anymore, let alone oversee the creation of a new constitution. Legal experts, human rights organizations, religious entities, and a broad-based network of civil society organizations contend that Moïse’s presidential mandate ended on February 7, 2021. They maintain that not only is his reform effort illegal, but that there is no chance for free, fair, or credible elections to be held under his watch at all. Last month, 69 members of the US Congress wrote to Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressing their agreement.
“We have repeatedly stated that constitutional reform is for the Haitian people to decide,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price told the press in late April. “We’ve emphasized to the Haitian government that the US government will not provide financial support for a constitutional referendum.” But, while the US isn’t providing direct support, that does not mean its policy is not de facto enabling the referendum.
The International Community’s Silent Support
The international community has remained largely silent on the question of the referendum. The Core Group, which consists of the US, Canada, Brazil, France, the EU, the UN, and the OAS, among others, issued a statement in April noting that the process was not sufficiently transparent or inclusive. Nevertheless, international actors have refrained from explicitly calling for its cancellation or even its delay. Further, both the UN and the OAS are actively providing support for the referendum, despite their public statements of concern.
These two multilateral organizations have provided technical assistance to the commission tasked with drafting the new text since it was formed last fall. The OAS even helped with revisions to the text in an attempt to remove some of the more controversial aspects in the original. The UN, meanwhile, has helped to procure sensitive voting materials for the electoral council overseeing the referendum and has an agreement in place to provide logistics for holding the vote. The UN is also helping to advise the national police on an electoral security strategy.
But, more important than this technical assistance is the international community’s insistence on the holding of elections this fall. It is simply impossible to separate elections from the referendum, and donor support for the former is making the latter more likely by the day.
For starters, the new constitution would drastically alter the political landscape; for example, replacing the post of prime minister with a vice president, and abolishing the Senate altogether. Additionally, the draft text, if approved, mandates the government to institute a new electoral law. How can one speak of organizing elections in a few months when nobody even knows what posts will actually be contested, or under what laws? Clearly, the elections depend to a great degree on what happens in June.
Further, the international push for elections papers over valid criticisms of the broader voting process. The current electoral council was appointed by decree by the president, contrary to the law; the supreme court refused to swear in the new members. This is the electoral council that is set to oversee both the referendum and the elections later this year. By supporting their management of elections, one inherently supports their management of the referendum.
The US support for the illegal electoral council goes even further. Through USAID, the US government has spent $12.6 million since Moïse was elected in support of “elections and political processes.” Most of that money goes to US-based entities like the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republic Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The organizations implement their own programs, and so do not necessarily equate to “direct” support to the referendum or to elections.
But, in late March, acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Julie Chung tweeted: “The U.S., via @USAID_Haiti, is helping the Haitian people prepare for elections by providing technical support to the @cep_haiti, strengthening political parties and NGOs, and increasing the participation of women in Haitian politics.”
The US may not be directly funding the referendum, but make no mistake, the policies of the international community are going a long way toward ensuring the controversial referendum takes place as scheduled.
On November 26, 2020, the Haitian government published two decrees on national security. The first creates a new national intelligence agency, while the second greatly expands the definition of terrorism. Haitian president Jovenel Moise has been ruling by decree since January when the terms of parliament expired, and has used that power to consolidate the strength of the executive branch. The government has framed the changes as a response to recently increasing insecurity, however the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and various human rights organizations have denounced the new decrees and warned that they could be used to increase repression.
Marie Suzy Legros, the head of the bar association, labeled the decrees as “tyrannical” and as the destruction of liberty. “Jovenel Moise has the madness of a dictator,” former Senator Steven Benoit commented in response to the decrees. “He does not realize that we are no longer in 1957,” he continued, in reference to Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier who created his own intelligence agency in the early years of the dictatorship. Even before these recent decrees, 11 human rights organizations had condemned the “dictatorial and unconstitutional” actions of the current administration.
On December 12, the Core Group in Haiti issued a press release “expressing concern” over the new decrees. The Decree on the Strengthening of Public Security, the diplomatic representatives note, “extends the qualification of ‘terrorist act’ to certain facts that do not fall under it and provides for particularly heavy penalties.” The intelligence agency, the Core Group, continued, gives “the agents of this institution virtual legal immunity, thus opening up the possibility of abuse.” Taken together, these decrees “do not seem to conform to certain fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law and the civil and political rights of citizens.”
