Beat the Press

Beat the press por Dean Baker

Beat the Press is Dean Baker's commentary on economic reporting. He is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). To never miss a post, subscribe to a weekly email roundup of Beat the Press. Please also consider supporting the blog on Patreon.

It seems a strange concern, but I suppose it’s what we would expect from a political party that is determined to block every effort to contain the pandemic. According to a NYT article on opposition to President Biden’s plan to increase spending on various social program by $3.5 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) over the next decade:

“To critics, the legislation represents a fundamental upending of American-style governance and a shift toward social democracy. With it, they worry, would come European-style endemic unemployment and depressed economic dynamism.”

Many European social democracies have consistently had lower unemployment rates than the United States. According to the most recent data from the OECD, the unemployment rate in Denmark is now 4.3, in Germany 3.6 percent, and in the Netherlands 3.1 percent. It’s now clear what measure of “economic dynamism” these critics use, but using productivity growth, the measure most often used by economists, the dynamism of European economies is comparable to the U.S. economy.

It seems a strange concern, but I suppose it’s what we would expect from a political party that is determined to block every effort to contain the pandemic. According to a NYT article on opposition to President Biden’s plan to increase spending on various social program by $3.5 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) over the next decade:

“To critics, the legislation represents a fundamental upending of American-style governance and a shift toward social democracy. With it, they worry, would come European-style endemic unemployment and depressed economic dynamism.”

Many European social democracies have consistently had lower unemployment rates than the United States. According to the most recent data from the OECD, the unemployment rate in Denmark is now 4.3, in Germany 3.6 percent, and in the Netherlands 3.1 percent. It’s now clear what measure of “economic dynamism” these critics use, but using productivity growth, the measure most often used by economists, the dynamism of European economies is comparable to the U.S. economy.

Last week’s jobs report filled news accounts with stories of gloom and doom. The 235,000 new jobs created in August was well below most projections. The theme was that something had gone seriously wrong with the economy and we should be very worried about the prospects for the labor market and the economy through the rest of this year into next.

While the jobs number was weaker than expected (my number had been 500,000), much of the pessimism in the reporting was a bit over the top. First, we know there is always some random movement in the monthly numbers. This is partly because of the errors in the survey and partly because of erratic patterns in employment. If a company hires a large number of workers in July, it will probably not turn around and hire a large number again in August.

It is likely that we were seeing this story to some extent with the August jobs report. We saw an extraordinarily rapid rate of job growth in June and July, with the economy reportedly adding 2,015,000 jobs, a number that was revised up by 135,000 with the August report. This translates into monthly job growth of 1,008,000 jobs.

It’s hard to know exactly how fast we should expect the economy to be creating jobs at this point, but let’s say 750,000 a month. That would translate into an annual rate of 9 million a year. That would get back the jobs lost in the pandemic in less than 8 months. It’s hard to argue that we should expect growth too much more rapid than this.

If we use 750,000 as a trend, then we were 515,000 above trend for the last two months. That means to stay on trend for the three-month period, we needed 235,000 jobs in August, exactly what we saw.

There clearly were surprises in this report. State and local governments lost 11,000 jobs in August after adding 246,000 in July. This left them down 815,000 jobs from the pre-pandemic level. This is most likely a matter of timing. Most of the decline in employment is due to fewer jobs in education. With nearly all schools returning to in-class instruction, presumably they will need roughly the same number of teachers and support staff as they had prior to the pandemic.

The restaurant sector was the other big surprise, shedding 41,500 jobs in August after adding 290,000 in July. Many commentators were quick to attribute this drop to the Delta Variant, with the idea that the fear of Covid kept people away from restaurants. This is far from clear. The Open Table data on reservations shows no clear trend, and its figure for the Sunday before Labor Day was 30.0 percent above the level from two years ago. There was also a gain of 35,500 jobs in the category of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation. It is a bit hard to believe that people are comfortable going to concerts and seeing movies, but not eating at restaurants.

Clearly Covid had some effect, but it is at least as plausible that weak employment growth in restaurants is a supply-side story. The argument would be that many of the people who had formerly worked in restaurants are no longer willing to do so, or at least not at the same wages and working conditions. This would mean that these workers had the resources to be more selective on where they choose to work. This could be the case if they were able to save some of the $3,400 in pandemic checks that were paid out to single adults over the course of 2020 and 2021.

Remember, the average weekly earnings for production and non-supervisory workers in restaurants in 2019 was less than $340, so these pandemic payments were equal to ten weeks of normal pay. Also, with the $300 weekly supplements, unemployed restaurant workers likely had been getting more money than when they had been working. So, it shouldn’t seem far-fetched that many of these workers have more of a financial cushion now than they did before the pandemic.[1]

Consistent with this being more a supply-side story than a demand-side story is the fact that we are still seeing very rapid wage growth in the leisure and hospitality sector, which is overwhelmingly restaurant workers. The average hourly wage for production and non-supervisory employers rose at an annual rate of 23.7 percent in the last three months (June, July, August) compared with the prior three months (March, April, May). Over the last year, the hourly wage is up 12.8 percent.

Another item that fits this supply-side story is the fact that both the home health care sector and nursing homes lost jobs in August, 11,600 and 7,100 jobs, respectively. Both these sectors generally have low pay and poor working conditions, making them undesirable jobs.

In the same vein, the number of unincorporated self-employed is running more than 700,000 (7.1 percent) above the average for 2019. This suggests that many workers are considering alternatives to the types of jobs they held before the pandemic.

The Unemployment-Employment Picture

While the weaker than expected jobs numbers got most of the attention on Friday, the unemployment rate did fall another 0.2 percentage points to 5.2 percent. While no one should be satisfied with a 5.2 percent unemployment rate, it is important to recognize that, until recently, most economists would have viewed this as a very low unemployment rate. The unemployment rate did not fall to 5.2 percent following the Great Recession until July of 2015, at which point the Fed was preparing to raise interest rates to slow the economy, so that unemployment would not fall much further.

Last summer, before the passage of the American Recovery Act, the Congressional Budget Office projected that the unemployment rate would still be 8.0 percent in the third quarter of 2021, so we are doing considerably better than expected.

If we look at the employment side, as shown above, the prime age (ages 25 to 54) employment to population ratio (EPOP) rose 0.2 percentage points to 78.0 percent. This is a level not seen following the Great Recession until July of 2016, although 2.5 percentage points below the peak hit in January 2020, just before the pandemic.

By more narrow age groups, the largest falloff is among the 25 to 34 age group, with a decline in EPOP of 2.8 pp. The drop is slightly more for women than for men, 3.0 pp compared to 2.9 pp.  For the 35 to 44 age group, the decline in EPOP was 2.7 pp. The falloff for men and women was almost identical, 2.7 pp and 2.6 pp. The drop in EPOPs for the 45 to 54 group was noticeably smaller at 1.9 pp. The decline for men in this age group was 1.8 pp compared with 1.9 pp for women.

 

The Economy Going Forward: Increased Worker Flexibility, Especially if the Biden Bill Passes

We still need to see more demand in the economy to create more jobs. It’s great if more workers have the bargaining power so that they can demand good jobs, and not be forced to accept work that offers low pay and bad conditions. If we continue to see the unemployment rate fall, then they may have the bargaining power to secure better pay and conditions, especially at the bottom.

Workers’ prospects will be further enhanced if Biden’s bill passes since it will hugely increase the amount of security they have.  Workers will be able to count on support for child care and pre-K for their young children. They will also get subsidies that will ensure them affordable insurance through the exchanges created by Obamacare. And, they can count on a more generous Medicare program so that they will need less money to pay for their health care in retirement.

This will not be sufficient to reverse forty years of upward redistribution, but it’s a good start.

[1] There may have been a modest disincentive effect associated with the $300 weekly supplements, but most research indicated that this was relatively small. The effect of the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, which made payments to people who would not qualify for traditional unemployment, may have been somewhat larger, however almost half the states have already eliminated these special pandemic benefits, and the federal program ends this month, so any disincentive effect will be dwindling rapidly.

Last week’s jobs report filled news accounts with stories of gloom and doom. The 235,000 new jobs created in August was well below most projections. The theme was that something had gone seriously wrong with the economy and we should be very worried about the prospects for the labor market and the economy through the rest of this year into next.

While the jobs number was weaker than expected (my number had been 500,000), much of the pessimism in the reporting was a bit over the top. First, we know there is always some random movement in the monthly numbers. This is partly because of the errors in the survey and partly because of erratic patterns in employment. If a company hires a large number of workers in July, it will probably not turn around and hire a large number again in August.

It is likely that we were seeing this story to some extent with the August jobs report. We saw an extraordinarily rapid rate of job growth in June and July, with the economy reportedly adding 2,015,000 jobs, a number that was revised up by 135,000 with the August report. This translates into monthly job growth of 1,008,000 jobs.

It’s hard to know exactly how fast we should expect the economy to be creating jobs at this point, but let’s say 750,000 a month. That would translate into an annual rate of 9 million a year. That would get back the jobs lost in the pandemic in less than 8 months. It’s hard to argue that we should expect growth too much more rapid than this.

If we use 750,000 as a trend, then we were 515,000 above trend for the last two months. That means to stay on trend for the three-month period, we needed 235,000 jobs in August, exactly what we saw.

There clearly were surprises in this report. State and local governments lost 11,000 jobs in August after adding 246,000 in July. This left them down 815,000 jobs from the pre-pandemic level. This is most likely a matter of timing. Most of the decline in employment is due to fewer jobs in education. With nearly all schools returning to in-class instruction, presumably they will need roughly the same number of teachers and support staff as they had prior to the pandemic.

The restaurant sector was the other big surprise, shedding 41,500 jobs in August after adding 290,000 in July. Many commentators were quick to attribute this drop to the Delta Variant, with the idea that the fear of Covid kept people away from restaurants. This is far from clear. The Open Table data on reservations shows no clear trend, and its figure for the Sunday before Labor Day was 30.0 percent above the level from two years ago. There was also a gain of 35,500 jobs in the category of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation. It is a bit hard to believe that people are comfortable going to concerts and seeing movies, but not eating at restaurants.

Clearly Covid had some effect, but it is at least as plausible that weak employment growth in restaurants is a supply-side story. The argument would be that many of the people who had formerly worked in restaurants are no longer willing to do so, or at least not at the same wages and working conditions. This would mean that these workers had the resources to be more selective on where they choose to work. This could be the case if they were able to save some of the $3,400 in pandemic checks that were paid out to single adults over the course of 2020 and 2021.

Remember, the average weekly earnings for production and non-supervisory workers in restaurants in 2019 was less than $340, so these pandemic payments were equal to ten weeks of normal pay. Also, with the $300 weekly supplements, unemployed restaurant workers likely had been getting more money than when they had been working. So, it shouldn’t seem far-fetched that many of these workers have more of a financial cushion now than they did before the pandemic.[1]

Consistent with this being more a supply-side story than a demand-side story is the fact that we are still seeing very rapid wage growth in the leisure and hospitality sector, which is overwhelmingly restaurant workers. The average hourly wage for production and non-supervisory employers rose at an annual rate of 23.7 percent in the last three months (June, July, August) compared with the prior three months (March, April, May). Over the last year, the hourly wage is up 12.8 percent.

Another item that fits this supply-side story is the fact that both the home health care sector and nursing homes lost jobs in August, 11,600 and 7,100 jobs, respectively. Both these sectors generally have low pay and poor working conditions, making them undesirable jobs.

In the same vein, the number of unincorporated self-employed is running more than 700,000 (7.1 percent) above the average for 2019. This suggests that many workers are considering alternatives to the types of jobs they held before the pandemic.

The Unemployment-Employment Picture

While the weaker than expected jobs numbers got most of the attention on Friday, the unemployment rate did fall another 0.2 percentage points to 5.2 percent. While no one should be satisfied with a 5.2 percent unemployment rate, it is important to recognize that, until recently, most economists would have viewed this as a very low unemployment rate. The unemployment rate did not fall to 5.2 percent following the Great Recession until July of 2015, at which point the Fed was preparing to raise interest rates to slow the economy, so that unemployment would not fall much further.

Last summer, before the passage of the American Recovery Act, the Congressional Budget Office projected that the unemployment rate would still be 8.0 percent in the third quarter of 2021, so we are doing considerably better than expected.

If we look at the employment side, as shown above, the prime age (ages 25 to 54) employment to population ratio (EPOP) rose 0.2 percentage points to 78.0 percent. This is a level not seen following the Great Recession until July of 2016, although 2.5 percentage points below the peak hit in January 2020, just before the pandemic.

By more narrow age groups, the largest falloff is among the 25 to 34 age group, with a decline in EPOP of 2.8 pp. The drop is slightly more for women than for men, 3.0 pp compared to 2.9 pp.  For the 35 to 44 age group, the decline in EPOP was 2.7 pp. The falloff for men and women was almost identical, 2.7 pp and 2.6 pp. The drop in EPOPs for the 45 to 54 group was noticeably smaller at 1.9 pp. The decline for men in this age group was 1.8 pp compared with 1.9 pp for women.

 

The Economy Going Forward: Increased Worker Flexibility, Especially if the Biden Bill Passes

We still need to see more demand in the economy to create more jobs. It’s great if more workers have the bargaining power so that they can demand good jobs, and not be forced to accept work that offers low pay and bad conditions. If we continue to see the unemployment rate fall, then they may have the bargaining power to secure better pay and conditions, especially at the bottom.

Workers’ prospects will be further enhanced if Biden’s bill passes since it will hugely increase the amount of security they have.  Workers will be able to count on support for child care and pre-K for their young children. They will also get subsidies that will ensure them affordable insurance through the exchanges created by Obamacare. And, they can count on a more generous Medicare program so that they will need less money to pay for their health care in retirement.

This will not be sufficient to reverse forty years of upward redistribution, but it’s a good start.

[1] There may have been a modest disincentive effect associated with the $300 weekly supplements, but most research indicated that this was relatively small. The effect of the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, which made payments to people who would not qualify for traditional unemployment, may have been somewhat larger, however almost half the states have already eliminated these special pandemic benefits, and the federal program ends this month, so any disincentive effect will be dwindling rapidly.

The August jobs report was somewhat disappointing. The economy added only 235,000 jobs for the month, just 48,000 more than the 187,000 pre-pandemic monthly average under Trump. Seriously, most of us did expect more jobs (my number had been 500,000), but after two months where job growth averaged more than 1 million, some falloff should have been expected, even without the impact of the Delta variant.

Anyhow, it’s time to see how the economy’s job performance under Biden stacks up against its performance under Trump. As I always say, this is silly since there are so many things that are beyond the president’s control, so the comparison really is not telling us much. But, you know if the situation were reversed, Donald Trump would be touting this graph to the sky. He probably would even have a huge neon version on top of Trump Tower.

So, here’s where we stand now. Including the August number, and the 135,000 upward revision to growth for the prior two months, Biden has now created 4.5 million jobs in the first seven months of his presidency.  Trump lost 2.9 million jobs over his four years in office.

 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Author’s calculations.

The August jobs report was somewhat disappointing. The economy added only 235,000 jobs for the month, just 48,000 more than the 187,000 pre-pandemic monthly average under Trump. Seriously, most of us did expect more jobs (my number had been 500,000), but after two months where job growth averaged more than 1 million, some falloff should have been expected, even without the impact of the Delta variant.

Anyhow, it’s time to see how the economy’s job performance under Biden stacks up against its performance under Trump. As I always say, this is silly since there are so many things that are beyond the president’s control, so the comparison really is not telling us much. But, you know if the situation were reversed, Donald Trump would be touting this graph to the sky. He probably would even have a huge neon version on top of Trump Tower.

So, here’s where we stand now. Including the August number, and the 135,000 upward revision to growth for the prior two months, Biden has now created 4.5 million jobs in the first seven months of his presidency.  Trump lost 2.9 million jobs over his four years in office.

 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Author’s calculations.

Politicians in Washington tend to be a pretty arrogant group. They think they can just define their own terms and expect everyone else just to accept these terms at face value.

Senator Manchin gives us a great example of this pattern in his Wall Street Journal column complaining about President Biden’s plan for a $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill, which would increase federal spending by an amount equal to roughly to 1.3 percent of GDP over the next decade. Manchin complained that he was worried that this spending would add too much to the debt and could spur higher inflation.

While the proposal would address many issues, such as extending Medicare to include dental and hearing coverage, to expanded support for child care, most of the items in the bill fit clearly under the definition of investment. Much of the spending goes to combat global warming, either by promoting electric cars, conservation, and clean energy or increasing the resiliency of our infrastructure to deal with extreme weather events, like Hurricane Ida.

As a practical matter, spewing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, without regard for its impact on the climate, is creating a type of debt. In future years, we will have more forest fires, droughts, and hurricanes due to a hotter planet. This will impose enormous costs as governments at all levels have to evacuate people, care for the injured, and constantly repair and replace damaged homes, businesses, and infrastructure.

Senator Manchin wants to pretend that this climate debt does not exist. He only wants to look at the debt that comes from the government directly borrowing money. He wants to ignore that the costs that we are imposing on future generations by not taking steps to counter global warming now. That may somehow work for his conscience, but it is absurd in the real world.

Also, if he is concerned about inflation, he may want to ask what happens to the price of beef when much of the land in the West where cattle now graze becomes too dry to support the herd. Or, to take the case of agriculture more generally, large parts of California, that now provide the bulk of our fruit and vegetable production, may no longer be suited for agriculture if they can’t get water due to persistent droughts. And, we will see more housing shortages and higher house prices, if rising temperatures and sea levels make much of our current housing stock inhabitable.

Inflation can come from too much demand, although that hardly seems the problem today. It can also come from reduced supply, which will be a problem if we insist on not taking global warming seriously.

I will also just briefly make the obvious  point that the government creates debt not only through its direct spending, but also by granting patent and copyright monopolies to things like coronavirus vaccines. Again, choosing to ignore this form of debt (which is enormous) doesn’t make it go away.

Politicians in Washington tend to be a pretty arrogant group. They think they can just define their own terms and expect everyone else just to accept these terms at face value.

Senator Manchin gives us a great example of this pattern in his Wall Street Journal column complaining about President Biden’s plan for a $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill, which would increase federal spending by an amount equal to roughly to 1.3 percent of GDP over the next decade. Manchin complained that he was worried that this spending would add too much to the debt and could spur higher inflation.

While the proposal would address many issues, such as extending Medicare to include dental and hearing coverage, to expanded support for child care, most of the items in the bill fit clearly under the definition of investment. Much of the spending goes to combat global warming, either by promoting electric cars, conservation, and clean energy or increasing the resiliency of our infrastructure to deal with extreme weather events, like Hurricane Ida.

As a practical matter, spewing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, without regard for its impact on the climate, is creating a type of debt. In future years, we will have more forest fires, droughts, and hurricanes due to a hotter planet. This will impose enormous costs as governments at all levels have to evacuate people, care for the injured, and constantly repair and replace damaged homes, businesses, and infrastructure.