So, what is in these new decrees?
A New Intelligence Agency
The National Intelligence Agency (ANI by its French acronym) is a technical and administrative institution, whose primary focus is on information gathering and the repression of hostile acts that could be perceived as a threat to national security. Though the new agency will operate under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, the president has the sole authority to name a director general and other high-level positions (Art. 54).
The ANI will be staffed by individuals recruited from the National Police Academy and from the military. The decree includes scant information on the vetting of ANI officers, but notes that recruits will be subject to testing as well as to psychological and moral inquiries (Art. 32). The officers, whose identities will remain anonymous due to national security concerns, will also be armed (Art. 51) . The decree also grants total secrecy to the ANI’s operations. The ANI is authorized to conduct surveillance and will have access to all relevant government databases. Officers will also be able to enter private homes or businesses at any time in order to access documents, objects, or anything else relevant to an ongoing investigation (Art. 55).
ANI officers will not be regular civil servants, but instead will hold a special status, de facto creating a third armed force in the country (Art. 33). The decree also grants legal protection to all ANI officers (Art. 49). There is no possibility for legal recourse in the case of abuse without prior authorization from the president. The agency itself is protected from any legal action that seeks to prevent its functioning or the execution of its activities (Art. 67). The decree offers relatively little information as to how this new agency might be funded.
An Expanded Definition of Terrorism
The Decree for the Reinforcement of Public Security expands the definition of “terrorism” to include such acts as robbery, extortion, arson, and the destruction or degradation of public and private goods.
Articles 1.12 and 1.13, however, go even further and specify that acts of crowding or blocking public roads to obstruct movement are included in this expanded definition. The decree specifies that even so much as placing garbage in a public road would fall under the new definition of terrorism. Blocking roads is a common protest tactic in Haiti, as in many other countries.
The decree also specifics penalties under the new definition. Those found guilty of committing “terrorist acts” can spend from 30 to 50 years in prison and face a fine ranging from two million to two-hundred million Haitian gourdes (about $28,000 – $2,800,000 at today’s exchange rate). The decree states that the penalties cannot be lowered under any circumstance. Individuals can be exempted from punishment if they provide the authorities with information that prevents a terrorist act and leads to the arrest of the individuals or groups responsible.
Oddly, the decree states that, if there are any reservations, the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate has 30 days to introduce a new law in parliament. The parliament has not functioned since January 2020.
On November 26, 2020, the Haitian government published two decrees on national security. The first creates a new national intelligence agency, while the second greatly expands the definition of terrorism. Haitian president Jovenel Moise has been ruling by decree since January when the terms of parliament expired, and has used that power to consolidate the strength of the executive branch. The government has framed the changes as a response to recently increasing insecurity, however the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and various human rights organizations have denounced the new decrees and warned that they could be used to increase repression.
Marie Suzy Legros, the head of the bar association, labeled the decrees as “tyrannical” and as the destruction of liberty. “Jovenel Moise has the madness of a dictator,” former Senator Steven Benoit commented in response to the decrees. “He does not realize that we are no longer in 1957,” he continued, in reference to Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier who created his own intelligence agency in the early years of the dictatorship. Even before these recent decrees, 11 human rights organizations had condemned the “dictatorial and unconstitutional” actions of the current administration.
On December 12, the Core Group in Haiti issued a press release “expressing concern” over the new decrees. The Decree on the Strengthening of Public Security, the diplomatic representatives note, “extends the qualification of ‘terrorist act’ to certain facts that do not fall under it and provides for particularly heavy penalties.” The intelligence agency, the Core Group, continued, gives “the agents of this institution virtual legal immunity, thus opening up the possibility of abuse.” Taken together, these decrees “do not seem to conform to certain fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law and the civil and political rights of citizens.”
So, what is in these new decrees?
A New Intelligence Agency
The National Intelligence Agency (ANI by its French acronym) is a technical and administrative institution, whose primary focus is on information gathering and the repression of hostile acts that could be perceived as a threat to national security. Though the new agency will operate under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, the president has the sole authority to name a director general and other high-level positions (Art. 54).