Senator Manchin wants to pretend that this climate debt does not exist. He only wants to look at the debt that comes from the government directly borrowing money. He wants to ignore that the costs that we are imposing on future generations by not taking steps to counter global warming now. That may somehow work for his conscience, but it is absurd in the real world.

Also, if he is concerned about inflation, he may want to ask what happens to the price of beef when much of the land in the West where cattle now graze becomes too dry to support the herd. Or, to take the case of agriculture more generally, large parts of California, that now provide the bulk of our fruit and vegetable production, may no longer be suited for agriculture if they can’t get water due to persistent droughts. And, we will see more housing shortages and higher house prices, if rising temperatures and sea levels make much of our current housing stock inhabitable.

Inflation can come from too much demand, although that hardly seems the problem today. It can also come from reduced supply, which will be a problem if we insist on not taking global warming seriously.

I will also just briefly make the obvious  point that the government creates debt not only through its direct spending, but also by granting patent and copyright monopolies to things like coronavirus vaccines. Again, choosing to ignore this form of debt (which is enormous) doesn’t make it go away.

The release of the new Social Security Trustees Report, coupled with a New York Times article on what strikes me as a rather silly debate on inequality, led me to think again about the lack of self-reflection in economics. We have seen a 180 degree turn in the understanding of one of the most basic economic problems, yet there is almost no one anywhere saying something to the effect of “yeah, we got that wrong, and here’s why.”

I’ll get to the contradiction in a moment, but first I want to explain why I think the debate which was the focus of the Times article is rather silly. The essence of the debate in the Neil Irwin piece (the Times reporter who wrote the article) is over whether inequality is leading to lower interest rates, which generates greater wealth inequality, or whether the big problem is the low interest rates themselves causing wealth inequality.

To my mind, this is a silly debate, starting with the idea that we should be concerned about inequalities in wealth resulting from low interest rates. That one is a bit hard for me to see.

Just to be clear, there is no doubt about the relationship between interest rates and wealth, as traditionally defined. Low interest rates increase the value of assets like houses, stocks, and bonds. In the last case, the relationship is literally definitional. If a very long-term bond pays a $10 a year coupon, it will be worth roughly $250 when the long-term interest rate is 4.0 percent, but $500 when the rate is 2.0 percent. The question is whether we should be bothered when all the rich people see their stocks, bonds, and to a lesser extent homes, double in price when interest rates plunge.

I know this provides a lot of grist for academic papers, and for foundations who are ostensibly concerned about inequality, but I just have a hard time seeing the problem here. Part of the story is that I sort of doubt that any of these people will be celebrating the reduction in inequality if things went the other way – we saw a sudden surge in interest rates and the stock market fell 50 percent (the celebrants weren’t very visible in the 2008-09 crash).

But the bigger problem is that I just see their accounting as giving a very incomplete picture of wealth. For the vast majority of middle-income people, wealth reflects the ability to meet needs they face in their lifetime. They accumulate wealth in order to cover the cost of their retirement, their health care expenses, especially in old age, and their kids’ education. Middle class people rarely accumulate any substantial sums beyond these needs.

If it’s not already evident, these needs are also often met by government-provided social insurance, like Social Security, Medicare, and, in countries other than the United States, publicly supported colleges and universities. In effect, for middle class people, social insurance provides a direct substitute for wealth.

In many cases, this substitution is quite explicit. In a country with a high wage replacement rate for its Social Security program, workers don’t need to accumulate large amounts of wealth in 401(k)s to support themselves in retirement.  The same is true if public health care programs can be counted on to pay their health care expenses. And, they don’t need to save for their kids’ college if it’s free or cheap.

We could of course count these benefits as “wealth,” but then the story of low interest rates causing inequality would largely disappear. Middle class workers would see the value of their Social Security and retirement health benefits soar when interest rates plummet, in the same way that bond prices soar. The whole problem of interest rates causing inequality then disappears.

Okay, but I don’t really want to destroy the basis for a major academic debate, just noting why I don’t see the problem. (I also have a hard time seeing it as an inequality problem when tens of millions of middle-income homeowners are able to save thousands of dollars a year on their mortgage, car, and credit card payments. But, that’s just me.) Anyhow, let’s get on to the bigger question.

 

Do We Save Too Much or Too Little?

This really should be a joke, but it is now a central question in economics. The reason why this should be a joke is that the answers give images about the economy that are 180 degrees at odds with each other.

The saving too much story is that we don’t have enough demand in the economy. If our main economic problem is that we save too much, then we help the economy, meaning we will have more growth and employment, if we spend more money. If we are in this world, we should worry that budget deficits are too small, not too large. We should be very happy to give low and moderate-income families additional money to support their kids and to ensure they have a decent living standard. (We should be happy in any case, but if our problem is that we save too much, then this money doesn’t have to be a trade off against other spending. We aren’t up against any constraint, so there is no reason not to make these payments.)

President Biden’s investment proposal looks especially good in the saving too much story. If the problem is that we don’t have enough spending in the economy, why wouldn’t we make whatever expenditures are necessary to quickly create the infrastructure for a green economy, as well as providing workers and businesses with subsidies to encourage them to quickly shift to electric cars and trucks, and clean energy sources for their homes and businesses.

And of course, we should want to improve the skills of the workforce by supporting free community college for the short-term and pre-K and child care for the longer term. And, we also should shore up our care-giving economy, with increased support for home health care and other forms of care for seniors and the disabled as well as improving the pay and working conditions for those employed in the sector.

If our economy’s main problem is that we are saving too much, we essentially have a green light to address all sorts of problems that have lingered for decades. The saving too little story is the complete opposite. If this picture is accurate, then we are pushing up against the economy’s limits to produce goods and services. The only way we would be able to spend any substantial sum on the agenda laid out by President Biden is by sharply curtailing spending in other areas of the economy. This typically means raising taxes to reduce the money households or corporations have, and therefore force them to cut back their spending.

While it’s a bit hard to tell the saving too little story today, with the interest rate on long-term bonds hovering near 1.3 percent, it really has been central to economics for many decades. This was the whole rationale for cutting the deficit and balancing budgets in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and the last decade. The idea was that our budget deficits were pulling resources away from other sectors of the economy that could better use them than the government.

And, the lack of savings story went far beyond just budget deficits. It was also the motivation for all the supply-side tax cuts, starting with Carter cutting the capital gains tax in 1978, Reagan’s huge tax cuts in the 1980s, George W. Bush’s tax cuts in 2001, and Trump’s tax cut in 2017. All of these tax cuts disproportionately gave more money to the wealthy with the argument that a large share of the cut would then be saved, which would free up resources for investment.

Conservatives also took their savings obsession in the other direction. Martin Feldstein, spent his career trying to show that Social Security reduced private savings. The argument was that typical workers saved less during their working years due to Social Security, which meant that there was less investment than would otherwise be the case, and therefore we were all poorer. His answer was to cut benefits, or better yet, privatize a large chunk of the program.

But, if we were saving too much, then increasing saving with tax cuts (they don’t seem to have had that effect) or cutting Social Security or other benefits, would be taking us in the completely wrong direction. It would mean further reducing demand and employment, and likely also reducing investment, which tends to follow the growth in demand.

We could of course have been saving constrained in prior decades, but not in recent years. This gets to the debate covered by Irwin. One side argued that we have too much savings now because we redistributed income upward, and rich people spend a smaller share of their income.

The other side sees the issue as primarily demographic. We, and other wealthy countries, now have older populations, and older people save a larger share of their income than younger people. In that view, we have a scary road ahead as our population ages further, and even many developing countries, most notably China, are seeing a rapid growth in the share of retirees in their population. So apparently, we are doomed to have too much savings for the indefinite future.

Will Large Numbers of Retirees Break the Bank or Leave the Stores Empty?

This is the point in the story where I have to pause for a little ridicule. The whole deficit debate of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s was framed in the context of the looming retirement of the baby boomers. The story as told by Very Serious People, like Peter Peterson and the many organizations he funded, was that the economy would be overwhelmed in meeting the demands of retired baby boomers, at the same time it was providing for needs of its working population and their children.

And, this was not just the perspective of a fringe group. This concern with providing for the needs of retired baby boomers was very much at the center of national politics and the economics profession. This was the whole logic behind Bill Clinton’s balanced budgets and his plan to pay off the debt, touted by leading economists such as Larry Summers. It was also the concern that ostensibly motivated the drive to balance the budget under President Obama and his search for a “Grand Bargain.” And, it was worldwide, as we can see from the World Bank’s volume Averting the Old Age Crisis.

Given this history, we should have a lot of Very Serious People walking around with very serious egg on their face. The view, now widely accepted, that having an older population doesn’t mean too much demand, but rather too little, means that the concerns that had dominated politics here and elsewhere for decades were completely unfounded.

There was no reason to cut back spending on child care, education, clean energy, and thousands of other items in the last two decades with the idea that we somehow would need a larger capital stock to cover the cost of baby boomers retirement. (Okay, that never made much sense in any case.) The Very Serious People not only got the magnitude of the problem created by an aging population wrong, they got the direction wrong.

Policy types can again be thankful that policy work is not like cleaning toilets or washing dishes, where you can get fired for doing bad work. In fact, for the most part getting the story completely wrong will not even be held against you on your career path.  

 

The release of the new Social Security Trustees Report, coupled with a New York Times article on what strikes me as a rather silly debate on inequality, led me to think again about the lack of self-reflection in economics. We have seen a 180 degree turn in the understanding of one of the most basic economic problems, yet there is almost no one anywhere saying something to the effect of “yeah, we got that wrong, and here’s why.”

I’ll get to the contradiction in a moment, but first I want to explain why I think the debate which was the focus of the Times article is rather silly. The essence of the debate in the Neil Irwin piece (the Times reporter who wrote the article) is over whether inequality is leading to lower interest rates, which generates greater wealth inequality, or whether the big problem is the low interest rates themselves causing wealth inequality.

To my mind, this is a silly debate, starting with the idea that we should be concerned about inequalities in wealth resulting from low interest rates. That one is a bit hard for me to see.

Just to be clear, there is no doubt about the relationship between interest rates and wealth, as traditionally defined. Low interest rates increase the value of assets like houses, stocks, and bonds. In the last case, the relationship is literally definitional. If a very long-term bond pays a $10 a year coupon, it will be worth roughly $250 when the long-term interest rate is 4.0 percent, but $500 when the rate is 2.0 percent. The question is whether we should be bothered when all the rich people see their stocks, bonds, and to a lesser extent homes, double in price when interest rates plunge.

I know this provides a lot of grist for academic papers, and for foundations who are ostensibly concerned about inequality, but I just have a hard time seeing the problem here. Part of the story is that I sort of doubt that any of these people will be celebrating the reduction in inequality if things went the other way – we saw a sudden surge in interest rates and the stock market fell 50 percent (the celebrants weren’t very visible in the 2008-09 crash).

But the bigger problem is that I just see their accounting as giving a very incomplete picture of wealth. For the vast majority of middle-income people, wealth reflects the ability to meet needs they face in their lifetime. They accumulate wealth in order to cover the cost of their retirement, their health care expenses, especially in old age, and their kids’ education. Middle class people rarely accumulate any substantial sums beyond these needs.

If it’s not already evident, these needs are also often met by government-provided social insurance, like Social Security, Medicare, and, in countries other than the United States, publicly supported colleges and universities. In effect, for middle class people, social insurance provides a direct substitute for wealth.

In many cases, this substitution is quite explicit. In a country with a high wage replacement rate for its Social Security program, workers don’t need to accumulate large amounts of wealth in 401(k)s to support themselves in retirement.  The same is true if public health care programs can be counted on to pay their health care expenses. And, they don’t need to save for their kids’ college if it’s free or cheap.

We could of course count these benefits as “wealth,” but then the story of low interest rates causing inequality would largely disappear. Middle class workers would see the value of their Social Security and retirement health benefits soar when interest rates plummet, in the same way that bond prices soar. The whole problem of interest rates causing inequality then disappears.

Okay, but I don’t really want to destroy the basis for a major academic debate, just noting why I don’t see the problem. (I also have a hard time seeing it as an inequality problem when tens of millions of middle-income homeowners are able to save thousands of dollars a year on their mortgage, car, and credit card payments. But, that’s just me.) Anyhow, let’s get on to the bigger question.

 

Do We Save Too Much or Too Little?

This really should be a joke, but it is now a central question in economics. The reason why this should be a joke is that the answers give images about the economy that are 180 degrees at odds with each other.

The saving too much story is that we don’t have enough demand in the economy. If our main economic problem is that we save too much, then we help the economy, meaning we will have more growth and employment, if we spend more money. If we are in this world, we should worry that budget deficits are too small, not too large. We should be very happy to give low and moderate-income families additional money to support their kids and to ensure they have a decent living standard. (We should be happy in any case, but if our problem is that we save too much, then this money doesn’t have to be a trade off against other spending. We aren’t up against any constraint, so there is no reason not to make these payments.)

President Biden’s investment proposal looks especially good in the saving too much story. If the problem is that we don’t have enough spending in the economy, why wouldn’t we make whatever expenditures are necessary to quickly create the infrastructure for a green economy, as well as providing workers and businesses with subsidies to encourage them to quickly shift to electric cars and trucks, and clean energy sources for their homes and businesses.

And of course, we should want to improve the skills of the workforce by supporting free community college for the short-term and pre-K and child care for the longer term. And, we also should shore up our care-giving economy, with increased support for home health care and other forms of care for seniors and the disabled as well as improving the pay and working conditions for those employed in the sector.

If our economy’s main problem is that we are saving too much, we essentially have a green light to address all sorts of problems that have lingered for decades. The saving too little story is the complete opposite. If this picture is accurate, then we are pushing up against the economy’s limits to produce goods and services. The only way we would be able to spend any substantial sum on the agenda laid out by President Biden is by sharply curtailing spending in other areas of the economy. This typically means raising taxes to reduce the money households or corporations have, and therefore force them to cut back their spending.

While it’s a bit hard to tell the saving too little story today, with the interest rate on long-term bonds hovering near 1.3 percent, it really has been central to economics for many decades. This was the whole rationale for cutting the deficit and balancing budgets in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and the last decade. The idea was that our budget deficits were pulling resources away from other sectors of the economy that could better use them than the government.

And, the lack of savings story went far beyond just budget deficits. It was also the motivation for all the supply-side tax cuts, starting with Carter cutting the capital gains tax in 1978, Reagan’s huge tax cuts in the 1980s, George W. Bush’s tax cuts in 2001, and Trump’s tax cut in 2017. All of these tax cuts disproportionately gave more money to the wealthy with the argument that a large share of the cut would then be saved, which would free up resources for investment.

Conservatives also took their savings obsession in the other direction. Martin Feldstein, spent his career trying to show that Social Security reduced private savings. The argument was that typical workers saved less during their working years due to Social Security, which meant that there was less investment than would otherwise be the case, and therefore we were all poorer. His answer was to cut benefits, or better yet, privatize a large chunk of the program.

But, if we were saving too much, then increasing saving with tax cuts (they don’t seem to have had that effect) or cutting Social Security or other benefits, would be taking us in the completely wrong direction. It would mean further reducing demand and employment, and likely also reducing investment, which tends to follow the growth in demand.

We could of course have been saving constrained in prior decades, but not in recent years. This gets to the debate covered by Irwin. One side argued that we have too much savings now because we redistributed income upward, and rich people spend a smaller share of their income.

The other side sees the issue as primarily demographic. We, and other wealthy countries, now have older populations, and older people save a larger share of their income than younger people. In that view, we have a scary road ahead as our population ages further, and even many developing countries, most notably China, are seeing a rapid growth in the share of retirees in their population. So apparently, we are doomed to have too much savings for the indefinite future.

Will Large Numbers of Retirees Break the Bank or Leave the Stores Empty?

This is the point in the story where I have to pause for a little ridicule. The whole deficit debate of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s was framed in the context of the looming retirement of the baby boomers. The story as told by Very Serious People, like Peter Peterson and the many organizations he funded, was that the economy would be overwhelmed in meeting the demands of retired baby boomers, at the same time it was providing for needs of its working population and their children.

And, this was not just the perspective of a fringe group. This concern with providing for the needs of retired baby boomers was very much at the center of national politics and the economics profession. This was the whole logic behind Bill Clinton’s balanced budgets and his plan to pay off the debt, touted by leading economists such as Larry Summers. It was also the concern that ostensibly motivated the drive to balance the budget under President Obama and his search for a “Grand Bargain.” And, it was worldwide, as we can see from the World Bank’s volume Averting the Old Age Crisis.

Given this history, we should have a lot of Very Serious People walking around with very serious egg on their face. The view, now widely accepted, that having an older population doesn’t mean too much demand, but rather too little, means that the concerns that had dominated politics here and elsewhere for decades were completely unfounded.

There was no reason to cut back spending on child care, education, clean energy, and thousands of other items in the last two decades with the idea that we somehow would need a larger capital stock to cover the cost of baby boomers retirement. (Okay, that never made much sense in any case.) The Very Serious People not only got the magnitude of the problem created by an aging population wrong, they got the direction wrong.

Policy types can again be thankful that policy work is not like cleaning toilets or washing dishes, where you can get fired for doing bad work. In fact, for the most part getting the story completely wrong will not even be held against you on your career path.  

 

That seems to be the case. This article on the $3.5 trillion budget outline didn’t mention once that the spending would be over ten years. (Hey, ten years, one year, what difference does it make?) This spending comes to a bit more than 1.2 percent of projected GDP over this period. For another comparison, we are projected to spend $8.6 trillion on the military over this period.

That seems to be the case. This article on the $3.5 trillion budget outline didn’t mention once that the spending would be over ten years. (Hey, ten years, one year, what difference does it make?) This spending comes to a bit more than 1.2 percent of projected GDP over this period. For another comparison, we are projected to spend $8.6 trillion on the military over this period.

Most progressives who have been pressuring the Fed to be more supportive of full employment, and less concerned about inflation, would be very happy to see Powell reappointed as Fed chair. He has led the Fed in a complete reversal of its priorities. He shifted it away from its obsession with inflation, which often meant raising rates and throwing people out of work, even when there was no clear evidence of accelerating. Instead, he wants the Fed to target full employment and only raise rates once we see the sort of unemployment rates we had before the pandemic.

This is hugely important, not only because it can mean that millions of additional workers get jobs, but also because high unemployment has been a major factor contributing to inequality over the last four decades. When the unemployment rate rises, it is disproportionately the most disadvantaged workers who lose their jobs. This means Blacks and Hispanics, workers without a high school degree, disabled workers, and workers with a criminal record.

Not only does a rise in the unemployment rate prevent these workers from getting jobs, it also puts downward pressure on the pay of workers at the bottom of the wage ladder. When we have sustained periods of low unemployment, such as the late 1990s and the four years before the pandemic, workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution were able to secure pay increases that outpaced inflation, and those at the tenth percentile saw the largest gains.