The ANI will be staffed by individuals recruited from the National Police Academy and from the military. The decree includes scant information on the vetting of ANI officers, but notes that recruits will be subject to testing as well as to psychological and moral inquiries (Art. 32). The officers, whose identities will remain anonymous due to national security concerns, will also be armed (Art. 51) . The decree also grants total secrecy to the ANI’s operations. The ANI is authorized to conduct surveillance and will have access to all relevant government databases. Officers will also be able to enter private homes or businesses at any time in order to access documents, objects, or anything else relevant to an ongoing investigation (Art. 55).
ANI officers will not be regular civil servants, but instead will hold a special status, de facto creating a third armed force in the country (Art. 33). The decree also grants legal protection to all ANI officers (Art. 49). There is no possibility for legal recourse in the case of abuse without prior authorization from the president. The agency itself is protected from any legal action that seeks to prevent its functioning or the execution of its activities (Art. 67). The decree offers relatively little information as to how this new agency might be funded.
An Expanded Definition of Terrorism
The Decree for the Reinforcement of Public Security expands the definition of “terrorism” to include such acts as robbery, extortion, arson, and the destruction or degradation of public and private goods.
Articles 1.12 and 1.13, however, go even further and specify that acts of crowding or blocking public roads to obstruct movement are included in this expanded definition. The decree specifies that even so much as placing garbage in a public road would fall under the new definition of terrorism. Blocking roads is a common protest tactic in Haiti, as in many other countries.
The decree also specifics penalties under the new definition. Those found guilty of committing “terrorist acts” can spend from 30 to 50 years in prison and face a fine ranging from two million to two-hundred million Haitian gourdes (about $28,000 – $2,800,000 at today’s exchange rate). The decree states that the penalties cannot be lowered under any circumstance. Individuals can be exempted from punishment if they provide the authorities with information that prevents a terrorist act and leads to the arrest of the individuals or groups responsible.
Oddly, the decree states that, if there are any reservations, the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate has 30 days to introduce a new law in parliament. The parliament has not functioned since January 2020.
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
The follow is a guest post from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.
On Thursday, December 10, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will hold a hearing on pervasive impunity and a lack of judicial independence in Haiti. The event will be broadcast live here. The Commission, a quasi‐judicial body of the Organization of American States (OAS) mandated to protect human rights, called this hearing in response to a Request submitted by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). We will be posting additional information and documents on the IJDH website.
The civil society delegation at the hearing will be comprised of Mario Joseph, Managing Director of the BAI; Alexandra Filippova, an attorney with IJDH; Sonel Jean-Francois, Director of Judicial Inspection for the Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire (and former Director of Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers – Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit); and Lionel Constant Bourgoin, former prosecutor and former Director General for Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption, Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit. The government of Haiti is also invited to attend; it has sent representatives in the past, as with last year’s IACHR thematic hearing on corruption.
At the hearing, we plan to demonstrate the pervasive nature of impunity in Haiti with examples of continued lack of accountability for individuals (i) convicted in absentia in the 1994 Raboteau massacre trial; (ii) implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre, 2019 Bel-Air massacre, and similar ongoing violence; and (iii) responsible for Duvalier-era human rights violations. We will likewise highlight how such pervasive impunity, alongside judicial dysfunction and corruption, leave perpetrators free and emboldened to commit further abuses, abandon victims without recourse, and undermine public confidence in the justice system; in our view, they can be directly linked to rising violence and insecurity in Haiti. It is our legal assessment that such impunity and lack of judicial independence represent serious violations of Haiti’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and thus merit the IACHR’s active engagement to support the people of Haiti in their efforts to secure accountability for abuses and a judicial system that protects and advances justice. We hope that this hearing is one more step towards that goal.
This post will be updated after the hearing with links to the participants’ written submissions before the IACHR.
[Update 12/14/2020]:
You can watch the full recording of the hearing here.
BAI & IJDH Request for Thematic Hearing of September 23, 2020 (French version)
BAI & IJDH Written Submission of November 16, 2020 (French version); Attachment 1 (IJDH Human Rights Update of March-October 2020)
The follow is a guest post from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.