For these reasons, progressive economists who have been pushing the Fed to pay more attention to full employment have been very happy with Powell’s reversal of past Fed policy. However, some progressives have objected to Powell because he has supported the weakening of the regulations that were put in place by the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill.

Powell’s record on regulation is bad, and this is a problem. However, the Fed’s policy on regulation can likely be shifted by appointing new members who are committed to a stronger regulatory framework. The rumored selection of Sarah Bloom Raskin, a former Fed Board member, and deputy Treasury Secretary, as Vice-Chair for Supervision, would go far towards this end.

But apart from the question of how much Biden can shift the Fed’s regulatory orientation, there is also the question of its relative importance. There has been a tendency to overstate the importance of regulation because many people believe that it was regulatory failures that led to the Great Recession, as opposed to the Fed’s ignoring a housing bubble that was driving the economy.

The distinction is important because the issue here was a huge bubble not bad regulation per se. Bubbles are not necessarily the result of regulatory failures. The 1990s stock bubble, whose collapse gave us a recession in 2001, and the longest period without job growth since the Great Depression (until the Great Recession), was not the result of any obvious regulatory failure.

As Alan Greenspan famously commented at the time, the bubble was the result of “irrational exuberance,” the widely held belief that stock prices would always rise and that investing in the market carried little or no risk. The bubble made it easier to hide financial fraud of various types, such as the Enron or WorldCom scams, but it was not driven in any important way by these scams.

Fraudulent loans and their securitization did play a more important role in the housing bubble, but it was really only necessary to see the bubble, which was pretty much impossible to miss than to see the financial edifice that was helping it to grow. Although as a practical matter, when mortgage issuers were boasting about their negative amortization loans, it wasn’t too easy to miss the bad loans either.

The point here is that we will not see another recession because the Fed was failing to monitor the books of a future AIG or ignoring fraudulent loans in a major sector of the economy. We got the Great Recession because the Fed ignored a huge housing bubble that was driving the economy. Seeing that bubble didn’t require a regulatory microscope, all that was needed was someone who paid attention to the quarterly GDP data and could examine the fundamentals in the housing market, which was clearly driving the economy from 2002 to 2007.    

Financial Regulation is Important

Having said this, I would argue it is still important to keep a tight leash on the financial sector, for three reasons. First, the financial industry is a major source of inefficiency in the economy. Finance is an intermediate good like trucking. We need it to allocate capital and make payments, just as we need trucking to get goods from one place to another, but unlike items like health care or housing, it does not directly provide benefits to people.

For this reason, an efficient financial sector is a small financial sector. Unfortunately, the financial sector has exploded as a share of the economy in the last half century. The narrow securities and commodities trading sector has nearly quintupled relative to the size of the economy over this period. This would be comparable to a situation where we needed five times as many trucks and drivers, relative to the size of the economy, as we did in 1971.

If we had something to show for the explosion of the financial sector, say in better capital allocation or more secure savings, then perhaps we could justify the increase in its size. But, it would be very hard to make that case. Instead, we have people working in finance who could be productively employed in health care, construction, or other sectors that actually provide goods and services that people value.

The second reason that we need to have tighter regulation of finance is that it is a major source of inequality. Many of the richest people in the country got their wealth from running hedge funds, private equity funds, or other financial institutions.

There is at least an argument for extreme wealth when it is associated with important innovations that benefit society, like electric cars or an efficient on-line retail system. There is not much of a case when the wealth comes from financial engineering that left workers, landlords, and/or other investors worse off.

The last reason why it is important to regulate finance is that unregulated finance will often turn to predatory practices that prey on lower income households, and especially Blacks and Hispanics. A well-educated lawyer or accountant, who devotes themselves to the task, can find ways to design deceptive contracts that will take advantage of their customers. If we greenlight such practices, effectively allowing people to make large amounts of money by ripping off their customers, then we can be very sure that many people will go into the business of ripping off customers.

We need the government to limit abusive practices in the financial sector. As Senator Elizabeth Warren famously argued in her push to get the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established, we wouldn’t let a company sell toasters that blow up in people’s kitchens, we shouldn’t let financial institutions sell products that blow up in the faces of the people who buy them.

The Net Story on Financial Regulation and the Fed

Having argued the case for the importance of regulating finance (see also Rigged chapter 4 [it’s free]), let me say that I still see it as very much a secondary consideration in the selection of the Fed chair. First, the Fed’s ability to control the amount of employment in the economy, through its monetary policy, is incredibly important in determining the economic well-being of tens of millions of people, especially those who are disadvantaged in the labor market and society.

Second, we have other regulatory bodies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Comptroller of the Currency, and several more. Good appointees at these agencies can go far towards ensuring that the financial system is well-regulated.

Finally, if Biden makes good picks for the currently vacant position at the Fed and for the Vice-Chair for Supervision, and the spot that will open up in the winter, he can likely change the Fed’s course on regulation.

But at the end of the day, it’s hard to see the Fed’s regulatory stance as being anywhere close in importance to its position on monetary policy. Firing Powell because he has not been good on regulation would be like dumping the great pitcher Bob Gibson from the team because he wasn’t a good base runner.

We need a Fed that is firmly committed to full employment. For the first time in seventy years, we have that with Jerome Powell. Biden would be taking a huge risk by going with a different chair.[1]

[1] It is also worth mentioning that Powell, unlike almost anyone else should have an easy confirmation. Many Republican senators will almost certainly vote for him. After all, he was picked originally as chair by Trump. (Obama appointed him as a Fed board member.) It is very possible that any other Biden pick will face 50 no votes from Republican senators. That means that Biden would need to make sure that Manchin, Sinema, and other centrists were on board. These centrists would then effectively have veto power over the success of Biden’s presidency.    

Most progressives who have been pressuring the Fed to be more supportive of full employment, and less concerned about inflation, would be very happy to see Powell reappointed as Fed chair. He has led the Fed in a complete reversal of its priorities. He shifted it away from its obsession with inflation, which often meant raising rates and throwing people out of work, even when there was no clear evidence of accelerating. Instead, he wants the Fed to target full employment and only raise rates once we see the sort of unemployment rates we had before the pandemic.

This is hugely important, not only because it can mean that millions of additional workers get jobs, but also because high unemployment has been a major factor contributing to inequality over the last four decades. When the unemployment rate rises, it is disproportionately the most disadvantaged workers who lose their jobs. This means Blacks and Hispanics, workers without a high school degree, disabled workers, and workers with a criminal record.

Not only does a rise in the unemployment rate prevent these workers from getting jobs, it also puts downward pressure on the pay of workers at the bottom of the wage ladder. When we have sustained periods of low unemployment, such as the late 1990s and the four years before the pandemic, workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution were able to secure pay increases that outpaced inflation, and those at the tenth percentile saw the largest gains.

For these reasons, progressive economists who have been pushing the Fed to pay more attention to full employment have been very happy with Powell’s reversal of past Fed policy. However, some progressives have objected to Powell because he has supported the weakening of the regulations that were put in place by the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill.

Powell’s record on regulation is bad, and this is a problem. However, the Fed’s policy on regulation can likely be shifted by appointing new members who are committed to a stronger regulatory framework. The rumored selection of Sarah Bloom Raskin, a former Fed Board member, and deputy Treasury Secretary, as Vice-Chair for Supervision, would go far towards this end.

But apart from the question of how much Biden can shift the Fed’s regulatory orientation, there is also the question of its relative importance. There has been a tendency to overstate the importance of regulation because many people believe that it was regulatory failures that led to the Great Recession, as opposed to the Fed’s ignoring a housing bubble that was driving the economy.

The distinction is important because the issue here was a huge bubble not bad regulation per se. Bubbles are not necessarily the result of regulatory failures. The 1990s stock bubble, whose collapse gave us a recession in 2001, and the longest period without job growth since the Great Depression (until the Great Recession), was not the result of any obvious regulatory failure.

As Alan Greenspan famously commented at the time, the bubble was the result of “irrational exuberance,” the widely held belief that stock prices would always rise and that investing in the market carried little or no risk. The bubble made it easier to hide financial fraud of various types, such as the Enron or WorldCom scams, but it was not driven in any important way by these scams.

Fraudulent loans and their securitization did play a more important role in the housing bubble, but it was really only necessary to see the bubble, which was pretty much impossible to miss than to see the financial edifice that was helping it to grow. Although as a practical matter, when mortgage issuers were boasting about their negative amortization loans, it wasn’t too easy to miss the bad loans either.

The point here is that we will not see another recession because the Fed was failing to monitor the books of a future AIG or ignoring fraudulent loans in a major sector of the economy. We got the Great Recession because the Fed ignored a huge housing bubble that was driving the economy. Seeing that bubble didn’t require a regulatory microscope, all that was needed was someone who paid attention to the quarterly GDP data and could examine the fundamentals in the housing market, which was clearly driving the economy from 2002 to 2007.    

Financial Regulation is Important

Having said this, I would argue it is still important to keep a tight leash on the financial sector, for three reasons. First, the financial industry is a major source of inefficiency in the economy. Finance is an intermediate good like trucking. We need it to allocate capital and make payments, just as we need trucking to get goods from one place to another, but unlike items like health care or housing, it does not directly provide benefits to people.

For this reason, an efficient financial sector is a small financial sector. Unfortunately, the financial sector has exploded as a share of the economy in the last half century. The narrow securities and commodities trading sector has nearly quintupled relative to the size of the economy over this period. This would be comparable to a situation where we needed five times as many trucks and drivers, relative to the size of the economy, as we did in 1971.

If we had something to show for the explosion of the financial sector, say in better capital allocation or more secure savings, then perhaps we could justify the increase in its size. But, it would be very hard to make that case. Instead, we have people working in finance who could be productively employed in health care, construction, or other sectors that actually provide goods and services that people value.

The second reason that we need to have tighter regulation of finance is that it is a major source of inequality. Many of the richest people in the country got their wealth from running hedge funds, private equity funds, or other financial institutions.

There is at least an argument for extreme wealth when it is associated with important innovations that benefit society, like electric cars or an efficient on-line retail system. There is not much of a case when the wealth comes from financial engineering that left workers, landlords, and/or other investors worse off.

The last reason why it is important to regulate finance is that unregulated finance will often turn to predatory practices that prey on lower income households, and especially Blacks and Hispanics. A well-educated lawyer or accountant, who devotes themselves to the task, can find ways to design deceptive contracts that will take advantage of their customers. If we greenlight such practices, effectively allowing people to make large amounts of money by ripping off their customers, then we can be very sure that many people will go into the business of ripping off customers.

We need the government to limit abusive practices in the financial sector. As Senator Elizabeth Warren famously argued in her push to get the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established, we wouldn’t let a company sell toasters that blow up in people’s kitchens, we shouldn’t let financial institutions sell products that blow up in the faces of the people who buy them.

The Net Story on Financial Regulation and the Fed

Having argued the case for the importance of regulating finance (see also Rigged chapter 4 [it’s free]), let me say that I still see it as very much a secondary consideration in the selection of the Fed chair. First, the Fed’s ability to control the amount of employment in the economy, through its monetary policy, is incredibly important in determining the economic well-being of tens of millions of people, especially those who are disadvantaged in the labor market and society.

Second, we have other regulatory bodies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Comptroller of the Currency, and several more. Good appointees at these agencies can go far towards ensuring that the financial system is well-regulated.

Finally, if Biden makes good picks for the currently vacant position at the Fed and for the Vice-Chair for Supervision, and the spot that will open up in the winter, he can likely change the Fed’s course on regulation.

But at the end of the day, it’s hard to see the Fed’s regulatory stance as being anywhere close in importance to its position on monetary policy. Firing Powell because he has not been good on regulation would be like dumping the great pitcher Bob Gibson from the team because he wasn’t a good base runner.

We need a Fed that is firmly committed to full employment. For the first time in seventy years, we have that with Jerome Powell. Biden would be taking a huge risk by going with a different chair.[1]

[1] It is also worth mentioning that Powell, unlike almost anyone else should have an easy confirmation. Many Republican senators will almost certainly vote for him. After all, he was picked originally as chair by Trump. (Obama appointed him as a Fed board member.) It is very possible that any other Biden pick will face 50 no votes from Republican senators. That means that Biden would need to make sure that Manchin, Sinema, and other centrists were on board. These centrists would then effectively have veto power over the success of Biden’s presidency.    

The explosion of coronavirus infections across the country, and especially in the low vaccination states in the South, is really bad news. While it appeared that the pandemic was coming under control and no longer posed a major health risk in early July, we are now seeing rates of infections of close to 150,000 a day.

The hardest hit states, like Louisiana and Mississippi are seeing daily infection numbers that far exceed the worst days of the winter. Intensive care units are filled to capacity, which not only prevents many people infected with Covid from receiving adequate care, but also victims of car crashes and others in need of immediate care. This is quite a turnaround from where we were a month and half ago.

But we can tell a better story about future prospects. We know that our vaccines are not as effective against the Delta variant in preventing infections, but they still seem to be quite effective in preventing serious illness and death. This story is well-demonstrated by the situation in Denmark.

Denmark ranks near the top in the share of its population that is vaccinated. As of August 21, 75.4 percent of its population had received at least one shot and 69.0 percent were fully vaccinated. These numbers refer to percentages of its whole population, so the share of the population over 12 that has received at least one shot is close to 90 percent.

By comparison, the shares for the same day in the United States were 60.2 percent of the whole population receiving at least one shot and 51.0 percent being fully vaccinated. Getting another 15.2 percent of the currently eligible population vaccinated in the United States would mean giving the shots to over 42 million people.

We are current giving out more than 800,000 shots a day, most of which are mRNA vaccines which require two doses. If we assume this translates into roughly 450,000 new people getting shots each day, it would take us a bit over 90 days, or three months to hit Denmark’s vaccination rates. So, hitting Danish rates of vaccination should not be seen as impossible, although if the active resisters can successfully press their case, we may not be able to sustain the current rate of vaccination.

But we can still look to the situation in Denmark as a guidepost. The country actually still has a fairly high rate of infection. It has been averaging roughly 970 cases a day. Denmark’s population is just over 5.8 million, or 1.7 percent the size of the U.S. population. This means that Denmark’s current rate of infections would be equivalent to a bit less than 56,000 a day in the United States. That is less than half of our current rate, but close to three times the lows hit in July.

There is one important qualification to Denmark’s reported infection rate. They do an enormous amount of testing in Denmark. They have given an average of 13.7 tests per person since the pandemic began. By comparison, the United States has given just 1.7 tests per person. This means that the reported number of infections in Denmark is likely very close to the actual number. By comparison, the positive rate on tests in the United States is over 11 percent, which means that we are missing a large number of new infections.  

So clearly Denmark has a far lower rate of infections than the United States, although it is still seeing a substantial spread of the pandemic. But the bigger difference between the United States and Denmark is not in the number of infections, but rather than number of deaths and seriously ill people. Denmark has been averaging just one death a day, which would be the equivalent of fewer than 60 a day in the United States. That compares to an average of more than 800 a day in the United States, a figure that has been rising. While every death is a tragedy, Denmark’s current death rate from Covid is considerably lower than what we would see from flu in a typical year.

Of course, many people who don’t die from Covid will suffer serious symptoms, some of which may be long lasting. We can’t know yet how many people who develop Covid will suffer severe or continuing symptoms, but rates of hospitalization should be a good proxy. Denmark currently has 20 people classified as being in serious or critical condition from Covid. That would be equivalent to roughly 1,400 people in the United States.

We currently have almost 23,000 people in intensive care due to Covid in the United States and of course these cases are disproportionately in the low vaccination states in the South. Denmark’s rate of Covid-related hospitalization would not be overwhelming hospitals and requiring health care workers to work themselves to the point of exhaustion.

In short, the situation with Covid in Denmark is not one where the disease has been eradicated. They are still seeing large numbers of infections. But it has become a very manageable disease, not one that most people need to fear and certainly not the sort of pandemic which would lead to large-scale economic shutdowns.

We should see this as an encouraging picture. If the nonsense coming from the vaccine resisters can be effectively countered, we should be able to reach vaccination rates comparable to Denmark’s in the not distant future. Some high vaccination states, such Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts, are not very far from reaching the vaccination rates seen in Denmark.

This means that bringing the pandemic back under control is still very much a reachable target. We just need to maintain a high rate of daily vaccinations and we will get there soon. And, ideally get people to wear masks and maintain social distancing in the areas where infection rates are still high, until we can substantially increase the vaccination rate in those places.

Covid may be with us for a while, but it need not be a dreaded disease and pose a major threat to the economy.

The explosion of coronavirus infections across the country, and especially in the low vaccination states in the South, is really bad news. While it appeared that the pandemic was coming under control and no longer posed a major health risk in early July, we are now seeing rates of infections of close to 150,000 a day.

The hardest hit states, like Louisiana and Mississippi are seeing daily infection numbers that far exceed the worst days of the winter. Intensive care units are filled to capacity, which not only prevents many people infected with Covid from receiving adequate care, but also victims of car crashes and others in need of immediate care. This is quite a turnaround from where we were a month and half ago.

But we can tell a better story about future prospects. We know that our vaccines are not as effective against the Delta variant in preventing infections, but they still seem to be quite effective in preventing serious illness and death. This story is well-demonstrated by the situation in Denmark.

Denmark ranks near the top in the share of its population that is vaccinated. As of August 21, 75.4 percent of its population had received at least one shot and 69.0 percent were fully vaccinated. These numbers refer to percentages of its whole population, so the share of the population over 12 that has received at least one shot is close to 90 percent.

By comparison, the shares for the same day in the United States were 60.2 percent of the whole population receiving at least one shot and 51.0 percent being fully vaccinated. Getting another 15.2 percent of the currently eligible population vaccinated in the United States would mean giving the shots to over 42 million people.

We are current giving out more than 800,000 shots a day, most of which are mRNA vaccines which require two doses. If we assume this translates into roughly 450,000 new people getting shots each day, it would take us a bit over 90 days, or three months to hit Denmark’s vaccination rates. So, hitting Danish rates of vaccination should not be seen as impossible, although if the active resisters can successfully press their case, we may not be able to sustain the current rate of vaccination.

But we can still look to the situation in Denmark as a guidepost. The country actually still has a fairly high rate of infection. It has been averaging roughly 970 cases a day. Denmark’s population is just over 5.8 million, or 1.7 percent the size of the U.S. population. This means that Denmark’s current rate of infections would be equivalent to a bit less than 56,000 a day in the United States. That is less than half of our current rate, but close to three times the lows hit in July.

There is one important qualification to Denmark’s reported infection rate. They do an enormous amount of testing in Denmark. They have given an average of 13.7 tests per person since the pandemic began. By comparison, the United States has given just 1.7 tests per person. This means that the reported number of infections in Denmark is likely very close to the actual number. By comparison, the positive rate on tests in the United States is over 11 percent, which means that we are missing a large number of new infections.  