On Thursday, December 10, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will hold a hearing on pervasive impunity and a lack of judicial independence in Haiti. The event will be broadcast live here. The Commission, a quasi‐judicial body of the Organization of American States (OAS) mandated to protect human rights, called this hearing in response to a Request submitted by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). We will be posting additional information and documents on the IJDH website.
The civil society delegation at the hearing will be comprised of Mario Joseph, Managing Director of the BAI; Alexandra Filippova, an attorney with IJDH; Sonel Jean-Francois, Director of Judicial Inspection for the Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire (and former Director of Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers – Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit); and Lionel Constant Bourgoin, former prosecutor and former Director General for Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption, Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit. The government of Haiti is also invited to attend; it has sent representatives in the past, as with last year’s IACHR thematic hearing on corruption.
At the hearing, we plan to demonstrate the pervasive nature of impunity in Haiti with examples of continued lack of accountability for individuals (i) convicted in absentia in the 1994 Raboteau massacre trial; (ii) implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre, 2019 Bel-Air massacre, and similar ongoing violence; and (iii) responsible for Duvalier-era human rights violations. We will likewise highlight how such pervasive impunity, alongside judicial dysfunction and corruption, leave perpetrators free and emboldened to commit further abuses, abandon victims without recourse, and undermine public confidence in the justice system; in our view, they can be directly linked to rising violence and insecurity in Haiti. It is our legal assessment that such impunity and lack of judicial independence represent serious violations of Haiti’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and thus merit the IACHR’s active engagement to support the people of Haiti in their efforts to secure accountability for abuses and a judicial system that protects and advances justice. We hope that this hearing is one more step towards that goal.
This post will be updated after the hearing with links to the participants’ written submissions before the IACHR.
[Update 12/14/2020]:
You can watch the full recording of the hearing here.
BAI & IJDH Request for Thematic Hearing of September 23, 2020 (French version)
BAI & IJDH Written Submission of November 16, 2020 (French version); Attachment 1 (IJDH Human Rights Update of March-October 2020)
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
On November 18, the 217th anniversary of the Battle of Vertières where Haitians delivered a fatal blow to Napoleon’s troops during their struggle for independence, thousands took to the streets across the country to protest rising insecurity and government inaction. Anti-government actions took place in Cap-Haitien, Gonaïves, l’Estère, Saint-Marc, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince,Cayes, Jérémie, Mirebalais, and Jacmel among other locations, according to Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), a rights organization. “The problem of insecurity therefore affects the entire national territory,” FJKL noted. “The demands of the Haitian people against power are gaining ground.”
The national day of action came just days after president Jovenel Moise appointed a new chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH), Leon Charles. Most recently Haiti’s ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Charles previously served as police chief under the interim government that replaced Jean-Bertrand Aristide following his 2004 ouster.
With the president ruling by decree and consolidating power, Charles’ appointment has raised new concerns about human rights and political violence in Haiti. If last week’s protests provided an early test, the new chief appears to have failed.
The police response to the November 18 protests “demonstrated a blatant lack of professionalism,” FJKL wrote. Street demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas, and, in some cases, with live ammunition. On the Champ de Mars, a young man was shot in the head. Eight others were admitted to area hospitals with bullet wounds. Nearby, a police vehicle rammed into a group of individuals sending at least two to the hospital with serious injuries — one eventually died due to the injuries sustained.
Video of the police vehicle hitting the protestors has been widely shared on social media and sparked outrage from civil society and human right groups. Lyonel Trouillot, a prominent Haitian author, published an op-ed criticizing the authoritarian use of the National Police by successive governments. He also noted the lack of interest from civil society groups in the international community. “It is shameful that a national call is not sent to international civil societies in the face of such acts […] for them to hold their representatives who might want to lend their support to a murderous regime, accountable,” he wrote.
The result of the day was conclusive, according to FJKL, the rights organization. “The PNH no longer considers the right to demonstrate as a democratic right.” Rather, FJKL continued, the police have become politicized and “[do] not act as a professional body responsible for ensuring the exercise of democratic rights.”
FJKL called on Charles, the new police chief, to immediately conduct an investigation into who is responsible for the abuses and to hold those actors accountable. “What the Haitian people expect from the new Director General of the PNH is the mobilization of the police to fight against gangs, kidnappers, insecurity … The police should in no way interfere with the exercise of the democratic rights of the population. Its priority is to protect them.” Taking a differing approach, the following day Charles released a statement commending the professionalism of the police in their response to the day of protests.