So clearly Denmark has a far lower rate of infections than the United States, although it is still seeing a substantial spread of the pandemic. But the bigger difference between the United States and Denmark is not in the number of infections, but rather than number of deaths and seriously ill people. Denmark has been averaging just one death a day, which would be the equivalent of fewer than 60 a day in the United States. That compares to an average of more than 800 a day in the United States, a figure that has been rising. While every death is a tragedy, Denmark’s current death rate from Covid is considerably lower than what we would see from flu in a typical year.

Of course, many people who don’t die from Covid will suffer serious symptoms, some of which may be long lasting. We can’t know yet how many people who develop Covid will suffer severe or continuing symptoms, but rates of hospitalization should be a good proxy. Denmark currently has 20 people classified as being in serious or critical condition from Covid. That would be equivalent to roughly 1,400 people in the United States.

We currently have almost 23,000 people in intensive care due to Covid in the United States and of course these cases are disproportionately in the low vaccination states in the South. Denmark’s rate of Covid-related hospitalization would not be overwhelming hospitals and requiring health care workers to work themselves to the point of exhaustion.

In short, the situation with Covid in Denmark is not one where the disease has been eradicated. They are still seeing large numbers of infections. But it has become a very manageable disease, not one that most people need to fear and certainly not the sort of pandemic which would lead to large-scale economic shutdowns.

We should see this as an encouraging picture. If the nonsense coming from the vaccine resisters can be effectively countered, we should be able to reach vaccination rates comparable to Denmark’s in the not distant future. Some high vaccination states, such Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts, are not very far from reaching the vaccination rates seen in Denmark.

This means that bringing the pandemic back under control is still very much a reachable target. We just need to maintain a high rate of daily vaccinations and we will get there soon. And, ideally get people to wear masks and maintain social distancing in the areas where infection rates are still high, until we can substantially increase the vaccination rate in those places.

Covid may be with us for a while, but it need not be a dreaded disease and pose a major threat to the economy.

That may sound pretty crazy, but that’s roughly what the minimum wage would be today if it had kept pace with productivity growth since its value peaked in 1968. And, having the minimum wage track productivity growth is not a crazy idea. The national minimum wage did in fact keep pace with productivity growth for the first 30 years after a national minimum wage first came into existence in 1938. Furthermore, a minimum wage that grew in step with the rapid rises in productivity in these decades did not lead to mass unemployment. The year-round average for the unemployment rate in 1968 was 3.6 percent, a lower average than for any year in the last half century.
 

 

The $26 an Hour World

Think of what the country would look like if the lowest paying jobs, think of dishwashers or custodians, paid $26 an hour. That would mean someone who worked a 2000 hour year would have an annual income of $52,000. This income would put a single mother with two kids at well over twice the poverty level.

And, this is just for starting wages. Presumably workers would see their pay increase above the minimum as they stayed at their job for a number of years and ideally were promoted to better paying positions. If we assume that after 10 or 15 years their pay had risen by 20 percent, then these workers at the bottom of the pay ladder would be getting more than $60,000 a year.

While that is hardly a luxurious standard of living, it is certainly enough to support a middle-class lifestyle. For a two-earner couple this would be $120,000 a year. Imagine this is what people at the very bottom of the labor force could reasonably expect when they are in their thirties and forties.

Don’t Try This at Home

The $26 an hour is useful as a thought experiment for envisioning what the world might look like today, but it would not be realistic as policy for local, state, or even national minimum wage without many other changes to the economy. A minimum wage this high would almost certainly lead to large-scale unemployment, and that would be true even if it were phased in over five or six years.

The problem is that we have made many changes to the economy that shifted huge amounts of income upward, so that we cannot support a pay structure that gives workers at the bottom $52,000 a year. This is the whole point of my book, Rigged [it’s free], we have restructured the economy in ways that ensure a disproportionate share of income goes to those at the top. If the bottom half or 80 percent of the workforce got the same share they got 50 years ago, we would have an enormous problem with inflation.  

Just to quickly run through the short list, we can start with my favorites, government-granted patent and copyright monopolies. Items like drugs, medical equipment, and computer software, which would all be relatively cheap in a free market, instead cost us huge amounts of money because of these monopolies. In the case of prescription drugs alone, patent monopolies and related protections may add more than $400 billion a year (roughly $3,000 per family) to our annual bill. In total, the cost from these protections can easily exceed $1 trillion a year (almost $8,000 per family).

And the beneficiaries from patent and copyright monopolies are overwhelming those at the top end of the income distribution. Many workers in the tech sector make high six or even seven figure salaries. Lucky winners can walk away with tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars because of these government-granted monopolies. Bill Gates would probably still be working for a living if the government was not prepared to arrest anyone who made copies of Microsoft software without his permission.

And yes, there are other ways to finance creative work and innovation. We can pay people, sort of like we do with just about every other task in the economy. (Read chapter 5 of Rigged.)

Next, we have corporate governance. The story here is that we have tens, or even hundreds, of millions of dollars going to CEOs, who don’t produce value anywhere close to this amount. This is not a moral judgement about the worth of the CEO. The point is that in almost all cases it would be possible to pay a person $2 or $3 million who would produce as much shareholder value as a CEO getting $20 million.   

The reason we don’t see downward pressure on CEO pay is that the corporate boards that most immediately determine CEO pay are largely selected by the CEO and other top management. They have no incentive to lower CEO pay. From their vantage point, there is no downside to grossly inflated CEO pay (it’s not their money), and there is no reason to risk antagonizing other board members by suggesting that their friend the CEO gets too much money.

Bloated CEO pay matters not only for the relatively small number of people who run major companies, but also for its impact on pay scales for those near the top. If the CEO gets $20 million, the chief financial officer may get $10-$12 million. And third tier execs may get $1-$2 million. [1]

The picture would look very different if CEOs got paid $2-$3 million, as would be the case if we had the same pay ratios between CEOs and ordinary workers as in the 1960s.  In that case, the third-tier executives would probably be looking at mid or high six figure salaries, not millions of dollars a year.

The financial sector is another place where we structure the economy to give large sums to a small number of rich people. We have created a tax and regulatory structure that allows some people to get incredibly rich by making little or no contribution to the productive economy. For example, it would be hugely more efficient if we all had digital bank accounts with the Fed, from which we could make all our payments and where we could receive our monthly paycheck and other income, at virtually zero cost.

The most obvious reason that we don’t have such a system is that it would deprive the banking industry of tens of billions in annual fees. There is no reason that we should not have a modest financial transactions tax along the lines of the 0.1 percent tax proposed by Senator Schatz. (Most other sectors have sales taxes, which are far higher.)  We can also make it difficult for public pension funds to hand billions in fees to private equity partners who do not produce higher returns. The same applies to private universities who seem to like having friends make millions off their endowments while losing the university money.

And, we have our doctors and other highly paid professionals, who make more than twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries because we protect them from competition, both foreign and domestic. If we paid our doctors the same as doctors in Germany or France, it would save us close to $100 billion annually, or roughly $750 per family. If we subjected all our highly paid professions to the same sort of competition as our auto and textile workers, the savings could be twice as high.

Bottom Line: These Huge Welfare Checks Make a $26 an Hour Minimum Wage Impossible

To see how the bloated incomes for those at the top, make it impossible for those in the middle and bottom to get decent pay, imagine that the high-end incomes came in the form of government checks. Instead of Bill Gates getting his billions from Microsoft’s patent and copyright monopolies, suppose their software sold at free market prices, but the government sent him billions of dollars each year to allow him to accumulate his current fortune.

Suppose we did the same with the pharmaceutical industry, sending top executives tens of billions annually, as all drugs were now being sold as cheap generics. And, the government paid out tens or hundreds of millions of dollars each year to private equity and hedge fund partners and other big winners in finance.

If we added this up, we would be increasing government spending on the order of $1-2 trillion annually, or $10 to $20 trillion over a 10-year budget horizon. If we did not offset this burst of spending on the country’s richest people with some serious tax increases, we would be looking at very real problems with inflation — too much money chasing too few goods and services, to take the classic storyline.

But, we did effectively have tax increases. We made the government’s labor policy far more hostile to unions, radically reducing the unionized share of the workforce, as well as reducing the power of those who are organized. We also subjected our manufacturing workers to direct competition with the lowest paid workers around the world, putting serious downward pressure on what had been a relatively privileged segment of the labor market.

And, we removed the link between productivity and the minimum wage. Not only did the federal minimum wage not keep pace with productivity growth, it did not even keep pace with inflation. A person working at the minimum wage today is getting substantial lower pay than a worker did 53 years ago in 1968.

It would be a great story if we could reestablish the link between the minimum wage and productivity and make up the ground lost over the last half century. But we have to make many other changes in the economy to make this possible. These changes are well worth making.     

[1] It’s amazing that many people can complain about share buybacks being used to manipulate the markets and thereby increase the value of top management’s options, without recognizing that this is a story of management ripping off shareholders. If shareholders want top management to have more money, they could just pay them more money, they don’t have to force them to commit stock fraud to increase their pay checks.

That may sound pretty crazy, but that’s roughly what the minimum wage would be today if it had kept pace with productivity growth since its value peaked in 1968. And, having the minimum wage track productivity growth is not a crazy idea. The national minimum wage did in fact keep pace with productivity growth for the first 30 years after a national minimum wage first came into existence in 1938. Furthermore, a minimum wage that grew in step with the rapid rises in productivity in these decades did not lead to mass unemployment. The year-round average for the unemployment rate in 1968 was 3.6 percent, a lower average than for any year in the last half century.
 

 

The $26 an Hour World

Think of what the country would look like if the lowest paying jobs, think of dishwashers or custodians, paid $26 an hour. That would mean someone who worked a 2000 hour year would have an annual income of $52,000. This income would put a single mother with two kids at well over twice the poverty level.

And, this is just for starting wages. Presumably workers would see their pay increase above the minimum as they stayed at their job for a number of years and ideally were promoted to better paying positions. If we assume that after 10 or 15 years their pay had risen by 20 percent, then these workers at the bottom of the pay ladder would be getting more than $60,000 a year.

While that is hardly a luxurious standard of living, it is certainly enough to support a middle-class lifestyle. For a two-earner couple this would be $120,000 a year. Imagine this is what people at the very bottom of the labor force could reasonably expect when they are in their thirties and forties.

Don’t Try This at Home

The $26 an hour is useful as a thought experiment for envisioning what the world might look like today, but it would not be realistic as policy for local, state, or even national minimum wage without many other changes to the economy. A minimum wage this high would almost certainly lead to large-scale unemployment, and that would be true even if it were phased in over five or six years.

The problem is that we have made many changes to the economy that shifted huge amounts of income upward, so that we cannot support a pay structure that gives workers at the bottom $52,000 a year. This is the whole point of my book, Rigged [it’s free], we have restructured the economy in ways that ensure a disproportionate share of income goes to those at the top. If the bottom half or 80 percent of the workforce got the same share they got 50 years ago, we would have an enormous problem with inflation.  

Just to quickly run through the short list, we can start with my favorites, government-granted patent and copyright monopolies. Items like drugs, medical equipment, and computer software, which would all be relatively cheap in a free market, instead cost us huge amounts of money because of these monopolies. In the case of prescription drugs alone, patent monopolies and related protections may add more than $400 billion a year (roughly $3,000 per family) to our annual bill. In total, the cost from these protections can easily exceed $1 trillion a year (almost $8,000 per family).

And the beneficiaries from patent and copyright monopolies are overwhelming those at the top end of the income distribution. Many workers in the tech sector make high six or even seven figure salaries. Lucky winners can walk away with tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars because of these government-granted monopolies. Bill Gates would probably still be working for a living if the government was not prepared to arrest anyone who made copies of Microsoft software without his permission.

And yes, there are other ways to finance creative work and innovation. We can pay people, sort of like we do with just about every other task in the economy. (Read chapter 5 of Rigged.)

Next, we have corporate governance. The story here is that we have tens, or even hundreds, of millions of dollars going to CEOs, who don’t produce value anywhere close to this amount. This is not a moral judgement about the worth of the CEO. The point is that in almost all cases it would be possible to pay a person $2 or $3 million who would produce as much shareholder value as a CEO getting $20 million.   

The reason we don’t see downward pressure on CEO pay is that the corporate boards that most immediately determine CEO pay are largely selected by the CEO and other top management. They have no incentive to lower CEO pay. From their vantage point, there is no downside to grossly inflated CEO pay (it’s not their money), and there is no reason to risk antagonizing other board members by suggesting that their friend the CEO gets too much money.

Bloated CEO pay matters not only for the relatively small number of people who run major companies, but also for its impact on pay scales for those near the top. If the CEO gets $20 million, the chief financial officer may get $10-$12 million. And third tier execs may get $1-$2 million. [1]

The picture would look very different if CEOs got paid $2-$3 million, as would be the case if we had the same pay ratios between CEOs and ordinary workers as in the 1960s.  In that case, the third-tier executives would probably be looking at mid or high six figure salaries, not millions of dollars a year.

The financial sector is another place where we structure the economy to give large sums to a small number of rich people. We have created a tax and regulatory structure that allows some people to get incredibly rich by making little or no contribution to the productive economy. For example, it would be hugely more efficient if we all had digital bank accounts with the Fed, from which we could make all our payments and where we could receive our monthly paycheck and other income, at virtually zero cost.

The most obvious reason that we don’t have such a system is that it would deprive the banking industry of tens of billions in annual fees. There is no reason that we should not have a modest financial transactions tax along the lines of the 0.1 percent tax proposed by Senator Schatz. (Most other sectors have sales taxes, which are far higher.)  We can also make it difficult for public pension funds to hand billions in fees to private equity partners who do not produce higher returns. The same applies to private universities who seem to like having friends make millions off their endowments while losing the university money.

And, we have our doctors and other highly paid professionals, who make more than twice as much as their counterparts in other wealthy countries because we protect them from competition, both foreign and domestic. If we paid our doctors the same as doctors in Germany or France, it would save us close to $100 billion annually, or roughly $750 per family. If we subjected all our highly paid professions to the same sort of competition as our auto and textile workers, the savings could be twice as high.

Bottom Line: These Huge Welfare Checks Make a $26 an Hour Minimum Wage Impossible

To see how the bloated incomes for those at the top, make it impossible for those in the middle and bottom to get decent pay, imagine that the high-end incomes came in the form of government checks. Instead of Bill Gates getting his billions from Microsoft’s patent and copyright monopolies, suppose their software sold at free market prices, but the government sent him billions of dollars each year to allow him to accumulate his current fortune.

Suppose we did the same with the pharmaceutical industry, sending top executives tens of billions annually, as all drugs were now being sold as cheap generics. And, the government paid out tens or hundreds of millions of dollars each year to private equity and hedge fund partners and other big winners in finance.

If we added this up, we would be increasing government spending on the order of $1-2 trillion annually, or $10 to $20 trillion over a 10-year budget horizon. If we did not offset this burst of spending on the country’s richest people with some serious tax increases, we would be looking at very real problems with inflation — too much money chasing too few goods and services, to take the classic storyline.

But, we did effectively have tax increases. We made the government’s labor policy far more hostile to unions, radically reducing the unionized share of the workforce, as well as reducing the power of those who are organized. We also subjected our manufacturing workers to direct competition with the lowest paid workers around the world, putting serious downward pressure on what had been a relatively privileged segment of the labor market.

And, we removed the link between productivity and the minimum wage. Not only did the federal minimum wage not keep pace with productivity growth, it did not even keep pace with inflation. A person working at the minimum wage today is getting substantial lower pay than a worker did 53 years ago in 1968.

It would be a great story if we could reestablish the link between the minimum wage and productivity and make up the ground lost over the last half century. But we have to make many other changes in the economy to make this possible. These changes are well worth making.     

[1] It’s amazing that many people can complain about share buybacks being used to manipulate the markets and thereby increase the value of top management’s options, without recognizing that this is a story of management ripping off shareholders. If shareholders want top management to have more money, they could just pay them more money, they don’t have to force them to commit stock fraud to increase their pay checks.

With the economy facing substantial bottlenecks, and the continuing spread of the pandemic, it is worth taking a quick look at how lower paid workers have been faring. Nominal wages have been rising rapidly for workers at the bottom of the pay ladder in recent months. This has allowed workers in the lowest paying jobs to see substantial increases in real wages, in spite of the uptick in inflation the last few months.

Here’s the picture in retail for production and non-supervisory workers. Note that real wages were actually somewhat lower in 2018 than they had been in 2002. (These numbers are 1982-1984 dollars, so multiply by about 2.6 to get current dollars.) They did rise in 2018 and 2019, due to a tightening of the labor market, as well as minimum wage hikes at the state and local  level. The impact of the pandemic and the recovery has been a big net positive. Real wages in the sector are roughly 4.6 percent higher than the level of two years ago, a 2.3 percent annual real wage gain.

Average Hourly Earnings for Production and non-Supervisory Workers in Retail , 1982-84 dollars 

 

 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The story looks even better in the hotel and restaurant sector. Real wages had been rising fairly consistently since 2014, but growth has picked up in the pandemic and recovery. Real wages are now 6.3 percent above their level of two years ago, an average annual increase of 3.2 percent. This rate of increase is not likely to continue, but so far workers in this sector have been seeing extraordinary wage gains.

Average Hourly Earnings for Production and non-Supervisory Workers in Leisure and Hospitality , 1982-84 dollars

With the economy facing substantial bottlenecks, and the continuing spread of the pandemic, it is worth taking a quick look at how lower paid workers have been faring. Nominal wages have been rising rapidly for workers at the bottom of the pay ladder in recent months. This has allowed workers in the lowest paying jobs to see substantial increases in real wages, in spite of the uptick in inflation the last few months.

Here’s the picture in retail for production and non-supervisory workers. Note that real wages were actually somewhat lower in 2018 than they had been in 2002. (These numbers are 1982-1984 dollars, so multiply by about 2.6 to get current dollars.) They did rise in 2018 and 2019, due to a tightening of the labor market, as well as minimum wage hikes at the state and local  level. The impact of the pandemic and the recovery has been a big net positive. Real wages in the sector are roughly 4.6 percent higher than the level of two years ago, a 2.3 percent annual real wage gain.

Average Hourly Earnings for Production and non-Supervisory Workers in Retail , 1982-84 dollars 

 

 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The story looks even better in the hotel and restaurant sector. Real wages had been rising fairly consistently since 2014, but growth has picked up in the pandemic and recovery. Real wages are now 6.3 percent above their level of two years ago, an average annual increase of 3.2 percent. This rate of increase is not likely to continue, but so far workers in this sector have been seeing extraordinary wage gains.

Average Hourly Earnings for Production and non-Supervisory Workers in Leisure and Hospitality , 1982-84 dollars

Want to search in the archives?

¿Quieres buscar en los archivos?

Click Here Haga clic aquí