In its most recent report on the human rights situation in Haiti, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) documented the alarmingly high level of insecurity that is particularly affecting poor neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince. Between March and August, there have been 701 reported killings and 161 kidnappings, according to the UN Secretary-General. The current government’s relative silence in the face of such abuses and its failure to address spiralling violence continues to spark outrage and lead to more public demonstrations. In turn, peaceful protestors have become targets of the oppressive and growingly aggressive nature of the Haitian National Police.
The rise in reported kidnapping and acts of violence is punctuated by an increase in police involvement; IJDH notes that ΅local human rights organizations investigating the rise in violence have documented the involvement of police officers and state officials in numerous attacks against marginalized communities and raised credible concerns that gang violence is being deployed as a tool of political repression.” It went on to state that threats to the judiciary system, corruption, and a lack of accountability also seem to be increasing.
Inheriting a fragmented National Police, Léon Charles will have to deal with “Fantom 509,” a group of police officers who have expressed dissatisfaction with their employers and have demanded better pay and working conditions. Yet they have also been known to cause panic in the country’s capital through at-times violent protests and destruction of government property.
“We’re in a situation where there are a lot of problems inside the police and in a context like this, it’s not easy for a director general of the police to give results,” Gédéon Jean, a lawyer with the Center for Human Rights Analysis told the Miami Herald. “If things do not change, it’s not Léon Charles who is going to come make a difference.”
Indeed, Charles has his own history as police chief to contend with as well. Working with UN troops after the 2004 coup, the Haitian police were involved in a widespread, iron-fisted, and politically-motivated crackdown in Haiti’s capital that left thousands dead. As police chief, Charles also oversaw the reincorporation of former members of the military into the force despite questions over human rights vetting. Further, a human rights report from the University of Miami found that Charles “routinely [gave] orders to stop political demonstrations, and the police [did not] hesitate to perform for him.”
As the Herald notes, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that foreign officials privately questioned Charles’ ability to adequately confront the insecurity at the time. “Charles was unwilling or unable to discipline or arrest officers that everybody knows are corrupt and colluding with the kidnappers,” one June 2005 cable noted. He was removed from his post one month later.
This time, Charles replaced Normil Rameau — widely seen as backed by the US and other donors, who continue to provide the local force with funding and training. Given that level of support, it is unlikely that Moise would have moved forward with Charles’ appointment without the support of the donor community, especially the US. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. This fall, the US reallocated an additional $8 million in assistance for fiscal year 2021, likely pushing the figure even higher.
On November 17, the State Department responded to a bicameral Congressional letter led by Representative Wilson (D-FL) and Senator Markey (D-MA) that expressed concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti. “Our Embassy continues to regularly raise concerns about insecurity and human rights abuses with the Haitian government,” State noted, while adding that continued financial assistance “supports the Haitian National Police’s efforts to maintain order, arrest perpetrators of human rights abuses… and strengthen accountability within the police force.”
On November 18, the 217th anniversary of the Battle of Vertières where Haitians delivered a fatal blow to Napoleon’s troops during their struggle for independence, thousands took to the streets across the country to protest rising insecurity and government inaction. Anti-government actions took place in Cap-Haitien, Gonaïves, l’Estère, Saint-Marc, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince,Cayes, Jérémie, Mirebalais, and Jacmel among other locations, according to Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), a rights organization. “The problem of insecurity therefore affects the entire national territory,” FJKL noted. “The demands of the Haitian people against power are gaining ground.”
The national day of action came just days after president Jovenel Moise appointed a new chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH), Leon Charles. Most recently Haiti’s ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Charles previously served as police chief under the interim government that replaced Jean-Bertrand Aristide following his 2004 ouster.
With the president ruling by decree and consolidating power, Charles’ appointment has raised new concerns about human rights and political violence in Haiti. If last week’s protests provided an early test, the new chief appears to have failed.
The police response to the November 18 protests “demonstrated a blatant lack of professionalism,” FJKL wrote. Street demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas, and, in some cases, with live ammunition. On the Champ de Mars, a young man was shot in the head. Eight others were admitted to area hospitals with bullet wounds. Nearby, a police vehicle rammed into a group of individuals sending at least two to the hospital with serious injuries — one eventually died due to the injuries sustained.
Video of the police vehicle hitting the protestors has been widely shared on social media and sparked outrage from civil society and human right groups. Lyonel Trouillot, a prominent Haitian author, published an op-ed criticizing the authoritarian use of the National Police by successive governments. He also noted the lack of interest from civil society groups in the international community. “It is shameful that a national call is not sent to international civil societies in the face of such acts […] for them to hold their representatives who might want to lend their support to a murderous regime, accountable,” he wrote.
The result of the day was conclusive, according to FJKL, the rights organization. “The PNH no longer considers the right to demonstrate as a democratic right.” Rather, FJKL continued, the police have become politicized and “[do] not act as a professional body responsible for ensuring the exercise of democratic rights.”
FJKL called on Charles, the new police chief, to immediately conduct an investigation into who is responsible for the abuses and to hold those actors accountable. “What the Haitian people expect from the new Director General of the PNH is the mobilization of the police to fight against gangs, kidnappers, insecurity … The police should in no way interfere with the exercise of the democratic rights of the population. Its priority is to protect them.” Taking a differing approach, the following day Charles released a statement commending the professionalism of the police in their response to the day of protests.
In its most recent report on the human rights situation in Haiti, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) documented the alarmingly high level of insecurity that is particularly affecting poor neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince. Between March and August, there have been 701 reported killings and 161 kidnappings, according to the UN Secretary-General. The current government’s relative silence in the face of such abuses and its failure to address spiralling violence continues to spark outrage and lead to more public demonstrations. In turn, peaceful protestors have become targets of the oppressive and growingly aggressive nature of the Haitian National Police.
The rise in reported kidnapping and acts of violence is punctuated by an increase in police involvement; IJDH notes that ΅local human rights organizations investigating the rise in violence have documented the involvement of police officers and state officials in numerous attacks against marginalized communities and raised credible concerns that gang violence is being deployed as a tool of political repression.” It went on to state that threats to the judiciary system, corruption, and a lack of accountability also seem to be increasing.
Inheriting a fragmented National Police, Léon Charles will have to deal with “Fantom 509,” a group of police officers who have expressed dissatisfaction with their employers and have demanded better pay and working conditions. Yet they have also been known to cause panic in the country’s capital through at-times violent protests and destruction of government property.
“We’re in a situation where there are a lot of problems inside the police and in a context like this, it’s not easy for a director general of the police to give results,” Gédéon Jean, a lawyer with the Center for Human Rights Analysis told the Miami Herald. “If things do not change, it’s not Léon Charles who is going to come make a difference.”
Indeed, Charles has his own history as police chief to contend with as well. Working with UN troops after the 2004 coup, the Haitian police were involved in a widespread, iron-fisted, and politically-motivated crackdown in Haiti’s capital that left thousands dead. As police chief, Charles also oversaw the reincorporation of former members of the military into the force despite questions over human rights vetting. Further, a human rights report from the University of Miami found that Charles “routinely [gave] orders to stop political demonstrations, and the police [did not] hesitate to perform for him.”
As the Herald notes, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that foreign officials privately questioned Charles’ ability to adequately confront the insecurity at the time. “Charles was unwilling or unable to discipline or arrest officers that everybody knows are corrupt and colluding with the kidnappers,” one June 2005 cable noted. He was removed from his post one month later.
This time, Charles replaced Normil Rameau — widely seen as backed by the US and other donors, who continue to provide the local force with funding and training. Given that level of support, it is unlikely that Moise would have moved forward with Charles’ appointment without the support of the donor community, especially the US. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. This fall, the US reallocated an additional $8 million in assistance for fiscal year 2021, likely pushing the figure even higher.
On November 17, the State Department responded to a bicameral Congressional letter led by Representative Wilson (D-FL) and Senator Markey (D-MA) that expressed concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti. “Our Embassy continues to regularly raise concerns about insecurity and human rights abuses with the Haitian government,” State noted, while adding that continued financial assistance “supports the Haitian National Police’s efforts to maintain order, arrest perpetrators of human rights abuses… and strengthen accountability within the police force.”
